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Abstract: Research generated by Prevent is abundant. The majority of studies focus on the 
delivery of Prevent as a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative but rarely question 
the methodological pretences that underpin its practices. There is however mounting 
pressure from the public sphere and sections of the research community that is casting 
doubt on Prevent’s effectiveness as a policy as well as its potentially harmful effects on the 
vulnerable communities it professes to serve. This qualitative investigation evaluates the 
implementation of Prevent and its statutory duty at the community level, drawing on the 
experiences of Local Authority (LA) Prevent managers, education providers, NGOs with a 
vested interest in Prevent and community advocates and Community Based Organisations 
(CBOs). It utilises the Foucauldian concept of governmentality as an explanatory tool to 
navigate the interplay between the bureaucratic, economic and ideological suppositions 
that facilitate Prevent, whilst also drawing upon Bourdieu’s methodological framework 
regarding the educational field to explore the paradox generated by Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality in practice. This study argues that Prevent is symptomatic of neo- liberal 
mechanisms of power that are primarily focused on generating large scale, quantitative data 
to answer societal questions only smaller, more focused qualitative studies can hope to 
solve. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: 
 
CONTEST, the counter-terrorism strategy currently enforced across the UK is organised 
around four main work streams: ‘PREVENT: to stop people becoming terrorists or 
supporting terrorism; PURSUE: to stop terrorist attacks; PROTECT: to strengthen our 
protection against terrorist attacks and finally PREPARE: To mitigate the impact of a terrorist 
attack (Home Office, 2011: 8).’ This study will focus on the ‘Prevent’ strand of the CONTEST 
framework. PREVENT, as its title suggest, precedes the other three work streams. Its 
purpose is to seek out and neutralise any potential avenues to terrorist activity before they 
are committed. In effect, it is creating a ‘pre-criminal space’ occupied by communities 
deemed at risk (CAGE, 2016, p.12). The policy itself has many detractors, from both the 
public and civic domain. For example, former Chief Superintendent of the Metropolitan 
Police and Chairman of the Association of Muslim Officers Dal Babu described Prevent as a 
‘toxic brand’ in 2016. Furthermore, Dal Babu purports that Prevent is targeting Muslims, 
particularly creating mistrust within the community by offering money ringfenced by the 
Home Office to anti-Islamic organisations such as the Quilliam Foundation 
(https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/09/anti-radicalisation-prevent-strategy-
a-toxic-brand).  
 
Dal Babu’s proclamations of the adverse effects of Prevent are merely one of many that 
populate the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) landscape. The critical discourse 
surrounding Prevent led to the Home Office initiating a review of its practices in late 2019. 
Lord Alex Carlile had originally been tasked with conducting the independent review, where 
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he claimed that the review is an ‘opportunity to take stock of the UK’s strategy to safeguard 
those vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-independent-reviewer-of-prevent-lord-carlile-
has-issued-a-call-for-evidence).’  Lord Carlile’s appointment as the independent reviewer 
was met with condemnation from many sections of civil society because he is a long-time 
proponent of Prevent. Rights Watch UK issued a formal judicial review challenge to the 
Secretary of State because they contend that Carlile cannot act with true jurisprudence 
because he recently sat on the Prevent oversight board and conducted the last review of the 
strategy under the jurisdiction of the Home Office in 2011. They place emphasis on Carlile’s 
focus for the review, which does not question the theoretical underpinnings of the Prevent 
strategy but rather its ‘efficiency’, circumnavigating the human rights concerns of its many 
detractors (https://www.rwuk.org/rights-watch-uk-extends-its-challenge-to-governments-
independent-review-of-prevent-october-2019/). 
 
Following Right Watch UK’s legal challenge, Carlile’s appointment was rescinded by the 
Home Office who launched the recruitment process for a new independent reviewer in April 
2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/recruitment-for-independent-reviewer-of-
prevent-launched). Whether Carlile’s successor will offer any more critical oversight to the 
role remains to be seen. What is illustrated by Carlile’s appointment is the lack of critical 
engagement the Home Office was initially willing to accommodate. This should not really 
come as too much of a surprise. The focus on the efficiency of Prevent as a strategy is a 
process which favours the government’s ability to counter potentially seditious populations 
using its existing bureaucratic mechanisms in order to utilise its preferred ‘art of governance 
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(Foucault, 1991: 88).’ The promotion of the government’s technical efficiency is primarily 
carried out at the behest of the economy, which is the main concern of its security 
apparatus (Foucault, 2014a: 92).  
 
Carlile’s preliminary appointment is the epitome of the ‘technologies of discipline’ of State 
whose core purpose is to safeguard the economy through biopolitical means (Lemke, 2019: 
68). Prevent’s targeted vulnerable communities wellbeing is not, and will never be, its 
primary focus. The factors that make communities vulnerable to hypothetical subversive 
behaviours are not something government has the will or perhaps even the capability to 
comprehend; it is beyond the scope of its governmentality (Foucault, 1991: 88-89). A 
problematic has been presented to the UK government where its practices have faced 
sufficient opposition that threatens the economic order. This thesis investigates security as 
a problematic that is the product of various ‘objective communities’ of expertise under the 
norms of Etat Providence (Beck, 1992: 46). The Welfare State in the 19th century once 
integrated the pauperised urban working class through policing and education as 
‘technologies of disciple,’ creating class divisions anew (Lemke 2019: 214). At the same time, 
the danger posed by radical Islam for the classical liberal State required a network of 
intelligence officers handling information from native informants, and when these measures 
In the colonies failed, pacification of a more violent kind from the largest standing army in 
the world was carried out (Hevia 2015).  My conclusion is that for Britain today, ‘the 
unstable association of community and market society’ also demands transformations in 
security with ‘politically provocative effects (Beck 1992: 98).’ Where once the State 
apparatuses mobilised security personnel to enforce order and educators to maintain civility 
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in civil society, the contemporary model of governmentality also creates conflicts between 
racial groups, where some are identified as sharing our values of productive citizenship and 
others are marked as countercultural and subversive.  
 
The competing fields of State described by Bourdieu (2014: 4-5) have explanatory value in 
this instance. The ‘objective’ methods of State, the practices of the Prevent managers, 
education providers, the NGOs who wilfully inhabit this domain and the community 
members who have little choice too are all held captive by the symbolic nature of the State 
(Loyal, 2017: 84). It is a symbiotic relationship between the ‘material order’, in this case the 
Prevent statutory duty and the institutions tasked with implementing it and the ideological 
pretences of Britishness that empower their actions (Loyal, 2017: 83). This study pays 
special focus to education as a pathway for Prevent because it is the primary ‘field of 
bureaucracy’ that the UK government’s utilises to ‘legitimate’ and ‘reproduce’ the narrative 
that best suits its aims (Bourdieu, 1994: 11-12). In short, education is a core component of 
what Bourdieu (2014: 4) describes as the ‘administrative state’, where the ‘specific logic of 
the bureaucratic field’ – in this instance the statutory duty and its CVE methodological focus, 
is both generated and reproduced (Bourdieu, 2014: 112). In the first section of this 
introductory chapter, I will provide an overview of Prevent in real terms, how it has been 
conceptualised and in turn how it operates within the UK context.    
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1.1. Background 
 
CONTEST was first developed in 2003 as part of a wider EU initiative to counter violent 
extremism. Originally only designed to be in force over a five-year period, CONTEST and its 
subsidiary parts are almost unchanged from their inception to this day. The EU’s response to 
counter-extremism (CVE) is also practically identical in scope, with the UK’s experience in 
Northern Ireland playing an important role in its design. At the Home Office-sponsored 
counter-terrorism conference held in May 2017 in London, Rob Wainwright, then acting as 
director of Europol described Prevent as the ‘best practice model in Europe’ for fighting 
extremism – something the majority of the international security community agree with 
wholeheartedly  (http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/european-embrace-uk-counter-
extremism-policies-despite-human-rights-concerns-1550167935).   
 
The events of 9/11 focused attention in Westminster, raising CVE as an issue of the utmost 
importance for policy makers. This resulted in a continued effort to centralise the UK’s 
efforts to deal with a newly developed problem within the UK context, the threat of 
domestic terrorism and the rise in extremism on the UK mainland. CONTEST was initially 
devised as a joint effort between the Cabinet Office and law makers in Whitehall in 2002 but 
it quickly transcended the policy making process and was put into action by early 2003 
(Gearson and Rosemont, 2015: 1040).  The next major development came in 2006 when an 
updated version of CONTEST was released to integrate the change in the counter terrorism 
narrative, which realised that the threat of Islamic terrorism had changed to incorporate 
both ‘domestic and international dimensions (HM Government, 2006: 3).’ It was at this 
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point that the strategy devised and implemented the ‘four Ps’: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and 
Prepare (Gearson and Rosemont, 2015:1043).  This structure has not been substantially 
changed for the past 14 years, even though it has seen considerable criticism from its 
inception. Many in the security services, sections of civil society and governmental 
institutions did not believe the Cabinet Office had the expertise or the legitimacy to create 
such a policy (Gearson and Rosemont, 2015:1041).  
 
Although criticism of the effectiveness of CONTEST persists, there is very little to no 
resistance within the political spectrum, with no major parties seemingly having an opinion 
on the issue. The original author of CONTEST, the former U.K. government’s security and 
intelligence coordinator David Omand (2005: 108) states that the lack of criticism from both 
national and local governmental agencies of the strategy is down to the fact that it is spread 
ethereally across agencies and departments and anodyne to existing bureaucratic 
mechanisms. In sum, it becomes another mechanism to adopt within a workstream and not 
a complete transformation of the work each department does.  
 
Foucault (2000: 218) denotes that this corporeality of State, where policy is diffused across a 
multitude of agencies and departments is also manifested within the civil sphere. Private 
enterprises interact with the State through the macro-economies created within the vast 
network of governmental agencies. Entire industries of NGOs have been created with the 
sole purpose of offering services that help government departments streamline their 
practices to facilitate policy such as the Prevent strategy (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015: 234). In 
this instance, Prevent creates a fiscally charged space that NGOs can exploit for financial 
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gain. A participant of this study, working for an international NGO which focuses ‘exclusively 
on counter-extremism’ admits that ‘the reaction of policy-makers at both the national and 
local level’ to CVE is central to the objectives the NGO has at any one time. Of equal 
importance is the NGOs ability to decipher ‘the doctrine of national government policy.’ 
NGOs ensure this by employing personnel with a working background in government. In this 
case the participant was a former Prevent manager who was head hunted by the NGO after 
working with them delivering a project within her local authority (LA).  
  
It is also important to note that within the UK context, the “doctrine” that underpins State 
security apparatus that this particular participant describes is not in any shape or form, new. 
The Northern Ireland example has set much of the precedent of CONTEST. Where it differs 
is in the PREVENT strand. The idea that potential sympathisers to extremist or terrorist 
causes can be intercepted by counter-insurgency operatives is not a novel one. However, 
the methodology and its implementation have been streamlined into governmental 
agencies beyond the scope of the security agencies who historically have control over such 
mechanisms.    
 
The NPCC (National Police Chief’s Council) have developed a four-tiered delivery framework 
to address its obligation to Prevent. This framework is comprised of four tiers (see fig.1). At 
the base of the pyramid or ‘Tier 1’, sits ‘all members of the community’. ‘Tier 2’ consists of 
individuals vulnerable to radicalised ideology. This grouping is seen as a ‘targeted’ subset for 
policing and surveillance. ‘Tier 3’ individuals are those that have adopted a radicalised way 
of thinking or those that are ‘moving towards extremism.’ An ‘interventionist’ approach is 
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adopted by counter-terrorist practitioners to attempt to intercept and divert the flow of 
information produced by persons at ‘Tier 3’ from disseminating to ‘vulnerable’ individuals 
lower down the structure. Finally, ‘Tier 4’ individuals are those ‘actively breaking the law’.  
In such instances, an ‘enforcement’ approach is adopted, and any individuals will be sought, 
arrested, and prosecuted (Staniforth et.al, 2013: 35-37).  
 
Fig.1. NPCC Prevent Framework.  
 
 
The framework put forward by the NPCC has several limitations. The individuals identified as 
‘vulnerable to radicalisation’ are ill defined and do not constitute a tangible demographic or 
community (Christmann, 2012: 11). Furthermore, the framework does not identify the 
reasons of how and why an individual may move from the base of the pyramid (members of 
the wider community) to the extremes of radicalisation and ultimately, to potentially 
commit acts of terrorism (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014: 72). Finally, it interprets the 
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radicalisation process to be linear. In practice the path to committing a terrorist act is 
unique to the individual and thus unpredictable (Spaaij, 2010: 867). Essentially, the four-tier 
delivery approach is systematising counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies on the native 
population of the UK.  
 
The focus on the ‘pacification’ of potential seditious populations by the State is effectively 
its attempt to micro-manage its geographies which are now global in scope. The State is 
forced to ‘rescale’ its efforts from the colonial heartlands that are the traditional 
battlegrounds of the counterinsurgent in order to securitise what it considers to be the 
‘besieged urban homeland (Graham, 2010: 54-55).’  But besieged by whom? There is no 
denying the Orientalist overtures of the contemporary counterinsurgent, focused on 
uncovering the Islamist extremist within the peripheries of the urban landscape, locating  
‘the foreign devil’ within populations made vulnerable by processes indicative of urban 
decay (Said, 2003: 4).  
 
Perhaps the most pertinent question posed by the radicalisation model is defining who 
exactly vulnerable people or communities are in relation to extremism. Using Foucauldian 
reasoning, one could postulate that policing powers would define the vulnerable in this 
instance by first defining ‘legality’, or what is legally acceptable behaviour within the context 
of subversion of the State (Foucault, 2001: 328).  This definition would then be used to 
construct ‘the field of illegality’, a hierarchy of behaviours unacceptable to the State 
(Foucault, 2001: 329). Those in society deemed to exhibit such unacceptable behaviours are 
in turn defined as a risk – or to use Prevent’s terminology, vulnerable (Johnson, 2014: 7). 
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The NPCC Prevent framework found in fig.1. is a prime example of such a typology in 
relation to violent extremism. In this instance police action is medicalising infractions 
against State power. Pariah’s of extremism – or perceived extremism using the definition of 
legality formed using Foucault’s (2001: 328-329) reasoning – are being observed as 
propagating a pathogen that vulnerable groups are susceptible to contracting. Ultimately, 
Prevent and CVE methodology in general is proclaiming to be the vaccination of such 
discourse. What Prevent and CVE discourse cannot accurately do is define vulnerable groups 
beyond shared, mostly benign characteristics with identified extremists. For instance, 
Educate Against Hate (2020), a Department for Education (DfE) run initiative designed to 
equip schools with the tools to spot signs of radicalisation, indicates a young person’s 
susceptibility to extremism extends to being ‘argumentative’, ‘feeling persecuted’, ‘changing 
friend groups’ and ‘changing appearance’, all things young people are guilty of on a regular 
basis, yet very few if any actually commit acts of extremism or violence 
(https://educateagainsthate.com/signs-of-radicalisation/) .        
 
The ‘de-radicalisation’ model employed by Prevent (and the Police and government bodies 
that enact it through such mediums as the Channel Programme, The UKs de-radicalisation 
education programme) is based on a study conducted by psychologists Christopher Dean 
and Monica Lloyd whilst in the employ of the UK government in the National Offender 
Management Service (NOMs). The study produced ’22 ‘factors’ that were used to construct 
a tool called the Extremist Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+) that security and safeguarding 
professionals are obliged to use when administering Prevent to individuals they deem at risk 
(CAGE, 2016: 14).  
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The original study conducted by Dean and Lloyd has not been made available for public 
scrutiny due to its importance to national security, however both researchers have 
produced an article defending the methodology used within the study in 2015.  It is 
important to note that both Dean and Lloyd have identified key weaknesses in their 
research framework. For instance, the study used a very small sample of convicted terrorists 
within the UK prison system that had committed a variety of offences, ranging from 
proliferation of ‘extremist’ material to violent crime. Dean and Lloyd admit that no 
systematic analysis was conducted with any data collated. A basis within the existing 
literature was also not conducted, due to the ‘exploratory’ nature of the study (Dean & 
Lloyd, 2015: 50-51).   
 
Not surprisingly, sections of the academic community surrounding the policy area of 
counter-extremism and race politics have found serious issue with this circumstance.  In 
2016, 140 leading experts within the field – remarkably including Marc Sageman, a 
proponent of ‘de-radicalisation’ discourse and the original creator of the radicalisation 
model which has been modified by the NPCC – have written an open letter to the UK 
government, calling for the original Dean and Lloyd study to be released to enable real 
scientific scrutiny to be conducted (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/sep/29/academics-criticise-prevent-anti-radicalisation-strategy-open-letter). 
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Creating a framework to predict terrorist violence based on a limited psychological 
experiment – or to be more precise the proposed journey one may take to it is obviously 
problematic. Foucault (1982: 220-221) ascertains that the field of psychology is often used 
as a mechanism of government to facilitate the ‘conduct of conduct’ or, using the reasoning 
of the State, to set the limits of freedom of the individual to ensure the freedoms of the 
whole. Lemke (2019: 68) argues that to do this effectively, the State needs to enable 
‘technologies of discipline’ that can provide oversight over the conduct of its citizens – the 
ERG 22+ is one such technology.  
 
Professor Arun Kundnani, working with CAGE (2016: 9) on a report to underline the 
precarities of a science that creates a ‘pre-criminal space’, highlights that the ‘knowledge’ of 
radicalisation has been deliberately constrained by the State. Furthermore, it ignores the 
‘political, social and historical’ reasons that perpetuate acts of terrorism to embody a 
surveillance rationale that makes suspects of law-abiding citizens. Professor David Miller, 
writing in the same report, argues that fundamentally the whole concept of radicalisation is 
inherently flawed. Miller purports that radicalisation theory has ‘no scientific basis’ and is 
‘relentlessly’ perpetuated by a ‘nexus’ of state security and intelligence agencies whose core 
interests are not aligned with true objectivity (CAGE, 2016: 10). The report compiled by 
CAGE (2016: 15) and peer reviewed by eighteen leading academics within related social 
science fields (including Kundnani, Miller, and Stampinitzky to name but a few) have 
outlined five key areas of concern regarding the ERG 22+:  
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 The study conducted by Dean and Lloyd has generated theory that is unproven 
which has then been put into practice.  
 
 The original remit of the study conducted by Dean and Lloyd has been deliberately 
overstretched to create the rationale that underpins the ‘pre-criminal space.’   
 
 Political proliferation of Islamophobic rhetoric as a factor of causation for 
disenchantment within the Muslim communities of the UK has been roundly 
ignored.  
 
 Lack of any evidence to suggest the Dean and Lloyd study went under any credible 
peer review process or that the study met any recognised ethical review standards.  
 
 The initial study has not been repeated or built upon to test the theory that has been 
put into action through the Prevent programme. 
 
In this instance, the relationship between ‘consent and force’ is an ‘effect’ of the biopolitical 
imperative of State (Lemke, 2019: 317). CAGE have highlighted a reality in which the UK 
government has set into motion practices that coerce sections of society into a gambit that 
identifies them as potential suspects. However, this reality is not owned by Prevent or its 
many detractors. It is important to understand that the ‘power relations’ between the State 
and actors within it are based upon structures of control that necessitate the security of the 
biopolitical – society as a whole – which often outweigh any notions of consent (Lemke, 2019: 
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316). Furthermore, consent can be granted and withdrawn within any given moment by the 
State (Lemke, 2019: 317). Consent is merely a component of a total structure of actions of 
State that are deployed upon an acting subject by virtue of their capability to act. The 
matriculation of risk found in the ERG22+ example creates a pre-criminal space whereby 
Channel referrals act as an ethical imperative to shape the vulnerable subject by recasting the 
policing power as a codification of conduct. Therefore the State, or in this example the UK 
government, is acting in the only way it knows how to act. This does not take away from the 
fact that the practice of Prevent and the ERG 22+ that enable it is inherently flawed. However, 
it should not come as too much of a surprise that in spite of its prominent detractors and the 
obvious gaps found in the methodological research that underpins it, Prevent still persists.  
 
Prevent is predominantly enacted through its statutory duty, which is imposed upon local 
governments to administer. All local authorities (LAs) within the UK have a legal obligation 
to ensure that they ‘monitor’ populations vulnerable to extremism and share that data with 
the Home Office (Home Office, 2015a: 5). They also have an obligation to ensure that all LA 
agencies and staff that work directly with the ‘public understand what radicalisation means 
and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism (Home Office, 2015a: 6).’ 
The Home Office (2016: 6) specifies further that frontline staff ‘need to be aware of what we 
mean by the term “extremism” and the relationship between extremism and terrorism 
(Home Office, 2015a: 6).’  In this instance, the definition of ‘extremism’ has been set by the 
Home Office as:  ’vocal or active opposition to fundamental British Values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of 
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members of our armed forces (Home Office, 2015a: 3).’ This definition is clearly lacking in 
many regards however the most important observation to be made here is the use of 
ideological terminology such as ‘Fundamental British Values’ (FBV) which are impossible to 
quantify across the broad spectrum of the UK population.  
 
In terms of direct LA agency work, the statutory duty is mainly facilitated through education. 
Foucault (1977: 141) denotes that mechanisms of regulation such as the statutory duty 
require the ‘protected place(s) of disciplinary monotony.’ The ‘educational regime’ that 
schools employ act as the perfect vector for the form of disciplinary power that Prevent 
takes (Foucault, 1977: 141). The duty bestows two main responsibilities on education 
providers such as schools: firstly to monitor its students and report any safeguarding 
concerns relating to extremism through the relevant channels and secondly, to promote 
‘Fundamental British Values’ across its curriculum. FBV enables a field of surveillance that 
education practitioners populate; it helps identify those within their cohorts that show 
opposition to the ideology FBV promotes. This monitoring process is dualistic. It allows the 
practitioner to intercept pupils that show signs of radicalisation, either to re-educate those 
with radical views or to separate harmful ideologies from its cohorts – ‘a libertine either 
alone or between two pious pupils (Foucault, 1977: 147).’  
 
For Bourdieu (2013: 93-94), the primary aim of State is to disseminate its core ideologies 
within the collective consciousness of its governed societies – its habitus – through the 
medium of its ‘social fields.’ The objective of State in this instance is to create a durable 
norm of obedience, or in the ideal case a ‘permanent disposition’ of its ideology within said 
16 
 
habitus. Bourdieu (1990: 130-131) postulates that within the ‘social fields’ – that constitute 
the totality of societal interactions – resides the ‘bureaucratic fields’ of State which 
mechanise its dominion over the social. Like Foucault (2001: 233), Bourdieu (1990: 132-133) 
recognises that the language and motivations of State are largely dictated by economic 
imperatives, which also dictate and are dictated by biopolitical realities and their associated 
risks. Bourdieu (1990: 267-268) also acknowledges the use of bureaucratic language to 
control discourse, to create ‘practicable taxonomies’ to relate economic obligations to social 
phenomena where they have no logical right to be.  The field of education acts as the ideal 
site to disseminate its ideology because it is the main producer (and reproducer) of ‘social 
and cultural capital’ that re-imbed the doctrine of State within the habitus (Jenkins, 1992: 
52).  
 
This Bourdieusian position identifies FBV as the UK government’s attempts to instil its 
hegemony through the ‘cultural capital’ of the concept of Britishness, creating a sense of the 
moral (Bourdieu, 1994: 8-9). Dean (2010: 19) concludes that government is an intrinsically 
moral actor – it uses morality or a moral code to illustrate that it holds itself accountable for 
its own actions. In doing so it discerns both its legitimacy to govern and its rationale for 
action. This discourse is then transposed upon the polis. Self-governance of the individual is 
enforced through varying physical mechanisms like policing and surveillance; however, the 
ideological field of education is the primary vector of its delivery because it already holds a 
captive and predominantly docile audience. For the State, as long as the moral language 
citizens adhere to fits the praxis of the moral code set out by government their citizenship 
by proxy is assured. Education providers are the ideal adjudicators of citizenship – they are 
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designed to disseminate knowledge and assess the individual’s capacity to understand and 
utilise it in wider social contexts (Dean, 2010: 21).  
  
 Education being used as a vector of State ideology – its governmentality – is not a 
contemporary fixture of the liberal State, although it remains an essential tool of 
government to this day. The colonial States of the 18th and 19th century brought upon the 
Western world a new global order, causing the breakup of ‘traditional societies’ both at 
home and abroad (Weber, 1976: 98). Eugen Weber (1976: 72) denotes that the western 
‘peasant’ was no longer assured of their lowly status as a new system of class emerged, with 
the ‘savage’ from faraway lands lifting their biopolitical power upward and onwards 
(Viswanathan, 2015: 136). During this period, education within the Western State was 
reformed to accommodate this new ‘consolidation of power’ – to shape its own populations 
‘moral and intellectual’ ideology within the new global order (Viswanathan, 2015: 2-3). This 
method of biopolitical control used forms of ‘indirect violence’ committed on the 
inhabitants of its conquered lands to pacify its home populations (Baron et.al. 2019: 200). 
These acts of indiscriminate violence were legitimised by the Western State through the 
educational field, where education was used to construct a sense of ‘habitus’ that 
homogenised its home populations as superior to those it had conquered (Bourdieu, 2013: 
94).  
 
The education field was also an important tool in the colonial State. Imposing the spoken 
language of the Western State upon indigenous populations was often seen as a ‘right of 
conquest’ for colonial powers. Creating a ‘linguistic unity’ across its borders was essential to 
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avoid the danger posed by ‘persistent diversity (Weber, 1976: 73).’  The danger for the 
colonial power and their answers to it were twofold in this instance: firstly, any form of 
resistance cannot be averted if you do not understand the language of those who may 
perform it. This of course remains a problem after the language of the colonial State has 
been imposed, however the target populations will no longer be ‘closed to outside 
influences’ and can be directed by the State’s form of ‘national consciousness’ to counter 
any ‘revolutionary agitation (Weber, 1976: 98-99).’ In short, the colonial State used its 
language as a tool to create a new form of national identity that better fitted its own vison. 
However, this creates a new set of problems – a population empowered by its newfound 
‘civility (Weber, 1976: 305).’      
 
The Second issue for Western powers was controlling the use of its language by its colonial 
subjects once it had become rooted within its systems of ‘cultural domination (Viswanathan, 
2015: 5).’  Gauri Viswanathan (2015: 142-143) describes how the ‘transmission of ideas of 
moral autonomy’ within the colonial educational system in India led to many young Indians 
questioning ‘their position in life’ assigned by their colonial rulers. In practice, the 
educational regime in colonial India became ‘a vehicle of acquiring and exercising power’ for 
Indian elites who used it to obtain incremental forms of autonomy, which over time allowed 
them to levy considerable power (Viswanathan, 2015: 167). However, the British colonial 
state of India continued to exist for decades under these circumstances. It managed to do so 
by means of liberal pacification not too dissimilar to those it utilised upon its home 
populations over a century earlier. The empowerment of sections of the indigenous Indian 
populations was shaped by the British as a form of ‘liberal improvement’, where this new 
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type of ‘hegemonic pacification’ allowed for an Indian elite to form and to take on some of 
the administrative duties of the colonial state (Baron et.al. 2019: 206). Once again, the 
educational field was used by the British state to emboss its own ‘cultural capital’ upon its 
populations, but this time it was applied to those who were not British by nationality but 
British by means of ‘subjectification (Bourdieu, 1990: 144-146).’  
 
Using ‘Eurocentric’ reasoning, the British educational system in India divided its populations 
along ‘racial and cultural’ lines – dividing and conquering using ideology, not domination 
through violence (Willinsky, 1998: 3). It is important to note that forms of violent 
punishment persisted right up until the end of colonial rule in India in 1947. However, its 
usage was not to impose ‘domination’ through fear, but to perform hegemony by shared 
interest (Foucault, 2001: 273). The Caste system in India had been modified by the British to 
create ideal types, or those who exhibited the British ideals of the civilised Indian. In this 
exemplar of imperialism, the threat to British rule from ‘the mass of the population’ was 
also shared with its chosen Indian elites (Foucault, 2001: 221-222). The educational field 
was ideally suited to perform the transformation of the Indian social system because it has 
the unique ability to ‘transmute living reality’ through modalities of ‘specialization (Said, 
1979: 86).’  In this instance, specialization creates experts. The educational field is populated 
by these experts who define the behaviours of both the ‘primitive’ and the ‘civilized’, and 
those who are instructed by them (or their knowledge) suffer with delusions of superiority 
through the agency of their educators expertise (Willinsky, 1998: 17). In this instance, the 
educational field is being used as an ‘instrument of social classification’, where its students 
are taught how to perform their superiority (Bourdieu, 1996: 42).    
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The form of governance the British colonial state conjured during this period in their history 
was the precursor for the liberal order we now see in the contemporary context – one not 
of ‘force, but of guidance (Mill, 1998: 232-233).’ FBV are one of the current forms of 
guidance adopted by the British state. However, the educational field as a modus of the 
‘moral’ has always been a permanent fixture of the liberal State since its inception 
(Oakshott, 1989: 62). For the infamous conservative liberalist Michael Oakshott (1989: 63), 
education is fundamentally a ‘moral transaction’, where the primary aim of the educator is 
to equip the student with the skills necessary to navigate ‘the world they are to inhabit.’ In 
Oakshott’s (1989: 64-65) educational paradigm, the student must be guided on how to 
perform as a citizen in accordance with both the written and unwritten ‘rules and rule-like 
considerations’ of the State. Oakshott’s (1989: 140) classical liberal conception of the role of 
education dictates that tuition in the moral must precede the tuition of the practical, where 
‘empiricism is preceded and guided by an ideological activity.’ The ‘ideological activity’ 
Oakshott (1989:66) speaks of is composed of ‘aspirations, sentiments, images, opinions, 
beliefs, modes of understanding, customs and practices.’ For Oakshott (1989: 66-67), the 
‘procedure of learning’ employed by the educational field is primarily constructed to teach 
its student body how ‘to perform humanly’, a concept he uses interchangeably with the role 
of the State and its responsibility to guide society.   
 
Examples of Oakshott’s rationale appearing within the contemporary British educational 
system are not hard to find. For example, Section 28 of the Education Act 2002 impose a 
responsibility upon schools to create a curriculum that incorporates ‘spiritual, moral, social 
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and cultural’ (SMCS) guidance (Department for Education, 2014: 2). The SMCS provision has 
provided the perfect conduit for the rollout of FBV, with corroboration between both 
statutory provisions actively encouraged by the Department for Education (DfE). FBV are 
described by the Home Office (2015a: 11) as the promotion of ‘spiritual, moral, cultural, 
mental and physical development’ whilst also promoting ‘community cohesion.’ There are 
clear parallels between the official descriptions of FBV and SMSC, which theoretically aids 
FBV assimilation within the pedagogic discourse. However, in practice the role FBV plays 
within the school setting causes much dispute. A participant of this study, a secondary 
school teacher and pastoral lead thinks FBV “make no sense.” He also argues that the four 
pillars of FBV: democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and tolerance being attributed 
to Britishness is “a fallacy.”  He believes this stance “smacks of jingoism.” Rather than build 
consensus as they are purported to be designed to do, they are in fact “divisive towards 
other members of communities who are not [intrinsically] British.”  Even though there is 
evidence of a lack of faith in FBV there is often little resistance to it. One potential reason 
being that it is but one of many identikit regulatory practices placed upon schools, with 
another participant in this study, a designated safeguarding lead (DSL) in a secondary school 
describing FBV as just another “box to tick from the LA, something we’ve kind of got to do” 
to fulfil the schools obligation to Ofsted.  
 
The implementation of the statutory duty is stratified. School leadership are required to 
undergo specific Prevent training and a Prevent lead – who is most often the Designated 
Safeguarding Lead (DSL) – is selected to oversee the school’s legal obligation to the 
statutory duty to disseminate Prevent training within the general staff population. This 
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process is externally monitored by Ofsted inspection (Home Office, 2015a: 11).  Further 
Education providers and universities also have a legal requirement to adhere to the 
statutory duty and have to follow predominantly the same protocol as schools, however 
there is less of an obligation to instil FBV within their workstreams, presumably because it’s 
too difficult to monitor (Home office, 2015a: 11-12).  
 
The statutory duty is also applicable to other forms of education providers, identified as 
independent learning providers, such as English as a Foreign Language (EFL) centres (English 
UK, 2015: 1). Their obligation is mostly the same as state schools, however they’re subject 
to spot checks from the governmental department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
who will monitor the EFL providers by ensuring that the required training and safeguarding 
mechanisms are being administered in line with the duty (English UK, 2015: 3). 
 
The Prevent statutory duty is also administered through partnership working with NGOs 
that help facilitate school compliance. For instance, a participant NGO for this study 
provides awards recognised by the DfE and Home Office that showcase a school’s 
commitment to the duty and delivering FBV for a fee, starting at £500 per school for a 
“Bronze” award. Although it may seem obvious that schools and LAs are the target market 
for NGOs focused on CVE in education a question is still posed; who exactly are these 
awards designed for? Foucault (2007: 265) would likely draw to our attention the theatrical 
nature of the award system offered. They act as a performance – almost ritualistic, 
ceremonial even, that rewards schools for producing evidence of compliance to the states 
mode of disciplinary power (Foucault, 2004a: 155). Elton-Chalcraft et.al (2016: 29) argue 
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that FBV is deliberate politicization of education by the UK government that is ‘instilling the 
expectation that teachers are state instruments of surveillance.’ In this instance, the 
performative nature of FBV is being played out across two stages, the pragmatic and the 
moral. Schools that can show obedience to FBV are a real-world example of the counter-
insurgent doctrine of manufacturing consent – of winning hearts and minds.     
 
The relationship between the targeted community setting and the Prevent duty is less clear 
than that with the school.  Under current legislation, unless the organisation works under a 
governing body that has a safeguarding responsibility there is no legal obligation for a 
Community Based Organisation (CBO) to engage with Prevent. However, LAs are required to 
produce Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CLTPs) that necessitate local authorities develop 
a ‘joint understanding’ of counter-terrorism legislation across all local partners which is 
promoted through the integration of Prevent ‘across local communities (Home Office, 2012: 
7- 12).’ Such activity can take many forms and varies across LAs, however the Home Office 
does provide monetary rewards for those that actively engage, with over £5 million pounds 
being awarded to community groups that have shown a commitment to fighting extremism 
through the Building a Stronger Britain Together fund as of October 2018 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/news/over-5-million-awarded-to-community-groups-to-
fight-extremism). 
  
Prevent and it statutory duty is fraught with limitations to engagement, mainly because it 
lacks the apparatus to effectively administer and communicate its aims, which are unclear 
for those obligated to abide by them. Thus far, this thesis has provided the reader with a 
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miniature portrait of the problematic presented by Prevent and how it operates in real 
terms. In the following section, the research focus and theoretical framing of this study, the 
Foucauldian concept of governmentality is discussed in greater analytical detail. It will also 
introduce to the reader the Bourdieusian concept of the bureaucratic field that is used by 
this study to navigate the pedagogical implementation of the Prevent duty within the school 
and community setting – a thematic Foucault is often accused of neglecting in his analysis of 
the discourses of power.  
 
1.2. Research focus 
 
Ferguson and Gupta (2005: 105) denote that the totality of State is only partially visible 
within the physical world. In fact, the manifestation of States lies predominantly within the 
realm of ‘metaphors and practices.’ A ‘spatial’ reality is created by the infractions of State 
that permeate society. Such infractions form the basis of its governance structures 
(Ferguson and Gupta, 2005: 105-106). The actual practices of government take a form akin 
to religious institutions – societies earliest attempts at governance. Governments act 
pastorally, shepherding their respective flocks in ways deemed acceptable to state doctrine 
(Foucault, 1988: 71). Such institutions of government and the ideology they embody are 
both empowered and protected by collective ‘knowledges (Foucault, 2000: 212).’  Mitchell 
Dean (2010: 184), highlights that such knowledges are safeguarded from wider society using 
specialised language, specifically bureaucracy and the rule of law. This bureaucratic 
language encompasses all matters of State however it has special relevance to economic 
commerce, which is paramount to a State’s security needs in the contemporary context. I 
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argue that the ideological principles of market rationale are a core driver for Prevent, as 
they are for most State incursions upon the biopolitical. Before I do so however, it is first 
pertinent to discuss the state of exception that Prevent represents in its totality.  
 
For Carl Schmitt (2005: 12) in his 1922 book Political Theology – Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty the State’s existence is ‘undoubted proof of its superiority over the 
validity of the legal norm’. As such, ‘all law is situational law’ with the ‘sovereign’ or State 
dictating the situation in its ‘totality (Schmitt, 2005:13).’ Therefore, no ‘general norm’ can 
be considered absolute (Schmitt, 2005: 6). According to Schmitt (2005: 6), the key to 
understanding this dynamic is to uncover ‘what constitutes the public interest or interest of 
the State, public safety and order’ and most importantly, ‘who decides’ what exactly this 
means in practice. The use of sovereign power is only effective if those wielding it can 
provide ‘unity’ of viewpoint across the demos (Schmitt, 2005: 19). Such ‘unity’ can only be 
ascertained if the sovereign power is used under the guise of impartiality and fairness, 
which most often takes the form of the judiciary in the State system of control (Schmitt, 
2005: 20).  
 
Foucault (1978:136) builds upon Schmitt’s assertions of sovereign power, detailing the 
advent of biopower that underpins sovereignty in the contemporary age. To be precise, he 
discerns that the judiciary has been created to normalise the sovereign’s capability to ‘take 
life or let live’, the ultimate expression of sovereign power. This can be performed upon the 
individual that poses a threat to the sovereign State in the form of execution or 
incarceration, or if the threat is supranational in scope it can take the form of diplomacy or 
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war. For Foucault (1978:137) biopolitics are paramount: ‘Wars are no longer waged in the 
name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of 
everyone.’ In effect, the threat of ‘massacres’ has ‘become vital’ to the envisaged safety the 
State provides and more importantly, those who reside within it that are deemed to belong 
there (Foucault, 1978:137).   
 
As part of the increasing entanglement of the biopolitical and the apparatus of State, issues 
of power have become ever more secretive, often disguised through the complicated nature 
of the judiciary and the legal language it uses. This creates a distance from the day to day 
lives of the average citizen – ignorance becomes bliss (Foucault, 1978: 87). The network of 
entrenched judicial powers described by Foucault (1978: 87-88) in this instance reacts to 
issues emerging from the social domain; the autonomy of the courts, largely a political 
fiction in the west in the constitutional, time-honoured form of a separation of powers 
between judiciary, executive and legislature, is supposed to guarantee reflexivity amongst 
the stewards of our democratic regimes (Dean 2010: 150). 
 
 But Schmitt’s (2005: 5) ‘states of exception’ convey to us how rare such cases are. Take 
Theresa May’s difficulty in deporting Abu Qatada to Jordan after the failure of the British 
courts to uncover enough evidence to prosecute as an example. Found innocent in Amman, 
the British government’s measures are now limited to preventing the comments of his 
Twitter account from reaching British citizens 
(https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/26/twitter-abu-qatada-al-qaida-
jihadi-syria-islamic-state).  
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Biopower is the most effective means of establishing security for neo-liberal States. CVE and 
by proxy Prevent is the contemporary iteration of the management techniques employed to 
steer this discourse across different, cultures, economies, and political ideologies (Dean, 
2010: 150). In Britain, the form this took was populist nightmares of Qatada and his family 
on welfare. The utilitarian calculation of the cost to the public (£3m) to extradite him now 
meets efforts to deny his family their citizenship, with ‘sources’ stating that the then ‘Home 
Secretary would also use the powers available to her to prevent the family from returning to 
Britain in the future (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/10246167/Abu-Qatadas-family-follow-him-out-of-Britain.html).’ May routinely 
contrasted her success in deporting Qatada with Jeremy Corbyn’s putative sympathy for 
terrorists in the General Election campaign of 2017, a strategy that failed to garner too 
much support.  
 
Although the law is designed to be the apparatus of authority for both the State and its 
citizens, it does not designate who can wield such authority, what purpose they have for 
using it and finally, what changes they have made through the precedent of its usage, 
intentional or otherwise (Schmitt, 2005: 32). When legal precedent does change, it is often 
done so using risk or ‘security concerns as justification (Chomsky, 2007: 160-161).’  
 
The concept of risk is difficult to define. Nothing is inherently a risk and conversely, 
everything can be perceived to be a risk dependant on context and circumstances (Dean, 
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2010: 177). Nevertheless, governments seek to understand risks to construct an order of the 
reality of the present to best understand how to govern and how to keep its position as the 
dominant power-mechanism within its locale (Hope, 2015: 872). Beck (1992: 157-158) 
draws to our attention that the State will seek to manufacture calculations of risk that 
adjudicate the ‘measurability’ of the field of ‘immeasurable side effects’ such risks pose to 
the biopolitical and by proxy State sovereignty, no matter how accurate such measurements 
actually are in reality. In order for the measurements of its target risky populations to be 
useful to the State, it must separate them from the ‘legitimate’ actions of the biopolitical 
(Beck, 1992: 87).    
 
In terms of CVE, ‘epidemiological risk’, which is often attributed to the health sciences is the 
form of risk analysis most often utilised by governments and security agencies (Dean, 2010: 
189).  In essence, ‘epidemiological risk’ is a quantitative science designed to observe and 
monitor populations deemed at risk from ‘epidemics’ to pre-empt the risk they potentially 
possess becoming a security concern and spreading (Aven, 2014: 15-16). This assertion is 
problematic for security analysts as there is a considerable margin for error (Bauman, 2012: 
171).  An extremist or a terrorist act is not a pathogen. Witnessing terrorism does not (in the 
vast majority of cases) make an individual want to commit a terrorist act themselves. 
Stampnitzky (2013a: 182) argues that the politics of ‘pre-emption’ within counter-terrorism 
discourse has created a situation where this reality is ignored. The case of the ERG 22+ and 
NOMs study conducted by clinical psychologists Dean and Lloyd referred to earlier in this 
chapter is an exemplar of the epidemiological risk model. The typology of risk it creates is 
designed to act as a sample frame for inoculation – with the Prevent statutory duty acting as 
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a vaccination for extremism. A question is asked of the State in this instance: where is the 
ideal site for such vaccinations to take place?  
 
The Prevent statutory duty is enforced on the basis of section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015, which acknowledges that LAs are responsible to show a ‘due regard 
to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism (Home Office, 2015a: 2).’ 
The duty itself is principally enacted through the safeguarding agendas of LAs. There are 
several bodies within any given LA that exhibit a safeguarding responsibility however, 
education is primarily where the strictest forms of safeguarding policy can be found. The 
duty takes a ‘risk-based approach’ which places a responsibility on schools to ‘ensure all 
staff understand the risk’ posed by radicalisation (Home Office, 2015a: 3-4).  Special 
emphasis is placed on insuring ‘that there are clear and robust safeguarding policies to 
identify children at risk’ whom the Home office identify as being the most vulnerable to 
extremist material (Home Office, 2015a: 7). The Home Office (2015a: 10) dictate that all 
schools are required to promote ‘community cohesion’ through the mechanism of 
Fundamental British Values (FBV).  In this instance, the school is acting in the capacity of a 
‘bureaucratic field’ of the State (Bourdieu, 1994: 1).  The implementation of FBV is 
effectively the State’s attempt to ‘produce and impose categories of thought’ that it wants 
the next generation to instinctively apply to their conceptions of society, and ultimately 
their expectations and allegiances to the State (Bourdieu, 1994: 2). In sum, it is an action of 
government that is designed to both ensure continued fidelity to the State and to safeguard 
against ideology that could harm such a position (Loyal, 2017: 84).  
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This study considers the field of education, in its Bourdieusian capacity, to be central to 
understanding the nuances of the Prevent statutory duty. The UK government is utilising the 
field of education, through bureaucratic channels i.e. the Prevent duty to create a reality of 
society that best suits its purposes. The Home Office (2015b: 8), in their guidance to schools 
regarding the Prevent duty, stipulate that it is a school’s legal responsibility to equip 
students with the ability to ‘develop positive character traits’ and to ‘prepare them to play a 
full and active part in society.’ In the Home Office’s specific guidelines for the 
implementation of FBV it is strongly implied that such ‘positive character traits’ are intrinsic 
to British society. The guidance defines FBV as ‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, 
and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs (Home Office, 
2014: 5).’ In the same paragraph, it is laid out in no uncertain terms that schools are legally 
obliged to teach ‘the difference between the law of the land and religious law’ with British 
law being promoted as paramount.  
 
To the cynic, this could be seen as a not so subtle attempt to single out the practice of 
Islamic Sharia law and insinuate its un-Britishness. Britishness is being promoted as 
ideologically superior to any other prevalent form of ideology found within the UK to 
reproduce the ‘symbolic capital’ of the British state within the student body (Bourdieu, 
1994: 8-9). The State’s main priority is to garner a ‘monopoly’ over universally held 
propositions that are dear to society. The State then uses the ‘bureaucratic field’ – in this 
case the field of education, to diffuse and maintain this hegemony (Loyal, 2017: 85).  For 
Bourdieu (2013: 93-94), the primary aim of State is to disseminate its core ideologies within 
the collective consciousness of its governed societies – its habitus - through the medium of 
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its ‘social fields.’ The objective of State in this instance is to create a durable norm of 
obedience – or in the ideal case a ‘permanent disposition’ of its ideology within said habitus. 
Bourdieu (1990: 130-131) postulates that within the ‘social fields’ – that constitute the 
totality of societal interactions – resides the ‘bureaucratic fields’ of State which mechanise 
its dominion over the social. Like Foucault (2001: 233), Bourdieu (1990: 132-133) recognises 
that the language and motivations of State are largely dictated by economic imperatives, 
which also dictate and are dictated by biopolitical realities and their associated risks. 
Bourdieu (1990: 267-268) also acknowledges the use of bureaucratic language to control 
discourse, to create ‘practicable taxonomies’ to relate economic obligations to social 
phenomena where they have no logical right to be.  The field of education acts as the ideal 
site to disseminate its ideology because it is the main producer (and reproducer) of ‘social 
and cultural capital’ that re-imbed the doctrine of State within the habitus (Jenkins, 1992: 
52).  
 
This Bourdieusian position identifies FBV as the UK government’s attempts to instil its 
hegemony through the ‘cultural capital’ of the concept of Britishness, creating a sense of the 
moral (Bourdieu, 1994: 8-9). Dean (2010: 19) concludes that government is an intrinsically 
moral actor – it uses morality or a moral code to illustrate that it holds itself accountable for 
its own actions. In doing so it discerns both its legitimacy to govern and its rationale for 
action. This discourse is then transposed upon the polis. Self-governance of the individual is 
enforced through varying physical mechanisms like policing and surveillance. However, the 
ideological field of education is the primary vector of its delivery because it already holds a 
captive and predominantly docile audience. For the State, as long as the moral language 
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citizens adhere to fits the praxis of the moral code set out by government their citizenship 
by proxy is assured. Education providers are the ideal adjudicators of citizenship – they are 
designed to disseminate knowledge and assess the individual’s capacity to understand and 
utilise it in wider social contexts (Dean, 2010: 21).        
 
The Foucauldian concept of governmentality, where a ‘government state of mind’ dictates 
the discourse surrounding risk and security has explanatory value in this instance (Foucault, 
2004a: 3). For Foucault (2004a: 4-5), the use of bureaucratic language to describe instances 
of violence, the use of legal pathways to legitimise the polarisation of unpolitical Islamic 
practice, as seen in the example of the French ban on face coverings in 2009 by then 
president Nicolas Sarkozy, from the Western, democratic world are all instances of 
governmentality in action. This mode of government legitimises its punitive actions through 
a narrative it constructs that illustrates its Islamic communities as ‘separate but equal (Afary 
and Anderson, 2005: 93).’  Prevent and its statutory duty is a typical example of Foucault’s 
assertions, creating typologies of risk that are based on the principles of exclusion. Defining 
what is unsafe by attempting to define what is known to be safe as a measure of risk (Dean, 
2010: 98). This epistemological approach to risk, where the probability of an individual or 
group committing an act of violent extremism is defined by how closely they relate to 
factors that differ from the ideal types that are perceived to be safe treats such 
communities like a disease. A disease that can be prevented by modifying the behaviour of 
susceptible communities or individuals to fit safe behaviours (Lemke, 2019: 221-222).    
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Foucault (2000: 219-220) depicts his conception of governmentality to have three main 
apparatus: firstly, the institutions of state function through the analysis of the polis to 
examine and control social normative action. Secondly the data or, as Foucault describes it, 
the knowledges created by these institutions becomes a calculable entity unto itself and 
those that hold such knowledge become the guardians of society through the pretence of 
expertise. The calculable nature of knowledges allows the institutions who use them to 
further entrench themselves within the biopolitical sphere via the economy which engages 
with elements of civil society creating new areas of expertise. Finally, this ‘new political 
economy’ has administrative needs that only the state has the capacity to facilitate, 
primarily through the rule of law, cementing its role as executive of state and society.   
  
In Dean’s (2010: 155) descriptions of ‘authoritative governmentality’ he draws upon the 
connection between ‘bio-politics and sovereignty’ that Foucault describes which shape the 
trajectory of such discourses. Entrenched systems of knowledge have created a paradigm 
for researchers looking at systems of rule and sovereignty beyond their own lived 
experience (Dean, 2010: 56). Thomas Kuhn (1970: 10) defines paradigms to be inherent 
within the scope of scientific study. He argues that the ‘rules’ of enquiry that are engaged by 
academia and beyond are rarely challenged. They are accepted as verbatim by the scholar, 
practitioner, and student alike (Kuhn, 1970: 11). In fact, Kuhn (1970: 11-12) believes that the 
scientific system or the endeavour to practice ‘normal science’ is self-replicating, in essence, 
it becomes an echo chamber that grows in on itself rather than towards the concepts it 
originally set out to understand.      
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Examples of Kuhn’s analogies are not hard to find within the field of CVE and terrorism 
studies. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2019, 7th Edition, produced by the Institute for 
Economics and Peace using data supplied from US homeland security sanctioned research 
centre based at the University of Maryland is one example. It purports to be the most 
‘comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity available globally’ which has ‘codified’ over 
‘170,000 terrorist incidents (GTI, 2019: 2).’ The presence of bodies such as the GTI, the level 
of influence they hold over governments through their codification of ‘incidents’ of 
terrorism which is dependent upon the creation of a field of statements from various 
domains, and the relationship with the media which interplays between experts and 
government is a prime example of self-replicating technologies of discipline (Foucault, 
2002:146). Used together, they create an ‘archive’ of knowledge which is drawn upon to 
create indices, which are easy for the bureaucratic mechanisms of government to digest 
(Foucault, 2002: 147).  
 
GTI (2019: 6) indicate that it is important to ‘analyse and aggregate’ data related to terrorist 
activities to ‘better understand its various properties.’ GTI purely exists to find patterns in 
terrorist activities, as such, its actions are perpetual. In this instance, terrorist events are 
being used by State-sponsored experts to develop models, which is a foundation for their 
future practice (Kuhn, 1970: 11). Furthermore, the creations of ‘statements’ of intent by 
organisations such as the GTI entrench and reproduce a ‘discursive’ regime that is practiced 
as a norm of science (Foucault, 2002: 64). In effect, GTI and their contemporaries are using 
scientific ‘norms’ to justify methodology that is not a correct fit for the problem at hand. For 
35 
 
Foucault (2002:145), the question presented here is for whom is this ‘archive’ of knowledge 
being created?  
 
For Gearson and Rosemont (2015: 1049), the crux of Prevent lies in the notion of 
‘deradicalization’, which is not clearly defined within the strategy therefore those 
implementing it are left without the scope to make any such efforts work effectively (if they 
indeed will work at all). The implementation of Prevent in Higher Education (HE) institutions 
such as universities strictly inhibits freedom of expression, a core component of academic 
freedoms and debate (Gearson and Rosemont, 2015: 1049). Such discourse has not 
discouraged subsequent governments who continue to implement Prevent without revision. 
It also important to note that universities play a role in shaping the discourse surrounding 
Prevent. For instance, the Centre of Defence Studies (CDS) at Kings College London run 
professional development programmes that work closely with the Ministry of Defence, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Office for Security and 
Counterterrorism, the Metropolitan Police Service and the NPCC. In CDS’ own words, the 
programmes on offer are focused on issues such as ‘national security; terrorism; counter-
terrorism; intelligence; defence policy; and public policy.’  These include ‘an MA-level 
accredited programme’ as well as offering ‘shorter, more intensive courses.’ With CDS 
working ‘closely with clients in identifying the most appropriate content and delivery style 
for each of its programmes.’ 
(https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/study/graduate/tss).   
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The question posed regarding the continued usage of the pre-criminal Prevent strategy in 
the face of its detractors, many of whom that are unparalleled experts in their field is an 
interesting one. Equally, the prevalence of research groups and NGOs with a CVE focus and 
individuals who produce research within the schematic of intelligence-based policing by 
government bodies is equally as interesting, if not that surprising. It could be argued such 
groups enjoy such capacity due to their willingness to produce research and practice that 
fits the prevailing dynamic (Foucault, 1991: 88). However, is such an explanation enough to 
justify the ignorance of the UK government and the continued failures of COIN and CVE 
initiatives such as the Northern Irish conflict, the colonial examples found in the Indian sub-
continent (to name but a few) and the contemporary example found in Prevent?  
 
The answer to this question in part can be found in the manifestation of ‘insurance 
technologies’ that dominate the public sphere in the contemporary context (Lemke, 2019: 
216). For Lemke (2019: 217), the continued entanglement of the State and the economy 
necessities the State safeguard itself from threats to the economic order, of which conflict, 
both internal and external is a factor. As such, the economy demands the State quantify 
such risks and insure itself against them. Although CVE initiatives have many weaknesses, 
they do have one main strength – they eagerly produce quantitative data that can be used 
to construct a tableaux of risk. In turn, this data, or as Foucault (2000: 219) would describe 
it, ‘knowledges’ can be used to both reassure the economic order that any threats to it are 
being curtailed and also create new areas for the economy to grow into within the CVE 
sphere of influence (Lemke, 2019: 218).     
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The methodology of Prevent is based upon radicalisation theory which creates a pre-
criminal space, ignores outlier factors such as the war in the Middle East, political 
proliferation of discontent over immigration and mental health. Prevent is ideologically 
driven. It creates ideal types for who is an extremist and who is a citizen based on arbitrary 
and ill-defined definitions of acceptable behaviours (Foucault, 1977: 217). Typologies are 
open to interpretation; consequences arise as no one definition of extremism exists. As 
such, common ground is found in generalisations, which are not precise enough and 
alienate large populations such as the Islamic communities of the UK.  
 
Kundnani (2014: 128) states how radicalisation theory mistakes ‘attitudes of disaffection 
and opposition to foreign policy for signs of extremist risk.’ Whether this mistaken logic is 
wilful or not is still open to debate. Prevent and its statutory duty has enforced surveillance 
by proxy across the UK’s LA agencies such as education providers and social services, which 
has seen a cross section of the Muslim population of the UK becoming viewed as ‘potential 
terrorist recruits (Kundnani, 2014: 129).’ This reality will be the focus of chapter 6 of this 
thesis where the responses of educational practitioners describe their responsibility to 
spotting signs of radicalisation within their cohorts to be ‘at the forefront of their minds.’ 
This narrative will also be discussed in chapter 5 which is designated to Prevent managers 
who describe education as ‘a key partner’ and chapter 7 which focuses on NGOs who 
provide education practitioners with training and resources designed to help schools 
understand ‘what we mean by extremism.’ In chapter 8, the responses of community 
advocates are also examined, with some respondents feeling like they are being forced “to 
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be retaught [their] religion” because the Prevent strategy prefixes their faith as inherently 
violent.  
 
A consequence of the CVE discourse surrounding Prevent has been the production of a 
closed methodological ecosystem that is shaped by a process that Foucault (1991: 88) would 
describe as ‘governmentality.’ The language of governance, ergo bureaucracy, inhibits 
critical discourse. In short, to successfully interact with power mechanisms organisations 
need to speak bureaucratically which in turn enforces State ideology; participation is only on 
the government’s own terms. Therefore, change happens slowly and incrementally, leaving 
little agency for critical debate. Such debate is needed to successfully counter security issues 
that are based upon populist discourse, which is most often used by extremist groups to 
promote their dialogue – to endeavour to justify it to the masses. The precise content of 
such discourse is often transient and based on a skewed perception of current affairs, which 
Prevent and its enactors are ill equipped to respond to (Pantucci, 2015: 272).  
 
There is a distinct lack of critical oversight found within the implementation of Prevent. This 
study will yield data that will shed light at both the LA and the practitioner level; it will also 
assess the effectiveness of current CVE practice in contemporary, localised and real-life 
conditions without theoretical pretences which dominate the literature and research 
strategies within this field to date. There is an apparent gap within the pre-existing literature 
that fails to explore the diffusion of Prevent in terms of how the model of surveillance is 
outsourced and delegated across both LA agencies and third-party organisations. The existing 
literature fails to assess the communication between state actors at the localised level (such 
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as education providers) with private enterprise that have a CVE focus (Alieo et.al., 2018: 448-
449). There is also little existing research that seeks to evaluate how Prevent is 
operationalised on the ground and how it both measures its successes and checks its 
accountability (Lewis and Hamid, 2018: 156-158). Additionally, there is a lack of oversight 
offered to private entities that perform CVE related practices on the ground (Lewis and 
Hamid, 2018: 162).  There is also a largely unexplored dynamic between member of targeted 
communities who are both pro and anti-Prevent (Parker and Lindekilde, 2020: 2). This thesis 
will examine the prevalence of NGOs with a CVE focus within the localised context and 
investigate the economic revenue streams that enact them. It will also assess the 
effectiveness of current CVE practice in contemporary, localised, and real-life conditions 
without theoretical pretences which dominate the literature and research strategies within 
this field to date.  In the following section of this chapter, the overall research aims and 
individual research questions will be defined in more detail. The selected methods and 
justification for the chosen sample frame will also be outlined.  
 
1.3. Research aim and objectives  
 
Research aim: The primary research aim of this study is to evaluate the impact and assess 
the implications of Prevent and its statutory duty across education, community-based 
organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tasked with monitoring 
and administering communities deemed vulnerable to radicalisation at the local authority 
level. The following research questions have been developed to facilitate this task:   
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Research questions: 
 
1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control 
its production of knowledge?   
 
2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is 
it reproduced?  
 
3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or 
reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?     
 
4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent 
statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have? 
 
 
Methodology: This study’s choice of methods is critical discourse analysis. Individuals whose 
main workstreams are enacted and/or affected by the Prevent statutory duty make up the 
cohort of participants. The processes of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, 
whereby the structuration of governmental institutions both shape and constrict policy will 
form part of this analysis, however it will not be restricted by it (Foucault, 1991: 12). For 
instance, the Bourdieusian concept of ‘bureaucratic fields’ is particularly pertinent to the 
focus on education as a mechanism of Prevent (Bourdieu, 2014: 112). Thematic analysis of 
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the data will be collated, and any emergent theories or concepts will be observed and 
evaluated.   
 
1:1 semi structured interviews of the following cohorts form the basis of the investigation: 
 
Fig.2. Sample frame: 
                                        Prevent Managers within the Local Authority    
 
The cohorts above have been selected to illustrate the dynamics of dissemination of the 
Prevent Duty at the community level. The Prevent managers have been selected on the 
basis that they are instrumental in the implementation of the Prevent duty across LAs; they 
are the focal point of the dissemination of the CVE narrative directed by the Home Office. 
Education is the primary mechanism or ‘field of bureaucracy’ in which the Prevent Duty is 
 
Have a statutory duty: legally obliged to cooperate   
 
Do not have a statutory duty: co-opted or coerced 
into cooperation   
 
 LA Schools  
 Private schools  
 Universities   
 
 Community Based Organisations (CBOs)  
 community advocates   
 NGOs working with and 
constructing/delivering Prevent based 
materials  
42 
 
delivered and as such schools have been selected to observe this dynamic (Bourdieu, 1994: 
2). This will provide an interesting contrast within the dataset and elicits an opportunity to 
test the applicability of one of the principles of governmentality – the role the language of 
economics plays within the praxis of governmental institutions and policy.  
 
Analogously, NGOs facilitating Prevent at the community level are doing so with the primary 
aim of generating a profit. Where they differ however is that they are choosing to do so, 
being a clear example of the intersection between neo-liberal governance and civil society. 
Finally, CBOs have been selected because they have no legal obligation to engage with the 
Prevent Duty. However, they are actively courted by the LA and there are consequences if 
these advances are rejected. This provides an opportunity to investigate the incentivization 
techniques used to engage with CBOs and to test implications to forms of resistance from 
vulnerable communities. All the participants have been drawn from four specific LAs. All the 
LAs have received designated funding from the Home Office to deliver Prevent as they have 
been deemed areas of high risk. All the cases under investigation allow the study to test the 
flexibility of the duty and observe instances of modification. The reader will now be 
provided with a brief breakdown of the thesis chapter structure:   
 
 
 
 
1.4. Thesis structure    
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
This chapter provides the reader with the key background information on the formation of 
CVE initiatives such as Prevent and it statutory duty in the UK context. It has introduced 
radicalisation theory as the methodological foundation of Prevent as a CVE initiative and its 
inherent flaws. It has also focused upon the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, which 
has explanatory value in navigating the landscape of bureaucracy that both enables and 
safeguards Prevent, despite its many failings. It has presented to the reader the 
Bourdieusian concept of the bureaucratic field, and how that helps elicit the role education 
plays in the delivery of Prevent.  The focus of this research and the gap in the current 
understanding found in the existing literature is deliberated and the overall research aim, 
individual research objects and sample frame have been outlined and justified.    
 
Chapter 2.  Theoretical foundation: Governmentality and the formation of Ideal types 
This chapter will begin by exploring the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality, whereby the gatekeepers of knowledge are controlled by the languages of 
governance.  It will then build on the previous chapter’s assertions based on the 
construction of ideal types in CVE initiatives and shows how this fits within this praxis. The 
historical foundations of CVE that can be found in the colonial exploits of western powers, 
namely the British Empire will be discussed.  It will provide a historiography (using empirical 
examples) of CVE initiatives in action from the past to contemporary contexts. Finally, it will 
examine the core principal of COIN initiatives i.e. the formation of ideal types and deliberate 
how they are both its core strength and weakness.  
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Chapter 3: Radicalisation theory: Modus Operandi of CVE  
The following chapter will focus on the theoretical model of contemporary CVE,  
radicalisation theory. It will move on to discuss how a closed research community has 
developed around this philosophy and show how the processes of governmentality has 
created the nexus upon which this body politick revolves.  This chapter concludes by 
discussing the gap in current understanding found within the academic literature at large 
that this study is designed to fill by reviewing the current critical discourse surround prevent 
and CVE initiatives.   
 
Chapter 4: Research Methods  
This chapter discusses and justifies the chosen research strategy (critical discourse analysis) 
and data collection techniques (centred on 1:1, semi-structured interviews) which have 
been adopted by the researcher in the empirical collection of data. The specifics and 
reasoning of the sample frame are provided along with a detailed description of the 
framework for analysis found within the praxis of governmentality that is employed within 
this study. This chapter concludes with a discussion on the limitations of the adopted 
approaches in terms of validity and reliability.       
 
 
Chapter 5.  Analysis: Prevent Managers  
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 In the first instance, the findings from the interviews with the Prevent managers are 
discussed, which are structured around the specific research objectives outlined in the 
introduction and methods chapters. The framework of analysis is used to create a synthesis 
of understanding from the data obtained through the 1:1 semi-structured interviews which 
is then deliberated within the praxis of governmentality and the bureaucratic field. The 
findings argue that the Prevent managers act in a pastoral capacity, disseminating 
knowledge and acting as a point of contact for those within the LA who have a statutory 
duty, whilst simultaneously courting influence over communities deemed at risk that do not 
have a statutory duty, primarily through economic means. Bureaucratic language is a core 
modus of their activity and how they maintain their position within the localised hierarchy. 
They also adhere to the Home Office and must pass on data they collect through their 
activity within the LA. Finally, they also act as a conduit for private enterprise – a symbiotic 
relationship between NGOs who operate within a CVE context is encouraged which acts as a 
legitimiser for both parties.       
 
Chapter 6. Analysis: Education providers   
Education is the primary modus operandi for the Prevent statutory duty. This chapter’s 
primary focus is on education providers and how they operationalise the Prevent duty. How 
different types of education providers make sense of this legal requirement and what its 
delivery looks like in real terms. Responses from state secondary schools (some of which 
that have a further education contingent), universities and private schools form the focus of 
this analysis. The data elicits that there are variated responses across the spectrum of the 
cohort both in favour and as detractors, however that there is often little resistance from 
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education providers to the Prevent duty. There are tangible links between the Prevent 
Managers and the cohort, as well as with private NGOs who have created resources and 
delivered sessions within educational settings.   
 
Chapter 7. Analysis: NGOs  
This chapter concentrates on NGOs and their role in the dissemination and facilitation of 
Prevent across LAs. Examples from both the localised setting and the national context are 
discussed. The analysis shows that NGOs legitimise their practice in two major ways: by 
utilising bureaucratic language which is facilitated by employing ex LA personnel and by 
offering packages that produce the results the LA and the duty demand at a price point 
below what the education providers and LAs would pay if produced by themselves. Close 
relationships are created and maintained with Prevent managers, who often act as 
gatekeepers to the NGOs revenue streams.   
 
Chapter 8. Analysis: CBOs and community advocates  
This chapter focuses on CBOs and their interactions with the LA and Prevent managers 
specifically. The analysis shows that there is general apathy towards Prevent from targeted 
communities and there is little scope for resistance. Prevent managers have actively 
engaged with the community on projects designed to gather data but advocates felt like 
their actual concerns are not being meaningfully heard. On the other hand, CBOs who 
actively engage with Prevent managers on a regular basis do receive (mostly) economic 
benefit from this – often this is delivered as resources rather than actual monetary 
exchange.      
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Chapter 9. Conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter revisits the overall aim and objectives of this study: to analyse the ideological 
pretences of the Prevent programme; assessing the dissemination of Prevent at the 
community level; examining how community level organisations adopt, modify or reject 
Prevent and investigating the role of third-party organisations in facilitating Prevent. The 
findings will be summarized and related to the specific research objectives. The key findings 
will derive conclusions that will be used to make recommendations, primarily aimed at the 
research community who create CVE models and the policy makers that enact their 
methodologies. The limitations of this analysis are also acknowledged, along with a 
discussion related to managing the implementation of the recommendations made. The 
overall contribution to knowledge this piece of research has generated is clarified along with 
a dedicated section of self-reflection, to provide the reader with a personal account of the 
processes and pitfalls encountered by the researcher when undertaking this work.    
 
Bibliography and Indices 
This study uses the Harvard APA 6th edition system of referencing; an alphabetical listing of 
the literary sources referred to in this work along with a list of tables and figures can be 
found at the end of this thesis.  
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Chapter 2. Theoretical foundation: Governmentality and the 
formation of Ideal types.  
This thesis investigates how in the early 21st century political violence has come to be 
engaged with by the State in terms of ‘dispersed and discontinuous offensives (Foucault 
2004a: 5).’ The ‘thematic’ presented in the form of extremism and terrorism – in relation to 
the Foucauldian concept of governmentality – offers many different potential routes to 
action or, ‘problematics (Chatterjee, 1993: 38).’ This chapter will firstly demonstrate the 
problematic posed by CVE discourse and the nexus between security and governmentality it 
inhabits by providing a historiography of the colonial origins of its methodology. I will use 
the empirical examples of 19th century colonial India, the Mau Mau rebellion in 1950s Kenya 
and the Troubles in Northern Ireland to show the evolution of counter-insurgency practices 
employed by the British state that have produced the precursor technologies of the CVE 
apparatus the Prevent statutory duty utilises. 
 
Although Prevent is primarily deposited as a security apparatus with homeland security in 
mind, it is the product of the transitional growth of risk produced from the ever-increasing 
globalised nature of governance. Western powers such as the UK largely hold onto their 
hegemonic position within the new global order through careful management of their 
ideological propriety – that of the liberal democracy– and economic prosperity, often at the 
behest of their former colonial states. The liberal order constructed by Western powers in 
the contemporary setting has created a whole new set of ‘antagonisms’ for governments 
charged with insuring against the threat of western homogeny in the post-colonial context. 
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The continuum of risk to the Western State is now decided upon by the relationships 
‘between those who produce risk definitions and those who consume them (Beck, 1992: 
46).’  
 
This new identity of the nation State, that of the ‘risk society’, creates ‘communities of 
danger’ that, according to Beck (1992: 48), can only be organised at the supranational level 
– a ‘world society’ of risk management. However, notions of ‘sovereignty’ still determine 
many matters of the nation State, which can lead to an impasse when dealing with 
supranational security concerns (Dean, 2013: 137-138).  For Beck (1992: 75), the ‘political 
inaction’ induced by the inability of nation States to cooperate over real risks to the global 
context – for example, racial inequality – creates a global multiplicity of ‘scapegoat’ 
societies.  In this paradigm, the actual ‘hazards’ to the liberal order are ignored – ‘displaced 
from the screen of consciousness’ – and are replaced by artificial risks that are often 
attributed to constructed suspect communities that point out the real dangers to the body 
politick (Beck, 1992: 75-76). In the UK context, British Muslims continually point out they are 
subject to widespread discrimination and Islamophobia which marginalises their 
community. However, The British state largely ignores this circumstance and instead focuses 
on their perceived vulnerability to committing acts of extremism. It is also important to note 
that the British Islamic community have continually labelled the Prevent duty as ‘alienating 
and provocative’, adding fuel to the fire for ‘an increasingly frustrated Muslim youth’, who 
believe themselves to be British citizens in name only (Ansari, 2018: 21).  
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Common sense would dictate this response on pragmatic grounds, where the methods used 
to identify the young person as a fellow citizen on a railway platform – to use Sir Richard 
Dearlove’s example – may want to blow themselves up.  What is interesting from the former 
Head of British Secret Intelligence’s view of the danger we all face, is that ‘a set of beliefs 
whose virulence is in total disharmony with our liberal democratic and tolerant values’ 
should be held by an individual that is ‘a fellow citizen in much more than name in our 
multicultural society (Dearlove in Johnson 2010: 37).’ The equivalent of ‘M’ in real life goes 
on to explain, as the typical expert, that the actual statistical likelihood of being killed in a 
suicide bombing is extremely remote. Regardless of this reality and in agreement with 
Dearlove, over 23,000 individuals are monitored by MI5 as suspects of extremism within the 
UK. Col Richard Kemp, a former chair of the Cobra Intelligence Group, an advisory body that 
coordinates the work streams of both MI5 and MI6, describes this number to the BBC as 
‘the tip of the iceberg.  (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-40409658/estimates-for-uk-
based-terrorists-are-tip-of-iceberg).’  
 
Regardless of how ridiculous the notion that over 23,000 extremists who mean to enact or 
support acts of domestic terrorism reside on British soil at any one time actually is – to add 
some perspective, at its peak Camp Bastion in Afghanistan housed around 40,000 military 
personnel – this statistic has been used to justify sweeping changes under counter-terrorism 
legislation to current policing methods. In terms of port and border controls, authorities 
have the power to stop, search and detain an individual for up to 6 hours without the need 
of prior knowledge under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. According to the House of 
Commons briefing paper released on 6 October 2017, data pertinent to Schedule 7 is only 
available from 1 April 2009. Between 2009-2017, 392, 921 such ‘examinations’ where 
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conducted. In terms of ethnicity of those targeted, 38% are described as white (no 
indication of country of origin is given) 26% of those stopped described themselves as Asian 
or Asian British, 18% described themselves as Black or Black British, and 28% described 
themselves as of another ethnicity or declined to comment (Allen and Dempsey, 2017:9).    
 
The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 also allows border control agencies to enforce 
Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) following instruction from the office of the Secretary of 
State. According to the then Secretary of State Amber Rudd and the Home Office Report she 
commissioned in February 2017, once an individual is deemed liable for a TEO, it ‘makes it 
unlawful for the subject to return to the UK without engaging with the UK authorities.’ This 
is implemented through cancelling the TEO subject’s travel documents and adding them to 
‘watch lists.’  
 
Perhaps even more concerning, the 2014 Immigration Act has given the government 
statutory powers to strip British Nationals of their citizenship if they are believed to have 
fought in the Syrian conflict, although evidence of fighting or what constitutes it are vague, 
as jihadi bride Shamina Begum would surely testify. The only official figures publicly released 
by the government are for the period between 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015, 
whereby there are 5 document usages of this power (Home Office, 2017b:25).  However, it 
has been widely reported in the press that up to 2017, around 150 UK citizens have been 
made stateless through this legislative mechanism (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/jul/30/uk-has-stripped-150-jihadists-and-criminals-of-citizenship).   
52 
 
The erosion of freedoms described in the examples of TEOs, stop and search procedures and 
stripping British citizens of their citizenship are just some of many made under the pretext 
of security from acts of terrorism, however, they are met with little to no resistance from 
the public at large. The ‘passivity’ of citizens within the ‘new urban’ landscape of 
metropolitan states such as the UK has established a ‘repressive space’, whereby the 
individual is removed from the mechanisms of their local community, including how it is 
policed (Lefebvre, 2003: 181-182). The social order is implied by those who govern, design, 
build and maintain the urban landscape, not by those who inhabit it. For Febvre (1973: 48), 
the urban landscape not only dominates our geographies but also our collective 
consciousness; they have become the physical manifestation of the State’s power. The 
administration of State occurs almost exclusively within the confines of the urban landscape 
and as such, the street becomes the perfect space for insurrections against it. The urban 
landscape is the physical ‘frontiére’ or boundary of the State’s expression of power, which it 
fervently polices (Febrve, 1973: 208).  
 
In the contemporary UK context, policing has become an indispensable feature of 
governmental power as it constructs the terrorist subject. The MI5 watchlists, enhanced 
stop and search powers and TEOs are all examples of the boundaries set by State, which 
limit the capacity of the observer to define exactly who a terrorist or extremist is. The 
‘power’ exerted by the State in this instance has three distinct apparatus or dispostifis, the 
‘law’, ‘discipline’ and ‘security’ which it uses to formulate its system of domination over its 
populations (Foucault, 2007: 108). These dispostifis are best described in their totality as the 
‘economies of power’, with ‘security’ acting as the government’s ‘essential technical 
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instrument’ on which all other apparatuses revolve (Foucault, 2007: 109). Security 
mechanisms hold such prominence because they are employed by the administrative arm of 
State that seeks too surveil and categorise the ‘mass of population’ to unlock its 
‘knowledges (Foucault, 2007: 110).’ The State then uses this knowledge base to legitimise its 
claims of sovereignty over its populations, often using emergencies to further its means of 
surveillance and control (Dean, 2013: 48). The example set by the UK government’s 
response to terrorist threat is a perfect illustration of the emergency created by acts of 
terrorism being used by government to make sweeping changes to legislation that enhance 
their powers of discipline which would ordinarily face stiff opposition by society if viewed in 
isolation (Dean, 2013: 50).  
 
In his lectures from 1976 that take alternative regimes of truth or ‘subjugated knowledges’ 
as the starting point, Foucault (2004a: 5) regards ‘the strange efficacy’ of discourses that 
challenge systematised forms of understanding about the nature of social order. To be more 
precise, Foucault (1977: 217), when speaking of the state’s response to challenges to its 
sovereignty in his work Discipline and Punish argues that the (deemed) hostile individuals or 
groups are ‘carefully fabricated’ within the ‘centralization of knowledge’ that surrounds the 
prevailing conceptions of social order. This form of governance can be found in 
contemporary CVE initiatives across the globe, targeting and countering the narrative of 
extremist recruiters online. The focus put upon the identification of risky discourses is in 
part due to the ‘growth of the informational economy’ that seeks to further the liberal 
pacification of counter ideologies found within the wider global sphere (Duffield, 2001: 46). 
In the contemporary context, the online space is one of the primary sites of the counter-
54 
 
identification of such threats to the liberal order. The liberal nation State finds itself 
incapable of managing this space without contradicting the logic of ‘market liberalisation’ 
that is a cornerstone of its ideology (Duffield, 2001: 47).  
 
The liberal State’s answer to this question is to open such concerns to the market itself.  
NGOs have taken advantage of the liberal States inability to administer its will legitimately 
within ‘unstable regions’ of the global body politick – both at home and abroad (Duffield, 
2001: 54). They also can work in a supranational fashion, becoming the de-facto ‘advocates 
of international reform’ that they promote through the international network of NGO – 
State interactions (Duffield, 2001: 54-55). A participant of this study, a senior project 
manager for an international NGO with a CVE focus, details how they work across national 
boundaries on a daily basis. In one instance they are focused on a project in Lebanon that is 
investigating “the impact of Daesh content” on Muslim youth communities in the online 
space. In another, they are working with the UK government to “utilise the online space for 
ethnographical research” regarding the growth of the far-right in economically deprived 
areas. Such interactions between NGOs and nation States is becoming ‘increasingly 
formalised’ within the global context, with supranational organisations such as the EU 
looking to congregate the approaches of nation States to their homeland security, with the 
internet being a focus point in the contemporary context (Duffield, 2001: 56).  
 
The EU, which adopts a four-tier strategy (Protect, Pursue, Prevent and Respond) that is, for 
all intents and purposes identical to the UK example found in CONTEST, denotes that all EU 
member states must ‘develop common approaches to spot and tackle problem behaviour, 
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in particular the misuse of the internet (European Council, 2005: 9).’  Then Prime Minister of 
the UK Teresa May in her speech to the G7 leaders in May 2017 maintained that the fight 
against ISIS and its contemporaries is shifting from the ‘battlefield to the internet’, even 
though such discourse has been prevalent within counter-terrorism legislation since the mid 
2000’s  (https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/25/theresa-may-calls-on-tech-
giants-to-lead-fight-against-online-extremism). Although this agenda is widely pushed by 
state actors and CVE agencies, there is little to no evidence within academic discourse 
linking the proliferation of extremist material and acts of terrorism. In reality, studying the 
interactions between online and offline activities of individuals is seriously hampered by the 
lack of access to subjects to study (Behr et.al., 2015: 21).   
 
The reliance of the State on unsubstantiated patterns in extremist behaviour to use as 
roadmaps to safety is an example of government’s ‘obligation’ to purport a ‘regime of 
truth’, even considering evidence that such truths could be anything but (Foucault, 2014a: 
93). Such obligations are underpinned by State actors attempts to circumvent the ‘moral 
offence’ of lacking efficiency, or to be more exact, ‘discipline (Foucault, 1977: 154).’ For the 
State to maintain its position of power, which translates to control through the biopolitical, 
it must also maintain the illusion that it is infallible (Dean, 2013: 29). Dean (2013: 19-20) 
considers that the ‘shadow of the sovereign’ looms over Foucault’s analysis of 
contemporary manifestations of State power even though he is cautious about its 
explanatory value. However, much like the religious institutions whom Foucault (1991: 88) 
would proclaim contemporary modes of governance imitate, the State must also emulate 
the sovereign forms of governance that preceded it (Dean, 2013: 137).   
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Foucault’s self-ironising tendency aside, if we are to examine how State and non-State 
actors alike are mobilised in the effort to eliminate the danger of terrorist events, the 
conceptual scheme of analysis has to include the locations where these dispersed and 
discontinuous offensives against the democratic order or regime meet.  
 
For Krasner (1985: 185) the relationship between ‘regimes and related outcomes and 
behaviour’ is paramount to understanding such dynamics that traverse the ‘principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures’ which dictate our behaviour as citizens. It is 
also important to appreciate the differences between ‘evolutionary knowledge’, ergo 
knowledge devised to propagate a current regime’s sphere of influence and ‘revolutionary 
knowledge’, which is designed to create regime change (Krasner, 1985: 204).  Not 
surprisingly, state and government actors are often drawn towards research that is 
‘evolutionary’ in scope as it both instils hegemony and creates space for innovation, 
something that is needed to compete in the global economy (Schumpeter, 1964: 3). 
Regimes of knowledge are both driven by public policy issues as well as tasked with steering 
them. A problem is presented when such regimes of knowledge are not consistent with the 
problem being faced, such as a danger to the State’s claim to preserve our way of life, or 
even more seriously, to life in general from within its own populace. In terms of current 
counter-terrorism policy and its enactment, the dominant regime of knowledge must start 
investigating society for ‘subjugated knowledges’ of people who appear to be like citizens 
but, as deemed by their actions, are not (Foucault, 2004a: 5).  
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Foucault (1977: 149-150) asserts that mechanisms of power have become entrenched in a 
system of ‘discipline’ that is governed by state level bureaucracy in the form of the judiciary 
and penal systems.  This system, he argues, creates ‘docile bodies’, those who conform to 
the mechanisms of power’s ‘will’ to evade the possibility of punishment and those who 
resist it despite the risks involved in doing so (Foucault, 1977: 74). As such, any effective 
forms of sovereign government must pre-empt resistances (which necessitates) the 
production of knowledge that is collected beyond what is understood to be ‘liberal, 
democratic and tolerant values (Dearlove in Johnson, 2010: p.37).’ I argue that to fully 
examine the relationship between State, regimes of knowledge and the behaviour of its 
citizens it is paramount to understand the effects of a governmental state of mind, or in 
Foucault’s (1991: 88) words ‘governmentality.’ This chapter will begin by discussing how civil 
society is shaped by this ‘state of mind’ of government. Furthermore, it will examine how 
governmentality has formed both enclaves of perceived collective danger that operate in 
resistance to the state and in contrast the communities of experts who actively work to 
embody it.     
 
2.1: Governmentality: a government state of mind.   
 
The concept of Governmentality can be broadly understood as the ‘art of government’, or 
conversely, the ‘conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1991: 89-90).’  In more didactic terms, power 
mechanisms have sought to shape, influence, and even design the conduct of those it seeks 
to control (Gordon, 1991: 3).  Foucault (1991: 91) denotes that the themes of governance in 
the modern era are consolidated upon the notion of self-identity and self-regulation. To 
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govern well, it is important to understand how to govern oneself, which demonstrates to 
those who you seek to govern how to act and in turn, to govern their own behaviour and of 
those around them (Dean, 2010: 10-11). For Foucault (2008: 4), this scenario is the 
foundation of normative society and the birthplace of ‘biopolitics’, the notion that human 
beings, not the state itself, provide the sovereignty for governance in the contemporary 
context. The security that the state provides is determined by the biographies of its citizens 
(Foucault, 2008: 5).  As such, government is perceived to be a rationalised actor (Mills, 1956: 
242).  
 
The rise of biopolitics as the legitimiser of the actions of government may well be a recent 
development in the art of governance, however the reliance on the individual to self-
regulate is not.  Foucault (1991: 89) denotes that western states are structured around the 
pretext of religious institutions, in particular Christianity. Governments are patriarchal; 
Foucault uses the analogy of the Shepherd and his Flock – the pastor delivering the sermon 
to the pastorate (Dean, 2010: 91). Ideology is central to this form of governance; who 
belongs, in this context – the citizen and who does not – the extremist; the saint and the 
sinner (Foucault, 2001: 221). Foucault (2001: 222) also alludes to the production and 
protection of knowledges or dispositifs that underpin such pastoral forms of governance. He 
uses the example of the early Catholic church’s exclusive use of Latin within their written 
texts and bibles which could only be read by a learned priesthood; if you wanted to access 
the Word of God you had to do so through the church (Foucault, 2001:233).  In the 
contemporary context, power structures also protect access to the knowledge of 
governance through the restriction of language. In sum, legitimisation to govern is gained 
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via perceived expertise. Interaction with power mechanisms is deliberated by the ability to 
speak governmentally – through the language of law, economics, security or to be more 
precise, the language of bureaucracy (Dean, 2010: 140).  
 
Bureaucracy is born of the ‘logic of hazard prevention’, where those who wield it seek to 
‘prevent what must be prevented’ by creating mechanism of power that enable the State to 
attain ‘dictatorship over dangers (Beck, 1992: 78-79).’ Although it may seem a worthy 
endeavour of the State to create political action that is designed to safeguard society from 
danger, there are consequences to the overuse of bureaucratic mechanisms. When 
persistent risks to the biopolitik present themselves, there are often calls to legitimatise 
‘totalitarian’ measures from society at large. Bureaucratic mechanisms are often 
manipulated by actors that wish to impose such measures because they are the perfect tool 
do so. This is largely due to the fact that although they can promote moralistic discourse, 
they are not bound by it. More often than not, by looking to avoid the worst, the State ends 
up creating ‘something even worse’ by enshrining in law processes that ‘threaten the 
continued existence of the democratic political system (Beck, 1992: 80).’   
 
In the UK context, homeland security is maintained by the CONTEST framework, the UK’s 
counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy consists of four main work streams for state 
officers: 
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 Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks 
Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism 
Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack 
Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.  
(Home Office, 2011: 6). 
 
The four work streams detailed above all offer problematics at the state level in logistical 
terms, with Prevent in particular posing complications with the rule of law by operating in a 
pre-criminal space.  
 
 A premise of accountability for the Prevent strategy is founded on the notion that ‘some 
terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and 
circulated by apparently non-violent organisations (Home Office, 2011:9).’ In fact, little 
distinction is made by surveillance and security agencies between violent and non-violent 
actors. Theresa May, when writing the foreword for the Counter-Extremism Strategy as 
Home Secretary in 2015, describes the focus of the revised strategy to encompass the ‘full 
spectrum of extremism: violent and non-violent, Islamist and neo-Nazi – hate and fear in all 
their forms (May, 2015: 7).’ Conventionally, citizens could protest peacefully against any 
State actions they deemed un-democratic, but now there are cases of exception where the 
traditional distinction of political resistance to State authority now no longer applies. The 
Home Office’s distinction (or lack thereof) between violent and non-violent extremism 
compounds this issue, becoming an innovation par excellence, of Schmitt’s (2005:26) ‘state 
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of exception.’ Ultimately, this tautology is used as justification for State level, multi-agency 
facilitated targeted surveillance of communities deemed at risk.  
  
It is not only at the State level that such issues are addressed. There is a whole system of 
NGOs that specifically exist to address the problematic of effective CVE techniques. Some, 
like the RAND Corporation, an NGO think tank for the US administration that offers ‘expert’ 
research and analysis, have successfully influenced states’ responses to extremism 
worldwide (Todd et.al. 2017: 1-2).    
 
Other civil society organisations operate in opposition to the above. CAGE, an ‘independent 
advocacy organisation’ cite policing and surveillance methods that employ the radicalisation 
process (advocated for by organisations such as RAND) as ‘the abuse of due process and the 
erosion of the rule of law (CAGE, 2016: 38).’ They argue further that this instance is creating 
divisions within communities that may lead to acts of terrorism. Although both the 
examples of RAND and CAGE offered above operate within the same field and look to 
influence similar audiences, both have contrasting abilities to do so. RAND and their 
activities are funded by both U.S. and international government agencies and ministries, 
local government, colleges and universities, foundations, industry, professional associations, 
and other non-profit organizations. They also have research centres in 53 countries 
worldwide, including the US, Australia, and most of Europe, including the UK (RAND, 2015: 
39).  In comparison, CAGE have been operating without a bank account since 2014 because 
their outreach coordinator, Moazzam Begg, former Guantanamo Bay detainee and political 
activist, was again detained under terror charges but was released three months later 
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without charge. CAGE continue to stipulate that they are put under ‘sustained pressure’ by 
UK state authorities (CAGE, 2015: 6).  
 
The space in which RAND proliferate and CAGE falter is one of the numerous ‘bureaucratic 
fields’ of State which facilitate its mechanisms of governance (Bourdieu, 1994: 3). Bourdieu 
(2014: 11) would likely assert that security, one of Foucault’s (2007: 108) central dispotifis, is 
the primary modus of the bureaucratic field inhabited by RAND, and to a lesser extent, 
CAGE. To be precise, RAND and its contemporaries inhabit the field of security expertise. 
RAND enjoy more access to the ‘field’ of security expertise in the UK context (as well as 
across the world) because they do not challenge the ‘symbolic power’ of the State (Loyal, 
2017: 83-84). In fact, their actions are designed to empower it. RAND replicate the 
‘restricted narratives’ set by the State when categorising or codifying the threats against it 
(Loyal, 2017: 84). CAGE, acting in opposition to the UK government are challenging the 
State’s capacity to ensure the ‘defence of the social (Bourdieu, 2014: 20).’  When comparing 
the fortunes of RAND and CAGE, the capacity of CAGE to influence the UK government is 
restricted because the ‘exchange rate’ of their philosophy falls short of the State’s 
expectations. Ultimately, in the State’s estimations, CAGE lack the ‘cultural capital’ that 
RAND possesses (Bourdieu, 1996: 264-265).       
 
In this instance the language of bureaucracy is also the language of State (Foucault, 1977: 
138). This is the corporate element in Foucault’s delineation of the ways in which the 
political anatomy of the State becomes transformed into the ‘mechanics’ of power. For 
example, the State now produces competition between such bodies as RAND and their 
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contemporaries for defence budgets that they deem are best able to deliver security to the 
citizen. The bureaucrat’s pen is truly mightier than the King’s sword.    
 
In the examples of RAND and CAGE, RAND offers a narrative that better fits the State’s 
current capabilities and resources. In particular, RAND’s narrative of threat to the civilian 
domain is specifically State-oriented; this piecemeal social engineering requires a circle of 
expertise that is responsive to acts of spectacular violence. In contrast, CAGE’s open critique 
of state mechanisms will not be co-opted into this pre-existing model as its agenda is more 
difficult to bureaucratise than the alternative posited by RAND and its contemporaries. This 
is primarily due to CAGE’s design – it takes a form of ideological resistance the State cannot 
modify through bureaucratic or economic means. 
 
Foucault (1977: 138) describes this environment as guided by ‘a multiplicity of often minor 
processes, of different origin and scattered location’ which imitate one another, only 
distinguishing themselves through eliciting ‘their domain of application.’ This creates a 
‘micro-physics of power’ that is often governed by forces that are not necessarily best 
placed to offer the most appropriate solution to a socio-political concern (Foucault, 1977: 
139).  For instance, RAND is a multinational corporation that was created from an arm of the 
United States air force following the Second World War. Although it has undergone many 
transformations between that time and now, it is still primarily a research organisation 
focused on the development of technologies of war. It is not best placed to present 
solutions to issues that manifest at the community level within populations such as the 
Muslim communities of the UK, which it has no tangible connection to. On the other hand, 
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CAGE has tangible connections with British Muslim community, although it is also important 
to note that its capacity to act as a conduit of the British Islamic community is constrained.      
 
Although it can be argued that the distribution of security apparatuses beyond the scope of 
traditional governmental bodies is a step towards more accountability, their actions are still 
limited by the bureaucratic mechanisms found within government (Dean, 2010: 136). It is 
also important to note that the role of the expert has not always been able to operate 
outside the realms of traditional governmental structures. In fact, the security expert has a 
long history steeped within the colonial past of western powers. For instance, the exploits of 
the Great British Empire and its counter insurgency (COIN) practices created the 
foundations for the theory utilised by RAND and its contemporaries today. As discussed in 
the introductory chapter, the British empire employed the educational field to manage its 
potentially seditious populations in its colonial states. This chapter will now examine the 
educational field’s role in the creation of the security expert and how they have used 
typologies and ideal types to shape contemporary CVE initiatives such as Prevent.     
 
2.2. Ideal types, the language of commerce and the creation of the security expert.  
 
It is widely regarded within the security community that the restructuring of the British 
army and its units from standalone entities to a more centralised organisation (with the 
treasury providing oversight) during the latter half of the 19th century created the role of 
the security expert (Luengo-Gutiérrez and Smith, 2016: 139-140). Well into the 1800’s, For 
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those that served in the military, rank was largely designated to those at birth; high ranking 
officers were also members of high society, with the Duke of Cambridge, a member of the 
royal family acting as ‘Commander in Chief’ of the British army between 1856-1895 (Hevia, 
2012: 38). However, following a report commissioned by Lord Panmure on the role of the 
Scientific Corp, it was found that the education of the specialised units and of the wider 
army were not of the same standard of its European rivals (Hevia, 2012: 41-42).  
 
Although military reform was a long and drawn out process, real change ensued. By the 
1870s there was a shift in how officers were recruited, from personal recommendations 
made by those in power to public examinations that were supervised by the Civil Service 
Commission (Hevia, 2012: 43). Once recruited, officers went through various training 
regimes depending on their specialism of choice. Would-be officers would first have to ‘pass 
out’ from the newly formed Military academy before being allowed to take positions within 
the field. If officers wished to move up the chain of command it was required that they take 
further specialised training (Hevia, 2012: 44-45).   
 
The ‘engineer’ in this new, modern British Army of the 19th century was the precursor for 
the intelligence services we see today (Braun, 2014: 2-3). Their skills in map drawing and 
surveying terrain were imperative to early reconnaissance work. This put them in a position 
of power and cemented their worth (Luengo-Gutiérrez and Smith, 2016: 141). The work of 
engineers, the new experts within the field whose maps and critical observations created a 
tapestry of information made colonial territories visible to the bureaucratic mechanisms of 
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government back within the UK for the first time. Dedicated Intelligence services inevitably 
established themselves within the data yielded by such engineers.  
 
Although the primary focus of the activities of the British Army at that time were threats 
generated by other nations engaged in empire building of their own, the British Empire had 
security problems within its own borders where intelligence was beginning to be used more 
frequently. William Wilson Hunter, a Scottish historian cum statistician who rose through 
the ranks of Indian Civil Service, eventually reaching Bengal Presidency in 1862, compiled 9 
volumes of the Imperial Gazetteer of India, an encyclopaedia of sorts detailing the 
geography, history, economics and administration of the Indian sub-continent which he had 
been requested to provide as a ‘statistical survey of the country’ by the British government 
in the late-1860s (Frowde, 1909: 5-6).   
 
During his tenure, Hunter had several security concerns to contend with. In particular, the 
Muslim population of Bengal, then referred to as the ‘Indian Muslamans’ posed a significant 
threat. A decade or so before Hunter’s tenure as the President of Bengal in 1857, a large 
proportion of the Indian British Army made up of Bengali Muslims mutinied and led a revolt 
that lasted until 1858 when Imperial rule was re-established. Subsequently, rebel groups 
persisted in the Northern territories of India for decades, permitting raids on British held 
regions, killing subjects of the empire as well as recruiting conspirators from the Bengal to 
their cause (Hunter, 1876: 9).   
 
67 
 
Hunter’s (1876: 10-11) conclusion on why Muslim Bengali resistance was so prevalent 
during the British occupation of India does not differ significantly to that found in today’s 
popular conceptions of radical Islam. For example, Hunter (1876: 11)  declares that ‘[Fatawa 
or Shariatic rulings] will convince every reasonable mind, that while the more reckless of the 
Musalmans have for years been engaged in overt treason, the whole community has been 
agitated by the greatest State Question that ever occupied the thoughts of a people.’ Here 
Hunter is essentially claiming that Islam’s creed that Allah is the only sovereign is not 
compatible with the imperial vison of the British state. In making these assumptions, Hunter 
(1876: 217-218) draws upon information obtained by his network of intelligence agents. He 
pinpoints scholars in Arabia and their influence on the scholars within India, who in turn he 
argued had motivated the actions of the Bengali rebel groups. What is perhaps quite 
surprising for a man of his time and station is Hunter’s (1876: 146) notions on how best to 
nullify the tensions within occupied Bengal. He argued that conceptions of British statehood 
should not have been forced on the Muslim population as it only perpetuates the grievances 
that entrench the rebel cause.  
 
The raison d’Etat for Britain’s attempts at imperial state building in Hunter’s India is an 
experiment in native-sovereign disciplinary power. The imperial security state Britain 
constructed during the latter half of the 19th century in India forced them to recognise the 
biopolitical power of a restive Muslim population that could not be controlled via sovereign 
power alone. This becomes the point at which sovereign and disciplinary power are 
reinvented ‘not as opposite forms of power but as different technologies of government 
(Lemke, 2013: 53).’ Hunter’s understanding of the Bengali Muslim insurgency in India can be 
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directly transposed on the contemporary understanding of the home-grown terrorist 
perpetuated by the experts of today. Ultimately, the British Empire failed to nullify the 
Bengali concern, in fact it left it to a newly formed India to deal with following the collapse 
of British rule in 1947.   
 
For Devji (2017:19), the revival of the narratives created by colonial experts such as Hunter 
by his modern-day equivalents is not surprising. It gives historical context and thus some 
sense of predictability; it fits the model of governmentality discussed by Foucault (1991; 89-
91), where he signifies the role of ideal types in creating a typology of who belongs and who 
does not – who is friend and who is foe. The narratives perpetuated by academia are equally 
prolix, fixated on the role of ‘propaganda’, focused on being an aide to policy makers rather 
than their ‘scholarly integrity’ and the pursuit of knowledge that explains rather than 
attempts to solve problems it has no capability or will to understand (Devji, 2017: 21-22).  
 
British imperial rule in India evolved following WWI. For Ghosh (2017:27), the passage of the 
Government of India Act in 1919 was an opportunity for the British government to diffuse 
tensions generated from ‘radical Indian’ pressure groups who had been committing 
sustained acts of political violence against colonial rule. It purported to extend to the Indian 
people representative power through democratic means, even offering maligned 
marginalised groups such as the Muslim population their own, separate forms of 
governance. In reality, the Act only entrenched long held divisions and hierarchies within 
the populations of India that had been fostered by imperial British rule (Sivanandan, 2006: 
41). Those eligible to vote in elections were severely limited to a subsection of Indian elites. 
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The British government only extended voting rights to members of their respective 
communities that fitted a profile in line with the ideal types constructed decades earlier by 
Hunter and his contemporaries (Ghosh, 2017: 28). It is also important to note that any 
decision made by these newly created democratic councils also had to be ratified by British 
administrators before it was passed – something the British government described as 
fostering ‘responsible government.’ Ultimately, the British did not trust the indigenous 
population to ‘self-govern’ in a way that would not threaten their hegemony (Ghosh, 2017: 
30). Those that did not fit such ideal types were impeded at every turn. The Bengali 
separatists who harried Hunter during his tenure were deemed ‘seditious’ and were 
targeted by legal reforms which made it illegal for them to hold meetings or rallies. If any of 
these individuals were found guilty of sedition by the authorities, they were denied the right 
to a trial by jury, facing a court of three judges selected by the British government who 
would have little sympathy for their cause (Ghosh, 2017: 42-43).    
 
The actions of the British government following the 1919 India Act is a form of muscular 
liberalism (Lemke, 2013: 44). Foucault (2008: 63) is quick to point out that liberal forms of 
governance do not guarantee liberty or freedom as they perhaps suggest doing at face 
value. In fact, the move to more liberal forms of governance is a process that replaces the 
‘external regulation’ of society conducted by the State with an ‘internal production’ of 
discipline where society begins to regulate itself (Lemke, 2013: 45). For this to work within a 
schematic acceptable to the State it must first set the parameters of freedom afforded to 
society. In sum, liberty is not a mechanism to confront the power of the state, but ‘the 
positive effect of government action (Lemke, 2013: 45).’ The State ‘consumes freedom’, it 
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calculates liberty, it uses the knowledges it produces to create the balance between 
‘security and insecurity’ that is essential for its existence (Foucault, 2008: 64; Lemke, 2013: 
46-47).   
 
WWII saw over 2.5 million Indians fighting on behalf of the British Empire in a ‘war for 
freedom’ in Europe and North Africa. When these soldiers returned home the thought of 
their own freedom was at the forefront of their minds (Sivanandan, 2006: 44-45). India 
finally gained its independence following British Parliament passing the Indian 
Independence Act in 1947 (Sivanandan: 2006: 49). Legislative authority was transferred to 
the Indian Constituent Assembly – India’s first parliament. However, the spectre of British 
rule still loomed over the newly formed country.  Violence between Hindu and Muslim 
groups preceded the Act in 1946 – the entrenched hierarchy of Indian identities constructed 
by the British to divide and conquer the sub-continent still very much at play (Subhash and 
Kedia, 2017, 8). The Muslim league demanded a separate constitution and the last British 
Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten decided to separate the colonial territories 
into two separate countries, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and India (Subhash and Kedia, 
2017: 9).  
 
Contemporary CVE initiatives and the research that underpins them is prefixed in the 
colonial advance of western powers such as the UK and France into South Asia and Africa 
(Porch, 2013: 1). In such instances, ‘western values,’ were transposed on indigenous 
populations to produce governance that fitted the narrative found within their own 
governmental systems, which was almost always met with resistance (Porch, 2013: 2). For 
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Gopal (2006: 142-143), it is the separation of ‘subaltern’ or peasant ‘action’ from peasant 
‘consciousness’ by colonial elites and their administrators which led to this dynamic. The 
motivation of rebellion from indigenous populations were wilfully ignored because they 
challenged the narrative being imposed upon them by the State – hear no evil, see no evil. 
For Guha (1988: 45), this is how the ‘prose of counter-insurgency’ became into being. It has 
been specifically designed to distort the ‘optics’ of the observer to the motivations of 
rebellion so that it becomes harder to empathise with it (Guha, 1988: 77). The technological 
superiority of western powers dictated that open warfare was impossible to win for 
indigenous populations. As such, small scale attacks made on a mass scale became common 
place. This created the ‘small wars’ narrative still seen in use across the world in the 
contemporary context (Porch, 2013: 3).   
 
There are many examples of traditional COIN operations within the old British empire, 
however there is perhaps no starker example than the Mau Mau rebellion also known as the 
‘The Emergency’ in Kenya between 1952-1960 (Bennett, 2012: 8). Primarily a conflict 
between the Kikuyu people and British colonists and their loyalist Kikuyu enclaves, the 
rebellion led to the loss of many lives and caused mass displacement of entire communities, 
particularly in the rural areas to the north of the country (Elkins, 2005: 234). The conflict 
itself arose from the disproportionate land use allocated to white European settlers and the 
widespread deprivation of the indigenous population as a result. For the British, there were 
simply two types of Kikuyu during this time, the loyalist Kenyan and the separatist Mau Mau 
(Bruce-Lockhart, 2017: 159-160). The main problem for the British however, was telling 
them apart. The principal strategy of the British administration was to co-opt the indigenous 
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populations to curb their ‘excessive behaviours (Bennett, 2012: 18).’ This endeavour to 
divide and conquer – a tactic employed many times over by the British empire, created 
more unrest. Specifically, the differences in fortunes of colonial appointed Kenyan ‘chiefs’ 
and their communities and the wider population exacerbated these tensions (Bennett, 
2012: 13).  
 
Those that were co-opted by the British government where operationalised through a newly 
embodied intelligence agency. By May 1953, the information collected by the British field 
agents through their networks of informants led to the arrest of 103,379 people, with a 
further 89,820 people being ‘screened’ to discern their threat level (Bennett, 2012: 19). 
Although perhaps not on such brutalist terms, current CVE initiatives such as Prevent also 
use similar mechanisms of co-option and surveillance. Prevent coordinators are actively 
encouraged by the Home Office (2015a: 4-5) to engage with community groups not covered 
under the statutory duty.  Furthermore, the use of informants by the police and intelligence 
services whose remit is to infiltrate populations is commonplace within the UK in the 
contemporary context. In effect, this is an example of the State’s endeavour to control the 
activity of the social body through ‘the means of correct training (Foucault, 1977: 170).’ The 
State recruits informants to acts as its agents with a dualistic purpose, both to inform on 
infractions against the State and to disseminate the ‘suspicious power’ of government to 
recruit new informants from within targeted communities (Foucault, 1977: 170-171).   
 
The Mau Mau capitalised on the unrest created by the mass arrests in 1953 to propel their 
cause, which snowballed during the summer months of 1954 (Bennett, 2012:20). In June 
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1954, the British War council acted hastily to quell this insurgency. They forcefully removed 
the population of the Kikuyu reserves, some 1 million people into 804 villages which were 
put under British Military control, with barb wire fences surrounding each settlement 
(Elkins, 2005: 235). As part of the forced removal, homes were burnt, cattle and crops 
destroyed, and any resistance was met with deadly force. The conditions within the villages 
themselves were equally dire. There were not enough huts to effectively house all the 
detainees, therefore it was not uncommon for two or more families to occupy a hut that 
would struggle to house one (Elkins, 2005: 240). This region was targeted by the British 
government because it had been known to be occupied by militant Mau Mau groups, who 
used the scattered homesteads as a supply line (Bennett, 2012: 23).  
 
The British explained the use of such tactics to its detractors by proclaiming that it was for 
the communities of Kenya’s own good, that the camps were not imprisonment but a form of 
protection, that it was an opportunity to spread civilisation and ‘British values’ to the Kikuyu 
people during this time of bloodshed (Elkins, 2005: 237). Such ‘education’ was carried out by 
‘development officers’, a mixture of personnel from the white settler communities and the 
loyalist Kikuyu communities who were tasked with ‘re-educating’ the population of the 
villages, who were predominantly women, into the civilised British colonial Kenya. Those 
that were ‘successfully re-educated’ were forced to work or protect the newly developing 
pipelines running through the heart of the country (Elkins, 2005: 239-240). The education 
programmes were marred by violence, and of particular depravity was the level of rape 
carried out by the Colonial British forces and their loyalist Kikuyu counterparts, with many 
women dying in the process and being buried in mass graves (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017: 161). 
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Women were targeted by British forces because previously they had been used by Mau Mau 
rebels as informers and message carriers, due to them being less likely to be suspected of 
collusion (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017: 163).  
 
Exact figures of the death toll are difficult to quantify, but Elkins (2005: 248) claims that it 
totals ‘tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands.’ Blacker (2007: 212), alleges that 
British forces are reported to have killed over 12,000 Mau Mau militants. Of particular note, 
there were 1090 recorded instances of capital punishment committed by British forces, the 
most carried out by the British empire in recorded history (Anderson, 2005: 7).  
 
For Gramsci (2012: 239), the ‘educational field’ is the location where hegemony is 
reproduced. Furthermore, there is a distinct delineation between the doctrine targeted at 
the ‘intellectual’ and the ‘simple souls.’ The example of the Mau Mau re-education 
programmes illustrates this point. During the emergency, European settlers, the primary 
targets of Mau Mau attacks grew discontented with the British forces’ inability to protect 
them and their properties. In response, British administrators created the ‘European Settler 
committee’ which acted as a conduit to the European settler community (Bennett, 2012: 
32). Through this mechanism, the British upskilled prominent members of the European 
settler population who helped to create policy reform that appeased their respective 
communities concerns (Bennett, 2012: 33). This is in obvious stark contrast to the Mau Mau 
experience where the focus of the education programmes was to, in the British 
administrations view, ‘defeat Mau Mau savagery (Bennett, 2012: 33).’ Although the 
methods are clearly different, the desired result is the same – to ensure State hegemony 
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(Gramsci, 2012: 240). In the Kenyan Mau Mau example, the ‘field of education’ has become 
stratified due to the differences in the respective ‘social capital’ of the indigenous Kenyan 
and the European settler (Bourdieu, 1996: 286). The ‘symbolic value’ possessed by the 
European settler dictates that they have greater control over the inclusion of their own 
ideologies within the schema of education than the indigenous Kenyan and the Mau Mau 
(Bourdieu, 1996: 287).            
 
This thesis will not argue that the conditions of ‘the emergency’ in Kenya are directly 
transposable to the contemporary UK context. However, the example of the Mau Mau 
rebellion and the education programmes instilling civilised British values has clear parallels 
with CVE models in use today, namely Prevent, of which the teaching of Fundamental British 
Values within schools and the education sector is a core component. It is also apparent that 
Foucault’s delineation of the construction of ideal types to attempt to govern the 
ungovernable is as paramount to understanding the Mau Mau example as it is Prevent 
(Dean, 2010: 98-99). Furthermore, the use of informants by the colonial British government 
in Kenya is also a core component of the contemporary COIN and CVE landscape. Kundnani 
(2014: 147) would describe this as an industry of the ‘professional’ informant, working 
towards the State’s aim to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of communities it deems to be on the 
periphery of its influence.  
 
However, a glaring question presents itself; if COIN and by proxy, CVE operations are 
ineffectual and brutal, why do they persist?   Porch (2013: 247) argues that the traditional 
COIN narratives employed by the UK are still so widely used because they have been 
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imbedded in ‘institutional learning’ and therefore are rarely questioned by those who enact 
them. Another, more contemporary example of typologies being used to govern a hostile 
population can be seen in the Troubles in Northern Ireland (NI). Although the conflict mainly 
took place throughout the 20th century, the problems that caused it stem back hundreds of 
years and are multi-generational in scope (Mitchell, 2013: 5).’  For the Catholic Republican, 
NI should not exist as a subsidiary of the United Kingdom but become a part of a united 
Ireland with the Republic of Ireland to the south, for the Protestant Loyalist, NI should 
remain a part of the UK (English, 2005: 3).  
 
The Troubles began as a Republican protest in 1969 which was staged as a response to 
continued discrimination from the Loyalist government, its police force, and its supporters. 
The protest was marred by instances of police brutality and ultimately culminated in the 
August 1969 riots - six days of sectarian violence and civil disobedience which led to British 
troops being deployed in the streets of NI (Shanahan, 2009: 13). The main contributors to 
the Troubles were Republican paramilitaries such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) and the British armed forces and security organisations (Shanahan, 
2009: 15).  Violence raged for the best part of three decades, with over 3500 recorded 
deaths, many (if not most) being civilians (Elliot, 2007: 188).  
 
The conflict finally ended during the peace talks held throughout the mid-1990s, 
culminating in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, where a multi-party and multinational 
agreement with the Republic of Ireland was reached which detailed that NI would remain a 
77 
 
part of the UK but enjoy a soft boarder with free movement with the Republic of Ireland 
through membership of the EU, with only one party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
not agreeing the deal (HM Government, 1998: 2-5). However, peace within the region 
remains tenuous – something the looming spectre of Brexit has intensified.   
 
Tony Blair (2010: 157), when talking about the peace process in NI in his autobiography, 
states that “politicians are obliged, from time to time, to conceal the full truth, to bend it 
and even distort it” to produce a solution suitable to all sides with entrenched, socio-
political problems such as those presented in the Troubles. Tomlinson (2012: 442) denotes 
that prior to the 1998 Good Friday agreement, a criminal justice industry was created in NI, 
fuelled by the ‘war economy’ that was set upon countering republican ideology and 
containing those who acted upon it. In short, the Troubles was an ideological war driven by 
economies of scale that cannot exist without each other (Foucault, 2001: 207).  
 
Foucault (2001: 207) contends that the State’s exertions of authority should be viewed as 
‘the art of exercising power in the form, and according to the model, of the economy.’ In the 
NI example, the criminal justice system is a model of the economy which demands ‘a form 
of surveillance and control’ to ensure the fragile State’s legitimacy (Foucault, 2001: 207-
208). Tomlinson (2012:443-444) highlights the reluctance of the criminal justice system to 
adapt to the reduction in investment from ‘conflict-related industries’ to ‘investment in 
social reconstruction’ – an episteme of the resistance to evolution found within the praxis of 
governmentality (Dean, 2010: 176). In this instance, the economic ‘reasons of state’ are 
acting as an obstacle to the effective resolution of the NI paradigm (Foucault, 2001: 213).    
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The peace process is still marred by an overly complicated legal process that removes any 
form of ‘sovereignty’ from those engaged with it, with the criminal justice system remaining 
decidedly British rather than unified Northern Irish (McEvoy, 2007: 425).  For Brewer et.al. 
(2010: 37), prevailing sociological concerns i.e. Loyalist- Republican divide, are too widely 
ignored for any form of coherent democratic process to develop, which leaves only the 
predominant institutions in power who are both politically and economically focused on 
hard policing techniques. Moreover, the peace process has heavily focused on ‘economic 
liberation’ rather than on social equality, cohesion and inclusion which has limited its 
effectiveness (Olsen et.al. 2010: 166-167).   
 
The transition period has focused on the de-militarisation and disarmament of paramilitary 
groups; however, the British authorities still have an armed presence within the region 
(Tomlinson, 2012: 446). The total cost for the UK’s war on terror in NI leading up to the 
Good Friday agreement was £23.5 Billion, which has the purchasing power of over double 
that amount in the contemporary context. The NI economy has been supplanted around this 
flow of capital and as such it could not operate without keeping these channels of 
commerce afloat. As a result, existing mechanisms have been modified rather than replaced 
with more appropriate ones.  Understandably, this has affected the overall success of the 
peace process. As such, sectarian violence still exists, albeit on a smaller scale (Tomlinson, 
2012: 444-445). The inflexible nature of governance, restricted by economies of scale and 
the bureaucratises that bind them has created continued biopolitical contention, one NI 
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cannot escape easily or willingly because of the symbiotic nature of government and 
commerce (Foucault, 2001: 221).        
 
Much like the examples of colonial India and Kenya, COIN and CVE initiatives in NI also rely 
heavily on the construction of ideal types and typologies of threat. Leahy (2015: 123) 
highlights the important role high level informers played in the counter-insurgency tactics 
utilised by the UK government in Northern Ireland during the period between the 1970’s 
and mid 1990’s.  Furthermore, many high-profile IRA members, including Freddie 
Scappaticci (reportedly codenamed Stakeknife by the UK authorities), one-time leader of the 
counter-intelligence IRA task force Internal Security Unit (ISU) - who were tasked with 
rooting out informants for the IRA Northern Command (INC) - were actually acting as double 
agent informants for the UK government (Leahy, 2015: 124).   
 
Scappaticci’s case is an interesting one. Former British Army Soldier and Force Research Unit 
(FRU) operative Ian Hurst, writing under the pseudonym Martin Ingram (2004: 60-62) for his 
whistleblowing book titled Stakeknife, denotes that Scappaticci was regularly given the 
names of other FRU informants that held lower positions within the IRA to execute, so that 
his commitment to the cause was not questioned. Ingram (2004:30-31) stipulates that this 
illegal activity was made possible in part because the FRU enjoyed unprecedented access to 
funds but did not have a centralised command structure linked within the armed forces. In 
this case, the State has rationalised illegal violence through its mechanisms of bureaucracy, 
whereby the connection between the chain of command and the person committing the 
acts is lost in the bureaucratic processes (Foucault, 2004: 13).  
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Ingram (2004:31) also points out that there was a lot of ‘competition’ for funding between 
other intelligence agencies such as Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) special branch and the 
FRU, which led to rushed decisions that rarely panned out well for everyone concerned.  
Furthermore, this lack of coordination between agencies lead to a culture of ‘distrust’ to 
develop between the RUC and the FRU, with both actively sabotaging operations at points 
during the Troubles (Ingram 2004: 31).  
 
This illustration of institutional sabotage is an example of a culture of economic competition 
that is systemic of the language of commerce that underpins the governmentality of 
security (Foucault, 2001: 207). To be more precise, the ‘art of government’ is primarily 
concerned with how to introduce the economy into ‘political practice (Foucault, 2001: 207).’ 
A core component of a healthy economy is to produce conditions that allows competition 
over resources. However, a paradox is created when introducing an economic rationale to 
the praxis of security: with competition comes the promise of insecurity (Foucault, 2007: 
207-208). This problematic is difficult for governments to overcome. Essentially, the State is 
tasked with attempting to square a circle, as the example of the RUC and the FRU competing 
over resources and actively sabotaging one another testifies.  
 
Another contributing factor to the cycle of violence in NI has been the ‘collusion’ between 
British forces and the Loyalist movement (Cochrane, 2013: 77-78). Successive British 
governments had no problem with members of its armed forces being members of the 
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Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the largest loyalist parliamentary group in NI with an 
estimated 40,000 members at its height in the 1970s and 1980s. In this instance, a typology 
of violence has been constructed based on the severity of threat presented to the continued 
governance of NI by the UK (Foucault, 2004b: 165). Foucault, (2004b: 165-166) denotes that 
only ‘a citizen by origin’ can exert ‘parrhesia’ or free speech. For Foucault (2004b: 166), acts 
of violence acceptable to the state are the ultimate form of freedom of expression. The 
ability to exert violence without reproach symbolizes that those committing it have moral 
'superiority’ over those who are its victims – the definitive manifestation of ‘ascendancy’, of 
ownership of the ‘discourse of truth (Foucault, 2004b: 173-174).’ The UDA enjoyed the 
capacity to commit violence without reproach because the UK government considered them 
natural citizens and their Republican counterparts as persona non grata. In short, those who 
committed violence were not categorised by their acts but by who they were.  
 
Although intelligence gathering was a primary focus of counter-insurgency practice in NI, 
general military tactics were still heavily employed. Mass arrests were common. After the 
1975 ceasefire, it was the UK government’s priority to cast IRA regulars as criminals and to 
try them as such. This effectively prevented the Republicans from advocating their cause 
through legal channels in NI, which in turn led to further violence (Leahy, 2015: 128). It is 
also important to note that throughout the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, many such cases 
were thrown out of court (Butler, 2017: 3).  Most were upheld due to witness testimony 
lacking corroboration or there was evidence that statements were being made under duress 
(Leahy, 2015: 129). Lafree et.al. (2009: 18) maintain that deterrent-based punishment has 
been key to CVE practice in Western states from its first usage and that the NI Troubles are a 
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textbook case.  Furthermore, the use of ‘deterrent’ based practices enforced a ‘backlash’ 
from the IRA, which created and imbedded a cycle of violence that became impossible to 
break (Lafree et.al, 2009: 19). 
 
Dixon (2012: 304) theorises that the role the UK’s ‘dirty war’ policies played in the successes 
in NI have been largely overplayed by the predominant neo-conservative political arm of the 
loyalist movement, backed up by the private military complex with entrenched business 
interests in the region.  Dixon (2012: 305) suggests that the narrative found in NI whereby 
‘Britishness’ is synonymous with safeness provides several problematics: firstly, coming to a 
conclusion on what constitutes ‘Britishness’ is not definable, and what is regarded as un-
British is equally equivocal. Secondly, the promotion of ‘Britishness’ or British values as 
something to be transposed upon lesser cultures is steeped in colonial discourse, which is 
often at the root of terrorist groups’ claims to legitimacy (Dixon, 2012: 316-317). The 
construction of ideal types in this instance is systemic of the processes of a form of 
governmentality being forced upon a resistance populace that do not recognise it. As with 
most cases of CVE initiatives that have come before it and that continue to come after, the 
lasting effect of the ideology promoted by those who govern is unstable and subject to 
change, in the worst cases violently. 
       
For Dnes and Brownlow (2017: 718-719), leniency and amnesty programmes have shown 
the greatest success rates in turning former IRA members away from terrorist activities and 
towards more traditional, political avenues of expression. However, entrenched republican 
and loyalist groups persist within the region. Factional differences are very difficult to break 
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down, which Dnes and Brownlow (2017: 719) theorise is inherent to some form of inter-
generational pride; this is about a fear of being the generation that surrenders.  
 
For Gallagher (2005: 429), the ‘over-privilege of difference’ in the Northern Irish education 
system, where students are segregated on religious lines and have been since the Butler 
Education Act 1944, has created a dynamic where it is impossible to create consensus on 
what Northern Irish citizenship means in real terms. Gallagher (2005: 433-434) argues 
further that the promotion of ‘particularistic identities’ within a homogeneous, British whole 
and the conflicts that arise from this is the primary contributing factor to the start of 
troubles, and why sectarian divisions still persist to this day. Additionally, the ‘legacy’ of 
sectarian divisions in NI cannot be erased by education programmes that promote ‘shared 
values’, which is the dominant form of CVE education within the contemporary NI context, 
as they do not address the primary cause – long standing ideological pretensions (Anderson-
Worden and Smith, 2017: 291-392). McCully and Clarke (2016: 365) also acknowledge that 
any successes educational programmes based on shared values has had in the NI context 
has been down to the skills of individual schools and practitioners, with the policy 
framework surrounding its implementation found to be largely inadequate. Despite this 
reality, schools in NI are still tasked with persisting with shared values-based education and 
there is little resistance to its implementation from practitioners, even though they may well 
question its effectiveness.  
 
The lack of resistance from schools in NI to shared values-based education could be 
attributed to the field of education’s core modus operandi - to ‘reproduce its essential 
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features’ on a subconscious level within its student body (Bourdieu, 2014: 173). In sum, the 
practice of shared values education is reproduced because practitioner and pupil alike know 
no different. Furthermore, they are not given the apparatus (nor do they seek them) by the 
State to change this dynamic. For Bourdieu (2014: 174), the ‘corporeal knowledge’ the State 
instils, predominantly through the bureaucratic field of education remains unquestioned 
because it is propositioned as natural, preordained. Foucault (1988a: 71) would attest that 
the sectarian divisions within NI empower the pastoral nature of governance in this instance 
because they create a ‘state of exception’ that could result in violent consequences if 
questioned (Schmitt, 2005: 5).  
 
Nevertheless, grievance and injustice played a large part in drawing public support during 
the Troubles. Hoyt (2017: 209) denotes that this lesson has not been learnt by the UK in the 
shape of Islamic domestic terrorism, with many of the same mistakes made in Northern 
Ireland during the Troubles being made today within the Islamic communities residing in the 
UK. Furthermore, the war on terror and the actions of the UK, the US and the other 
members of the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a similar, inter-generational 
disdain for western powers (Hoyt, 2017: 210). Al Qaeda, ISIS and its contemporises, have 
also adopted a similar approach to the IRA in the way they have provoked the UK and the 
US into making decisions that have been costly – particularly the involvement of Western 
powers in Syria where US and UK weaponry have ended up in the hands of ISIS affiliated 
terror groups.  
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This chapter has illustrated the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality, whereby knowledges of governance are controlled by the languages of 
bureaucracy, law and commerce to the praxis of counterterrorism and extremism. It has 
also focused on the construction of ideal types as a method of surveillance and control. I 
have explored how the implementation of Fundamental British Values within the Prevent 
statutory duty, mobilised through the bureaucratic field of education is steeped in colonial 
discourse and that similar instances can be found throughout history, from colonial India 
and Kenya to Northern Ireland. The following chapter will focus on the theoretical modus 
operandi of contemporary CVE; radicalisation theory. It will move on to discuss how a closed 
research community has developed around this philosophy and go on to discuss the gap in 
current understanding found within the academic literature at large.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Chapter 3: Radicalisation theory  
 
The role of the expert as functionary arbiters of socially derived problematics such as home-
grown terrorism often raises questions related to their ability to act legitimately. In 
particular, the ability of experts to ‘remain neutral’ of the cultural motivations of the body 
politick – which they are duty bound to do by the liberal State – is questionable (Turner, 
2001: 125-126). In reality, total neutrality is pragmatically impossible. Each individual is 
located within their own locus of subjectivity, with their expertise being shaped by a ‘per-
speculative discourse’ that is centred on ‘the survival of the speaking subject’ themselves, 
rather than the subject of their observations (Foucault, 2004a: 52-53). The discourse that 
dictates the activities of the CVE expert in the contemporary context is a colonial one. CVE 
experts are ultimately working towards the ‘reproduction’ and maintenance of the Western 
liberal State’s ‘hegemonic position’ on the global scale in a post-colonial era (Novelli, 2017: 
837-838). The demise of the colonial epoch has also led to some unforeseen consequences. 
The ‘boomerang effect’ of colonial rule, where the security apparatus deployed in colonial 
States to control hostile populations has been brought back to Western shores has led to 
the liberal Western State conducting a form of ‘internal colonialism’ upon itself (Foucault, 
2004a: 103).  
 
Whether the CVE research community is willingly or subconsciously working towards this 
end is up for much debate. Regardless, communities of CVE experts have the ability to wield 
their own authority  – a ‘micro-power’ deposited from the State of whom they are in service 
– through the archology of knowledge they create via their research practices (Foucault, 
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2008: 186). The knowledge base such experts collate is established upon the proclivity of 
risk – specifically the risk of violent extremism and those deemed most likely to commit this 
crime. These loosely put together communities are defined as vulnerable by experts, which 
enables the State to enforce its ‘pastoral practices’ legitimately upon its target populations 
for their own good (Foucault 2004b: 349). This cycle of the creation and consumption of risk 
is the driving force behind the industry of expertise that surrounds the Prevent statutory 
duty. The CVE expert is motivated to contribute to the ‘production of risk definitions’ both 
morally and financially, ‘drawing lines of causation’ that the State’s security agencies can 
use to control its potentially seditious populations (Beck, 1992: 46). The State’s primary 
concern in this instance is how it may control the research produced by its CVE experts; how 
its data ‘is received, understood and used’ by the body politik to meet its own aims 
(Massoumi et.al., 2019: 2).  
 
In the contemporary context, the underlying philosophy of CVE research and practice is 
radicalisation theory. Peter Neumann (2008: 4), Director of the International Centre for the 
study of radicalization (ICSR) at Kings College London and one of the forefathers of 
radicalisation theory, asserts that ‘it was through the notion of radicalisation that a 
discussion about the political, economic, social and psychological forces that underpin 
terrorism and political violence became possible again’ after the extremely charged 
responses of Western powers following 9/11. Foucauldian scholars will be particularly 
interested in the language chosen by Neumann to illustrate his point. Neumann (2008, 4-5) 
views radicalisation as a process that is influenced by factors that are also utilised by 
Foucault (2001: 221) to describe the reasoning of State. The relationship between the 
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language of economics and violence sanctioned via biopolitical means are central to 
Foucault’s (2001: 222) analysis of the State’s capacity to securitise itself.  
 
For Foucault (1991: 89-90), acts of State violence must be rationalised to its populations. 
The acceptance of State violence by the biopolitical is central to the State’s capacity to exert 
such power. Such acceptance is generated through the production of knowledges, or as 
Foucault (1980a: 194) describes them, dispositifs. Such dispositifs exist through the 
mediums of law, administration, science, philosophical and ‘moral and philanthropic 
propositions’ that are the core elements the State uses to exhort its ideological position. The 
effectiveness (and perhaps usefulness) of such apparatus of State are calculated by how 
fiscally ‘discursive’ they can be with both one another and the State itself. For Foucault 
(1980a: 195), economic imperatives act as an enabler of the State to mobilise its agents to 
enact its will. Neumann (2008: 4-5) and his conception of radicalisation theory uses State 
rationale to attempt to decipher the motivation of terrorist groups and the methods they 
use to attract people to their cause. However, for Neumann and his contemporaries a 
problematic is presented in the terms set by the State for their investigations; the State 
determines that radicals or extremists are to be studied as rational actors but portrayed as 
ideologically irrational.  
 
Foucault (1980a: 195) propositions that the security-based apparatus of State, its dispositifs, 
are operated through the pretext of ‘responding to an urgent need.’ Under such conditions, 
circumstance often supersedes context. The obvious contradiction in terms laid out to 
Neumann and his contemporaries is merely a technicality, an ‘unintended, negative effect 
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(Foucault, 198a: 196).’ The core purpose of radicalisation theory and the experts who use 
and devise it is not to question why one may become a radical or extremist, but to identify 
those who are or those that have the potential to be on the basis that they present an 
urgent threat to life.  
 
The threat to life the would-be terrorist has potential to carry out is not necessarily the 
primary focus of the State’s intentions. For Dean (2010:20), the morality of governance 
dictates that it has a duty to reform those that do not fit the ideal typology of the ‘moral’ 
citizen. As such, a typology of risk is created to identify those that require reformation. In 
such instances, the primary focus for government is not one of ‘identity’, which cannot be 
effectively measured across an entire population but of ‘identification’ of those that 
challenge the ‘values’ that underpin regimes of governmental practices (Dean, 2010: 44-45).  
Ultimately, the primary objective of CVE initiatives such as Prevent is not to eliminate the 
threats to the moral problem they presumed to tackle, but rather to ‘distinguish them, 
distribute them; to use them’ as a means to entrench the State’s position as the guardians 
of the biopolitical (Foucault, 1977: 272). It is through this process a classification of illegality 
is constructed and mobilised. In essence, radicalisation theory is the States signifier of the 
‘delinquent milieu’ of the extremist, the ‘strategic completion’ of the State’s attempts to 
mobilise its security apparatus within the public domain (Foucault, 1980a: 196). The State is 
obliged to disseminate this practice through economic means to ensure that its civic actors 
have significant motivation to both comply with and enact its will.   
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This chapter will begin by discussing the nature of radicalisation theory and how it has 
become entrenched within the existing CVE discourse. It will go on to discuss the 
explanatory value of Foucault’s (2001: 221-222) analysis of the entanglement of the 
economy and security apparatus of State and the role the construction of ideal types plays 
in the contemporary context. Furthermore, the manifestation of an epistemic research 
community that underpins radicalisation theory will be deliberated upon. Finally, it will 
examine how the ‘field of education’ has become the ideal site to disseminate CVE doctrine 
within the western - and by proxy the UK – setting (Bourdieu, 2014: 112).  
 
3.1. Radicalisation theory. 
 
Regardless of the scholarly fragilities of radicalisation theory it remains the primary 
theoretical perspective adopted by CVE initiatives across the globe. Radicalisation by 
definition is a process of drastic change, whereby an individual undergoes a transformation 
in views and ideology. The Counter Terrorism Handbook provided to all CVE practitioners in 
the UK defines radicalisation as ‘the process by which people adopt an interpretation of 
religious, political or ideological belief which may lead to them legitimising the use of 
violence (Staniforth et.al, 2013: 38).’  Scholars that adhere to this model for the most part 
agree that this process is gradual and does not happen instantaneously (Christmann, 2012: 
6).  To date, various models have been developed to identify characteristics of radicalisation 
and a common consensus within the study of terrorism has emerged to describe the process 
of radicalisation to be comprised of distinct phases (Christmann, 2012: 10). Advocates of 
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this methodology argue that it can be used to map the journey from early engagement to 
active participation in radical ideology up to a potential act of terrorism.  
 
Perhaps one of the strongest proponents of the radicalisation process is Marc Sageman, a 
former CIA operative and eminent forensic scientist with putative experience of mobilising 
the Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Sageman (2008: 223) suggests 
that the progression of ‘Jihadi radicalisation’ to actual acts of terrorism consists of four 
stages or ‘prongs.’ Firstly, there is the ‘moral outrage’ - an event or sequences of events that 
are perceived by the individual to be morally unjust. This develops over time into a ‘specific 
interpretation of the world’, such as the ‘war against terror’ being a war against Islam. This 
then ‘resonates with personal experiences’ and the individual links themselves to their 
perceived injustice. Finally, the ‘mobilization’ stage occurs, where the radicalised individual 
moves through networks and likeminded groups or persons, acquiring new skills and the 
validation necessary to move onto violent acts of terror.  
 
 In agreement with Sageman, McCauley and Moskalenko (2014: 70) conceptualise and 
identify key indicators of what creates a ‘radicalised individual’ and how they come to 
commit terrorist acts. They argue that the radicalisation process is split into two main 
spheres that operate in pyramidal fashion, each with their own independent stages (see 
fig.3). Firstly, there is the ‘radicalisation of opinion’ pyramid. Initially, the individual forms a 
‘neutral’ standpoint, but accepts the assertion that Islam is under attack from a Western 
crusade led by the United States.  They then move onto the mind-set of the ‘sympathiser’, 
whereby Jihadists, referred to as terrorists by the West are defending Islam against this 
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attack. The actions Jihadists take is then ‘justified’ by religious sanctity by the individual. 
Finally, a ‘personal moral obligation’ is felt by the individual to support the Jihadists and 
their actions in any way possible to remain a ‘good Muslim (McCauley and Moskalenko, 
2014: 70-71).’  The second sphere is the ‘Radicalisation of Action’ pyramid. At the base level 
resides the ‘politically inert’ Muslim - whatever their beliefs they do not engage with 
radicalised actions. Above them lie the ‘activists’, those involved in legal and nonviolent 
political action.  Higher yet are ‘radicals’ who engage in political action that can be violent in 
nature. At the Apex of the pyramid are the ‘terrorists’, radicals that are actively targeting 
civilians with lethal violence (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014: 71-73).  
 
Fig .3. McCauley and Moskalenko Model of Radicalisation 
 
 
McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014: 70-73) model shares many similarities with Sageman’s 
(2008: 223) ‘Four Prong Process’. It differs on the assertion that each stage does not have to 
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happen concurrently or be linked across each mode – individuals can move up and down the 
scale at any given time (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014: 73). It also suggests that there is 
more potential for violent terrorist acts to occur when the individual has high levels of 
‘radical opinion’ with the means of ‘radical action.’ However, they do acknowledge that 
‘most activists do not become radicals’ and that it is not ‘necessary to be an activist to 
become a radical’ which does really bring into question the validity of their model 
(McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014:73-74).    
 
There are clear parallels to be drawn between Sageman and McCauley and Moskalenko’s 
conceptions of the radical Muslim and the experiences of the British colonial state in 19th 
century India. The contemporary radicalisation model creates a typology or hierarchy of 
ideal types in much the same way the British colonial state divided the diverse populations 
of India into subgroups. In Colonial India, those found exhibiting behaviours closer to the 
British ideal enjoying a degree of autonomy under British Rule, whereas those that did not 
were heavily policed and controlled via methods of surveillance and subjugation. Emphasis 
was placed upon assimilation of British civility within the indigenous population via 
education. For instance, the earliest Muslim migrants to the British homeland in the 19th 
century were often Indian elites who were only allowed to do so in order to acquire a British 
education to enable them to better serve the empire on their return to India (Ansari, 2018: 
35). It is also important to note that the British elites who had expertise of the Colonial 
Indian state regarded even the most moderate Muslim as lacking ‘self-control.’ They lobbied 
the institutions tasked with taking care of the Muslim migrants to impose many punitive 
methods to regulate their freedoms, no matter the length of their stay (Ansari, 2018: 80-81). 
94 
 
In short, the colonial state and its methodological system of divide and conquer considered 
even the least risky Muslim as a risk if left unchecked.      
 
Although there has been a considerable development in how Western States determine 
their risky populations, radicalisation theory follows a similar format in the way it manages 
them. Prevent and its statutory duty functions through the methodological principles of 
radicalisation theory outlined by experts such as Sageman and McCauley & Moskalenko and 
their models of radicalisation. It creates at risk categories that government agencies use to 
identify and quarantine demographics that fit the factors delineated by the ‘bureaucratic 
judgement’ of such experts (Dean, 2010: 219). This leads to an epidemiological or clinical 
approach to risk, whereby the role of government is to identify and contain individuals or 
groups exhibiting ideology deemed hazardous to the State before it can spread to the 
general population. It is through this process governments are allowed to act in a way that 
undermines its biopolitical capital, such as limiting freedom of expression and the retraction 
of civil liberty for sections of society – much in the same way the British colonial state 
restricted the freedoms of its Muslim populations (Dean, 2010: 207). 
 
A key component of radicalisation theory is the notion that a ‘radicalised’ individual could 
potentially be ‘de-radicalised’. De-radicalisation programmes are conducted all over the 
world. For example, in Singapore a de-radicalisation programme is run within the prison 
system that adopts a mental health-based approach. In Germany, the EXIT programme is 
designed to give people who find themselves ‘trapped’ within the many far-right 
movements sweeping the country a ‘route out’ and in Egypt there are various youth 
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programmes designed to ‘warn’ children of the dangers of getting involved in radicalised 
and extremist groups (Kooman & Pligt, 2016: .253).  
 
In the UK, the Channel Programme identifies members of vulnerable communities who, 
through the medium of LA safeguarding agencies are deemed to be exhibiting extremist 
behaviour and re-educates them.  The programme is based on a study conducted by 
Psychologists Christopher Dean and Monica Lloyd whilst in the employ of the UK 
government in the National Offender Management Service (NOMs). The study produced 22 
‘factors’ that were used to construct a tool styled as the Extremist Risk Guidance 22+ 
(ERG22+) that security and safeguarding professionals are obliged to use when 
administering PREVENT to individuals they deem at risk (CAGE, 2016: 14). 
 
The original study conducted by Dean and Lloyd has not been made available for public 
scrutiny due to its importance to national security. However, both researchers have 
produced an article defending the methodology used within the study in 2015.  It is 
important to note however, that both Dean and Lloyd have identified key weaknesses in 
their research framework. For instance, the study used a very small sample of convicted 
terrorists within the UK prison system that had committed a variety of offences (ranging 
from proliferation of ‘extremist’ material to violent crime) and that no systematic analysis 
was conducted with any data collated. A basis within the existing literature was also not 
established, due to the ‘exploratory’ nature of the study (Dean & Lloyd, 2015: 50-51).  
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Although the risk factors themselves are not available for public scrutiny, Powis et.al. (2019: 
1-2) have assessed the validity of the ERG 22+ under the directive of the Ministry for Justice. 
They state that the factors of ‘Engagement, Intent and Capability’ are the core domains of 
the ERG 22+ and that each individual case is graded on a scale using the formula of ‘strongly 
present, partly present and not present’ to calculate how radicalised an individual is. The 
conscientious observer will notice clear parallels with McCauley & Moskalenko’s (2014:73) 
model of radicalisation here, where the relationship between ‘Intent’ and ‘Capability’ can 
easily be transposed with the terminology of ‘radical opinion’ and means for ‘radical action.’ 
Powis et.al (2019:1-3) conclude that the ERG 22+ are applied in good faith by practitioners 
and often as a last resort when more traditional safeguarding mechanisms fall short of 
recognising the threats of extremism. They also propose that they are a useful tool for 
identifying those at risk of extremism if applied in enough time to re-direct an individual 
before they can harm themselves or others around them. In total, 171 individuals where 
used in Powis et.al. (2019: 1) analysis, with all respondents being described as ‘Islamic 
extremists.’  
 
The epistemological nature of the studies conducted by researchers such as Dean and Lloyd 
and Powis et.al. serve two purposes: firstly, to dilute the sociological factors that lead to 
individuals becoming extremists into digestible, calculable units and secondly to provide a 
scientific basis which the State can use to legitimise its efforts to control the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ of its citizens (Foucault, 1982: 220). Fundamentally, the ERG 22+ is acting as a 
‘technology of discipline’ that the State employs to limit the freedom of the individual, 
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which it then justifies as a necessary evil to ensure the freedoms of the whole (Lemke, 2019: 
68).      
 
There are obvious issues with the de-radicalisation process as a model of counter 
extremism. Firstly, less than 1% of terrorism related research is conducted directly with 
individuals who have been deemed ‘radicalised’ or extremist (Silke, 2008: 33). This is partly 
because no one can effectively determine who exactly a radicalised individual is. There are 
also obvious ethical issues involved when researching individuals within the judiciary 
system. It is also important to note that the causal relationship between radicalisation and 
acts of violent terrorism are tenuous; correlation alone does not equate to causation.  Even 
with a clear definition of what or whom a radicalised individual is, the fact remains that not 
all (in fact, very few) individuals that hold extreme views will commit a violent act. Secondly, 
not every terrorist can be considered radical. According to Neumann (2008: 5) and the 
model of radicalisation he promotes, some individuals commit acts of terrorism to further 
political or financial gain. Finally, and most importantly, many of the reportedly successful 
de-radicalisation programmes offer the least transparency. For instance, the Singapore and 
Egypt examples have received widespread criticism from civil and human rights groups for 
the lack of information they share with the public domain, particularly the lack of 
information regarding the wellbeing of those involved (Coolsaet, 2011: 174).  
 
There have also been many miscarriages of justice, some very public. If the prevailing model 
of radicalisation is applied to the experiences of Moazzam Begg, a British Pakistani man who 
was identified as an ‘enemy combatant’ by the US military and imprisoned, both in the 
98 
 
Bagram Theatre Interment Facility and Guantanamo Bay for over three years, its flaws 
become very apparent. Begg was politically active within Afghanistan where he was working 
as part of a humanitarian project to build wells in the northern territories in 2001.  He later 
went on to start his own initiative to build a school for girls in Kabul, a project technically 
illegal under the then Taliban leadership. In 2002, The US authorities believed Begg to be 
visiting training camps within the surrounding areas which were considered to be associated 
with Al Qaeda, however this has since been declared to be untrue following Begg’s tribunal 
in 2004 (QARDEC, response to tribunal process, Begg, 2004). Begg was extracted and 
detained by a joint US and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) task force during the 
night of the 31 January 2002 from his family home in Islamabad, Pakistan. He was held for 
several weeks by the Pakistani authorities who questioned him, along with US and British 
intelligence officers, who identified themselves as MI6 operatives.  
 
After his initial incarceration, Begg was sent to the notorious Bagram Theatre Internment 
Facility, where he was detained for one year. During this period he was subjected to torture; 
he was hog-tied, beaten, put in isolation with a bag put over his head, emotionally and 
verbally abused, denied access to legal support, threatened with sexual abuse and with 
extradition to Egypt to face the death penalty if he did not sign pre-written confessions. It 
was also during this time that Begg witnessed the fatal beatings of other detainees (Begg, 
2007:260-261). Begg was transferred to Guantanamo Bay in February 2003 without 
warning. During his detention there, Begg was subjected to over 600 days of solitary 
confinement interrupted by sessions of integration under torture, still having not been 
charged with any crime (Begg, 2007: 262). Begg was put through systematic torture 
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throughout his incarceration and he continually professed his innocence throughout. 
However, under duress of torture, Moazzam relinquished false information that he 
perceives to have played a part in the murder of two other detainees, which he witnessed 
first-hand (Begg, 2004). 
 
Eventually, under sustained pressure from the media and civil society, Begg was released 
from US custody in January 2005. Upon returning to the UK, he was arrested and 
questioned for 24 hours before finally being released to his family (Begg, 2007: 356-358). 
Since his release, Begg has been an avid campaigner against Prevent. He has also been 
arrested by the West Midlands Police for being suspected of attending a terrorist training 
camp and facilitating terrorism overseas in 2014. The case was thrown out of court because 
Begg had legally travelled to Syria with the consent of MI5 and he was cleared of any 
wrongdoing (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/moazzam-begg-freed-case-
collapses). Ultimately, Begg was identified, investigated, and detained on the basis of his 
fitting the radicalisation model developed by researchers such as McCauley and 
Moskalenko, Neumann and Sageman. In short, the US authorities believed him to be a 
would-be radicaliser and removed him from the public domain, with the backing of the UK 
and Pakistan agencies also operating within Northern Afghanistan. 
 
Begg’s experience at the hands of the western military complex is an atypical case of the 
State’s incursion on the biopolitical via the mechanism of ‘hierarchical subordinations 
(Foucault, 2007: 2-3).’ Afghanistan was largely under US allied control during 2002 when 
Begg was picked up by US forces. By this point, the US had developed and employed a vast 
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network of surveillance designed to identify and intercept individuals and groups who were 
perceived to undermine US authority within the region. The US military’s subversion of the 
‘subaltern’ populations in Afghanistan (which Begg was a party to) is their attempt to 
‘coerce via observation (Foucault, 1977: 171).’ In this paradigm, the application of power 
over individuals such as Begg has two primary locus. Firstly, to make the consequences of 
incursions against sovereign forms of control visible to the governed ‘subaltern’ populations 
and secondly, to make the methods of surveillance that highlight such incursions to the 
sovereign invisible via diffusion to and also through the governed (Foucault, 1977: 171-172).  
 
Although the US occupying forces were in Afghanistan on the pretext of ensuring 
democracy, they very much governed the Afghan population in a sovereign, colonial form. 
The surveillance methods they employed embody an omnipotent power; ‘each gaze would 
form a part of the overall functioning of power’ exerted both upon and by the bodies of the 
governed (Foucault, 1977: 171). In this instance, the model of radicalisation employed by 
Neumann, Sageman, Macaulay and Moskalenko and their contemporaries acts as 
justification for US intrusions on the Afghan population on the pretence of safeguarding 
them from dangers found within. In effect, the occupying US forces are exercising practices 
that seek to ‘normalise judgement’ upon aspects of Islamic culture which do not conform to 
the US ideology being enforced upon the Afghan people (Foucault, 1977: 177). This is 
legitimised on the assertion that it is for the Afghan people’s own wellbeing, when in reality 
it is designed to administer the US hegemonic order – control through coercion (Foucault, 
2007: 20).   
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The example found in the Begg case is not a singular one and such incidents are not 
restricted to the conventional theatres of war that are found thousands of miles away from 
the homelands of the Western powers that fight them. In the UK, the advent of the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016, colloquially known as the Snoopers Charter, is designed to 
provide government policing and security agencies the power to obtain ‘bulk warrants’ to 
surveil the private communications of thousands of people at any one time (HM 
Government, 2016:113). The Snoopers’ Charter and surveillance initiatives like it exemplify 
the fragility of the radicalisation model and the wider security apparatus which underpin 
them; they are particularly vulnerable to misinformation or to be more exact, bad 
information (Stamptnitzky, 2013a: 191). For Stampnitzky (2013a: 194), a ‘politics of anti-
knowledge’ underlies the radicalisation discourse which has led to mass surveillance 
initiatives such as the Snoopers Charter. In short, the notion that extremist groups are 
instruments of ‘evil’ stops researchers from engaging with the discourse of terrorist and 
extremist groups critically. Extremist discourse becomes an ‘object of knowledge’ rather 
than a source of knowledge; discourse becomes data which is quantified rather than 
qualified (Stampnitzky, 2013a: 195).  
 
For Stampnitzky (2013a: 195 -196), the primary aim of government and the research 
community of ‘terrorism experts’ created to empower it have devised methods to calculate 
the potential risk of perceived extremist discourse rather than understand its motivations –
knowledge that could ultimately nullify its potential risks if acted upon sympathetically. 
Foucault (1997: 122-123) postulates that the ideological capital of good versus ‘evil’ is a 
primary motivator of security mechanisms such as the Snoopers Charter. The trajectory of 
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the identities of those deemed extremists (or vulnerable to extremism) are assessed via a 
field of ‘political calculations’ that do not consider the authenticity of the agents of 
knowledge production or dispostifis. Instead, emphasis is placed on the quantity of 
information they can provide, not its validity (Foucault, 1997: 125). In sum, quantity of 
information is valued over quality of information.  
A consequence of the process of data accumulation that places precedent on volume over 
detail leaves little room for nuanced interpretations. For instance, Arun Kundnani (2014: 
121) draws attention to the conspicuous lack of sociological awareness amongst experts 
about the way Islamist movements may be infiltrated by marginal groups for whom 
terrorism is a viable reaction to the history of military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
In fact, Kundnani (2014: 128) purports that radicalisation theory misidentifies ‘attitudes of 
disaffection and opposition to foreign policy for signs of extremist risk’ with state actors 
visualising a ‘cross section of young Muslims as potential terrorist recruits’ rather than 
politically active citizens with valid concerns about Western military interventions in the 
Middle East. To provide some context, in February 2003 coordinated protests against the 
Iraq war were held in over 600 countries worldwide, with an estimated 6-11 million 
participants believed to have been present (Walgrave & Rucht, 2010: 13). All protests were 
legal and peaceful and those involved, from countless different cultural and ethnical 
backgrounds, held similar views to many young Muslims who, if found exhibiting similar 
behaviour within sites of State surveillance would be deemed as at risk of radicalisation.  
 
The result is that ‘belief systems’ become denominators. This suits State security strategists 
as it creates a scientific basis to facilitate widespread surveillance of individuals who hold 
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similar beliefs, even though there appears to be no causal link between particular strands of 
Islam and those who commit acts of terrorism (Stampnitzky, 2013b: 625-626). Foucault 
(2001: 213) would elicit that the economic imperative of the security apparatus makes such 
discourse inevitable.  In effect, communities are being created from loosely put together 
demographics to suit the needs of State funded surveillance strategists, which is being 
legitimised by sections of the research community who also profit from such discourse 
(Stampnitzky, 2013b: 623). Radicalisation theory and those who use it are creating a ‘pre-
criminal space’ occupied by individuals and communities deemed at risk (CAGE, 2016: 12).  
 
This chapter has so far sought to analyse the wider discourse surrounding the core empirical 
issues within contemporary CVE research and practice.  It has also examined the dominant 
academic theory which underpins such apparatus - radicalisation theory and subsequently 
the concept of ‘de-radicalisation. In the following section, the relationship between the 
concept of governmentality and radicalisation theory will be discussed in greater detail. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that the creation of typologies or ideal types of the extremist 
are a proponent of a government state of mind that restricts theoretical debate. 
 
3.2. Creating typologies: radicalisation theory as a mechanism of governmentality   
 
Foucault (1978: 235) would describe acts of terrorism as ‘fundamental crimes’ against 
‘sovereignty’ and most importantly by association, ‘citizenship’ that necessitate a moral 
response. Such ‘fundamental crimes’ against the ‘normal liberal state’ subjugate traditional 
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security apparatuses. To justify such actions, the ‘perverse individual’ and the characteristics 
that tie to such notions are paramount to the contemporary security expert who utilises the 
radicalisation process in their work (Foucault, 1978: 236).   
 
Acts of terrorism, in essence, are violent crimes. Instances of violent crime are common. 
Often, the best ‘stories’ are the ones that researchers and criminologists focus on in their 
analysis, even though they have no more value than any other comparable crime in the aim 
of categorisation. If anything, the nuances of such crimes become denominators, thus 
skewing the overall understanding (and potential preventative capability) of policing 
institutions that use such studies to supplement their work (Foucault, 1977: 2). For certain 
crimes that create a forceful moral response (such as killing a loved one), the mental state of 
the defendant is often overlooked in their punishment and in their route to punishment. 
This is further inflamed if such crimes have political implications, such as an act of terrorism. 
Severe punishments are often rationalised in such instances (Foucault, 2007: 4). Foucault’s 
(2004: 11-13) four ‘dispositifs’ or ‘technological security apparatus’ that shape discourse 
surrounding factors of risk (such as violent crime) and the use of force exercised by security 
agencies describe how such punishments are legitimised:   
 
Spaces of security 
Securitised spaces are bound by territorial mechanisms, be that States, cities, schools, 
shopping malls or prisons. The notion of territory is intrinsically linked to the notion of 
sovereignty, which forms the basis for ‘ownership’ of space, which subsequently gives 
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security agencies legitimacy to perform outside of traditional codes of conduct to protect 
these spaces, especially in times of ‘emergency.’      
 
The aleatory  
The notions of territory and sovereignty are only discernible by what they are not. As such, 
the ‘aleatory’ or the random/unknown – the ‘alien’ – are often used to define boundaries, 
both in the physical world and in the moral, administrative and economic spheres of society. 
Frequently, this is where security concerns are brought to the fore in the minds of the 
‘bodies’ or population and the mechanisms of power that govern them.    
 
Normalisation of security  
Security mechanisms such as legal violence and lethal force that can be exercised by the 
police and the armed forces are normalised by sovereign bodies on the proviso that they 
keep the necessary equilibrium between the individual bodies that make up society, the 
space in which they reside (territory) and the balance between moral and economic 
concerns within the bounded territory.  
 
Relationships between populations and security   
Normalisation of security is only sustainable if the relationship between governed 
populations and security agencies develops within the ‘milieu’ or the ‘environment of 
society’ it is bound by. What can and cannot be normalised and the process to normalising 
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security mechanisms is unique to each territory and the populations that inhabit it at any 
given time. In short, the relationship between the State and its population is context 
dependent. The state must manage biopolitical expectations by convincing its populations 
that its interests coalesce; it shares core identities and thus interests with its populace. One 
way for States to do this is to create a sense of the other, a body that does not share such 
identity – those who may threaten the prevailing identity of its population.     
       
The genealogy of the dispositifs described by Foucault (2004: 11-13) can be easily 
transposed upon the discourse surrounding contemporary CVE. The work of Rabasa & 
Bernard (2015: 56) of the RAND corporation suggests that the ‘threat of radicalisation’ is 
particularly prominent within second generation Muslims in a UK context. It is through this 
statement that Rasbasa and Bernard create a sense of the space being securitised, the 
sovereignty or identity being threatened and the aleatory nature of the ‘accused’ radicalised 
individual. Rabasa & Bernard (2015: .58) describe the proliferation and consumption of 
‘jihadi material’ coupled with a lack of belonging within a western cultural space to be the 
main denominators of potential terrorist actors, but then contradict this assertion by 
making the point that individuals often appear as integrated as the ‘average’ (whatever that 
is supposed to mean) citizen. 
 
It is also important to observe that much of the above assertion is made on the basis of one 
case, that of Mohammad Siddique Khan. For a living, Khan was involved in youth and 
mentoring work with his local mosque and primary school. It is alleged that he proliferated 
‘jihadi material’ to vulnerable individuals, an activity that may have led to the 7/7 bombings 
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which Khan is believed to have spear headed. Based on this one case, Rabasa and Bernard 
(2015: 59) proclaim that the aim of all terrorist conspirators is to disseminate material to 
vulnerable individuals within communities deemed at risk. This can be seen as an effort by 
Rabasa and Bernard to ‘normalise’ the use of surveillance strategies by citing a particularly 
prominent member of the biggest ‘jihadi’ terrorist act on UK soil as justification, even 
though there is questionable validity in the process of ‘behaviour replication’ that is central 
to their narrative and typology. Rafaello Pantucci (2015: 3-4), Director of International 
Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), argues that the 7/7 bombings 
and the events that led up to them can be described as a ‘confluence of historical trends 
and local dynamics’ that shaped the narrative of Khan and his accomplices. For Pantucci 
(2015: 5), the bombers contact with Jihadi individuals and groups was the catalyst which 
gave them the agency to carry out the attack but that their own sociological contexts made 
them more vulnerable than the average citizen.  
 
However, it is important to note that all the conspirators had varied biographies and 
junctures in their life that deviate from the linear process of radicalisation proposed by 
Rabasa and Bernard (2015: 56-57). For instance, Khan’s disassociation from his family is 
often cited as evidence of him being pulled along the radicalisation process. However, the 
initial break with his family was actually a result of him refusing a proposed arranged 
marriage (Pantucci, 2015: 27). It is also worth noting that Rabasa and Bernard (2015:.60-66) 
used a ‘database’ of 30 individuals to create their typology, most of which is based on 
witness testimony, which has been proven to be unreliable, especially when taken under 
duress (Thompson, 2012: 331).  In many cases, especially those connected to violent 
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aleatory crime, witness testimony is ‘loaded’, particularly when taken after the fact. 
Harmless or even common behaviours are perpetuated as indicators of the individuals’ 
potential to exhibit violent behaviour (Foucault, 1978: 24-25).   
 
Rabasa and Bernard (2015: 58) assert that ‘second generation, British Muslims of Pakistani 
origin’ are predominantly responsible for terrorist acts carried out by British Muslims, both 
‘domestically and abroad’ based on such limited data. Put into context, there are an 
estimated 1.17 million people living in the UK who identify as Pakistani (ONS, 2011). This 
narrative is designed to appeal to those that wish to maintain the relationship between 
populations and security apparatus. For those in governance, this information puts a 
boundary to the problem that they face regarding extremism. Although 1.17 million people 
is a vast demographic to surveil or securitise it is decidedly smaller than the purported 1.5 
billion Muslims found across the globe (Pew Research Centre, 2011: 13).   
 
Dean (2010: 206) denotes that typologies of risk are established through the technologies 
and languages of governance, specifically statistical analysis and the calculation of 
probabilities. This process presents a problematic within the praxis of human and social 
interaction; by attempting to quantify its processes to fixed values the qualitative nature 
and thus, principally, mutable and fluid interactions between actors is largely ignored. In 
short, government aims to make the incalculable calculable. Prevent and its focus on 
targeting demographics at risk of radicalisation is a case exemplar of the State’s risk-based 
security apparatus failing to understand the qualitative milieu that makes individuals or 
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groups vulnerable in the first place. Failing to understand such factors can lead to vulnerable 
communities becoming isolated and often, demonised (Said, 1979: 26).   
 
Public discussion surrounding terrorism is often dominated by the concepts of ‘evil’ and the 
‘irrational hatred’ of western culture (Stamptnitzky, 2013a: 187-188). Terrorist actors and 
the groups they are perceived to speak for are put through many ‘de-rationalising’ practices 
by both the media and the government without any evidence, empirical or otherwise, to 
support such claims (Stamptniitzky, 2013a: 189). Using the circumstances surrounding Khan 
as an example, security analysts have followed a system of categorisation that fulfils the 
notion of the ‘perverse individual’ described by Foucault (1978: 231), where like ‘all heinous 
criminals’ Khan had muted his ‘voice of conscience’ and yet remained ‘cogent’ of his 
nefarious aims.  Khan had seemingly sought out vulnerable members of his community who 
he purportedly radicalised over a period of time to the point that some of them have 
committed a fundamental crime against the sovereign authority of the State and the moral 
crime against the citizen.  
 
What is most problematic with this assertion however is that Khan was in fact a citizen 
himself, as were all his assailants. Moreover, considerable emphasis is put upon his 
international links in areas of conflict even though the connections are often tenuous. The 
portrayal of Khan is essentially an extension of the Western interpretation of the Islamic 
world as ‘sadistic, treacherous’; with the individual Muslim only a cog in the illogical 
machine of Islamic ‘mass rage’, blighting the West and all that it holds dear (Said, 1979: 286-
287). For Said (1979: 290), Khan and those even remotely like him can never truly be a 
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citizen of the West. Although the good Muslim can find asylum within the Western world, 
they must remain ‘passive’, compliant, and above all ‘non-active’ in the affairs of state (Said, 
1979: 97).  For Said (1979: 97-98), the construction of a ‘typology’ of the Muslim based upon 
Eurocentric ideology will inevitably result in rebellion against it from sections of the 
communities that it targets. Furthermore, it is the Western world’s obligation to posit such 
resistance as zealous, salacious, and ultimately ‘irrational (Said, 1979: 313).’     
 
Prevent and the radicalisation methodology it is endowed with is, in essence, a normative 
mechanism of power. It proclaims that it is not culturally or racially motivated policy; 
however a significant proportion of its targeted demographics happen to be Muslim 
populations within the UK. It justifies this because acts of Islamic terrorism have occurred on 
British soil. It does not however consider that such acts of terrorism have, in the words of 
those committing them, been in response to the UK’s involvement in the war on terror and 
the fallout that persists to this day. This is an example of a ‘race struggle’, whereby the 
dominant race or culture – in this instance the UK government and it’s Eurocentric, white 
British born ideology – has set the precedent on where such discourse takes place; absolving 
itself from any moral conflict by depoliticising the dialogue of engagement (Foucault, 2003: 
61-62). The State portrays its detractors from within its target demographics as irrational. 
The State would argue it is not worthwhile to reflect on their motivations, only on their 
actions – or perhaps more pertinently the actions of the select few (Lemke 2019: 233).    
 
For Crenshaw (2011: 52) the Islamic terrorist is the symbolic outcaste, the figurative 
barbarian who dwells in the space between the physical and perceptual world, which is 
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often (if not always) deeply rooted in the historical perspective of East versus West (Said, 
1979: 27). However convoluted our understanding of exactly what terrorism is or who 
extremists are, an elaborate CVE industry exists and purports to know the answers to these 
questions. Actors within this sphere range from university research groups, NGOs, and 
private security firms to government agencies (Stamptnitzky, 2013a: 84). In short, counter 
terrorism and counter extremism is big business. In the next section of this chapter, the 
establishment of a closed research ecosystem that self-perpetuates narratives that are 
proven to garner economic favour will be explored, with this thesis arguing that there is 
little room available for truly critical analysis of CVE initiatives such as Prevent. 
 
3.3. Epistemic research ecosystem surrounding CVE initiatives  
 
For Dean (2010: 153), the logic of competition that the capitalist economic model offers 
would denote that technological advancement is better facilitated by private organisations 
that will produce more innovative security apparatus in the search for profit, with the aim of 
distinguishing themselves from their competition. However, this analysis does not consider 
that the organisations manufacturing security products might shape potential security 
concerns around the products they have to offer rather than develop effective assistive 
technology suited to the purpose for which they are intended. In addition, political decision-
making that is primed by risks that originate outside of the political sphere but require State 
intervention are prolific in the contemporary context (Giddens, 2003: 5-6).  
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If a risk is deemed serious by actors or agencies within society and they believe that it 
requires State level attention, the risk must be proliferated through communitive channels 
such as the media (and ever more importantly, social media) to create public attention, 
which is the currency used to create biopolitical will. The State and its agents must ensure 
that their sovereign power is ‘media-filtered’ in order to distance themselves from tensions 
caused by rising inequality and ‘ethnic conflict’, of which their policy is the architect 
(Stenson, 2005: 281). This process can often lead to ‘scaremongering’ and consequently, 
rushed political action (Walkate & Mythen, 2015: 10). In such instances, governmentality 
and the due process it employs falls short of providing democratic oversight of both the 
modelling and the execution of security related affairs (Dean, 2010:154). The State and its 
agents are acutely aware of this contradiction, and use media manipulation as a means to 
navigate the ‘side effects’ of the policy they create to mitigate risks such as those posed by  
radicalisation, which create negative socio-political outcomes of their own (Beck, 1992: 80).    
 
In this instance, Prevent acts as a component of the ‘economy of illegalities’, where the 
motivation of government and the rule of law have shifted away from prosecution of 
criminality (Foucault, 1977: 62). Consequently, the ‘condemned’ has very little biopolitical or 
economic value to prevention, which is focused on the acquisition of knowledge through 
enforced surveillance (Foucault, 1978: 262). This process yields more valuable results 
because it creates both a product that is sellable to biopolitical sensibilities i.e. prevention is 
better than cure, and it creates an industry of knowledge that embeds the will of 
governance within the broader spectrum of the mechanisms of power and wider society 
(Lemke, 2019: 78-79). A by-product of this form of governance is that a hierarchy of illegality 
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is formed through the construction of knowledge. This ‘new economy of power’, where the 
transgressions of the superordinate is outweighed by those of the subordinate is 
functionally concerned by how widespread the potential for illegality is, not necessarily on 
the number of crimes being committed (Foucault, 1980b: 104).  
  
In sum, if evidence is found of pervasive misdemeanours against the prevailing ideology of 
State within a target demographic it takes precedent over actions of the State that have 
negatively impacted on said target demographics (Lemke, 2019: 81). For example, Prevent 
largely ignores the UKs involvement in the war on terror and the political proliferation of 
immigration (that has led to widespread racism) as factors that could lead to vulnerable 
individuals or groups becoming radicalised.   
 
Current CVE initiatives are an iteration of classic counterinsurgency (COIN) models 
pioneered by western militaries in the 19th and 20th century described at length in the 
previous chapter of this thesis. David Galula (2006:4) describes how in times of ‘revolution’ 
or ‘insurgency’, terms he uses interchangeably, the ‘insurgent’ or extremist can often obtain 
legitimacy through legal channels, which the ‘counterinsurgent’ or sovereign power in 
juxtaposition has a ‘duty’ to make as difficult as possible. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual translates this movement beyond the sovereign power of 
the State to civil society as paramount to ‘resolving insurgencies (The United States Army, 
2007:64).’  Galula’s (2006:84) asserts that contact with civil society engineers a systematic 
process that re-establishes the counter-insurgents’ control over the population, which in 
turn gives them access to intelligence that can both remove the target population from the 
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insurgent organisation and lead to the capture of individuals who are actively pursuing 
subversion of the State’s power.  In essence, ‘the acceptance of an authority by a society, 
and control are the central issues in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies’ for the State as it 
provides them with the legitimacy to act with force if deemed necessary (United States 
Army, 2007:8-9).  
 
Stephen Graham (2010:14) describes this process of the securitisation of discourse as an 
extension of a ‘new military urbanism’, whereby the widespread availability of advanced 
technologies in global markets for groups who want to deploy them has created an overlap 
with the interests of the State. In some cases, surveillance and military technology created 
by civilian markets can be of a higher standard than that produced by the State. For Graham 
(2010: 15), it is this definitive shift which renders ‘communal and private spaces’, along with 
their ‘civilian populations’ both a location for ‘targets and threats’ and the site in which the 
terrorist inhabits. As such, the citizens that reside in our urban centres have also become 
potential suspects. Further compounding this problem, the work of ‘experts’ within the field 
of counter-terrorism is in fact far removed from actual ‘terrorists’ or ‘terrorist groups 
(Hoffman, 2006: 36).’    
 
Neumann and Kliemann (2013: 370-371) assert that most studies conducted on CVE 
initiatives are generated from the academic fields of criminology, political science and 
sociology. Primary data is the preferred source of choice, however first-hand accounts of 
radicalisation are extremely rare to non-existent (Neumann and Kliemann, 2013: 372). 
Gielan (2017: 14) denotes that CVE based research has a dearth of ‘effect evaluations’ of 
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said theory being applied to target demographics. Furthermore, those that do endeavour to 
test the effects of CVE initiatives have limited access to empirical data, which limits their 
explanatory value and overall generalisability. In short, very specific case models are being 
used to justify widespread policy rollout when they have little scope to do so (Gielan, 2017: 
15). 
 
For Neumann and Klienmann (2013: 363) the renewed interest in CVE research globally 
following the 9/11 attacks is primarily economically driven. However, this incentivised, 
‘renewed vigour’ has not guaranteed higher academic standards (Gielan, 2017: 17).  Whilst 
conducting a study of CVE based research, Neumann and Kliemann (2013: 378) found that 
just over half of the research’s methodologies originating within the field met general 
scholarly requirements but that over a third fail ‘to meet minimum standards’ of academic 
rigour. Perhaps quite surprisingly for such proponents of radicalisation theory,  Neumann 
and Kliemann (2013: 379) concede that this is tolerated within CVE focused research (when 
it would not in other areas of academic study) because the majority of funding comes from 
governmental sources that have their own agendas, which they wish to legitimise through 
the medium of an impartial research community.  
 
 Nasser-Eddine et.al. (2011: 16), whilst writing a report for the Australian government 
regarding CVE related studies and methodologies observe that CVE is rarely defined beyond 
its basic terminology; it is a universally accepted phenomenon that lacks real 
conceptualisation. Nasser-Eddine et.al. (2011: 17-18) highlight that there is an upsurge of 
CVE focused research teams within academia who seek to foster a closer relationship 
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between public and private entities, which is evidence of the increasing coalescence 
between the economy and State, where both entities court each other’s amity to legitimise 
their services and for economic favour (Foucault, 2001: 272). Perhaps the most damning 
finding of Nasser-Eddine et.al.’s (2011: 70) is that insufficient academic analyses is dedicated 
to critiquing research into CVE initiatives. They argue further that there is a limited number 
of studies that focus on empirically evidenced investigations and that there is a ‘lack of 
seriously tested quantitative and qualitative field research’ found within the field, nor an 
obvious will to fill this gap (Nasser-Eddine et.al, 2011: 70).  
 
Heath-Kelly (2013: 397) argues that much like the exotic hypothetical material ‘dark matter’ 
is used to fill the gaps in some aspects of theoretical physics, radicalisation theory and by 
proxy CVE methodologies are being used by academics and governments to fill the gaps in 
knowledge found in ‘unknown risks’ to the prevailing social order. For Heath-Kelly (2013: 
398), it is the performative nature of governance, the appearance of government to predict 
and react to potential future risks that cement legitimation for radicalisation theories as the 
theology of contemporary security, or as Foucault (2001: 233) might attest, as the crook the 
Shepherd uses to tend their flock.  
 
 If the performative example can be used further to describe the replication of security 
narratives such as CVE methodologies and radicalisation theory, much like any performance 
it must be rehearsed and repeated before it can be convincingly performed (Foucault, 
2004b: 61-62). As such, a closed research community has developed around the perceived 
threat of extremism to provide an environment conducive for such rehearsal. So far, this 
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chapter has discussed the core methodology of CVE initiatives, radicalisation theory and its 
inherent flaws. It has also deliberated the epistemic research community that has 
developed around this practice, driven by economic factors and the performative nature of 
governance. In the following and final section, the example of Prevent and the literature 
surrounding it will be discussed in more detail. It will conclude by alluding to the current gap 
in understanding this study is designed to fill.  
 
3.4. Prevent; the current literature.  
 
 Although there is an apparent unwillingness within the broader research community to 
critique CVE initiatives such as Prevent it still has many detractors within academia. Richards 
(2011: 150) argues that attributing a ‘language of vulnerability’ to extremism and terrorism 
is non-conducive to what Prevent professes its purpose is – to keep society safe and its 
communities harmonious. Its focus on the principles of a pathogenic transference of 
extremism on the grounds of arbitrary risk factors, which for Richards (2011: 151) creates a 
pre-criminal space that only makes communities more vulnerable to isolation – something 
Prevent is apparently designed to, perhaps ironically, prevent from happening. The 
paradigm described by Richards also has a contradictory element that is hard to coalesce 
from a public engagement perspective; evidence of vulnerability becomes an indicator for 
potential dangerousness (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 405-406). Those most vulnerable, those most 
at risk become risks in themselves from a governance perspective. For Heath-Kelly (2013: 
407), the most obvious weakness of this rhetoric is that both the research community and 
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the UK government have failed to define the exact moment somebody ‘at risk’ becomes ‘a 
risk.’ As such, everyone ‘at risk’ is ‘a risk’ at inception (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 408).  
 
 Skoczylis and Andrews (2019: 2-3) argue that the ‘loose’ connections Prevent makes 
between extremism, terrorism and targeted vulnerable communities is the basis for most of 
its criticism. They also argue that this is also one of the reasons it persists; it is merely 
‘othering’ – something that comes as second nature to mechanisms of State, which still have 
one foot firmly placed in its colonial past. This prejudicial ideology is legitimised by the 
biopolitical danger presented in an act of terror which is operationalised in a fiscal format, 
which is in turn conducive to the dominant political order (Skoczylis and Andrews, 2019: 3). 
Austerity measures and the retention of subsidy for public services have also compounded 
the negative effects of Prevent and proliferated its uptake due to its potential to form a 
revenue stream for LA agencies severely lacking in funding (Abbas, 2018: 13).      
 
  Skoczylis and Andrews (2019: 4) denote that historically the Muslim communities of the UK 
have been the primary targets of Prevent’s operations, however the threat of a resurgent 
far-right has posed a significant problem for Prevent. The far-right in the UK, buoyed by the 
proliferation of anti-immigration rhetoric within contemporary political discourse during 
general elections and Brexit have exponentially grown. What is particularly difficult for 
Prevent and those that enact it is that not all those vulnerable to far-right extremism are in 
fact vulnerable in the traditional sense. They do not come from isolated communities, they 
are not always from areas of economic deprivation and they also may not lack education or 
critical thinking skills (Skoczylis and Andrews, 2019: 5-6).  
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The one thing Prevent can use to delineate or categorise those who have become a risk in 
the shape of far-right extremism is by using its schematic of Fundamental British Values 
(FBV). However, in this instance, far-right rhetoric is intrinsically British and based on the 
politics of othering, deciding what is British by defining what it is not, in the exact same way 
Prevent has attempted to do in the form of FBV. As such, the line between far-right 
extremism and acceptable political discourse is blurred. This is particularly apparent when 
you consider the politics of exclusion exhibited by the current government in the form of 
the Windrush scandal and the prevailing anti-immigration sentiment that led to Brexit 
(Abbas, 2018: 13). It can also be argued that the primary targets of the far-right in the UK 
are its Muslim communities. Strategies such as Prevent that highlight differences within 
communities only exacerbate this issue (Abbas, 2018: 2).  
 
For Abbas (2018: 12), Muslim communities are left with no choice but to tackle both 
Islamophobia and any forms of radicalisation within their communities on their own terms, 
not because they are inherently Muslim problems but because the State or Prevent by proxy 
is incapable or not willing to address these issues. Choudhury and Fenwick (2011: 174-175),  
when conducting a qualitative study across four local authorities found that there is a 
distinct and alarming difference between the perceptions and lived experiences of Muslim 
and non-Muslim residents within the same local areas, with Muslims being much more likely 
to have interacted with Prevent personnel than their non-Muslim counterparts. Lewis and 
Hamid (2018: 161) highlight that the British Muslim community are conscious that the rising 
level of far-right extremism and the subsequent hate crimes the community has felt as a 
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result have not been given the same level of attention by those implementing Prevent as 
instances of radical Islam, which are much less common.  
 
Foucault (1981: 52) asserts that there are three modalities utilised by government to 
regulate discourse; firstly, by determining what is forbidden via normative action, secondly 
by establishing what is rational and irrational behaviour and finally, by defining what is 
‘truth’ and what is not.  Prevent works on the principles of all three modes of Foucault’s 
analysis. It uses case studies of extremists to establish what is prohibited behaviour. These 
examples also act to establish what is rational and irrational thought, which is further 
embodied by training, lessons and engagement activities that are designed to resonate with 
both practitioners and vulnerable individuals/groups. It is also through these mechanisms 
that a social truth is created through the formation of resolute norms; in the case of Prevent 
it takes the form of FBV. This is then disseminated and replicated across a network of 
agencies that engage with the target demographics. 
 
 Fundamentally, Prevent is a ‘technology of security’ that projects the optimum model, the 
ideal type of the citizen, by first distinguishing what is not citizenship (Foucault, 2007: 56-
57). This negative modality is then operationalised by implementing procedures to evaluate 
individuals and groups against an ideal, that is to say, a fabricated norm of conduct. Instead 
of establishing what is the norm, which is an almost impossible task, Prevent becomes the 
apparatus of what is normal. It does this by conferring with the knowledges created through 
various levels of statistical analysis – creating an average of averages (Lemke: 2019: 194).  
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This data is primarily collated through practitioners in frontline services such as education 
through their respective safeguarding agendas and administrative responsibilities.   
 
Bryan (2015: 213-214) observes the changing trajectory of Prevent from a wholly 
community-based surveillance tool into the safeguarding agenda of LAs, cumulating in the 
Prevent Statutory duty.  The statutory duty is primarily enacted through schools, facilitated 
through teaching staff. Schools also employ a multitude of NGOs with a CVE focus to help 
enable staff to deliver CVE focus activities, both through training and by directly delivering 
workshops/lessons to students. Bryan (2015: 224) acknowledges that teaching staff are 
mainly unaware of the contentions surrounding Prevent – lamenting the lack of resources 
available to them to fully enact their responsibility to it. That is not to say that schools and 
teachers are merely ‘passive receptors’ to the Prevent duty or their obligations to it 
(Vincent, 2019: 23).  There is ‘ground-level mediation’ of Prevent by individual practitioners 
who do see conflicts of interest. However, resistance is mostly fractured and often no more 
than a compromise (Thomas, 2017: 315-316). In reality, the methods used by teachers to 
mediate the conflict that can arise via the implementation of FBVs often become a source of 
information that is resourced by the duty, marketized as a means to continue its assimilation 
into the wider educational discourse (Vincent, 2019: 24). Bryan (2015: 224) denotes that 
there is a lack of research that fully explores this dynamic, which is greatly needed if we are 
to understand, what Foucault (1982: 220–221) would call the ‘conduct of conduct’ in 
relation to how educators teach students modality of behaviour as a means of freedom of 
expression via FBV whilst having their own freedom of expression restricted by the 
stipulations of the State.    
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 Bourdieu (1994 1-2) considers the field of education to be the ideal site for the State to 
disseminate its ideology, in this case FBV, through the bureaucratic channels of the 
safeguarding agenda to create an order of reality that best suits its purposes. It also 
possesses the tools to replicate such narratives – to reproduce norms CVE initiatives such as 
Prevent and its apparatus require to function (Loyal, 2017: 86). Education is a fundamental 
element of what Bourdieu (2014: 4) describes as the ‘administrative state’, where the 
‘precise rationality of the bureaucratic field’ – in this instance FBV and the Prevent statutory 
duty, is both generated and reproduced (Bourdieu, 2014: 112).  
 
FBV and the ideological position of Britishness it fosters is driven by a fear of difference 
(Elton-Chalcraft et.al, 2017: 41). It places focus upon the assimilation of this sense of 
Britishness, with no agency given to adapt it to better fit the multi-cultural society that FBV 
proclaims to promote. Elton -Chalcraft et.al (2017: 41-42) highlight that teachers are also 
tasked with implementing an ‘unsophisticated’ narrative of FBV which is largely left open to 
their own interpretation. This creates two problematics, firstly, the delivery of FBV lacks 
continuity. In fact, FBVs offer a ‘civic rather than cultural understanding of identity’ which 
places institutions as bastions of morality on which conceptions of citizenship must revolve 
(Vincent, 2019: 29). They act as part of a wider ‘civic rebalancing agenda’, where previous 
indicators of the moral (such as religion) are losing their relevance and are being replaced by 
muscular liberalism that is inherent within the contemporary democratic logic of the UK 
State (Keddie, 2014: 540).  Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, FBV creates a narrative 
of the ‘insider/outsider’ that centres ‘white Britishness’ as the normative centre that all 
should adhere too (Elton-Chalcraft et.al., 2017: 42).  
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Ultimately, FBV and the discourse it generates is ‘inherently divisive’ by design (Farrell and 
Lander, 2019: 479). It magnifies the dysphoric effects of structural racism – particularly 
when Muslim teachers are tasked with delivering them. Muslim teachers are left with a 
choice – to deliver FBV and become alienated from their own identities or resist them and 
become alienated from their professional roles (Farrell and Lander, 2019: 480).    
 
Lemke (2019: 189) acknowledges that the ideology of policy such as Prevent is legitimised 
by the premise of ensuring the continuation of civil liberty and freedom of expression. It 
aims to set a precedent for ‘the conditions under which individuals are able to be free 
(Lemke: 2019: 190).’ As such, freedom, or to be more precise, a sense of freedom is a 
fabrication. In terms of Prevent, the construction and proliferation of FBV offers a case in 
point. Nothing about them is particularly intrinsic to a sense of Britishness but they do set an 
ill-defined notion of liberty upon the British way of life whether they agree with it or not.  
 
This fragile sense of freedom constructed by Prevent is constantly under threat precisely 
because it does not translate into many people’s notions of liberty. For instance, a senior 
teacher who was a part of this study described FBV as “problematic” because they create a 
vison of the UK that wasn’t accurate because they didn’t take into account the role wider 
cultural contexts has played in shaping our “shared values as human beings.” However, it is 
important to note that they continued to teach them because it was central to their role as 
a pastoral lead – they simply could not fulfil their function without them. Prevent creates 
ideal types that closely fit the artificial liberty constructed by the State, which in turn creates 
the hierarchy of risky behaviour that form its methodological focus. The fragile nature of 
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this ideology in turn generates more risks and Prevent keeps enabling its existence through 
its practice, a terrarium of risk if you will. Foucault (2008: 60-61) argues that ‘security 
mechanisms’ such as Prevent act autonomously from the state even though they are 
working to preserve its interests. This leaves room within the bureaucratic regime for 
dissonance such as that expressed by the participant teacher when asked about their 
opinion regarding FBV. However, there is little avenue to act upon it because the apparatus 
afforded to actors and agencies that may disagree with aspects of the liberal order are 
controlled by the State. In this case, the teacher is left with no choice but to implement 
them because not doing so would effect every other aspect of his work.   
 
In addition to schools responsibility to deliver FBV they are also tasked with being the 
primary site of surveillance within the localised context. For Bourdieu (1996: 184), the 
educational field is the ideal site for the state to exhibit the ‘counter identification’ of those 
that do not fit the desired ‘trajectory’ modelled by the state in order to intercept them and 
change their course.  Bourdieu (1996: 184-185) describes the mechanisms of the school in 
this instance as morally obliged to present such discourse as a choice to the ‘deviant’ 
individual, however in reality there is no agency to diverge from the predetermined path set 
by State. As such, the school is obligated to detect and remove such ‘deviant’ individuals if 
they do not respond to reformation for fear that they may pass on their aberrant behaviour 
to their peers (Bourdieu, 1996: 185-186).   
 
The corroborative relationship between Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s conceptions of the 
regulatory regime is at its most evident when viewing the educational field through the 
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paradigm of surveillance and its relationship to self-regulation. For Foucault (1977: 201), the 
‘permanent visibility’ the student body are subject to within the confines of the school 
produces their ‘docility’ to their educators will, and by proxy, to the education system that 
promotes the ‘functioning power’ of the State. Bourdieu (2013: 164) argues that this system 
of docility is supplemented by the schools endeavour to make the State sanctioned ‘social 
world appear as self-evident’ through targeted educational programmes such as FBV. This 
process takes advantage of what Bourdieu (2013: 160) terms ‘Doxa’, the ‘social experience’ 
where an individual determines their behaviour according to the ‘natural order’ presented 
to them by external sources of power which they then internalise and develop into their 
own regulatory practices (Schlosser, 2012: 39).  
 
The point where Foucault (2004a: 5) deviates from Bourdieu is in his conception of the 
‘regimes of truth.’ For Foucault (2004a: 5-6), the State produces layers of reality that are 
acceptable to it by utilising aspects of the discourse of target communities – their  
‘subjugated knowledges’ – to make State ideology more palatable to those who have the 
capability to be resistive. To do this successfully, the State ‘produces reality’ that is tailor 
made for essential ‘enclosed disciplines’ that serve society, such as the school. Within these 
parameters, security apparatus like the Prevent duty act as a mode of ‘social quarantine’ to 
identify those not susceptible to the State’s chosen ideology in order to retrain or remove 
them (Foucault, 1977: 216).  Prevent produces several different ‘rituals of truth’ which 
constrict the interpretation of freedoms that are inherent within the liberal order (Foucault, 
2000: 194). For example, although FBV uphold freedom of speech as one of its core tenants, 
exceptions to this rule are allowed on the basis of exceptionalism – when freedom of 
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expression has the potential to threaten life. This assertion is based upon the radicalisation 
model adopted by Prevent which has direct parallels with the safeguarding agendas of LAs – 
to protect life. The duty’s focus on freedom of expression as a potential safeguarding 
concern becomes a ritual of truth that is repeated across agencies with a safeguarding 
responsibility. Although the logic of freedom is paramount to social educational projects 
such as FBV, only ‘certain forms of freedom’ are permissible within the field of ‘specific 
limitations’ set by the State (Foucault, 2007: 353). Those who fall outside of the State’s 
estimation of exhibiting appropriate ‘respect for freedoms’ become the targets of policing 
agencies (Foucault, 2007: 354-355).    
 
For Sian (2015: 196), Muslims have become the individuals schools have been tasked with 
identifying, who require the ‘intervention and regulation’ that Foucault and Bourdieu speak 
of. This endeavour is a ‘post racial’ mechanic of State that is merely rephrasing forms of 
structural racism that are steeped in the UK’s colonial past (Sian, 2015: 197). Sian (2015: 
197-198) proposes that the monitoring of Muslim pupils within the educational setting 
systematically removes their agency to challenge the Islamophobic rhetoric that will 
inevitably shape their lives. In short, if they do not feel capable of discussing the societal 
processes that make them vulnerable in a centre of learning they will never be able to 
escape their vulnerability when they grow beyond it (Sian, 2015: 198). Examples of Sian’s 
assertions are not hard to find with the UK Muslim community. In the context of this study, 
a member of the Islamic community in charge of a Community-Based Organisation (CBO) 
who took part in this study describes how young people in their community are subjects of 
surveillance, where their social media, their friendship groups, “every piece that comes out 
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of them is examined.” The participant, who works with hundreds of young Muslims, has 
seen first-hand how such practices “actually change the future of people.” They believe that 
Prevent has created an environment that “criminalises them, and alienates them”, which 
ultimately “stops them being able to speak and develop themselves” which in turn leads to 
them becoming more marginalised and vulnerable.  
 
In this cycle of ‘vulnerability production’, the school and the field of education in general has 
become a tool of the ‘surveillance bureaucracy of the security state’ designed to highlight 
the vulnerable, both to its dispositifs and to the vulnerable themselves (Ramsay, 2017: 155). 
Universities in particular have been tasked by Prevent and its statutory duty to identify 
students with apposing political views to the prevailing notions put forward in the form of 
FBV, which is an obvious ‘subversion of the educational mission (Ramsay, 2017: 156).’ 
Essentially, FBV is a form of political virtue, where ideological pretexts become almost 
theological in scope (Dean, 2010: 102-103). The usage of FBV by Prevent and its subsidiary 
mechanisms is a case exemplar of this in action. The danger exhibited within any theological 
based form of governance is that rules become rationalised based upon ideological contexts 
– they may not actually be rational if measured outside this mode of supposition (Dean, 
2010: 104).  
 
However, this isn’t necessarily a problem for the State or the Prevent duty. FBV are by 
design a form of ‘political marginalisation’ that identifies what is acceptable citizenship by 
defining what it is not (Foucault, 1988a: 150-151). The moralistic discourses of FBV – its 
values– are a ‘tactical element’ of government that promotes ‘asceticism’ or in more 
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didactic terms, loyalty to normative values in pursuit of the ‘endless obedience of one man 
to another’, much like any other pastoral form of governance (Foucault, 2007: 207). The use 
of nationalistic language like British values allows the State to ‘wield a power that cannot be 
taken’ from them even if they are not based in reality, because a ‘higher authority’ does not 
exist within the body politick that has the power to do so (Foucault, 2007: 208).  
  
In this chapter, I argue that the prevalence of radicalisation theory and the closed research 
community that has grown around it enable CVE methodologies such as those used by 
Prevent. I have also deliberated the current literature surrounding this problematic and 
have identified a gap within in it that this investigation is placed to fill. In the following 
chapter, the research methods of this study will be outlined. A qualitative study of 31 
participants ranging from LA Prevent mangers, education providers, NGOs with a CVE focus 
and local community groups and advocates has been conducted across four LAs in the South 
East of England. The specific rationale for case selection and the chosen research method –
critical discourse analysis – will now be discussed in more detail.   
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Research Methods 
 
Thus far, this thesis has explored the historical implications of the colonial governmentality 
of Western powers and its impact on the State as an amalgam of security apparatus. 
Emphasis has been placed upon the COIN rationale employed by the British Empire in the 
19th and 20th centuries that act as a precursor to CVE initiatives such as Prevent. I have also 
highlighted the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality and how it 
applies to the current model of CVE that Prevent and its statutory duty follow: radicalisation 
theory. The primary site of the Prevent duty’s delivery, the Bourdieusian bureaucratic field 
of education, has also been explored.  This research methods chapter will provide the 
reader with details of the research strategy I have adopted together with the means of data 
collection and the chosen analytic framework. In addition, the reader will also be supplied 
with a discussion of the potential limitations of the chosen research strategy and its 
implementation.   
 
The primary research aim of this study is to evaluate the impact and assess the implications 
of Prevent and its statutory duty across education, community-based organisations (CBOs) 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tasked with monitoring and administering 
communities deemed vulnerable to radicalisation at the local authority level. The following 
research questions have been developed to facilitate this task:   
 
1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control 
its production of knowledge?   
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2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is 
it reproduced?  
 
3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or 
reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?     
 
4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent 
statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have? 
 
The research questions have a twofold focus; in the first instance, they have all been 
designed to uncover the explanatory value of governmentality when explaining the ‘very 
subtle explicit and tacit combination’ of ideology and repression that goes into producing 
security as problematic (Althusser 1970). The repressive elements of Prevent and its CVE 
mechanisms are attenuated, or concealed in the form of ‘non-statutory advice’ where the 
law (in this case, the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act) is evoked as a general requirement 
in the school when ‘promoting Fundamental British Values’ 
(https://educateagainsthate.com/resources/dfe-guidance-schools-providing-advice-
promoting-fundamental-british-values-spiritual-moral-social-cultural-smsc-development-
pupils/).’ The methodological issues at stake for social scientists when examining the 
elements that constitute the CVE strategy as ideological repression requires a double-fold 
focus because: 
Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to 
‘discipline’ not only their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the Family.... 
The same is true of the cultural IS Apparatus (censorship, among other things), etc. 
(Althusser 1970, emphasis added). 
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Although many academics are keenly aware of the ideological and repressive functions of 
Prevent, this thesis closes the gap in the literature concerning the ways in which Prevent as 
a model of surveillance is outsourced and delegated across LA agencies and in third-party 
organisations in civil society. In other words, this study examines the various realities 
encountered by the personnel in charge of implementing a counter-terrorism strategy by 
examining the responses of agencies that both share a legal obligation and those that 
choose to opt into the statutory duty.  
 
To achieve this aim, this study has adopted a qualitative, interview-based research design. 
31 semi-structured interviews have been conducted with individuals that work within a LA 
or community setting – the primary locations of the Prevent statutory duty’s delivery. 
Respondents form four main sub-groups: LA Prevent managers, education providers, NGOs 
that deliver educational programmes with a CVE focus and finally, CBOs and community 
advocates who have significantly interacted with Prevent and its statutory duty. Education is 
the primary mechanism that the Prevent statutory duty is delivered through. As such, the 
Bourdieusian concept of the ‘field of education’ as the ideal site for the state to disseminate 
its doctrine – which Prevent and its CVE discourse acts as an example of – has informed the 
sampling frame adopted by this investigation (Bourdieu, 1996: 184). This chapter will now 
begin by discussing the research strategy adopted by the researcher and the use of critical 
discourse analysis as a methodological approach.  
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4.1. Research strategy  
 
The analytical viewpoint that I have adopted is described by Margaret Archer (2012: 1) as 
the ‘reflexivity imperative.’ To negate the problem of confirmation bias implicit in any form 
of social research, Archer (2012: 1-2) describes how researchers must adopt a more 
reflexive approach to investigating social phenomena. For Archer (2012: 2), the reasoning 
behind this approach is threefold: firstly, the ‘sense of self’ one occupies within any social 
dynamic is more important to objectivity than preconceived notions of where one fits within 
any given social order. For instance, in the case of this study, I had several preconceptions of 
where I fell within the CVE narrative and subsequently the Prevent framework before 
conducting fieldwork.  
 
On the one hand, as a seasoned practitioner within LA environments working as an 
educational keyworker for 7 years, facilitating the education of young people who could not 
access full time education for a variety of reasons,  (such as young offenders, marginalised 
ethnic minorities, refugees and those with behavioural special education needs) I found the 
landscape surrounding the safeguarding duty straightforward to navigate.  On the other 
hand, my ethnic and cultural background as a second generation, mixed race Middle Eastern 
man, places me within the target demographics of Prevent, which acted as another mode of 
reflection. As part of my role within the LA, I was asked to take part in surveillance practices 
aimed at young people who were not that different to me – certainly no less vulnerable to 
radicalisation than me according to the metrics being deposited upon them by the 
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safeguarding rationale of the LA. Awareness of these issues did act as a restraint against bias 
when conducting analysis.  
 
Secondly, the ‘reflexive monitoring’ I conducted in light of my lived experiences within the 
praxis of Prevent and its LA contexts allowed the investigation to avoid the potential to fall 
back on ‘traditional’ modes of thought – that of the educator tasked with safeguarding their 
student cohort –  whilst also acknowledging this ingrained philosophy within the practices of 
participants (Archer, 2012: 2). I have spent a considerable amount of time working as an 
educational key worker within the LA setting and have been party to numerous 
safeguarding procedures during this time. It is important to note that practitioners are 
tasked with keeping those in their charge safe from harm. This primary imperative is 
imprinted upon practice daily by educational bodies and agencies from inception.  
 
As such, safeguarding methodology is often practiced without much critical thought 
precisely because it adjudicates the dilemma of keeping those in the practitioners care safe. 
It is an attractive methodology to employ as a practitioner – despite its pertinacity to 
potentially marginalise the vulnerable – because it provides them with a network that aids 
them in monitoring their cohorts, to share the burden of care. I have had to critically reflect 
on the use of safeguarding procedures, which has almost become second nature, in order to 
effectively assess the implementation of Prevent – which places itself firmly within the 
safeguarding agendas of educational providers such as schools.   
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Finally, the conflicts between ‘norms’ that present themselves when investigating any social 
phenomena, which in this instance acts as an ‘open system’ and as such is situational, is also 
extremely important to forming an objective viewpoint (Archer, 2012: 2). Prevent acts as a 
‘generative mechanism’ inside the open system of the LA, facilitating the exchange of 
material goods, personnel, capital, and information through its networks of NGOs and CBOs 
(Archer, 2007: 152). These ‘unscripted realities’ form the basis of new information that any 
analysis of this nature demands (Archer, 2012: 3). This investigation seeks to explain the 
duty’s systematic nature by examining the ‘unscripted realities’ it uses in order to conform 
to the existing mechanisms of the LA.  In particular it will focus on the relationships between 
Prevent managers, schools and educators, NGOs, and CBO’s/ community advocates who are 
the functionaries of the ‘normative system’ of the State transposed upon the local setting 
(Archer, 2007: 27).  
 
The denomination of risk bestowed upon target demographics (such as the Islamic 
community) by an epistemological calculation based on scant evidence is troubling in itself. 
In order to understand how such methods of denomination have been constructed and 
wilfully carried out without critical oversight is perhaps the most pertinent question. To 
effectively assess the mechanisms of Prevent and how it is adapted by practitioners and 
organisations alike the ‘normative conventionality’ of how marginalised groups are treated 
must be taken into account (Archer, 2007: 94). What I mean by this statement is that there 
is an underlying normative language exhibited by individuals that relates to their 
understanding of the ‘particular other’ – in this case the Islamic community – that is deeply 
rooted in colonial discourses (Archer, 2007: 95). All the participants are acting reflexively 
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within their own environment, balancing their internal normative understanding they have 
acquired through their own life course with the normative discourse they must exhibit in 
their respective roles within the LA setting. The same of course can also be said about 
myself.  Whether this is a conscious effort or not is open to debate – certainly one this study 
does not aim to settle. However, it is essential to view the responses of participants as a 
relationship between the performance of Prevent as a structural apparatus of State and the 
individual as an actor in their own right. It is imperative to do so in order to allow the 
situational data to reveal itself naturally and to take its true form. It has been equally 
important for me to objectively question my own normative understanding whilst 
conducting this study – which has been a conscious effort of reflexivity on my own part.  
 
Another normative language of State that is critical to understanding the practices of 
Prevent is its economic functions.  For Archer (2012: 206), the encroachment of the ‘market’ 
upon the State has created an environment where the ‘institutional hegemony of State’ is 
dependent on the health of its economy. Foucault (2008: 244) postulates that the raison 
d'être of all mechanisms of State are fiscally motivated and Prevent is no exception. In 
relation to this investigation, those enacting Prevent and those advocating for it may be 
doing so to ensure their own financial wellbeing and not because it is the best fit for the 
problematic at hand. Dean (2010: 208) would argue that this is an example of how 
systematic governmentality is anchored by financial profitability – the fiscal properties of 
Prevent are what perpetuate its practitioners, not necessarily a belief in its properties as a 
safeguarding mechanism. For example, a Prevent manager who took part in this study is 
quick to point out that acquiring “associated funding” – or funding from a body that isn’t 
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necessarily associated with Prevent –  is one of the core functions of their role. When asked 
to elaborate on why this was the case, the Prevent manager detailed that much of their 
work lay in “areas outside of risk” because this was a stable workstream with guaranteed 
income. The “preventative side” of their role is often less “intense” because it is aligned to a 
risk that “fluctuates”, making it harder to maintain and ultimately, to evidence to the Home 
Office in order to get further “funding [for] certain projects.” 
 
 The economic imperative driving Prevent as a social policy has a core weakness; it 
predicates that social issues are merely trends that can be shaped by economic means. It 
does not take into consideration the complex social milieu that create pockets of 
deprivation and thus vulnerability that extends beyond the economic (Dean, 2010: 259). In 
particular, pre-emptive policies such as Prevent inhibit free choice, one of the cornerstones 
of the body politick in the liberal order. The economic crisis of the early 21st century and the 
culmination of the war on terror has seen the rescission of risk analysis from the global 
transposed back onto the national context (Dean, 2010: 263). Prevent and the industry in 
which it inhabits has grown as a result and the interplay between ‘risk, security and liberty’ 
has shifted the rationality of government. The State has shifted its focus from the risk posed 
by external powers to the potential threat posed by its own ‘populations and communities.’ 
Subsequently the regimes of practice of public servants and experts has also shifted to 
accommodate this new form of risk management (Dean, 2010: 264-265).  
 
To view and assess the regimes of practice created by Prevent, the modality of discourse 
which enable them must be deciphered and interpreted. For Machin and Mayr (2012: 4), 
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language both shapes and is shaped by society. As such, power relations are played out 
through discourse. Engaging with the methodological approach of Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) allows the reflexive researcher to analyse and apply meaning beyond the initial 
statement, to question the ideological pretexts that have constructed the narrative being 
performed by the subject (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 5). This study has chosen to employ a 
CDA methodological approach, normally utilised by critical linguistics in this instance 
because of its focus on Foucault’s (1991: 88) concept of governmentality, which similarly 
chooses to engage critically with the discourse of power, to look beyond its performance – 
to delineate its true meaning (O’Regan and Macdonald, 2009: 80).  
 
Machin and Mayr (2012: 77) highlight that discourse is never neutral, and that 
categorisation of those we interact with is key to our ability to communicate both our own 
needs and the perceived needs of others. At any one-time multiple classifications of actors 
populate the dialogue of society and power mechanisms will promote those that ‘best serve 
their interests (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 103).’ This study is designed to define these 
different ‘representational strategies’ found across its cohorts of participants and connect 
this to the broader safeguarding discourse surrounding Prevent and its CVE focus (Machin 
and Mayr, 2012: 103).  
 
Engaging critically with the responses of participants also allows this study to analyse the 
‘nominalisation’ of the discursive effects of Prevent, whereby those who enact the strategy 
filter the negative effects through bureaucratic language (Foucault, 2001: 233-234). In 
particular, the Home Office and by proxy its agents – the Prevent managers, use the 
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language of economics to incentivise the uptake of its practices. For example, Prevent 
coordinators act as gatekeepers for resources and funding for both agencies who work with 
vulnerable communities and NGOs assisting service providers and/or community groups.  
 
The dialogue that enables this process of economic dependencies within the localised 
setting can only be interpreted by examining the dynamics of power posited in the 
responses of the Prevent managers and those of education providers, NGOs with a CVE 
focus and CBOs/ community advocates. For Johnston (2018: 12-13), establishing the 
‘locations of meaning’ through the subtext of discourse can only be established if at first you 
can determine the ‘locus’ of intent. The expression of the Prevent duty’s power, or its 
‘public transcript’ as  Scott (1990: 45-47) would describe it, is effectively locked into a 
relationship with the ‘hidden transcripts’ of its target demographics – their subtextual 
discourses that are not within the duty’s ability to observe. Those producing Prevent have to 
assume that its target demographics mean to resist it, even if publicly they seem to accept 
it. The enactors of Prevent must continuously manufacture ‘the appearance of consent’ in 
order to maintain its legitimacy to act (Scott, 1990: 55).   
 
Prevent, like all forms of governance is subject to public resource and to political demand 
(Foucault, 1984b: 73). Prevent operates on the presumption that vulnerable communities 
are economically motivated, which creates a common ground for engagement (Foucault, 
2008: 245-248). It is this logic that propels Prevent in its community engagement work. It 
stimulates participation by offering resources. Once embedded, Prevent attempts to steer 
community group’s actions to match its intended outcomes. Social transactions merge with 
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economic ones to the point that they are no longer distinguishable from one another. This 
creates a relationship of dependence between community groups and the LA, where any 
concerns participating social actors may have are supplanted by economic imperatives 
(Lemke, 2019: 259).  
 
For example, a community advocate that took part in this study reported that they were 
tasked by the Home Office to implement a set of workshops in several mosques in a few 
neighbouring LAs. When this person was approached via recommendation from a Prevent 
manager, they were offered funding and a level of autonomy the person was happy with. 
However, once the workshops were ready to role out, the Home Office stipulated that the 
speaker must “widen the [interpretation] of extremism” to incorporate “political Islam.” The 
community advocate was not happy about this, citing that promoting political Islam was 
essential to the Muslim communities prosperity – “political Islam means instead of violent 
Islam you work through politics [to] try to change, or achieve your dreams through going 
into politics and democracy and elections.” Unfortunately, the community advocate had to 
go ahead with the project as stipulated by the Home Office because the organisation he ran 
was already economically invested in it – he had to “take money from Prevent” because he 
had already spent too much time and resources on the project to give it up.  
 
O’Regan and MacDonald (2009: 84) denote that CDA techniques allows the researcher to 
differentiate one ‘order of discourse’ from another, where a ‘regime of truth’ can be 
established by acknowledging the power dynamics at play between actors. An analysis of 
‘the totality of the discursive practices’ across ‘social domains’ is the only way to create a 
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holistic view of the problematic under investigation (O’Regan and MacDonald 2009: 85).   
For Fairclough (2005: 53), critically engaging with the discourse of all actors across 
hierarchies of power unlocks an understanding of the ‘multiple modalities’ of power. For 
Foucault (1984b: 211), this analytical emphasis repositions the researcher away from the 
seductive position of evaluating power from the viewpoint of what it subjugates or 
prohibits. Additionally, it allows me to analyse power mechanisms in the terms of its 
productions, which is both a more objective and constructive position for the researcher to 
take (Foucault, 1984b: 212).   
 
Public policy such as Prevent dictates what is ‘thinkable and unthinkable (Woodside-Jiron, 
2011: 154).’ The use of CDA techniques show how the language of governance is used to 
generate a language of legitimation for Prevent and its soft surveillance techniques and the 
role that individuals play in its enactment. The approach adopted is the perfect tool for 
assessing how Prevent sets the parameters for its enactment, how it shapes the agenda of 
its discourse and ultimately, how it convinces the affected parties to validate its existence 
despite fierce opposition (Edmondson, 2002: 114).         
 
4.2. Data collection and sampling:  
 
Etikan et.al. (2016: 3-4) denote that purposive sampling techniques are the most common 
approach in qualitative research projects because ‘the deliberate choice of participants due 
to the qualities each participant possesses’ allows the researcher to collect data that comes 
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from a source that is well informed on the ‘phenomenon of interest.’ The criteria for the 
sampling frame in this instance have been designed to incorporate the dissemination of 
Prevent from its operational base, in this case Prevent mangers and associated personnel 
within the LA. It also focuses on how the duty is then circulated within the organisational 
structure of wider local authority mechanisms through the safeguarding agenda, which is 
predominantly facilitated through education providers. Education providers are legally 
obliged to interact with the Prevent statutory duty however there are also bodies and 
organisations that are co-opted into engagement. Therefore, the sampling frame has been 
extended to encompass the perspectives of NGOs who operate within the localised context 
delivering CVE based training and services and community voices in the form of CBOs and 
community advocates.   
 
This study has also followed the principles of theoretical sampling. The concept of 
theoretical sampling is effectively to collect, code and analyse data in accordance to the 
theory that the research questions are grounded in and to develop the understanding of the 
theory and its dimensions within the thematic under discussion as they develop (Morse and 
Clark, 2019: 146). The process of theoretical sampling starts with the generalised thematic 
presented in the research questions which develops into a theoretical sample frame, then 
data is collected and analysed. Eventually the researcher reaches a point where theoretical 
saturation is achieved i.e. when the data presented from within the sample frame has 
reached the point where it successfully answers the problematic presented within the 
research questions (Robins and Eisen, 2017: 768).  
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The nature of the sample frame denotes that some element of ‘snowball’ sampling has 
occurred to reach theoretical saturation (Morse and Clark, 2019:162). The dissemination of 
Prevent (and general local government inter-agency work) is heavily reliant on networking. 
Such networks are in a constant state of flux and are ever changing. As such, it is important 
that the collection of data has been equally transitional and open to exploring emergent 
sources of information. It is also important to note that there is opposition and distrust from 
Prevent managers for those who engage critically with Prevent and as such the research 
strategy has had to remain fluid rather than fixed.  
 
Etikan et.al. (2016: 3) suggest that heterogeneous sampling techniques are best utilised 
when there are a diverse cohort of individuals or groups that are affected by the 
phenomena under investigation. The likelihood of ‘outliers’ affecting the sample is greatly 
reduced when all varying perspectives have been considered and all attempts have been 
made to include them within the analysis (Etikan et.al. 2016: 4). Critical case sampling is best 
employed when there are key gatekeepers or a central site of investigation that tie the 
cohorts together. Bourdieu (1996: 184-185) views education as the primary ‘bureaucratic 
field’ in which State doctrine is disseminated within any population.  It should perhaps come 
as no surprise that the field of education acts as the primary site for the delivery and 
distribution of the Prevent duty.  As such, the following cohorts have been interviewed by 
the researcher: 
- Local Authority (LA) Prevent managers  
- Safeguarding and pastoral leads within secondary education and Higher Education 
(HE) academics  
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- Relevant NGOs with a CVE focus 
 
- Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and community advocates  
 
The ‘educational regime’ that Prevent inhabits, which Foucault (1977: 141) considers to be 
the perfect trajectory of disciplinary power, is not only restricted to educational providers. 
The services that relevant NGOs offer all centre around educational outputs. For example, a 
participant of this study who works for a national level NGO provides FBV resources to over 
“12,000 members who are schools and teachers” in LAs across the country, with funding 
provided by the Home Office on a “contract or a grant basis.” The participant’s NGO uses 
the ‘educational regime’ Foucault speaks of to evidence their “policy and campaigning 
work” which gets them the attention of “government departments…to keep the message” 
Of FBV at the forefront of policy makers agendas.   
 
It is also important to note that Prevent managers provide training and funding for 
educational programmes for CBOs as a matter of course to encourage their engagement 
and ultimately their docility. The roll out of FBV within schools is effectively an effort by 
Prevent to ‘impose categories of thought’ on both the children it is designed to be delivered 
to and upon those tasked with delivering it (Bourdieu, 1994: 2).  This is imposed by Prevent 
managers and NGOs who oversee and train teachers and community members in the 
correct modalities of engagement with their own cohorts. The ultimate aim of this pastoral 
form of governance is to create an environment where obedience becomes self-regulation; 
where practitioners and citizens alike are held responsible to incorporate the ‘wisdom’ of 
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the pastorate, in this case taking the form of Prevent and FBV,  into their own daily practices 
(Dean, 2010: 92).   
 
To be precise, the sampling frame utilised by this study is a tautology – critical case sample. 
However, it is important to note that most of the respondents do not belong to a tangible 
community and have been targeted based on their occupation and/or their relationship 
with the Prevent statutory duty. As such, it is difficult to define the sample size as a 
grouping, which is directly related to the weaknesses of Prevent to transfuse within its own 
targeted demographics, which are even more loosely related. The makeup of interested 
parties in each sight of investigation is situational. The number and focus of Prevent 
managers are determined by the risk tier status determined by the Home Office and can 
change according to the funding available to each LA. The number of DSLs and the work that 
they do in any given LA is determined by how many schools there are and the 
size/demographics of their student bodies. The nature of CBOs is related to the 
demographical makeup within the LA and their existence is often the result of an 
individual/small groups who come from the community setting creating a service not 
provided by the LA in which they preside. Finally, the type and amount of NGO activity in an 
LA is an amalgamation of all the above factors, where they tailor their services to fill in gaps 
in provision that they identify via proximity to Prevent managers, often aided by the Home 
Office.  Nevertheless, the variants presented in the targeted individuals is worthy of study 
and analysis due to the relationship between ‘experience and structure’, or in this case the 
day to day applicability of the Prevent statutory duty to the workstreams of Prevent 
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managers, educational safeguarding leads, CBOs/community advocates and CVE focused 
NGOs within the localised context (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006; 493).   
 
The participants have been sourced from 4 LAs in the south east, two located in London and 
two on the South coast. Each LA has been deemed by the Home Office as a priority Prevent 
area and given guided funding to implement the statutory duty. NGOs that are CVE focused 
are also national in scope and as such are not restricted to any particular LA. However, such 
organisations do predominantly operate at this level and all participants from this cohort 
have worked in at least one of the LAs of the Prevent managers interviewed.  
 
4.3. Framework for analysis 
4.3.1. Interviewing techniques: 
 
As is widely ascertained, interviewing is the most extensively used research method in the 
qualitative researcher’s toolbox. This mainly due to its flexible nature, where the line of 
enquiry can be tailored at the individual level if required (Roulston, 2017: 324). For Tim May 
(2011: 131), the interview technique of data collection and analysis yields ‘rich insights’ into 
the biographies of the people who enact social conditions, for themselves and for wider 
society. However, May (2011: 132) is also quick to point out that the quality of the data 
yielded is directly proportional to the quality of the interviewer, who must maintain 
oversight of the study’s aims throughout the process. A balance must be stuck between the 
pursuit of ‘objectivity’ and that of rapport with each participant. An ‘intersubjective 
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understanding’ needs to be reached between the participant and the interviewer (May, 
2011: 140). For this to be successful, three main criteria have to be established: 
‘accessibility’ i.e. does the interviewee hold the knowledge necessary to answer the 
questions posed?, ‘cognition’ i.e. does the participant understand the format of the 
interview and why it is being conducted? And finally, ‘motivation’ i.e. is the participant 
interested in the research context and do they feel valued as a contributor? (May, 2011: 
141-142).  
 
This study has employed a semi-structured interview process. The reasoning behind this is 
directly related to the problematic under study. Prevent and its statutory duty is a policy 
area that seeks to be heavily standardised. However, it operates in a biopolitical space that 
is transitional and dependant on social groups that are everchanging in reaction to the 
world around them. the semi-structured approach is the only way to uncover both sides of 
the problematic presented by Prevent. It has allowed the interviewer to map the 
standardized elements of the Prevent policy and its mechanism whilst also giving the 
freedom to probe further; to gain a ‘clarification’ of its usage and to ‘elaborate’ on its real-
world effects on those that are enacting it and perhaps more importantly, those who are 
affected by it (May, 2011: 134). This process has allowed participants to respond to the 
questions on their own terms – to tell their truths. The theoretical interpretation of the data 
participants yield has granted this study the ability to contextualise this truth – to deliberate 
its true meaning.  
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For Bryne (2004: 184), interviewing offers a ‘flexibility’ to data collection that other forms of 
analysis are incapable of. Its interactive nature allows the researcher to respond to new 
information in real time and there is less scope to miss phenomena worthy of analysis. 
However, there is a question raised about the power dynamics between those involved, the 
differences in understanding between researcher and participant and the artificial nature of 
the interview process itself. As such, I have adopted a ‘reflexive’ approach (Bryne, 2004: 
184).  
 
Although I cannot directly mitigate the power dynamics between participants, I can be 
cognizant of ‘the boundary between the researcher and the research subject as an exercise 
of disciplinary power (Ackerly and True, 2008: 698).’ In practice, this has resulted in me 
examining the impact of both ‘similarities and differences’ between participants and how 
my own identity and reason for investigation might affect the participants’ responses or 
behaviours (Bryne, 2004: 185). This ‘on-going self-reflection’ has allowed me to assess the 
‘multiplicity’ of the social processes revealed by the participants responses as and when 
they present themselves (Ackerly and True, 2008: 699). This study is designed to uncover 
knowledge beyond the ‘dominant institutional cultures’ that the Prevent duty is a 
component of, and to do so effectively I have had to acknowledge my own place within that 
hierarchy (Ackerly and True, 2008: 700-701). 
 
The use of In-depth qualitative interviewing has allowed me to make objective observations 
of not only the social constructs surrounding the problematic presented by Prevent, but also 
the personal experiences of each participant – which act as evidence of the performance of 
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those social constructs in real world settings (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006: 484-485). This 
gives the study a deeper understanding of what entrenches such social constructs within the 
schematic, in this case the Prevent statutory duty within localised contexts. Although the 
‘objects’ of our assessments differ, both the researcher and the interviewee share the same 
epistemological position, that of the assessor (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006: 486). This adds 
value to the responses overall because the discussion is not being led by the interviewer’s 
predispositions. The knowledge created from the participants responses is not outlined by 
the theoretical framework but can be confidently used to test it – with a less fear of 
producing a false positive relationship (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006: 487).  
 
The exploratory nature of this piece of research requires a semi-structured approach to the 
interview process. An interview schedule is employed, however deviation from this has 
been encouraged upon the basis of the relevance of the topic under discussion. The 
interview schedules have been designed to engage with the research questions and each 
interview is structured around the key areas of enquiry (For an example of the interview 
transcripts used by this study for each cohort, see appendix 2). Each script varies depending 
on the level in which Prevent is implemented based on their job role. Context is paramount 
to the success of each interview which have been tailored individually, with the research 
questions remaining the core line of enquiry. All interviews have been audio recorded and 
transcribed. The interview data itself has gone through a CDA analysis, details of which can 
be found in the following subsections. 
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4.3.2. Interview data analysis: 
 
 May (2011: 153-154) denotes that an ‘ethnographic understanding’ of the participants must 
be reached prior to the first phase of data analysis. Each interview is situational and should 
be treated as such when categorising responses.  For instance, data collated from 
participants from educational bodies, such as those working within the LA, is a mixture of 
‘performance’ responses i.e. those formed through the entrenched understanding of the 
Prevent policy facilitated through their daily work-related activities and their 
personal/professional understanding and critique formed from their own unique life 
courses. Both are equally important to understanding the dynamics at play throughout the 
implementation of the Prevent statutory duty but should be understood in proximity of 
each other rather than as one homogeneous dataset. In effect, the relationship between 
both sets of data, both from an operational and theoretical viewpoint is an important 
variable.  
 
The interview data has been thematically analysed. Seal (2016: 445) states that the starting 
point of any form of thematic analysis is relating the data obtained throughout the study to 
the understanding of the problematic that caused the investigation to be conducted in the 
first place. As has been ascertained at length throughout the previous chapters, the 
theoretical underpinnings of governmentality in relation to contemporary CVE initiatives 
such as Prevent is the core understanding of this investigation and any data yielded has 
been obtained with this theoretical principle in mind. Equally, Bourdieu’s (1996: 184) 
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concept of the ‘educational field’ as the ideal bureaucratic mechanism to disseminate State 
doctrine is also being used to create understanding within the data analysis.  
 
The process of governmentality is not being assessed by this investigation. I am overtly 
proclaiming governmentality as the driving mechanism behind all social policy, Prevent 
included. All coded data is both situational and framed through the analytical lens of 
governmentality. This gives the data meaning beyond a simple ‘code book’ of findings, a 
criticism that can be levied at the predominant narrative set by CVE initiatives such as 
Prevent and the epistemic research community that underpins it with the knowledges it 
creates (Seal, 2016: 448). The themes found throughout the coding process have been 
formed with explicit regard to the overall research questions. Although patterns within the 
data that do not fit this line of enquiry have not been ignored, they have been prioritised 
according to their explanatory value to the overall schematic of governmentality and the 
breakdown of this found within the research questions.  
 
4.3.3. Theoretical focus  
 
The analysis process commenced with the first stage of coding. The interview transcripts 
were initially scouted for emergent themes that were related to the overall research 
questions – which form the basis of the coding schematic. The first stage analysis was then 
embedded by creating the second, more formal stage of analysis, where the praxis of 
governmentality was used to elicit a framework of understanding that can be used to 
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navigate the data. The impact of governmentality and its processes on the work of 
practitioners within the LA is a key measure of this study. Although participants may not be 
actively aware of the Foucauldian concept, they have offered many observations of its 
processes that are worthy of analysis.    
 
The second level of analysis has  grounded the findings within the praxis of what Foucault 
(1978: 221) would describe as the ‘genealogy’ of state or governmentality, further described 
by Dean (2010: 52) and Lemke (2019: 153) as the balance between the biopolitical and 
ideological pretences of contemporary governance and how this relates to security 
mechanisms – in this case Prevent and its statutory duty. I have also utilised Bourdieu’s 
(1996: 183-84) concept of the ‘bureaucratic fields’ of State, specifically how government 
uses the field of education to disseminate its ideology through instruction.  
 
This analytical schematic has been applied across all cohorts found within the dataset. The 
explanatory value of governmentality, and particularly its pastoral nature, has been used in 
this instance to navigate the Prevent statutory duty and the actors that both enact and 
participate within its praxis. The construction of ideal types is central to the CVE focus of 
Prevent, which is based upon the methodological underpinnings of radicalisation theory. 
This process has become a central focus of this study’s mode of enquiry. An understanding 
of the bureaucratic languages of government is essential to understanding the relationships 
between the cohorts targeted by this study. Finally, education is the both the primary target 
of the Prevent statutory duty and its core modus operandi, enabled through the 
safeguarding agendas that shape the practice of educators. Bourdieu’s (1996: 184) 
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conception of the field of education acting as an enabler of state level doctrine, evidenced 
by the delivery of FBV, has also informed the data analysis. 
 
4.3.4. Realities of data collection  
 
The Prevent duty must negotiate two distinct discourses: firstly its ‘public transcript’, that is 
to say the narrative it wishes to convey as an instrument of public safety, and secondly the 
‘hidden transcripts’ or the implicit realities of the demographics it targets as risks to the 
social that fall beyond the capabilities of its surveillance apparatus (Scott, 1990: 18). Those 
in charge of enacting Prevent at the LA level (i.e. Prevent managers) are habitually 
concerned with identifying evidence of ‘dissonant political culture’ within their target 
demographics in order to subdue it (Scott, 1990: 19). As a result, Prevent managers are 
often distrustful of those who critically engage with the Prevent duty, particularly of those 
who have the agency of institutional apparatus (such as the university) that can legitimately 
challenge their own.  
 
When I first started this study, I initiated the data collection within a tier 2 LA and the 
Prevent coordinator was my first point of contact. I began as I meant to go on, by expressing 
my intentions to critically engage with the Prevent duty as I found it to be ineffective and 
counterproductive. The Prevent coordinator of course respectfully disagreed with me and as 
a measure of goodwill, invited me to attend several training events and workshops that he 
ran within the community in the coming months. I duly accepted, out of courtesy more than 
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anything else. I believe this was an effort on his part to inculcate me into his ‘pastoral’ 
network – to ‘steer’ me with displays of his expertise (Foucault, 2004: 184). During this time 
we had several more discussions which lengthened out over a year. His terms for 
engagement with the project were initially quite narrow, but with careful negotiation – and 
several rewrites of the study research aims – I acquired his participation. My experience 
with all the other Prevent managers I engaged with was pretty much identical. Gaining their 
trust was a lengthy and protracted process. All of them wanted me to attend their training 
courses and workshops and all of them were very particular about how they would take part 
and what information they were willing to share.   
 
My experience with education was a very different affair, with the vast majority of schools I 
approached very willing to engage with the project. I surmise this is largely due to my 
proximity to the ‘educational field’ via my association with the university setting that they to 
inhabit (Bourdieu, 1990: 132). I mainly engaged with Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSL) 
and Pastoral Leads because they are the members of staff on which the responsibility of the 
Prevent duty predominantly falls. One DSL in particular who worked for a secondary school 
with a sixth form in a tier 1 LA was very eager to share his experiences of working with his 
Prevent manager and with the Home Office directly. A particular challenge that I found 
when engaging with him (and the cohort in general) was that although he had acquired a lot 
of practical experience with the duty, he had little conception of how contentious some of 
its practices (such as FBV) could be for sections of his student cohort who fell within the 
target demographics of the duty.  
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Getting the attention of NGOs with a CVE focus was particularly hard to do. This should not 
come as a huge surprise as these organisations are largely economically motivated – time is 
money after all. I was lucky enough to acquire the participation of several high-profile NGOs.  
 
A particular coup was a supranational NGO that had security clearance of the highest level – 
working with the Home Office, DfE and Foreign Office directly on all matters CVE. This was 
largely due to their ability to speak the language of governance, acting as a conduit of the 
‘bio-economic reality’ of the CVE landscape that Prevent inhabits (Dean, 2010: 135-137). In 
the case of this particular NGO, it appears that they actively acquire this ‘lexicon’ of 
governance by employing personal from the public sphere (Lemke, 2019: 243). The 
participant I interviewed from this NGO – a project manager for a CVE programme that 
networks LAs across the world – was an ex Prevent coordinator from a tier 1 LA in London. 
She was surprisingly critical of Prevent at times; however one must assume that her services 
are only required if there are problems that her organisation can solve. It was this cohort 
where it was particularly difficult to ascertain the true meaning of statements – was the 
participant being critical because they guessed it was the position I took or because they 
actually believed this to be the case? I could not entirely be sure in this instance.  
 
Engaging with CBOs and community advocates was similar in many ways to that with the 
Prevent managers. Potential participants were very wary of my intentions at first, but for 
very different reasons; the Prevent duty targets them by virtue of its ‘typologies’ of risk that 
heightens their vulnerability (Foucault, 2001: 221-222). There were also several instances 
where participants imparted sensitive information. For instance, one participant detailed 
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how he had been the subject of surveillance for several months due to a lecture he had 
given at a university about political Islam that had been leaked to the press, where what he 
had presented had been recorded, edited and deeply misrepresented. Ensuring the 
anonymity of all participants is of course paramount, however in these instances it was 
particularly important. This adds limitations to the analysis of data – on what one can 
report.  
 
Engaging with the totality of the Prevent duty’s populations is beset with difficulties. There 
is a wide spectrum of narratives that populate the duty’s discourses and it can be difficult to 
adjudicate their relationships to one another. However, to appraise the Prevent duty in 
terms of its effectiveness as a mediator of risk, you must also evaluate the understanding of 
all actors involved in enacting it. Perhaps most importantly, you must also ensure that the 
voices of those targeted by Prevent – its vulnerable communities – are heard, because 
Prevent is very eager for those voices to be silenced.    
 
4.4. Limitations  
 
The data yielded within this study has been narrative rich. In some instances, it has been 
impossible to summarise the complexities of such discourse. This can be seen as a potential 
limitation to its applicability to the wider schematic under investigation. However, 
generalised applicability is not always a good thing, especially when critiquing social 
phenomena (Flyjberg, 2001: 84). The generalised narratives perpetuated by CVE initiatives 
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and the research that underpins it is the focus of this investigation. It falls short of dealing 
with the social milieu that surrounds acts of violent extremism and consequently does little 
to actually prevent them.  
 
In order to mitigate the potential to overgeneralise, a distinction needs to be made between 
‘performance’ data i.e. reiteration of organisational language to succeed a viewpoint on the 
Prevent statutory duty and that of personal/professional observations (May, 2011: 153-
154). The same premise can also be ascribed to the nature of the interview structure. An 
interview in itself is a performance and is not a form of natural conversation. There is an 
assumption that no truths exist beyond the accounts expressed within their bounded 
contexts, when in reality this is clearly not the case (May, 2011: 156). Furthermore, not all 
the accounts recorded can be accurately posited as truthful. Equally, there may be 
circumstances shaping the experience of participants without their knowledge, which 
creates a scenario of misunderstanding that both the participant and interviewer are 
unaware of (May, 2011: 158).     
 
I have attempted to combat this by adopting a semi structured interview design tailored to 
each participant to keep the premise of enquiry as open to natural discourse as possible 
without straying from the problematic at hand. Participants’ responses have not been 
attributed to create a verbatim fact-based dataset, they have been analysed to determine 
the relationship between viewpoints, which has been grounded through the theoretical 
position of this thesis, governmentality. The data yielded throughout this study has 
undergone critical discourse analysis that has synthesised all the data collected into a 
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schematic that sheds light onto the interventions of Prevent and how the work of NGOs has 
affected both the operational aspects of LA departments and their stakeholders.     
 
Finally, it also must be acknowledged that Prevent and its wider CVE focus holds both 
historical and contemporary social sensitivities that can skew perceptions, which inevitably 
inform actions. For Silverman (2004: 68), fully understanding the problematic under 
investigation within socio-political concerns is paramount to producing findings that are 
objective i.e. can transcend these realities by acknowledging them. This study has sought to 
do just that by framing the findings through the lens of governmentality. However, media 
accounts, social media practices and social prejudices also play a part outside of this 
narrative, even if they are shaped by them.  
 
Throughout this investigation I have sought to illustrate such deviances when and where 
they arise, but it also must be acknowledged that such activity can be enacted beyond the 
researcher’s gaze. With that in mind, this study has not proclaimed that it can provide a 
catch all description of the enactment of the Prevent statutory duty in each location, but it 
does provide a succinct and multi-faceted evaluation of its CVE mechanisms, the role 
research is playing/has played in its inception and its broader effects on the communities it 
targets.  
 
This chapter has provided the rationale and operational details of the research strategy 
utilised by this study. It has also addressed the limitations of this research design and steps 
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taken to minimize their potential effects. The next chapter – Analysis: Prevent Managers – 
places the study within the context of the Prevent managers within the LA setting.  I will 
discuss and analyses the variated responses of respondents tasked with facilitating the LA’s 
statutory responsibility to prevent violent extremism.  
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Chapter 5: Prevent Managers Analysis.  
 
Foucault (2007: 102-105) indicates that the production of knowledge and the way it is used 
is primarily dictated by economic circumstances, which in turn are determined by 
biopolitical factors. All forms of governance must operate fiscally. This necessitates the 
continued reproduction of economically viable policy, which takes precedent over other 
measures of performance (Foucault, 2007: 109-111). In short, economic or ‘market 
rationality’ informs the evaluatory tools employed by all forms of biopower (Foucault, 2007: 
269). This raison d'être incorporates issues of security that policies such as Prevent are 
designed to facilitate; it takes for granted that economic factors dictate the actions, and by 
proxy the capability for action, of both individuals and groups.  
 
Thus far, this thesis has established the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality within the praxis of Prevent. It has also defined the primary focus of this 
study, a qualitative analysis of the individuals and actors that facilitate and are affected by 
Prevent and its statutory duty. In this first analysis chapter, the responses of Prevent 
managers will be examined. All LAs have a responsibility to implement Prevent but only a 
select number receive funding from the Home Office to employ specific Prevent managers. 
Whether an LA qualifies or not is dependent on their designated threat level. The threat 
level of each LA is quantified across three tiers, with tier 1 areas (highest threat level) 
receiving the most funding and tier 2 areas (heightened risk) receiving some funding 
dependent on need, whilst tier 3 areas are defined as only holding a general threat level and 
as a result receive no funding. In this case, the categorical differentiation of heightened risk 
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from the highest priority areas (tiers 1 and 2, respectively) is a conflation of pastoral and 
policing narratives, transforming the ‘pastoral of souls to the political government of men 
(Foucault, 2007: 227).’ In short, the ideological pretext of the supposed threat posed by 
those that populate areas outside the gaze of the LA’s conventional mechanisms is used as 
justification to bolster the State’s security apparatus with modes of surveillance.   
 
The funding supplied by the Home Office is used to employ individuals to fit certain job roles 
and titles which can vary across LAs, yet their responsibilities remain broadly the same. For 
example, Prevent Coordinators are responsible for coordinating the delivery of the Prevent 
statutory duty across agencies with a safeguarding responsibility, businesses and targeted 
communities – generally widening the footprint of Prevent within the local. Prevent 
Education Officers (PEOs) have a much more focused responsibility – to disseminate Prevent 
across its primary targeted demographics: schools and education providers. They do so by 
placing themselves in a position of authority, mandated by the legal requirement for schools 
to adhere to the Prevent duty. However, PEOs primarily promote themselves as the 
educator’s collaborators. They posit that they are there to help educators to steer the 
vulnerable, those deemed to sit on the periphery of the ‘ecclesiastical authority’ of the 
ideology of the State – taking the form of Fundamental British Values (FBV) as its current 
guise (Foucault, 2007: 230).   
 
This chapter and all subsequent analysis chapters will be structured around the individual 
research questions utilised by this study, which can be found on page 40. The cohort for this 
chapter offers an oversight of both Prevent Coordinators and PEOs. All respondents operate 
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in the South East of England; two come from tier 2 designated LAs on the South Coast and 
two come from tier 1 LAs in London. Pseudonyms will be used to ensure the anonymity of 
all the participants throughout the analysis. A brief description of each participant found 
within this chapter can be found below:       
 
The cohort:  
 
 Peter: Peter is a Prevent Coordinator for a tier 2 LA in the South East and has held 
the post since its inception in 2015. He is in his late-30’s and of British – 
Mediterranean descent. Peter is a seasoned community worker, having spent most 
of his working life employed by the LA in some capacity, most notably within the 
hate crime team and the community safety partnership before his tenure with 
Prevent.    
 
 William: William is a PEO working for a tier two LA in the South East. He was the first 
person within the LA to hold the post, having been employed for just over one year. 
William is in his early-40’s and of white British descent. His professional background 
is in primary education, with 18 years’ experience – most recently as a headteacher.    
 
 Brian: Brian is a PEO in his mid-30’s for a tier one LA in London of white British 
descent. He has held the post for 2 years but has been involved within the delivery of 
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Prevent in the LA for around 4 years. Brian has a professional background in 
facilitating community development projects for both local government and NGOs.    
 
 Julian: Julian is a newly promoted Prevent Coordinator and former senior PEO in his 
mid-30’s in a tier one LA in London of white British descent. He was one of the first 
PEO’s in the country and helped create the role in 2014. He previously worked as a 
religious education teacher where he held senior leadership and safeguarding 
responsibilities in a multitude of schools across London.  
 
This study utilises the Foucauldian concept of governmentality to reveal how the pastoral 
and policing functions present themselves in the Prevent manager’s accounts in response to 
their designated level of threat. Of particular interest is the dynamic between the 
paternalistic and authoritative functions of the Prevent managers and how much freedom 
they have to interpret their briefs. It will also incorporate the Bourdieusian concept of the 
bureaucratic field of education which is pertinent to understanding the role of PEOs who are 
essentially acting as both arbitrators and instructors of the moral code dictated by Prevent 
and its statutory duty. It will do this by discussing how the Prevent managers have made 
sense (and perhaps peace) with the dynamic between tolerance and intolerance, both 
within their practice and the formal representative of the radical extremist within the 
opaque mass of the community.  
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5.1. the Ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its 
production of knowledge?   
 
LAs are designated at risk on a tier basis, with tier 1 LAs being determined as harbouring the 
most risk and tier 2s having communities that pose a significant risk. Tier 1 and Tier 2 LAs 
are supplied with funding by the Home Office to employ specific Prevent focused personnel, 
but they still must bid for funding for specific events or activities pertinent to their role. 
Julian, a newly appointed Prevent Coordinator and former senior PEO working for a tier 1 LA 
in London declares that “different boroughs will get different amounts of funding depending 
on risk and threat”, and that evidencing levels of risk is a key part of any funding bid he may 
make. It is also important to note that keeping one’s tier status is an ongoing concern for 
Prevent managers – if designation is lost, so too is the funding for their employment. When 
pressed on this issue, Peter, who is the Prevent Coordinator for a tier 2 LA on the south 
coast with a decade long work history of LA community work acknowledges that funding for 
his and other members of his teams’ roles are “aligned to our risk.” Building on Julian’s 
assertions, Peter denotes that being designated as “a priority area has added value” when 
applying for funding for projects from the Home Office. If tier status is transitional, a 
question is posed on how such status is both won and lost. All the respondents reported 
that they were heavily monitored, with their respective services being measured by 
quarterly performance indicators set by the Home office.  
 
A problematic is raised here – it appears that the delivery of Prevent across LAs is not being 
applied objectively to accommodate the welfare of the citizens the duty has been set up to 
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serve. Instead, it appears to be operating based on threat level with the need being decided 
by designated agents of pastoral power. In this instance risk is being calculated on the 
grounds of market logic – the Prevent team with the best pitch receives the funding 
(Foucault, 2008: 243). Peter implies that successful funding bids are dependent on how well 
Prevent teams interpret the regular “guidance coming out from the Home Office”, which 
alludes to the pastoral nature of the implementation of Prevent’s methodology from central 
to local government (Foucault,2007: 123).    
 
Brian, a PEO working within a tier 1 LA with an administrative background delivering 
community safety and safeguarding initiatives to London boroughs for 4 years, made clear 
that his role dictated that he bid for funding from the Home Office on a regular basis. Taking 
a similar position to Peter, Brian denotes that the Home Office regularly contact his and 
other Prevent teams within his network and “come in and say this is what’s required” to 
help generate ideas for projects they are willing to fund.  Brian also made clear that the 
“range of projects” the Home Office funds can differ significantly in orientation and impact. 
Taking an essentially defensive posture, Brian purports that his team ”run community 
question events, like our supplementary Madrassa network”  which elicits to a more 
interventionist model that LAs are more accustomed to running in order to eliminate 
criminality by addressing the causes of crime they are used to dealing with, including youth 
engagement programmes where “some sessions [are] run within schools in terms of specific 
workshops.”  Brian denotes that this activity all falls under the jurisdiction of the “Prevent 
Advisory Group” which he runs under the guidance of his Prevent Coordinator. The group 
works as a network between community-based organisations, schools, supplementary 
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Islamic education providers and community leaders to provide “safeguarding guidance and 
governance” across his target demographics. Brian acts proactively within this space, using 
social media platforms such as WhatsApp groups to ask questions like “what’s the feeling 
within your communities, is there anything we can do.” At this level, it is hard to discern 
what security imperative Brian is employing beyond the ‘relatively stable field of correlation’ 
between technologies and agencies being utilized to identify problem mentalities by 
inducing maximum visibility (Dean 2010: 37).  
 
At this point in the interview with Brian, it became apparent that he may not be able to 
clearly discern any difference between the pastoral government of souls (winning hearts 
and minds), or the diagnosing of risk, an overtly policing function within Prevent. Brian’s 
concern was about a justification of oversight (“making sure that all feeds in well”) by 
process: “it’s a formal process where you are writing a very detailed Word document or Excel 
spreadsheet which says why you’re doing this, loads of evidence into why you’re doing it.”  In 
this instance Brian must use information derived from projects to defend both his practice 
and his continued suitability for the role of PEO. Brian was asked what kinds of things he 
reports on to renew his contract, but this was met with resistance even at the most 
nominal, generic level.  
 
Brian’s role as PEO is essentially determined by policing norms of knowledge production, a 
more strategic enterprise of collecting data on immanently dangerous elements within 
society by the officers of the state – “you’ve got to show how it’s addressing the risk locally, 
and evidence is absolutely vital.” Brian’s usefulness for the intelligence community lies in his 
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ability to inform on local bodies. He must provide “loads of evidence.” A further question is 
raised – how confident is Brian that the information he is registering to renew his tenure or 
to fund projects from the Home Office is accurate? Brian is not particularly forthcoming on 
that question, but he does state that a “broad selection of data and information” is collated 
because “we never know what [the Home Office] are going to ask in the future.” When 
pressed further, it becomes apparent that one of Brian’s primary concerns is providing 
evidence for question such as “how many people have you trained, how many communities 
have you met with, how many meetings are you part of” which are posed by the Home 
Office which then “have to be reported back” on a quarterly basis.  
 
 Brian is also keen to point out that he fosters close ties with the community and local 
schools, which he describes as “key partners.” For Brian, this engagement acts as both a 
legitimiser of his practice and his role as the gatekeeper of ‘knowledges’ pertinent to his 
sphere of influence (Foucault, 2000: 219). At this juncture it is perhaps pertinent to discuss 
who exactly is all this ‘knowledge’ being collated for? (Foucault, 2002: 91). Brian is quick to 
mention that the community responses he collates “don’t just go into a vacuum, instead 
they are logged and written down, they’re sent up the chain so they can have an impact at 
central government.” When asked who exactly “central government” were in real terms, 
Brian mentions the Home Office as the primary recipient of such data, but the DfE and 
Ofsted are also partners; these are all regulatory bodies with a vested interest in monitoring 
target populations to mitigate potential risks.  
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Brian is essentially reporting a hierarchy of responsibility, where the assessor, in this case 
the PEO, is being assessed by agencies deemed to be in receipt of a broader knowledge base 
than they themselves possess. The processes described by Brian are archetypical devices of 
‘pastoral power (Foucault, 2007: 123-125).’  In essence, Prevent managers disseminate 
knowledges and practices across target demographics and the agencies that serve them, 
‘shepherding’ their flock with ideological – yet broadly secular – proficiency (Dean, 2010: 
89).  Obedience becomes self-regulation. Prevent managers, service providers and citizens 
are held responsible for incorporating the ‘wisdom’ of the pastorate, in this case the Prevent 
duty and its creators the Home Office (and to a lesser extent its collaborators such as the 
DfE and Ofsted), into their own daily practices (Dean, 2010: 92).  
 
The introduction of educational bodies by proxy of PEOs such as Brian envelopes the 
‘bureaucratic field’ of education upon the security apparatus that Prevent embodies 
(Bourdieu, 1994: 2). He aids the assimilation of the duty within the ‘established academic 
order’ by facilitating the modification of ‘school programmes’, incentivising his activity by 
drawing attention to the ‘social problem’ posed by the threat of radical extremism and how 
that fits within the safeguarding responsibility of the school (Bourdieu, 1994: 2-3). This 
process of adaptation is expediated by the ‘specific logic’ of the State, which dictates that 
education as a ‘field’ acts as a natural progression to the pastoral nature of Prevent, which is 
formulaically identical to the educational process i.e. pastor - pastorate vis-à-vis teacher -
student (Bourdieu, 2014: 4-5).   
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Peter was eager to describe a network of pastoral power overseen by the Home Office that 
links his LA with others across the region of the South East. He attends regular events held 
in London in “some of the higher risk areas who come out with lots of different 
recommendations on what we should be doing.” Peter is essentially describing a hierarchy of 
expertise set by the Home Office, where the practices of higher risk areas delineate their 
expertise over that of his team, although he would be unlikely to want to acknowledge it as 
such. The premise of expertise that the Prevent mangers garner is often difficult for them to 
relinquish.  
 
William, a PEO employed in a tier 2 LA also participates and sometimes delivers at Prevent 
education workshops that are run by the Home Office, both regionally and nationwide. 
William, much like all of the participants within this cohort, is keen to promote any 
examples where he has contributed to the pastoral process; where he has been given the 
opportunity to disseminate his expertise by “contributing to conferences ….. sharing best 
practice.” William legitimises his presence as the facilitator at such events by regularly 
collecting data from his interactions with LA agencies. In this instance, William’s ‘vocation’ is 
primarily one ‘of saving souls (Strenski, 1998: 359).’ He does so through the statement and 
repetition of the duty’s ‘truths’, its “best practice” (Tirkkonen, 2015: 306). This ‘ritual 
prescription’ William levies upon his audience is designed to locate the ideal site for him to 
position his own practice within the continuum of the ‘archaic’, subaltern behaviours of his 
target demographics and the ‘rational’ actions needed to participate within the community 
setting (Tirkkomen, 2015:306). He is equally aware that in order for him to prescribe the 
duty’s ‘truth’ across its communities he must be in possession of the ‘knowledges’ that can 
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be found within them, and the resources needed to maintain his own form of ‘political 
power (Foucault, 2011: 200).’ William collects his data to identify “any gaps in training” he 
could highlight to both his peers and the Home Office, which is often the first step in 
accruing the means to apply for further funding – resources needed to participate in 
Prevent’s socio-political economy.  
 
A key question is raised here - how much of this secular pastorate produced by Prevent is 
acting as a normative in-group system of belief; a system that is increasingly divorced from 
the social reality shared by the objects of their surveillance? Both Peter and William describe 
the focus of such conferences to centre on the needs of facilitators of the duty i.e. LA 
agencies such as education, and not on the respective needs of those deemed vulnerable 
within their respective LAs – ultimately the primary focus of their gaze. This conundrum 
could be partly explained by the responses of Brian who, similarly to William sees the 
regular Prevent network meetings as a means to acquire the knowledge necessary to make 
successful funding bids. Brian is also quick to point out that this is only one facet of being 
successful in getting funding and delineates the importance of monitoring each project that 
is undertaken. In sum, having a good track record of meeting the Home office’s 
performance indicators with previous projects makes it much more likely that a LA will 
receive further funding for future ones. Collecting a “broad selection of data and 
information” is central to Brian’s workstreams precisely for this reason.  
 
Brian states that he is required to report back to the Home Office quarterly regarding the 
projects he is running, providing information, answering questions such as “how much have 
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we spent so far … how many people have you trained.” To the outside observer, such 
indicators seem to focus on how successfully the Prevent agenda has been disseminated 
within LA agencies and the economic viability of each project rather than on the actual 
responses of the communities the duty purports to serve. Moreover, interacting with 
Prevent and its statutory duty is not met with much resistance from those it targets – 
primarily LA practitioners. This is likely due to their association with the Home Office and 
the effort they put into promoting their expertise.    
 
Julian is a Prevent Coordinator and former PEO for a tier 1 LA in London. Much like the rest 
of the cohort he is not afraid to promote his professional credentials. He began his interview 
by asserting himself as one of the most experienced Prevent managers in the UK, who was 
“now the longest person who’s being doing this in the country.” One of Julian’s primary tasks 
was to assist in the management and deployment of new PEOs across the South East. His 
main responsibility is to “coach” new PEOs, who Julian conveys would “come to meet [him] 
one-on-one”, where he and other senior colleagues would share their resources (lesson 
plans, presentations etc.) and teach the new PEOs about the ethos of the role and the 
practicalities of the job.  The primary focus of such meetings is to convey the importance of 
“monitoring” to the role, which involves the PEO completing “checklists” that are designed 
to evaluate the scale at which a partner organisations or school comply with the duty. When 
pressed on what such “checklists” look like in reality, Julian wasn’t particularly forthcoming 
– something he has in common with the rest of the cohort who were cautious about 
divulging the specificity of their monitoring techniques.   
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Julian’s responses raise a pivotal question – why is it so important for a PEO to assess the 
compliance of schools? Schools are legally required to comply with the Prevent duty and are 
already assessed on this via Ofsted inspection. When this question was posed to William, he 
revealed that the rescission of LAs across the educational landscape, where academy trusts 
have taken the place of LA-run schools has raised concerns about whether academies can 
“effectively risk manage.” When pressed further, William explains that “trusts have their 
own safeguarding team, part of that will be their own Prevent experts” and as such there is 
the possibility that “some of these central messages aren’t always clearly communicated.”  
The problem William faces in terms of the growth of autonomous service provision that is in 
competition with his own is compounded by the fact such activity is encouraged by the 
State.  However, the State does impose some caveats – it demands that such agencies 
produce ‘contributions to the knowledge of the state’ whilst also promoting the State’s 
‘particular vision’ upon their delivery (Bourdieu, 1994: 3-4).  
 
It is also important to note that the precarious nature of William’s tenure – where his 
continued employment is largely based upon his ability to create and foster pastoral 
relationships with schools could also play a part in his willingness to view such autonomy or 
diversity of provision in the field of education as problematic. When William was asked how 
he creates links with academy trusts that already employ their own experts he was keen to 
promote his connections to the Home Office; he is the only individual within the LA that 
possessed the knowledge that came with the “Home Office seal of approval.” William 
denotes that only he and his fellow Prevent managers can ensure that the delivery of the 
duty is “proportionate” to need. Guaranteeing “the right kind of message” is essential to this 
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task and proximity to the Home Office – the architects of the duty itself is critical in this 
instance. Although William does not outrightly state this, he is indirectly alluding to the 
differences in provision across tier threat level LAs and their respective abilities to deliver 
the duty in line with their capacity and need. In reality there is very little variation in terms 
of the focus and delivery of the duty across tier levels. The only discernible differences is the 
manpower LAs have at their disposal to “compile data” – crucial for ensuring the duty’s 
viability in terms of maintaining direct funding.   
 
The taxonomy of pastoral power exhibited by Julian and William ultimately formulates 
across four primary locus; firstly ‘ontology’ or deciding on the nature of discourse, which can 
be seen in the example set by William who is actively looking to subvert the expertise of 
others within his sphere of influence and replace it with his own, which in turn is guided by 
the Home Office’s central ‘knowledges (Dean, 2010: 26).’  Secondly – ‘ascetics’ – or more 
simply what resources are available to meet this need. For example, Julian and his senior 
colleagues in tier 1 areas are acting as a primary resource to guide less senior PEOs such as 
William who interact with each other through networking groups. Thirdly, ‘deontology’ or 
identifying weaknesses in the approach and creating mechanisms to negate them, in this 
case, the PEO network acts as a constant connection between PEOs, allowing them to share 
and assess each other’s work to ensure some level of continuity that could be an issue when 
working over such a large area. PEOs in this instance are employing a ‘regulatory principle’ 
that is pastoral in nature, using ‘pedagogical apparatus’ to shape their practices through a 
‘network of authority’ that acts as an orthodoxy of sorts (Foucault, 1984b: 377-378). Finally, 
‘teleology’ which is agreeing on an end goal and a way of measuring outputs which is 
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enabled by the monitoring process and the attempt to imbed continuity across PEOs by 
getting them to learn how to complete this from more senior members of the network 
(Dean, 2010: 27). 
 
Although Dean’s (2010: 27) understanding of pastoral power goes someway to explaining 
the apparatus of the Prevent duty and the actions of those tasked with enacting it, it does 
not explain the failure of reality to shape the deontological process. Prevent continues to 
fall short of its aims because it is constructed on weak theoretical foundations which are 
based on limited empirical evidence – yet it persists. It could be argued that this is the case 
because the terrorist threat the Prevent strategy is designed to pre-empt necessitates an 
abstraction of the surveilling consciousness from material reality (Foucault, 2007: 110). 
Simply put, any counterfactual evidence is not permitted to enter the debate on Prevent at 
the policy making level. Prevent, acting as a reactive policy to a threat to the biopolitical and 
by proxy the state’s legitimacy to govern, is primarily concerned with maintaining 
continuity, whatever the cost. That is what such a teleology entails, a monistic discourse 
that is designed to resist infiltration of any dialogues that weaken its resolve.  
 
The field of education is the site that infractions against the doctrine of state are most likely 
to arise (Bourdieu, 2014: 11-12). As such, Prevent is placed in the hands of its custodians, 
who in this instance take the shape of PEOs such as William and Brian who use the pastoral 
network, with the Home Office at its apex, to facilitate the ‘ symbolic power’ of the State. 
They do so to both legitimise their positions of authority and to replicate said power within 
the educational field (Loyal, 2017: 83). Furthermore, the ‘cultural capital’ of the threat of an 
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act of terrorism would outweigh any prospective frailties of Prevent’s delivery (Bourdieu, 
1996: 264). In essence, Prevent relies on the notion that it is better to be safe than sorry. It 
mobilises this sentiment by creating an evidence base to perpetuate its theoretical 
underpinnings – radicalisation theory.      
 
Radicalisation theory features heavily within the Prevent manager’s worldview. At one level, 
this is self-evident: the British state helped foster it by producing the modalities of evidence 
for the experiences of typical cases. Marc Sageman’s radicalisation-as-process is one way 
the National Offender Management Service applied dubious metrics from psychology to 
assess the risk of terrorist recidivism among the prison population. The Prevent managers 
also adopt a version of this.  Its principal function is to create a typology of risk that 
government, and by proxy Prevent managers can follow to facilitate their work.   
 
The core problematic presented to the State is that risk is primarily a qualitative concern, 
one that can only be fully understood by delving into the minutiae of each case. However, 
the State’s apparatus is only set up with a quantitative focus in mind; it is not capable of 
taking a case by case approach (Dean, 2010: 195). In response, the State creates narratives 
that perpetuate the responsibility of the individual to negate their own proclivity to risk. 
This process – the ‘individualization’ of risk – is a unique feature of the neoliberal model of 
government (Dean, 2007: 63). Individuals are left to decipher both their own proneness to 
risk and the potential risk posed by others based upon the ‘expert knowledges’ afforded to 
them from government or their endorsed actors (Dean, 2007: 65). As such, a continuum of 
risk is constructed by the State with common junctures used as quantifiable measures 
175 
 
(Dean, 2010: 195-196). Prevent uses radicalisation theory as its own continuum of risk. It 
produces a roadmap that can be used by enactors or ‘active citizens’ of the statutory duty to 
construct a typology of risk. Furthermore, it legitimises modes of surveillance by purporting 
inherent altruistic qualities, to enable ‘targeted populations’ or those vulnerable to 
safeguard themselves from such risks (Dean, 2010: 195).  
 
Prevent managers are tasked with engaging with targeted demographics as part of their 
remit from the Home Office, however the guidelines they are given are open to some 
interpretation. Brian came into his post following on from a senior PEO who had set up 
several networks within the Islamic community. Eager to make his own mark, Brian set out 
to grow this network and used the guidelines sent out by the Home Office to identify any 
gaps within it. He noticed that the Prevent team had no engagement with “supplementary 
schools”, areas within the LA setting that the Home Office guidelines stipulate can often 
harbour extremism. As a solution, Brian set up a network of Madrasa (Islamic faith) schools 
who liaise with him on a regular basis – something he is very proud of. When Brian was 
pressed on what evidence the Home Office were basing their claim that 
supplementary/faith schools are particularly vulnerable to extremism he was unable to give 
a clear answer.  Brian proclaims that the reason Madrasa schools were targeted was not 
because he thought they were “some hotbed of extremists”, but rather “because they’re the 
best equipped to address the narratives pedalled by groups like Daesh and Al-Qaeda.”  As 
the conversation progressed, Brian highlighted that his primary objective was to make the 
recruitment process of the Madrasa schools “more robust” and to instil safeguarding 
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mechanisms that would reduce the likelihood of “someone with extremist views coming 
through” within the Madrasa setting.  
 
For Brian, prevention is better than cure. The radicalisation theory he is using to 
substantiate his practice predicates that individuals or groups are susceptible to extremism 
via risk factors which are beyond the control of the vulnerable, an accident waiting to 
happen. In this instance, Prevent is effectively acting as an extension of the ‘insurance 
technologies’ of the State, which utilises radicalisation theory to create a hierarchy of risk; 
functioning at the intersection of the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ within the biopolitical 
schema (Lemke, 2019: 216-218). This technique of governance – its management of risk – is 
born from the emergence of ‘individualization’ as a priority of neo-liberalism, the modus 
operandi of contemporary government (Dean, 2007: 74).  
 
The drive to promote ‘self-governance’ above that of a unilateral consensus on behaviours 
is designed to create the conditions for the economy to grow and to create (potentially) an 
infinite number of new markets to exploit (Dean, 2007: 76). Conversely, this creates an 
infinite number of possible risky outcomes, which insurance technologies have been 
designed to offset (Dean, 2007: 78). The basic premise of insurance is to safeguard the 
individual (or bodies of individuals) from accidental harm, with the probability of their 
coming into harm deciding the premium they must pay to insure themselves against it 
(Lemke, 2019: 217). In the case of the Madrasa network, the premium Brian exacts is 
twofold: firstly the Madrasa’s facilitate the collection of data for the purposes of his 
continued employment with the Home Office, which in turn allows him access to their 
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curriculums, details on whom they chose to employ to deliver it and admittance to the 
communities they deliver it to. Secondly, the Madrasas offer up compliance to Brian by 
allowing him to shape their practice through the medium of training. However, a question is 
posed – who (or what) exactly are the Madrasas insuring themselves against? Is it the 
potential extremist within their midst or the perpetual obligation of the State placed upon 
the Islamic community in the shape of Prevent?   
 
Prevent has introduced a pre-criminal space that disproportionally targets vulnerable 
communities, making them suspects of crimes that have not yet been committed. When 
William was asked to state his position on this perspective he acknowledged that it was 
problematic, but was quick to distance himself and Prevent as a whole from any 
wrongdoing:  “I think in the Prevent world what we’re asking people to do is to support 
individuals where they notice something. We are talking about an arena where people 
haven’t done anything wrong yet, we’re just responding to behaviours that we’re seeing.” In 
this instance William is qualifying his work through the typology of risk produced by 
Prevent, which is primarily based around and through discourse. The nature of statements 
and wider expression of communities deemed at risk are effectively graded against how 
closely they fit or do not fit the ‘ideal type’ constructed by the experts in William’s “Prevent 
world” (Foucault, 2002: 30). This in practice makes Prevent a hermeneutical mechanism of 
governance. A language of expertise is constructed and the enactor of policy, in this case 
William, must determine the subjective risk from the function (Lemke, 2019: 40). 
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Similarly to Brian, Julian took it upon himself to deliver training to all the education 
providers within his LA, including sixth form colleges, primary and secondary schools, “even 
the nurseries.” Julian essentially believes that schools are an ongoing security concern – 
something he is uniquely positioned to insure against. Julian went onto explain that he saw 
his obligation to the duty and the schools he operated within to be directly related to their 
own safeguarding agendas. Julian also considers it his responsibility to inform the 
curriculum being taught within the classroom setting, placing emphasis on the subject areas 
of ICT, RE and PSHE – which he describes as the ‘base’ subject areas schools can use to 
showcase their commitment to the statutory duty. For Julian, the stronger that ‘base’ is ‘the 
fewer referrals there are going to be.’  
 
Julian was not willing or perhaps even able to divulge figures on how many children had 
been referred to the safeguarding board from the nursery setting, which cater to children as 
young as three. Prevent legitimises its existence in two main ways in this instance. Firstly, by 
proclaiming to teach the vulnerable to be less vulnerable, reducing the premium they pay to 
interact with society because of their risky status. Secondly, Prevent declares that it is 
reducing the amount of, or at least the potential for, acts of terror to safeguard society. 
Prevent is a mechanism of the securitization of probabilities, where actual liability is 
superseded by potential to be culpable (Lemke, 2019: 221-222). In this instance, Prevent, 
and the radicalisation methodology that underpins it is effectively being used as a formula 
for risk.    
 
179 
 
When Brian was asked how he utilises the radicalisation process in his work he went on to 
describe how his primary focus is to identify vulnerabilities within the target demographics 
in his LA and to communicate strategies to overcome them to whoever was charged with 
safeguarding them. For Brian, this is “the key aspect of radicalisation” as a methodological 
approach – to educate the vulnerable, to “make them less vulnerable.” When Brian was 
asked how he made his assessment on what vulnerability looked like in real terms he 
asserted that he would look for an absence of “protective factors.”  Effectively, Brian is 
looking for any potential avenues where a vulnerable person/s could gain proximity to 
“extremists” without appropriate, state sanctioned safeguarding mechanisms in place. 
Common sense dictates that for Brian to make such a judgement he must first have a 
conception of whom exactly an extremist is. Brian, like the rest of the cohort, used several 
real-world examples of individuals (such as, Umar Haque, Shamina Begum, Ahmed Hassan 
etc.) convicted of terrorist offences to illustrate his points.    
 
The stylization of the ‘delinquent’, which in the case of Prevent is the extremist, has its 
political advantages. Visual delinquency, which is the form extremism most often takes, be it 
verbally or through an act of terror, offers an opportunity for policing powers to create a 
portrait of the nefarious other in order to generate support from the populace (Lemke, 
2019: 85). Prevent Managers often draw parallels with extremist groups and other forms of 
criminality deemed to be morally bankrupt to galvanise support. In this instance, Prevent is 
attempting to split the ‘popular classes’ by creating a typology of the criminal from 
marginalised groups on a moralistic basis (Foucault, 1977: 280).  
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For example, William made several links between forms of organised crime and acts of 
extremism and terrorism. He also makes a connection between the radicalisation process 
and other forms of grooming that are more traditionally accepted within existing 
safeguarding protocols to aid its transition into the daily practices of schools and other LA 
agencies. Similarly to Brian, William saw his primary objective to highlight vulnerabilities 
within target demographics to the service providers working within them. What was 
particularly interesting about William’s perception of the extremist’s grooming rationale 
was how they coalesced with his own methods. For William, the extremist groomers were 
also “looking for vulnerabilities, people who can be manipulated.”  William would argue that 
his methods are not designed to cause the vulnerable individual any harm and are instead 
being utilised to guide them, shepherd them. Fundamentally, William and his peers are 
endeavouring to steer the ‘trajectory’ of persons of interest away from the ‘deviant 
(Bourdieu, 1996: 184).’ The potential benefits to the individual in doing so are sold by the 
likes of William and his fellow Prevent managers as a chance to improve one’s ‘cultural 
capital’ to community leaders, however it is unlikely that they would describe it as such in 
their own terms (Bourdieu, 1996: 186).  
 
The Prevent managers responses show how the production of knowledges under the duty is 
rooted within the ideological position of the State. This is dispersed and graded across 
targeted institutions by the Prevent managers, cementing together the constitute apparatus 
of the bureaucratic education field that best fulfil its means of reproduction. In the next 
section of this chapter, this process will be looked at in more detail; how exactly is Prevent 
reproduced by its target agencies in real terms?     
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5.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it 
reproduced? 
 
For Foucault (2000: 212) the strength of pastoral forms of government are based upon the 
knowledges of those that wield it. Although it is similar to Patristic authorities in the sense 
that the knowledges of power are safeguarded by the select few experts, it differs in the 
fact that the knowledge in which it is founded has to be material, measurable, and 
ultimately provable to those that seek to scrutinise it. However, the scope given to those 
who wish to scrutinise the knowledge base of pastoral governance structures is limited by 
the ideology that interlaces them (Lemke, 2019: 164). Prevent operates in the same 
manner, it uses mechanisms such as the safeguarding agenda to proliferate its objectives. 
Practitioners are less likely to question Prevent’s credentials because the principles of 
safeguarding the vulnerable communities and individuals they serve is ingrained in their 
practice. As such, Prevent managers are eager to streamline their practices into pre-existing 
safeguarding mechanisms wherever possible.  
 
When asked what were his biggest successes whilst in his post as Prevent Coordinator, Peter 
was particularly proud of the fact that he had embedded Prevent within the safeguarding 
agenda of partner organisations, proclaiming his and his team’s efforts have enabled 
Prevent to “become part of the safeguarding language” spoken within the LA. For Peter to 
do this, he had to ensure “that people understand that vulnerability [to radicalisation] is 
present in young people.” If a critical standpoint is taken to Peter’s assertion, a question is 
posed: are all young people vulnerable to radicalisation? Vulnerability is a relative concept, 
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as is the disputed concept of resilience to vulnerabilities. Such discourse is motivated by a 
new industry of ‘humanized securitization (Amar, 2013: 7).’ The ‘juridical personalism’ or 
the shift towards viewing security through the lenses of individual responsibility has led to 
various actors, both State and private, having to create a language of expertise that 
coalesced with their own capacity to act. In real terms, this has led to practitioners on the 
ground having to find the best fit for their services in order to proliferate them. Often, this 
discourse takes a ‘moral’ standpoint (Amar, 2013: 7-8).  
 
Peter’s focus on the perceived vulnerability of young people, coupled with the tendency of 
the Prevent managers to draw comparisons with radicalisation theory and traditional forms 
of grooming (such as sexual exploitation, gangs, drugs etc.), is an exercise designed to 
manipulate the morality of education practitioners in order for them to accept the Prevent 
agenda. This gives Prevent managers the licence to diffuse its normative philosophy through 
the mechanisms of other LA agencies. Prevent Coordinators are agents of diffusion in such 
instances, or agents of the ‘coaching’ of Prevent’s CVE normative discourse, which can be 
difficult for the uninitiated to understand because it is shrouded in technical and legal 
jargon. In short, they demystify the bureaucratic language that underpins the Prevent’s 
statutory duty to those who are tasked with enacting it, which legitimises their role as the 
expert in their relationships with their partner LA agencies (Dean, 2010: 108 -110).  
 
For William, one of the most important functions of his work is embedding the Prevent 
ecosystem within each school in his caseload and assessing their respective Designated 
Safeguarding Lead’s (DSL) level of understanding – topping up the Prevent provision as and 
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where necessary. William views each school’s delivery of the Prevent agenda to be 
“somewhere on a continuum of Prevent.” William described how he would assess each 
partner school by questioning them, deciding on their level of understanding “through the 
responses that they gave [him].” He would pay attention to whether “they were aware of 
local risks, or whether they had something in their curriculum.” In this instance, William is 
acting as the mediator of expertise – as an agent of pastoral power administering to his 
flock; he is deciphering the code of conduct by directing behaviour (Foucault, 2007: 123). 
William and his counterparts facilitate this role by creating a network of quasi-experts 
within the partner organisations and schools. For example, William prefers to use existing 
personnel to administer the Prevent statutory duty wherever possible, tutoring 
professionals that already work with the target demographics with specific Prevent training. 
In short, William uses these key personal to facilitate the Prevent agenda for himself. He 
describes this activity as “upskilling”, allowing him and his team to “work through” that 
practitioner by proxy.  
 
One of the reasons Prevent managers may want to operate in this way is because it can 
create pathways to new information. Prevent works across two main workstreams: firstly to 
disseminate ideology deemed favourable by the Home Office to displace ideologies it deems 
unfavourable and secondly to create indices and databases, creating new areas of 
knowledge and ultimately expertise. Foucault (1977: 224) observes that the interrelation 
between the accumulation of knowledge and the increase in power is exponential; 
knowledge truly is power. Prevent has been designed to simultaneously repurpose the 
‘subjugated’ but also learn more about them. It creates a ‘corpus of knowledge’ that 
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reinforces and extends the effects of government and the power that they wield (Lemke, 
2019: 77).  
 
Nevertheless, programmes of governance such as Prevent must assert they understand the 
reality of the demographics they are designed for to garner biopolitical legitimacy (Lemke, 
2019: 149). If a programme of governance is to satisfy such realities, they must first be 
rendered ‘programmable.’ The phenomena are not actually the subject of analysis but a 
facet of it, a production. In the case of Prevent, it proposes that there are tangible 
communities of people vulnerable to radicalisation that are identifiable through arbitrary 
factors when there is little to no evidence that this is the case. Effectively, such factors 
generate the ‘intellectual transformation of reality’ which is readily replicated by political 
institutions because it provides a rationale of both discourse and practice that fits the 
modalities they are accustomed to (Lemke, 2019: 149). Although such forms of practice are 
not formed in total reality, they do have real world effects that end up shaping reality 
(Foucault, 200: 346). Prevent is, at its most basic elements, a programme of social 
engineering. Whether or not there is any basis for its assertion that there are communities 
vulnerable to radicalisation is a moot point to those responsible for executing it. These 
communities have been formed nonetheless and, although loosely, have become 
homogenous groupings that do exist in reality. One way Prevent tries to socially engineer its 
moral positioning is through the agency of those affected by extremism.  
 
All the Prevent managers mentioned their work with “formers”, individuals who were 
formally involved in extremist groups who now promote CVE discourse as part of some 
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advocacy group. Interestingly, most of these “formers” came from “ex Far-Right” 
backgrounds and presented workshops of their experiences at schools and colleges. When 
Peter was asked why that was the case, he was happy to point out to me several Islamic 
focused NGOs that offer similar services. When probed further on if he had approached any 
of these groups, he decided to talk about a couple of events he had helped organise 
alongside a local NGO, where victims of terrorist attacks came along to speak to a local FE 
college. Michael Haynes presented at one of the events, the brother of David Haynes, a 
humanitarian aid worker executed by ISIS in 2014. What is particularly interesting about 
these two examples is that the story of Islamic forms of terrorism and extremism were told 
from the perspective of its victim, however the experiences of Far-Right extremists were 
being told from a first-hand perspective. One is a story of the ultimate deviant that can 
never be truly forgiven, the other is a story of the long road to redemption that can only be 
avoided if those attending listen.   
 
Dean (2010: 96-98) denotes that there are special roles for ‘outsiders’ that can potentially 
conform to the dominant form of pastoral power who were once classed as interlopers. 
They are used as positive examples for reform; models of what to become or as negative 
specimens, what not to be. As such, citizenship is based on the principles of exclusion – it is 
defined by what it is not (Dean, 2010: 98-99). It is also important to note that biopolitical 
emergencies – such as extremism and acts of terrorism – enable the politics of prejudice. 
When an act of violence is committed by a deviant, society looks for the most obvious 
fragmentation from itself to delineate a difference between the enactor and themselves; an 
attempt to know one’s enemy by knowing oneself (Foucault, 2004a: 254).  
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Government will reflect society in such instances. Prevent is an example of this in action. Its 
hierarchy of risk is constructed upon racial and cultural lines. Although it has made efforts to 
incorporate the risk that Far-Right elements of society have within its schematic, the Home 
Office specifically target areas with a high Muslim population based on little to no evidence 
that this makes them vulnerable to extremism. The Home Office, and by proxy, its agents 
the Prevent managers, also ignore the role government has played in creating the 
conditions deemed to have made Muslim communities vulnerable in the first place. 
Institutional racism, poor social, economic, and mental health outcomes have all played a 
part in increasing the vulnerability of marginalised communities such as the UK Muslim 
population but are roundly ignored by the Prevent managers in their training and delivery.  
The typology of risk becomes less about identifying conditions of vulnerability and more 
about reduction of accountability (Lemke, 2019: 238).   
 
In sum, the reproduction of Prevent’s surveillance apparatus within the localised setting is 
an exercise designed to dilute responsibility across agencies and individuals; to create a 
hydra of liability, where the body of the State is buried beneath the oleaginous mass of its 
constituent agencies. However, in order to do this effectively Prevent must have a modicum 
of flexibility. In the next section, this will be analysed in more detail.         
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5.3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or 
reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?     
 
Education providers have little choice but to adopt the Prevent duty as it is a statutory 
requirement but there are community groups that lie outside this area that do engage with 
Prevent to varying degrees. The success of such interaction is reliant on Prevent managers 
creating avenues for dialogue. Peter denotes that the “brand” of Prevent has stopped him 
from engaging with community groups in the past. Peter divulges further that a large 
amount of his time early in his tenure was taken up convincing his stakeholders that “there 
needs to be a preventative point to this issue.” In short, Peter and his contemporaries must 
sell Prevent to its target demographics to embed the ‘knowledges’ it deems to be true.   
 
Foucault (1982: 212) reasons that the language of contemporary governance is dictated by 
the societal conception of ‘truth’, or to be more precise, to convince those that they govern 
that the State is the guardian of the ‘truth.’ The form of power they exercise makes 
individuals ‘subjects’ of those ‘truths.’ Moreover, it is the government’s job to construct an 
‘order of the true’ or a regime of truth (Foucault, 1984b: 72). The construction of this ‘truth 
regime’ must be facilitated by a system of governance that allows the ‘truth’ to be 
distinguished from falsehoods. This is the role of the expert, using the apparatus of scientific 
discourse and the institutions that produce it as the cornerstone of their legitimacy 
(Foucault, 1984b: 73). The expert is employed by the State to ‘evaluate and approve’ the 
data collected by its agencies to permit the development of the State’s technologies of 
performance (Beck, 1992: 229). Prevent is one such performative technology, an 
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‘information technology’ to be exact, that seeks to make target populations ‘intelligible and 
evaluable’ in order to perpetuate its continued existence (Beck, 1992: 234).   
 
The consumption of this industry of truth is the basis of Prevent’s economy; the industry of 
knowledge its experts administer generate its capital. Its central truth is that violent 
extremism acts like a pathogen and that there are vulnerable communities within society 
that are particularly susceptible to it. To make itself operational, it needs to sell this truth to 
frontline staff from education, LA agencies and community groups who work or may 
encounter vulnerable communities.  
 
For Brian, the importance of community engagement is “crucial” to his team, with a clear 
focus placed upon embedding his team within the community, which Brian describes as a 
“key partner.” When questioned as to why community engagement was so key to his 
workstreams, Brian was quick to point out that “these people are not just yes men and 
women, these are people who will be challenging and ask questions.” Brian was pressed 
further on what he meant by this statement. He claimed that it was paramount for him to 
demystify the Prevent programme – to challenge any “anti-Prevent feeling” that might be 
present within his target demographics. For Brian, there was little to no anti Prevent 
sentiment within his LA, something he puts down to “the fact that community engagement 
has been [made] a priority.” Brian was then asked how he measured the outputs of his 
community engagement activities. He pointed out that the responses of community 
advocates were “logged and written down.” When questioned on how this data is utilised, 
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Brian revealed that the responses are” sent up the chain…… it gets passed up to Home 
Office, or the Department for Education, or Ofsted.”  
 
In Brian’s responses he makes the point that interactions (both negative and positive) with 
community groups become information that is passed on back to the Home Office, which in 
itself is a form of the codification of ‘counter conduct (Foucault, 1982: 220).’ In short, 
‘counter conduct’ is an instance where the moral code or lexicon of governance structures is 
questioned (Foucault, 2007: 202). This can take both passive and proactive forms depending 
on the actor/s involved. The most stabile forms of ‘counter conduct’ are procedural and 
take root over a significant period of time, becoming less radical as time progress when a 
middle ground is reached (Foucault, 2007: 194-196). The Community groups liaising with 
Brian and his Prevent team are an example of this form of governance where resistance has 
become pacified.  
 
 There are several other examples of similar positions taken by all the other Prevent 
Managers interviewed. For instance, Peter indicates that his “community focused” 
engagement work has allowed him to be more “flexible” in his approach to “organisations 
the duty doesn’t fall on, like youth groups or mosques” who he denotes can sometimes be 
resistant to the aims of his projects. Julian created school-parent coffee mornings within 
schools with a large Muslim demographic where he would liaise with the parents that were 
uncomfortable with certain aspects of the FBV curriculum being taught to their children. In 
these sessions he would seek to allay their concerns, by offering to change aspects of its 
delivery if he thought that they had “a point.” However, Julian was also careful to mention 
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that he would often “stick to his guns” and try to explain why aspects of the FBV agenda are 
important, which he would then “back up with the LA values and the school values” which 
broadly align with FBV. In short, Julian’s coffee mornings were being used to subvert and 
pacify any resistance to its core agenda within the target schools – to promote FBV and the 
wider CVE Prevent framework. In this instance, Julian was willing to modify some of this 
agenda to ensure that this core premise was instilled.   
 
The conflict between the ‘technologies of domination’ and the ‘technologies of the self’ that 
drive the production of knowledges in policies such as Prevent are difficult to solve for those 
tasked with steering them (Foucault, 1982: 219). In one instance, Prevent is acting as the 
conduit of pastoral power that is designed to lead the targeted demographics, sometimes 
through coercion, towards behaviours it deems appropriate. In juxtaposition, it requires 
those it wishes to control to create new knowledges and technologies for it to act reflexively 
to an everchanging societal reality. Therefore, for Prevent managers to assert their authority 
over those it is required to govern they must be able to navigate the near infinite ‘field of 
possibilities’ they could encounter (Foucault, 1982: 220). The narrative and mechanisms 
they wish to embed must be easily replicated and as such should be straightforward to 
modify (Foucault, 1982: 222). Julian acknowledges that he is competing with many other 
pressures put upon education providers and as such needs to make the duty and the 
resources he creates as accessible and flexible as he can to ensure uptake. He makes the 
point that the resources he provides “have to be creative” and modifiable to fit within the 
schema of the existing curriculum, which is delivered differently from school to school. In 
short, Prevent has to compete with a multitude of other forms of bureaucracy put upon 
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schools. Peter also acknowledges that national level NGOs input at the LA level is mostly 
positive, however it can sometimes undermine the work that he does because it is not 
specific to the localised community setting. Peter divulges that he “would have liked to have 
developed more locally-based projects” however the funding of the NGOs came from the 
Home Office and he had little scope to steer their activities, which he deemed could 
sometimes be too general in their approach.   
 
Foucault (2008: 20) argues that liberal forms of governance and the policy that they create 
is formed on the praxis that there is ‘too much government.’  In this instance, the role of 
government is to position itself out of the equation of any societal problematic and let 
society evolve itself, to teach society to swim rather than to stop it sinking (Lemke, 2019: 
177). Overtures of the oft-cited invisible hand of Adam Smith aside, the art of government in 
this instance is not testing the limits of power but of limiting the power of society to hold it 
to account (Foucault, 2008: 22). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Prevent also operates upon these 
principles. The primary objective of Prevent Coordinators is to disseminate the responsibility 
of the statutory duty across as many mechanisms of society as it can. In fact, Prevent 
Coordinators often have a conflict of interest they need to balance when interacting with 
other forms of governance themselves. They are directly funded by the Home Office rather 
than the LA’s they work in, on the basis that the LA has a problem with extremism within its 
communities. Part of their funding requirements is to evidence they have made an impact 
on extremism within vulnerable communities. In short, part of the conditions of their 
continued employment is to prove that they are no longer needed.  
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During the data collection period of this investigation, Peter’s LA lost its tier 2 status as the 
Home Office had deemed the threat level to have sufficiently reduced during his tenure. 
Effectively, Peter lost the funding for his role because he did too good a job. Peter remained 
in post as the LA still had a legal responsibility to the Prevent duty however his team was 
downsized from four personnel to just two and moved into another department. Peter 
suggests that the process of embedding the Prevent framework had slowed because the 
partner organisations became “well aware of what the [statutory duty] is, they’ve had plans 
in place to deal with it” which made his team’s role less important as time progressed. Peter 
acknowledges that the volume of data he reported to the Home Office also reduced as time 
progressed. Similarly, Julian describes how the yearly surveys he sends out to local schools 
to assess their understanding of the duty struggled to get uptake, where “the numbers of 
returns we get back have dropped off” year on year. For Julian, the biggest challenge was 
how he was going to continue to “monitor this” information if he could not get access to it.    
 
The precarity of the Prevent manager’s employment is an example of the core weaknesses 
of contemporary forms of pastoral power; it is too reliant on the technologies of 
governance, in this case the production of data for its own stability and reproduction 
(Foucault, 1988a: 71). A vacuum is created when the flow of data or knowledges begins to 
ebb. The drive to create statistical data, to create an ‘average of averages’, is what 
underpins the practices of policy such as Prevent (Lemke, 2019: 194). In such instances, 
Prevent managers will likely fall back on the biopolitical value of the Prevent duty: to 
combat extremism, to encourage partner agencies to take part in their knowledge 
production (Foucault, 2007: 102-105).  
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Although targeted LA agencies are becoming savvier about the requirements of the Prevent 
duty, rejection of it still takes place. William believes that the pressurised environment such 
agencies occupy is the main reason that partner organisations may be difficult to engage 
with. Using schools as an example, William believes that the pressures of attainment tables, 
“Ofsted inspections, academy trust audits” and the like put the Prevent duty quite low down 
on the list of their priorities. William describes how he has to be reflexive when “promoting” 
the duty to garner the schools’ attention – he needs to make the duty as accessible as 
possible to enable its uptake. Foucault (2008: 243) acknowledges that the language of neo-
liberalism has shaped the practices of government structures and its institutions – in this 
case schools – to prioritise their practices in order of their economic proprietary, not 
necessarily according to their primary function. As the Prevent duty does not impact directly 
on the schools’ budgets on a regular basis it tends to fall down the list of priorities to 
complete. In this instance, William has to become reflexive in his practice to ensure that his 
responsibilities are fulfilled and that he keeps dialogue with his target audiences open, to 
ensure the ‘technology of government’ – of which he is an agent – continues to operate  
(Dean, 2010: 146).  
 
The Prevent managers’ responses illustrate that the statutory duty is flexible to a degree, 
however there are instances when they meet resistance to engagement that often fall out 
of their control. Third party organisations also play a part in this circumstance. On the one 
hand they can act as a conduit for engagement with target communities inaccessible to the 
Prevent managers and on the other they can act as a barrier to them by replicating their 
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work – making them redundant. In the next section of this chapter, this dynamic will be 
discussed in more detail.  
 
5.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent 
statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they 
have? 
 
All the Prevent managers mentioned that they regularly networked with the private sector, 
namely NGOs with a CVE focus and universities producing CVE-based research.  Brian is 
quick to emphasise the importance of liaising with academia and private research 
organisations such as the Research and Development group (RAND) for him as well as the 
wider Prevent manager networks. The nature of this interaction takes various forms (such as 
mailing lists, attending conferences and bringing in speakers to the Prevent network events)  
however the core premise for this activity is the same across the board, to make “sure that 
we’re at our optimum in terms of knowledge.” When asked if Brian had reciprocated and 
had presented his own expertise to RAND, he exclaimed that he would jump at the 
opportunity, however he felt that he was “not at that level.”  In this instance, Brian is very 
quick to point out the reverence he holds for these organisations, holding up their expertise 
as beyond his own capacity or knowledge base; he is trying to learn and replicate from them 
– to reach their “level.” In this instance, the third sector is legitimising Prevent. Its existence 
is predominantly supplanted by the problematic biopolitical realities of creating a pre-
criminal space. It supports the technologies of government that generate radicalisation 
discourse, it becomes another voice of reason (Foucault, 2008: 295). It also defuses 
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responsibility beyond government and fits the ‘quasi – natural’ processes of the economy: 
NGOs operate based on generating a profit from their activity and therefore speak the same 
language as government (Dean, 2010: 63). In sum, they supply a ‘new frame of reference’ to 
the ‘complex whole’ without directly challenging prevailing political norms (Foucault, 2008: 
312).  
 
Of all the Prevent Managers interviewed, Julian had the most prolific network within the 
NGO sector. He has presented at RAND conferences and his work has allowed him to 
network on the international stage – sharing “best practice” with governments and NGOs 
based in Australia, the USA, the Netherlands and Germany. For him, this is an opportunity to 
create “different kinds of thinking.” Perhaps paradoxically, Julian denotes that this grouping 
of experts is “quite a tight network….. all the project providers I know.”  In this statement, 
Julian is describing how he maintains close working relationships – this is a closed ecosystem 
of expertise that is hard to penetrate unless you are a legitimate actor. Prevent managers 
become gatekeepers of such knowledge, embodied by their access to funds that the third 
sector is eager to acquire.   
 
However, NGOs can threaten the relevance of Prevent managers because they often 
emulate their practices and have the resources to reproduce them in a more tailored way. 
In response to this, William thinks that the legitimacy his connection to the LA offers 
negates this issue simply because they are the most direct conduit to the legislative 
apparatus put upon LA agencies in the form of the Prevent duty. For him, only he and his 
fellow Prevent managers can provide the “correct training.” Although there is a plethora of 
196 
 
“third party groups” offering similar services to William and his team, he believes the 
localised knowledge he possesses, along with his connection to the Home Office is the only 
way a partner organisation can be sure “they’re getting the right kind of message.” 
 
Foucault (2008: 148) argues that the core institutional responsibility of the contemporary 
neo-liberal government is to provide the format for ‘economically rational’ freedoms 
beyond that of the State, even if it puts them in direct competition with mechanisms of the 
State. However, the praxis of economic freedom is controlled by the rule of law, therefore, 
such competition is regulated and rarely contradicts the overall nature of State mechanisms 
(Dean, 2010: 184). This becomes a ‘strategic game between liberties’ where there are 
several forces vying for authority through the semblance of expertise, regulated by both 
jurisprudence and the need for competitors that create the industry these personnel inhabit 
(Foucault, 1988b: 19). The work of NGOs parallels that of Prevent managers, and in some 
instances replicates it. This puts them in direct competition with Prevent managers for the 
attention of the statutory duty’s primary audiences and by proxy, State funding. In reaction 
to this, the enactors of the State at the community level (i.e. Prevent Coordinators) select 
NGOs to engage with. They share the marketplace with a select few NGOs that share their 
agenda and use them as allies to stave off further competition from NGOs that do not. In 
short, the ‘enterprise’, in this case the Prevent statutory duty and the Prevent managers 
tasked with facilitating it, become the ‘entrepreneur’ by facilitating the profiteering of select 
NGOs on the basis that they’re the most legitimate actors (Dean, 2010: 185-186).  
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All the Prevent Managers showed a preference for employing NGOs that had access to 
formers. Brian has used several private organisations that are approved by the Home Office 
at community question events “to address vulnerabilities.” He believes that formers are 
“best placed” to address the potential of extremism to take a foothold within a community 
setting. For Brian, the NGOs that offer this service “promote a really powerful message” that 
he and his team are not placed to provide unaided. Brian “bids” for these services from the 
Home Office directly – often in competition with other priority areas where people are also 
bidding at the same time, using the data he collects to provide proof that the NGO’s services 
are needed more in his LA than elsewhere. The language used by Brian shows how the 
typology of risk formed through the methodology of radicalisation theory has been 
embedded within the community work that Prevent managers coordinate. His comments 
also show how the language of commerce has permeated the Prevent landscape through 
the medium of NGOs. 
 
The structuration of such forms of neo-liberal governance has also forced upon targeted 
demographics the responsibility of reformation. In order to participate freely within society 
they must prove they’re not a risk, which Foucault (1984a: 56) describes as the realisation of 
the care or ‘practices of the self.’ A core component of this ethos is that the targeted 
individual must acknowledge their own accountability as paramount and that they have a 
moral obligation to modify their risky behaviours for the betterment of themselves and 
wider society (Foucault, 1984a: 57). This is scaffolded by governance structures through 
mechanisms of social enterprise, through partnership programmes that encourage 
collaborative working with service providers, who are in turn working in proximity to 
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experts in the form of bureaucrats and professional bodies (Dean, 2010: 221). Prevent 
managers utilising NGOs who use formers within their targeted schools and community 
groups is a prime example of this in action.   
 
This chapter has assessed the role of the typical Prevent manager. It has shown how they 
operate as both a conduit and component of the pastoral functions of power delineated by 
the State. They facilitate the security apparatus of government by embedding soft 
surveillance systems within LA agencies through ideological prepositions of vulnerability. 
Their work is a constant balancing act – attempting to equalise forms of sovereign power 
with that of the liberal, economic order of the contemporary State.  Additionally, the 
bureaucratic mechanisms of the educational field have proven to be the primary site of the 
Prevent managers activity. This is the case because education, much like the structures 
governing Prevent, operates within the pastoral mechanisms of the State. In the next 
chapter, the educational field and the practitioners who inhabit it will be investigated in 
more detail. It will focus on the delivery of the Prevent statutory duty, which primarily acts 
as a safeguarding initiative, but it will also examine how state ideology is manufactured 
through the Fundamental British Values curriculum.       
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Chapter 6. Education; the Prevent statutory duty in action.     
 
If the theoretical position of the State as a ‘conceptual variable’ is adopted by the would-be 
researcher, the relationship between its ‘empirical value’ and its socially constructed milieu 
becomes paramount (Nettl, 1968: 559-561). In short, the State and its languages of 
governance are dictated and created by humans and their reaction to both material and 
ideological artefacts. This produces a language of governance that is focused on predicting 
the reactions of the citizen, or the codification of the ‘conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1982: 
220).’ The ability to predict the course of the biopolitical and its influence on governance 
can help shape it. However, this produces a conundrum for the State. Firstly, the State must 
circumscribe the polis it governs to cement its authority. At the same time, the State is 
obliged to give biopolitical systems the room they need to grow in order to fulfil the needs 
of the free market that underpin the State’s legitimacy to govern – but only in ways desired 
by those that govern (Dean, 2010: 18). In sum, governance in the contemporary context has 
become the science of how ‘groups or individuals might be directed’ to better fulfil the aims 
of government (Foucault, 1982: 222). Furthermore, the ‘educational field’ that operates 
within the wider schema of the bureaucratic processes of government becomes the ideal 
site for the State to model the ‘trajectory’ of its citizens; it is shaping the biopolitical at its 
inception (Bourdieu, 1996: 184).  
 
I argue that the UK government has infiltrated civil society in the way Bourdieu (1996: 184) 
has described the nature and function of the educational field, disseminate both nodes of 
surveillance and modalities of behaviour it deems appropriate. The Prevent statutory duty 
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demands that schools and other educational providers have a legal responsibility to report 
any signs of extremism within their stakeholder communities through the relevant 
safeguarding channels (Home Office, 2014: 4-5). Furthermore, Schools are legally obliged to 
promote a curriculum of Fundamental British Values (FBV) to their student populations.  In 
the Home Office’s (2014: 5) official guidelines on FBVs, they delineate that schools are 
responsible for promoting a commitment to the concepts of ‘democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and 
beliefs.’ Schools are required to encourage ‘spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical 
development’ through their FBV curriculum, which is measured by Ofsted inspection (Home 
Office, 2015: 11). The implementation of FBVs in this instance becomes the State’s 
endeavour to promote its own form of ‘symbolic capital’ within its targeted demographics, 
who will ideally reproduce these narratives within the wider population (Bourdieu, 1994: 8-
9). Such machinations of the State are an attempt to maintain its hegemony, to pre-empt 
any narratives that may challenge it (Loyal, 2017: 85).   
 
Thus far, this thesis has established the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality and Prevent in practice. It has also discussed the relevance of the 
Bourdieusian notion of the bureaucratic educational field, which acts as the primary site of 
Prevent’s securitised gaze. Education, and by proxy the school, is the ideal site to identify 
those who do not fit the State’s preferred ‘trajectory’, allowing for their interception and 
modification (Bourdieu, 1996: 184). It is also important to note that the school is obliged as 
an agency of the State to identify and if necessary, remove ‘deviant’ individuals if they do 
not respond to their proscribed reformative action (Bourdieu, 1996: 185-186).  In the 
201 
 
second analysis chapter, the responses of education providers – the core focus of Prevent 
Coordinator’s and PEO’s activity – are analysed. The implementation of the statutory duty 
itself is stratified. All school’s leadership teams undergo specific Prevent training and a 
‘Prevent lead’ – who is most often the designated safeguarding lead (DSL) – is selected to 
oversee the school’s legal obligation to the statutory duty by disseminating Prevent training 
within the general staff population (Home Office, 2015: 11).   
 
This responses of the DSL’s and other participants of relevance form the cohort for this 
study, with the analysis being structured around the individual research questions, which 
can be found on page 40. The cohort for this chapter offers an oversight of the main 
enactors of the Prevent statutory duty: educational practitioners. Pseudonyms will be used 
to ensure the anonymity of all the participants throughout the analysis. A brief description 
of each participant that appears within this chapter can be found below:   
     
The Cohort:  
 
- Wendy: is a DSL and deputy head teacher in an independent school, situated in a tier 
2 level LA. She is in her early 50s, having worked as a teacher for the last 30 years, 
primarily as a teacher of Business, and later ICT. She is of white, British descent. 
William is the PEO that serves her school.  
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- Victor: is an assistant head, pastoral lead, head of RE and Personal, Health and 
Economic Education (PSHE) in the same independent school as Wendy, who acts as 
his line manager. He is in his mid-40s. Victor is white and French, having moved to 
the UK to work as a teacher – which he has done for the last 20 years.  
 
- Sarah: is a pastoral lead and science teacher in an academy school situated in a level 
2 LA, with William acting as its PEO. She is of white British descent and in her mid-
30s, having worked as a teacher for the last 12 years.  
 
- Belle: is a pastoral lead in an academy school in a tier 2 LA, of white British descent 
and in her mid-30s. She has worked as a Teacher for the last 12 years, primarily as a 
science teacher but later as a SEN specialist. Peter is the Prevent Coordinator that 
covers her school’s provision.  
 
- Patrick: is an assistant head, Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) and pastoral lead in 
an academy trust school that has only recently been established in an economically 
deprived area within a tier 2 LA. He is of white British descent, in his late 40s and has 
been a teacher for the last 25 years, originally trained as a RE teacher but later 
specialising in PSHE. Peter is the Prevent Coordinator that liaises with his school.   
 
- Margret: is an assistant head, DSL and pastoral lead within a tier 2 level LA of white 
British descent. She is in her early 50s having worked in teaching for the last 20 
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years, with a prior professional background in clinical psychology and counselling. 
William is the PEO responsible for the schools Prevent provision.  
 
- Wayne: is an assistant head, DSL, pastoral lead and head of sixth form provision 
within an academy school in a tier 1 LA. He is of white British descent and in his early 
40s. He has worked in education for nearly 20 years and is a PSHE specialist. Brian is 
the PEO that liaises with his school.   
 
- Whitney: is a deputy head teacher, DSL and Pastoral lead of an academy school in a 
tier 1 LA. She is of white British descent and in her late 40s. She has worked in 
education for the last 25 years. Julian is the Prevent coordinator that works with her 
school.  
 
- Rachel: is a recently qualified educational psychologist working in a tier 1 LA. She is 
of white British descent and in her mid-30s. Previous to her current employment, 
Rachel has worked as a SEN teacher, with 10 years prior experience. Brian works as 
the PEO within her LA.    
 
- Paul: works for a group of universities that operate in the south east on projects to 
widen participation from targeted demographics. Paul is of white British descent and 
in his mid-30s. Previous to his current role Paul was an FE teacher for over 10 years. 
Paul is responsible for working with schools within Julian’s tier 1 LA.    
204 
 
 
- Oliver: is a senior university lecturer of sociology within a tier 2 LA, having worked 
there for 6 years. His research interests include race, national identity and attitudes 
towards immigration.  He is of white British descent and in his early 40s. Peter is the 
Prevent coordinator that facilitates the university where Oliver works. 
 
- Johanna: is a senior lecturer of sociology within a tier 2 LA – working in the same 
university as Oliver. Her research interests include critical race theory, intersectional 
feminism, gender and sexuality. She is in her mid-30s and of white British descent. 
Peter is the Prevent coordinator that operates within her local.   
 
In the first section of this chapter, the responses of educators will be used to discern the 
ideological gradations of the Prevent programme. The terminology it uses to embed itself 
within Bourdieu’s (1996: 184) educational field will be examined to identify the factors that 
control the environment in which its central knowledges are both constructed and re-
constructed.      
  
6.1.  What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control 
its production of knowledge? 
 
The Prevent statutory duty was first implemented in 2015, which dictates that all LAs within 
the UK are required by law to ‘monitor’ populations vulnerable to extremism and share that 
data with the Home Office (Home Office, 2015: 5). LAs are also obligated to enlist their 
205 
 
frontline staff in the duties delivery, ensuring that they fully ‘understand what radicalisation 
means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence 
of it (Home Office, 2015: 6)’ The Home Office (2016: 6) stipulate that LA staff with a 
safeguarding responsibility should also be made ‘aware of what we mean by the term 
“extremism” and the relationship between extremism and terrorism (Home Office, 2015: 
6).’  The Home Office’s (2015: 3) definition of ‘extremism’ is designated as the ’vocal or 
active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also 
include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces.’ 
For the purpose of this analysis the term ‘Fundamental British Values’ (FBV) must be 
observed as the ideological foundation of the Prevent statutory duty – as a process of what 
Foucault (1991: 88) describes as governmentality.  
 
The role of the Prevent managers is a simple one: to disseminate the Prevent statutory duty 
within the LA setting and to imbed its practices within its existing safeguarding structures. In 
the first instance, this is largely facilitated by training programmes, where educators attend 
sessions led by PEOs who teach what radicalisation may look like in real, tangible terms. All 
the cohort were able to recite a description of the radicalisation process in line with the 
Home Office’s definitions. Sarah, a pastoral lead and science teacher working in an academy 
secondary school, sees the radicalisation process as initiated by a would-be radicaliser, 
somebody who disseminates extremism ideology amongst the vulnerable, the 
impressionable – “taking somebody from thinking thoughts to taking action.” For Sarah, 
radicalisation starts in the minds of those who do not “necessarily know how they feel or 
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why they feel the way they feel” and her responsibility as a teacher is to teach them an 
appropriate method to navigate such thoughts.  
 
Belle, a pastoral lead within another secondary academy school in the same tier 2 LA as 
Sarah, believes that a core component of her role is to identify children within her cohort 
that she “thinks are vulnerable to being taken on this journey of extreme values and ideals, 
and through targeting them and intervening we would then de-radicalise them… back into 
more mainstream beliefs, ideals, values.” Although Belle freely admits that her students as 
individuals are “entitled to believe what they want” she, like Sarah, believes that “there’s an 
appropriate way to express their opinion, and a safe way to do that.”  For Belle, her job is to 
discern the “motive” of statements, and if appropriate, to subvert their “momentum”, to 
stop them from spreading within her cohorts. In this instance, the practises of both Sarah 
and Belle are modelled on the ‘bureaucratic judgement’ of experts – taking the form of the 
Prevent manager – to create a typology of risky behaviours they are morally obliged to steer 
their students away from (Dean, 2010: 218-219). This process is epidemiological by design. 
The risk of extremism is viewed as a pathogen and the role of the teacher, the pastoral 
leads, is to stop it from spreading, even if it limits the individual’s freedom of expression 
(Dean 2010: 207). The purpose of Belle and Sarah’s safeguarding procedures are to act as an 
‘extra-legal functioning of power’, a cog in the machine that mechanises the ‘perpetual 
surveillance’ of the social field conducted by the State (Foucault, 1977: 280-281).  
 
Surveillance by design creates a pre-criminal space. Its primary function is to insure against 
‘a series of probable’ criminal acts that make suspects of those deemed most likely to 
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commit them (Foucault, 2007: 6). The ‘subjectivizing power’ exercised by surveillance 
apparatus is technocratic by design, however it is often carried out by sections of society 
that have their own bias which adversely affect its efficiency (Beck, 1992: 189). This process 
is also influenced by the surveillants understanding of the continuum of the ‘permitted and 
the prohibited’ behaviours established by the State, where the ‘bandwidth of the 
acceptable’ is transmutable dependent on current biopolitical will (Foucault, 2007: 6-7). The 
implications for the State in such instances are fairly evident – if the ‘means of subsistence’ 
of the biopolitical is exceeded by the States surveillance apparatus, the balance between the 
‘population and the sovereign’ is fraught (Foucault, 2007: 71).  
 
In terms of the implementation of the statutory duty, Prevent managers address the moral 
problematic presented by the pre-criminal space by using a perception of vulnerability to 
nullify it. They also profess that there are multiple vulnerabilities that afflict the population 
and that teachers need to be vigilant in order to anticipate them. Patrick, a DSL and pastoral 
lead in a secondary academy school also views the radicalisation process to occupy a diverse 
frame of reference, even mentioning “animal liberation groups” as potential sources of 
influence he would look for within the school population and potentially intervene against. 
For Patrick, his role as a pastoral lead is to develop his student’s “moral compass” to make 
appropriate judgments, to make them less vulnerable to “brainwashing.” Patrick believes he 
is duty bound to do this pre-emptively because, in his mind, once a person has become 
radicalised it becomes harder to challenge their extremism; the only real way to tackle 
extremism is by “stopping it in the first place.” Margret, also a DSL and pastoral lead in an 
academy secondary school views the process of radicalisation to be intrinsically linked to 
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vulnerability. She uses terminology such as ‘indoctrination’ and ‘brainwashing’ quite freely 
in her responses. Similarly to Patrick, Margret believes that whether a young person could 
overcome potential radicalisation would ultimately “depend on how far along the process 
they are.” For Margret, prevention is better than cure.  
 
In this instance, Patrick and Margret – both agents of the educational field – are enactors of 
the ‘counter identification’ of those that do not follow the ‘trajectory’ of the prevailing 
ideology sanctioned by the State (Bourdieu, 1996: 184). They’re obligated to do so because 
education acts as the primary producer of the ‘cultural capital’ of the State, which bestows a 
duty upon the educator to safeguard its charges, to ‘defend the social’ from the anti-social 
(Bourdieu, 2014: 20). Educators enable this responsibility through pastoral mechanisms, 
which are ideally suited to such a task; it multiplies the ‘technologies of domination’ by the 
‘technologies of the self (Foucault, 2000: 212-213).’ In sum, it allows instruments of 
ideological diffusion to imbed themselves within the educational discourse upon moral 
grounds, to safeguard the vulnerable. In terms of the Prevent duty, the pastoral functions of 
the educational field allows Prevent managers to entrench radicalisation discourse within 
the safeguarding agenda simply by mimicking it.    
 
For instance, Prevent managers cement their role as the expert in the localised context by 
providing DSLs with comprehensive details of the local extremist threats.  Wendy, a deputy 
head teacher and DSL in an independent school in a tier 2 LA describes how she was 
informed by  William, her PEO, of the local threat of “county lines”, where young people are 
groomed into criminal activity such as drug dealing which has been linked to local extremist 
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groups. For Wendy, “keeping abreast of local threats” is central to her role as a DSL. 
Although such concerns may seem remote to her cohort of broadly middle class, fee-paying 
students, local instances of extremism have been brought to her attention by William. This 
has bolstered her resolve. Wendy, as a means of persuasion to her sometimes dubious staff,  
uses an example whilst delivering safeguarding training provided by William of a group of 
young people from another local independent school that left for Syria and is quick to point 
out that “just because we’re a nice little school [don’t think] that it can’t happen here." 
 
Prevent, and CVE initiatives in general are a product of ‘problematization (Foucault, 1988a: 
257).’ In sum, certain events or aspects of society become problematic for government if 
they are not entirely explainable. The occurrence of acts of terror or extremism by home-
grown terrorists – citizens born in the UK, is one such instance. They happen sporadically 
and do not appear to follow a completely predictable pattern using atypical methods of 
deduction – that of the foreign terrorist infiltrating our shores. This gap in knowledge 
represents a gap in power. Prevent and its mechanisms have reacted to this problematic by 
setting new parameters; creating the conditions that generate new knowledges or truths. 
The power of narratives generated from historical reference and known knowledges can 
manufacture a reality that finds the truth in, for want of a better word, fiction, simply 
because it is believable (Foucault, 1979: 193). Whether the knowledges posited by the 
Prevent managers and their Home Office superiors answer the questions posed by home 
grown terrorism does not necessarily discern how credible they are; it is how sellable they 
are to the target audience that dictates the uptake of this new truth (Lemke, 2019: 358).   
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Bourdieu (1996: 5) recognizes that the balance between ‘power and legitimacy’ described 
by Foucault can only be facilitated through devices of ‘cultural transmission (Reed-Danahay, 
2005: 38).’ The educational system has been designed to facilitate the State’s ideological 
functions through mechanisms of ‘functional duplicity’ – appearing as an entity autonomous 
to the State whilst acting to replicate the State sanctioned ‘established order (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990: 199).’ The delivery of FBV is a central component of the statutory duty’s 
ideologically driven agenda. FBV is delivered in a pastoral fashion in the main through the 
mechanisms of PSHE and RE. It is also important to note that the people in charge of its 
planning and delivery are in most cases called pastoral leads. Patrick is one such pastoral 
lead. He describes how the delivery of Prevent is stratified over different age groups, 
following the thematics of FBV delivered through a PSHE curriculum he has designed, 
facilitated by both Patrick and form tutors.  Key stage 3 (ages 11-14) are taught “ethics and 
morals lessons” , which can focus on topics such as “social media, online safety”, however 
the overall emphasis of this teaching block is to introduce the cohort to the border question 
of  “what being British means… and what we want to be proud of to be British.” Key stage 4 
(ages 14-16) take part in the “citizenship” curriculum which provides more of a targeted 
approach. Pupils discuss the FBVs themselves, with focused discussion on “democracy, the 
rule of law, liberty and freedom of speech and tolerance” which Patrick describes as the “key 
messages” of the PSHE programme at the school.  
 
 PSHE lessons facilitated by Patrick and his peers inculcate FBV by instilling a specific 
‘sociocultural-milieu’ through discursive immersion within the ‘cultivated-habitus’ both 
designed and desired by the State (Bourdieu, 2013: 88-89). In the school setting, ‘symbolic 
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constructions’ – which take the form of academic cultural capital – are used to mask 
ideological, societal gradations that permeate both the educator and their student bodies 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979: 68). These procedures, of which PSHE and FBV are prime 
examples, are designed to create docility, compliance – to dilute resistance (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990: 201).       
 
When the participants were asked about the most challenging aspect of teaching FBV, most 
respondents who deliver it agreed that the concept of individual liberty was the hardest to 
get across to their students. Victor, a pastoral lead within the same independent school as 
Wendy, believes that it is difficult for young people to understand because they “take liberty 
for granted.” Sarah highlights that her students struggle with the concept of free speech and 
its consequences, which she describes to her students as “not necessarily your right to free 
speech” but to speak responsibly to preserve one’s individual liberty. The primary focus of 
the Prevent statutory duty in this instance is to equip its enactors to balance the perceived 
needs of two types of governed subjects: citizens that already adhere (or appear to adhere) 
to the stratification of the form of pastoral power in operation, in this case taking the form 
of FBV and the targets of said power and the vulnerable, needy and uniformed who need to 
be educated how to adhere to the desired pathway of norms that Prevent purports to 
deliver (Dean, 2010: 93).  
 
In essence, FBV is a moral enterprise where the teacher is both legally and morally obliged 
to teach them, under the premise that the vulnerable student is in need of their guidance if 
they’re to become good citizens. Ultimately, the Prevent managers, and by proxy the 
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schools that facilitate their target demographics are worried about students encountering 
the wrong information. FBV is rationalised as a modus of critical thinking, which most of the 
participants agree FBV delivers to some degree. For instance, Wendy wants her students to 
leave her care with the ability to see “both sides of the story [whilst] being able to make an 
educated decision” which she believes FBV and the wider PSHE discourse is uniquely 
positioned to deliver.   
 
Nevertheless, the symbolic nature of FBV can be challenging to deliver for practitioners. For 
Whitney, the politicised nature of FBV can prove problematic in her school, where her 
student population is “67% Bengali Muslim” but the majority of her teaching staff are white 
British. Whitney acknowledges that FBV focused lessons can foster a sense of “otherness” 
and that she must ensure that any staff tasked with delivering FBV are “mindful and 
sensitive” to the cohort’s cultural dispositions. In this instance, the school – and by proxy 
Prevent – is not acting as an instrument of liberation as Whitney would likely profess; it is 
modifying the behaviour of the school’s practitioners to ‘legitimate domination’ over its 
potentially unruly student population (Bourdieu, 1996: 5).  
 
 Educational apparatus that feign liberatory intent like FBV are a form of ‘social alchemy’, 
where a cocktail of ideology is formulated to facilitate the manipulation of student’s minds 
into docile facsimiles of State allegiance (Bourdieu, 1996: 81). The proactiveness of Whitney, 
where she manages the delivery of FBV in order to pre-empt the conflicts it creates is a form 
of ‘mechanical solidarity’, where the educator assimilates inert aspects of subcultures of 
resistance and diverts the more harmful ones through mediation (Bourdieu, 1996: 91). For 
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Whitney to cultivate the ‘certain type of culture’ that the Prevent duty demands, she must 
adopt a position that acknowledges the ‘shared certainties’ of her student cohort (Bourdieu, 
1996: 92-93). She acknowledges that there is resistance to the duty but endeavours to 
create a ‘practical harmony’ that allows her to implement the duties requirements, limiting 
the resistance to affordable levels (Bourdieu, 1996: 94). This requires Whitney and her team 
to “do a lot of groundwork”, always being “mindful of how [they] presents information” to 
guide her students and staff so that everyone is working on an “even keel.”  
 
Overall, the responses of the participants suggest that the ideological gradations of the 
Prevent statutory duty within the field of education are formulaic, facilitated through 
mechanisms of surveillance and behaviour modification. Although the theoretical 
perspectives of Foucault and Bourdieu are accurate descriptions of pedagogical authority, 
the realities of how its functions are multiplied and implemented within the school setting 
require further analysis. In the following section, the responses of participants will illustrate 
exactly how Prevent’s model of surveillance is disseminated and embedded in practice.   
 
6.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how 
is it reproduced?  
 
Metric values of performance have become calculable entities in the neo-liberal age, where 
the acceptable actions of the free individual are rendered measurable against them (Dean, 
2010: 194). In this instance, neo-liberalism is performing as a stylisation of neo-
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conservatism, which proliferates on the basis that the moral corruption of society can be 
avoided by instilling an ethos of self-discipline within the populace (Dean, 2010: 192). Where 
it differs from traditional neo-conservatism is that the State becomes a custodian of values 
rather than sole arbiter (Dean, 2010: 192).  Prevent and its CVE contemporaries follow this 
narrative – they use indicators of safety that they diffuse through a network of agencies that 
work with communities deemed vulnerable to radicalisation. These agencies in turn 
measure these cohorts against such indicators and pass on this information to the LA and 
subsequently the Prevent managers. In practice, this exercise takes the form of 
safeguarding policy.  
 
The statutory duty has enabled the Prevent managers, under the guidance of the Home 
Office, to streamline its surveillance procedures into the general safeguarding agenda of the 
LA. This is primarily because safeguarding is ingrained within the teachers psyche. When 
Belle was asked about the importance of safeguarding, she replied that she was 
“hyperaware” of any potential issues that may affect the safety of her students, and that 
her training had instilled in her the need to “refer as many people [as possible]”; it is better 
to be safe than sorry. For Belle, her role as a teacher is dependent on her interaction with 
her students and “the interpretation of their voice.” The safeguarding practices exhibited by 
Belle are programmed through discourse, with judgments ruled by a typology of risk 
designed to ascertain how well individuals fit the ‘ideal type’ designed by experts (Foucault, 
2002: 30-31). Belle and her contemporaries are motivated to act by a moral obligation 
instilled through their own training – to recognise the role of the ‘practices of the self’ and 
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how they impact on their vulnerable cohorts, who they are duty bound to protect (Foucault, 
1984a: 56-57).   
  
In order to instil the moral imperative within their discourse, Prevent managers often draw 
parallels between radicalisation and grooming. When asked to consider if the radicalisation 
process and grooming are linked, Wendy was quick to exclaim that “obviously it is.”  She 
considers this risk to be a “major threat” and seeks out the guidance of William her PEO on 
a regular basis – information she then uses to demonstrate her understanding of the “local 
threats” when her school is audited by Ofsted. Knowledge of local threats is employed by 
schools when making risk assessments. As part of Victor’s role as PSHE and RE coordinator, 
he is responsible for organising school trips. This requires him to conduct risk assessments 
which are guided by the information shared by Prevent managers. For instance, Victor 
disclosed that when planning a trip to a local mosque, his PEO advised him to avoid the one 
he had originally planned to visit because it did not have “a particularly good atmosphere” – 
advice he duly heeded. The management of both Wendy and Victor’s activities by their PEO 
William is an example of Prevent’s capability to steer the student body through the 
‘spontaneous social order’ found within the local, unguided population (Hayek, 1979: 163). 
Such activity is designed to instil a system of regulation; the ‘discipline of freedom’ deemed 
necessary to instil and reproduce the narrative of the State through mechanisms of ‘punitive 
sovereignty (Dean, 2007: 126).’   
 
As part of the guidance delivered by Prevent managers, teachers are educated on potential 
vulnerabilities within their student bodies that might elicit a radicalisation risk. Often, there 
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is a focus on monitoring the online activity of the students, something difficult to do 
because most of this activity happens beyond the teacher’s gaze. Patrick explains that his 
school uses a programme called “Smoothwall” to both monitor students when logged into 
the school computers and to block sites deemed inappropriate. The programme monitors 
keystrokes and search inquiries of each student looking for signs of extremism or other 
safeguarding concerns. For Patrick, the software is useful because it allows him to spot 
“patterns” in student behaviour that he can then use to build a profile of vulnerability, both 
for the whole school population and for the individual/s concerned. Although Patrick cannot 
monitor the individuals when they are using their own devices, “Smoothwall” allows him to 
create a picture of what they may be looking at – an educated guess at their potential 
vulnerabilities that he can then attempt to counter through PSHE lessons.  
 
Patrick is using “Smoothwall” as a form of ‘knowledge management’, where the behaviours 
of the student body are being collected and remodelled in order to systematise the 
regulation of the student bodies’ behaviours (Bauman and May, 2019: 51-53). The 
knowledges created by “Smoothwall” are acting as an extension of biopower – to be precise 
a ‘biotechnical power.’ This biotechnic calculates the possibilities of the infinite field of 
possibilities in order to assemble a finite, malleable intelligence. This intelligence becomes a 
device of disciplinary power, its modality of control (Foucault, 1979: 138-139).  
 
However, a question is raised: how are such modalities utilised? Margret, acting as DSL gets 
specific training annually which she then disseminates to the rest of her staff. For Margret, 
extremism and radicalisation are not issues she ever faced as a teacher before the 
217 
 
introduction of the statutory duty but it is now “in the forefront of the minds of staff.” 
Margret asserts that the consolidation of the Prevent duty within general safeguarding 
procedure helped demystify it for her. Additionally, she proclaims that her PEO William 
helped her realise that her obligation to the duty was not “rocket science” and that 
safeguarding against extremism was much like safeguarding against traditional 
vulnerabilities such as abuse and neglect. As time has progressed Margret and her team 
have become “very hot on” spotting signs of extremism, “constantly monitoring” her 
student cohort to protect them from who she believes may cause them harm.  
 
The repetitive nature of training and monitoring processes described by Margret is designed 
to enable her and her staff to separate the ‘subjectivity and intersubjectivity’ of her 
student’s behaviours in order to make them calculable to Prevent and its custodians (Rose, 
1999: 7-8). By simplifying the nature of practice through regular association with expert 
knowledge, forms of resistance against Prevent’s systems of power are diluted (Rose, 1999: 
10). Regular contact also allows the Prevent managers to keep the risk of radicalisation at 
the forefront of educators minds – so that they are always ready to spot any ‘deviation from 
the norm’ that could pose a danger to the student body as a whole (Poster, 1990: 91).      
 
When pupils do display safeguarding concerns Prevent managers are often consulted by 
DSLs, even though they have no official remit to do so. Most responses from the 
participants implied that this was largely due to staff lacking the confidence to make a 
reliable judgment. For instance, Sarah does not feel like she “actually knows what 
[radicalisation] looks like” in real terms. She highlights that many of the case studies used as 
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examples by PEOs in their training show extreme cases rather than a depiction of the “early 
stages” of the radicalisation process which she feels is her responsibility to monitor. Sarah’s 
hesitancy is likely due to the fact that the acts of the radical extremist have been introduced 
to her without sufficient context (Foucault, 2014b: 214). Although all the crimes presented 
to her had been made with a form of ‘avowal’ – that is to say, the perpetrators acknowledge 
their guilt which legitimates their importance as case studies – the reasoning behind their 
actions have not been rationalised to her (Foucault, 2014b: 215). Although the PEOs that 
present to Sarah and her peers provide a symptomatic approach to radicalisation, in 
practice Sarah finds it hard to attribute this to her students because the process itself is 
portrayed as ‘devoid of motivation (Foucault, 2014b: 216).’ She is quite conscious of the 
‘social danger’ acts of extremism and terrorism pose, however relating them to her students 
as subjects of extremism seems impossible to comprehend beyond a sudden outbreak of 
‘madness’ within her student cohort (Foucault, 2014b: 218).   
   
Sarah’s uncertainty could in part be due to the nature of safeguarding systems in general, 
where there is a clear chain of command to follow when reporting concerns. For Wayne, 
“the duty of the teacher first and foremost is to simply report anything they believe is a real 
concern” in order to not only protect the child, but also to “safeguard themselves” from 
charges of negligence. Ultimately it is the DSL’s responsibility to gather as much data as 
possible on the case and pass on that information to the safeguarding boards within the LA. 
As part of this process, DSL’s such as Wayne may contact their PEOs “to pass the buck a little 
bit… to get a second opinion” which often ends in the PEO (in this case Brian) coming into 
the school to deliver an intervention. The safeguarding practices displayed by Wayne are 
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one of many ‘technologies of security’ that are utilised by the State to demonstrate 
normality by identifying what it wishes it not to be (Foucault, 2007: 56). Undesirable 
behaviours, no matter how innocuous are identified and passed on through the mechanisms 
of the State by Wayne and his peers who are actively encouraged to do so because of a 
potential risk to their own freedoms. The PEOs delivering interventional work when there is 
no discernible threat, is an example of ‘normalization’, where the PEO is operationalizing 
their pastoral functions (Lemke, 2019: 194). The PEO delivering their workshops allows staff 
to view good practice, to reflect on it so that the safeguarding concern can be mediated 
whilst also allowing the PEO to supervise the teaching staff, embedding themselves in a role 
of superiority (Lemke, 2013: 14).   
 
The PEOs’ position of authority is further embodied by the fact that almost all of them have 
a background in teaching which allows them to enjoy close working relationships with DSLs. 
DSLs and teachers in general value this arrangement because the Prevent agenda is being 
delivered to them from their perspective. Whitney appreciates the input of Julian because 
of his background as a RE teacher and pastoral lead. Whitney feels that because Julian is 
“very grounded in classroom practice” it makes him more “sensitive to teacher’s needs.”  
 
This type of relationship is often co-dependent. For example, Wayne was approached to 
take part in the creation of Home Office training resources because he had actively 
participated within the Channel process involving one of his students. Wayne’s performance 
had impressed Brian, his PEO, who subsequently passed on this information to the Home 
Office, who then set about recruiting him. Wayne appeared on a “DVD [which] they created 
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alongside a training package, which was delivered by Prevent officers and police up and 
down the country in all the public services.” Interestingly, Wayne describes his contributions 
as not being “real life” – a fabrication if you will – however he was largely brought in to give 
a first-hand account of the referral process concerning students that display extremism 
ideology. The educational field and its primary actors – in this case Wayne and the PEOs 
with teaching backgrounds – produce a ‘collective recognition’ within its target audience, 
which in turn reproduces docility and compliance (Bourdieu, 1990: 138). The fact that most 
PEOs have a teaching background is not surprising. They aim to shape the language of the 
educational field through shared discourse. The co-option of Wayne into the Prevent 
training materials is an extension of this practice. Its aim is to seduce, to certify Prevent’s 
desired ‘modes of conduct (Rose, 1999: 7).’  
 
However, Prevent managers do not always enjoy a good working relationship with 
educators, particularly when it comes to possible critique from the university setting. Oliver, 
a senior university lecturer in a tier 2 LA has been at events with a critical focus on Prevent 
where Prevent managers have turned up en-masse and attempted “to dominate 
discussion.” He also describes how Prevent managers actively court the university 
management to impose a “sturdier” Prevent training platform that they wish to facilitate. 
the university has not accommodated this invitation to date. It is important to note that 
Prevent has its detractors, not only within its target demographics but also within the 
apparatus of State and civil society it attempts to utilise. The most robust forms of 
resistance use the maxims of liberal government and the contradictions found within the 
praxis of Prevent as their justification: ‘the guarantee of freedom is freedom’ after all 
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(Foucault, 1982: 245). The subjectification of target demographics by Prevent, the basis of 
its knowledges, is met with resistance because they present a paradox – Prevent embodies 
qualities it professes to combat; namely it encourages critical thinking but not about itself 
(Lemke, 2019: 327).       
 
Johanna, a senior lecturer of sociology at a university in a tier 2 LA has had several run-ins 
with the local Prevent managers at events she has organised. In fact, they have actively tried 
to stop her from booking high profile speakers such as Moazzam Begg by contacting the 
university prior to the event, often being privy to information that is not public at the time 
of their communication. Although in this case the university denied their advances, there 
are some bureaucratic responsibilities that are impossible for academics to negate. Johanna 
detailed how she is forced to fill out risk assessment forms related to the “external speakers 
policy”, where she must provide detailed information about the speaker, likely attendees, 
and the topics under discussion. Johanna is acutely aware that any event she organises that 
is critical of prevent or CVE in general maybe subverted by Prevent managers in the 
audience, often finding that she is “bracing [herself] for the Prevent officer coming.” 
Johanna recalls one occasion where she was contacted prior to an event she was organising 
by Peter the Prevent Coordinator who is responsible for the LA in which her university is 
based.  Peter wanted Johanna to include him on the presenting panel to provide “balance.” 
Johanna refused to allow this. However, Peter turned up at the event, along with three of 
his colleagues – another Prevent manager and two police officers. Johanna details that the 
group took over discussion, and “derailed” the focus of the event and, quite ironically, made 
it impossible for Johanna acting as chair to create “some balance” between the arguments 
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being made. Although Johanna is careful to point out the university is generally supportive 
of her right to platform events critical of CVE, they offer little assistance in safeguarding 
them from outside interference from the Prevent managers who can turn up to research 
seminars unchallenged. For Johanna, “there’s a sense of powerlessness” that inhibits her 
ability to facilitate such events and as such she no longer organises them.   
 
Peter and his peers’ actions at Johanna’s seminar is an example of the physical 
manifestation of the ‘disciplinary mechanism’ of surveillance (Foucault, 2007: 5-6). Although 
its primary focus is to identify the ‘prohibited’ within the field of ‘permitted’ behaviours, it 
also serves a secondary function: correction, or the ‘possible transformation of individuals.’ 
Peter is obliged by his appointment as Prevent Coordinator to intercept discourse that 
matches the indicators denoted to him from the Home Office, to judge and assess their 
performance within his local (Foucault, 2007: 17). Peter’s endeavour to divert and lead 
discussion is testament to his desire to embed himself within the university setting, which is 
his attempt to maximize the ‘circulation’ of discourse that benefits Prevent’s doctrine ‘by 
diminishing’ the flow of information that contradicts it (Foucault, 2007: 18).   
 
The participants have demonstrated that the dissemination of the surveillance techniques of 
the Prevent duty are varied, however there are common junctures. The safeguarding 
mechanisms that are deeply embedded within the school setting are the modus operandi of 
Prevent managers, closely followed by the delivery of FBV that acts as both an ideological 
educational tool and as a petri dish to isolate individuals that question such ideology. In the 
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following section, the dynamics of Prevent’s delivery will be analysed, with specific focus 
paid to the flexibility of Prevent’s apparatus for those tasked with delivering them.   
 
 
6.3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or 
reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?     
 
 
In the contemporary context, the fundamental obligation of the State is to ensure that 
individuals or ‘subjects of freedom’ can act freely because it embodies the concept of free 
market and enterprise; money makes the world go around after all (Dean, 2010: 193). 
However, individuals, or ‘subjects’ must first be ‘shaped, guided and moulded’ through a 
system of authority so that they act in a way that is both predictable and beneficial to the 
State. Subject and subjectification become one and the same, facilitated through a ‘regime 
of truth’ embodied by the State under the guise of morality (Foucault, 2003: 6). Prevent’s 
statutory duty is one such apparatus. On the one hand it demands that LA agencies adhere 
to its soft surveillance mechanisms and that they also deliver FBV on the basis it is enabling 
their vulnerable cohorts to safeguard themselves from extremism. Conversely, it allows such 
agencies a level of autonomy on how such materials are delivered, actively encouraging 
creative licence and fostering an environment where such resources can be shared. This 
activity is guided by the Prevent Coordinators who act as gatekeepers of such knowledges. 
 
Sarah denotes that FBV is predominantly delivered by non-specialist teachers in PSHE 
lessons taught in tutor groups during “extended form time” held once a day. The 
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programme is delivered to all the staff at the beginning of the school year during a planning 
session guided by their PEO, where they all get some input on the subjects covered. 
Whitney makes it clear that the school is free to incorporate FBV anywhere in the 
curriculum they see fit, with her school implementing it across subject areas as diverse as 
Drama, Geography and History. Whitney is also careful to point out that the School is aware 
that Ofsted could turn up and look for proof of FBV’s delivery, which would be evidenced by 
the school’s “promoting and supporting spiritual and moral and cultural development” 
checklists. Julian has provided Whitney with support in this endeavour, supplying her with a 
“Blue Peter-already filled in” example of the checklist, which is designed to elicit how the 
activity has developed the student’s levels of “oracy, participation and articulacy” in relation 
to FBV. Whitney has then distributed this to her staff who can use it to scaffold their lesson 
plans which in turn fulfil their obligation to Ofsted.   
 
Both Sarah’s and Whitney’s activity, where their delivery of FBV is shaped by the ‘pedagogy’ 
delineated by their respective PEOs, is motivated by their ignorance of its processes 
(Foucault, 2005: 45). In this instance the PEO is using the pastoral functions of the school to 
guide the uninitiated through the perceived ‘modalities of experience’ they possess that 
both Sarah, Whitney and their peers do not (Foucault, 2005: 46). This allows the PEO to 
assert their pastoral functions within the school setting, becoming the ‘saviour’ of 
practitioners who feel ill equipped to deliver what is required of them (Foucault, 2005: 47-
48). The disciplinary mechanisms of Ofsted, that will punish the school – and by proxy its 
practitioners – for not delivering FBV in line with their expectations exemplify the PEO’s 
value. The PEO acts as the school’s conduit to becoming a ‘subject of truth’ that need not be 
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afraid of Ofsted’s punitive power because the PEO’s knowledges absolve them (Foucault, 
2005: 365).  
    
Although there is widespread uptake of Prevent and its agenda across education, not all 
staff are fully on board with its methods – particularly the focus that FBV can take. Victor is 
tasked with both the planning and delivery of FBV. He believes that FBVs are largely “a 
fallacy” because they suggest universal values are intrinsically British, which hampers their 
effectiveness. For Victor, “they are not British values, democracy is not British, it’s Greek, 
tolerance is not British it’s universal… to me that smacks of jingoism.”  Victor’s judicious 
stance on FBV is highlighting the ‘micropractices’ of power found within the biopolitical; 
although technologies of discipline dominate the discourse of power, they can never fully 
nullify all dialogue found within its populations (Dreyfus and Rabinow: 1983: 184-185).  
 
For Victor, the Prevent agenda is “designed to cater for people who have a problem as 
opposed to an agenda that’s here to enlighten people who haven’t.” in short, Victor is 
worried that his students are designated as problematic before they have been given the 
opportunity to prove otherwise. Belle is of a similar opinion, arguing that young people are 
still acquiring the skills to express themselves and that forcing them to adhere to a system of 
surveillance is harmful to their development,  believing that there must be better methods 
of safeguarding children “without suppressing them or risk them becoming further 
disengaged.”  It is worth mentioning however, that although Victor and Belle have 
reservations about the functionality of Prevent, they do not stop adhering to it. Ultimately, 
any ideological differences individuals or groups may have with power mechanisms such as 
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the Prevent duty do not impact on its operative functions because resistance is fragmented 
(Foucault, 1979: 95). Such fragmentation occurs because the ritualistic ‘logic’ of the wider 
discourse Victor and Belle inhabit – in this case the pastoral mechanisms of the school – 
inhibits them from doing so (Foucault: 1979: 93). In short, they do not have the will to upset 
the ‘equilibrium’ of their environment; to pull on this one thread could unravel the whole 
ball of string (Dreyfus and Ranibow, 1983: 188). Consequently, ‘domination is not the 
essence of power’ – convincing the biopolitical to impose domination on oneself is (Dreyfus 
and Ranibow: 1983: 186).      
 
Rachel, an educational psychologist working within a tier 1 LA has used several targeted 
behaviour management programmes with young people who have displayed extremist 
behaviour. In one case, Rachel was drafted in to work with a young mixed-race boy with an 
autism and ADHD diagnosis who was repeatedly reported for safeguarding concerns. The 
incidents reached a crescendo when the young person turned up to school, claiming he had 
a “bomb in his bag” and that he was a “Muslim and [wanted] to blow the school up.” When 
questioned by Rachel he proclaimed that the incident was a “joke”, but the school wanted 
to take further action. Rachel put together a mentorship programme involving “a student in 
sixth form who was a practising moderate Muslim to buddy up with him [which] was 
overseen by the DSL.” They had “Weekly sessions together” over a period of six months, 
where the school provided them with resources that focused on activities that promoted 
FBV, such as visiting a local Mosque (which was known to the school and risk assessed) and 
regular discussions about responsible social media use. What is particularly interesting 
about Rachel’s account is the use of the word “moderate” in relation to Islam. Colonial and 
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orientalist connotations aside, the use of peers to moderate radical behaviours within the 
educational field is a well-trodden path. The school often mobilises the ‘reproduction of the 
established order’ through the ‘controlled selection’ of students who steer individuals who 
do not already conform through peer modelling techniques (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979: 
167). Schools - along with any other pastoral functioning apparatus of State – utilise the 
function of ‘kinship’ in this way because of its specious properties. In short, conformity 
fostered within peer groups appears more natural and less conflictual to those it is imposed 
upon – improving its effectiveness (Bourdieu, 1990: 171-172).   
 
Although peer mentorship programmes are effective and follow the pastoral functions of 
the school, the zealous nature of extremist risk still dictates that traditional safeguarding 
methods take precedence. Belle describes how safeguarding tasks take up a lot of her time, 
with “a lot of investigation into our worries for the children” conducted continuously. 
Although the majority of her monitoring is focused on more conventional risks, when a 
Prevent related issue presents itself, Belle implies that they create “a panic” where there is 
“more urgency in the way it’s approached” by the DSL and the wider safeguarding network. 
Wayne also acknowledges that his staff are often hypersensitive to the “scary” nature of 
instances of perceived extremism within their cohorts, which can cause them to overact at 
times. Wayne sees it as his responsibility as DSL to manage the “internal individual 
complexities and fears” of his teaching staff and that his close working relationship with his 
PEO Brian is invaluable in this endeavour. For Wayne, Brian is equally invested in 
maintaining equilibrium because he is “scared of getting it wrong too.”   
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The Ideological pretentions of Prevent, its moral imperative if you will, dictates that those 
who enact it are morally obliged to be precise; potentially the lives of those in their care are 
at stake after all. It perhaps comes as no surprise that a sense of panic is created, especially 
when you consider that the life courses of young people are used in the public imagination 
as ‘barometers’ of social decay (Thompson, 1998: 44).  
 
There is no sociological grouping more associated with risk than youth, with young people 
considered equally ‘as risks and at risk’ in situations that create moral panics (Thompson, 
1998: 43). As such, ‘moral panics’ are ‘pre-interpreted’ conceptions of the socio-political 
schema made by the ‘layperson’ which the sociologist cannot ignore in their analysis, even if 
they’re not based in any form of tangible reality (Thompson, 2006: 60-61). In the context of 
Prevent, its narrative produces an ‘ideological conflict’, where the perceived threat of 
extremism creates a hysteria beyond the scope of its ‘episodic events (Thompson, 1998: 
122-123).’  Emphasis is placed on deciphering symptomatic behaviour of perpetrators, 
rather than focusing on the ‘political-economic factors’ that cause individuals to act in the 
first place (Thompson, 1998: 131-134). Such instances of hysteria are common within the 
school setting. During Wendy’s interview, she described a procedure called “lockdown”, 
where her small, independent school in an economically affluent area on the outskirts of a 
tier 2 LA prepares itself for a terrorist attack. The fire alarm system (which can play different 
sounds) is used to alert staff, who lock all the doors of classrooms, barricade all possible 
entry points, pull the blinds and get all the children to sit underneath their desks. After a 
period of time, Wendy will then go around each classroom, check that each room is secured 
adequately and “release” them one by one.  
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In this case, the physical barricades constructed by the teachers to secure their classrooms 
at Wendy’s behest are also acting as the moral barricades described by Cohen (2002: 1) in 
his seminal account of moral panics. For Cohen (2002: 1-2), the State encourages moral 
panics in order to enable the cooperation of various actors across all levels of society to 
create a version of reality in order to ‘orchestrate consent’, no matter how ridiculous the 
premise of the perceived risk may seem (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995: 560). This process 
is mechanised by a ‘regime of truth’, enacted by an ‘exclusive control culture’ which is 
committed to framing ‘objects of problematization’ that the State has no other means of 
controlling (Foucault, 2014: 93; Cohen, 2002: 66). All schools are required to have their own 
“lockdown” procedures regardless of the designated threat level of their LA, although not all 
of them are as thorough as the one conducted in Wendy’s school. Events such as 
“lockdown”, through their repetition, imprint a logical anxiety upon an illogical fear; by 
acting the threat out it becomes more real. The legitimation of the threat then creates an 
environment of compliance. The primary aim of events such as “lockdown” is not to prepare 
the school for a terrorist attack, it is used to construct an ‘institutional anxiety’ which 
promotes solidarity between agencies with similar aims. In this case, it is a solidarity among 
experts in the form of Prevent managers and their school counterparts (Schinkel, 2013: 
298).      
 
However, it is important to note that many educators are not blind to the way elements of 
the statutory duty are utilised to manipulate them into compliance. For Paul, a widening 
participation professional who works in several secondary and FE schools on behalf of a 
University in a tier 1 LA, the delivery of Prevent training leaves a lot to be desired. Paul 
230 
 
describes the training as “too similar to other safeguarding training, which is to escalate and 
don’t think” which he believes actively discourages teachers to think critically. Ultimately, 
Paul thinks this message is counterintuitive to the apparent agenda of FBV – to equip young 
people with critical thinking skills. Paul is quick to point out that he has seen some good 
examples of FBV in his partner schools that “promote multicultural society”, however he is 
left to wonder “whether it’s tokenism” rather than something that is empowering the 
communities it is purporting to help. Similarly, Belle sees the implementation of FBV 
problematically. Belle believes FBV is just “another box to tick” which is easy to evidence to 
Ofsted because it is much more adaptable than most curriculums; an easy win if the school 
implements the duty with gusto. For Belle, FBV is not an effective tool to create an 
environment where young people feel “as if they’re part of a community” and if not handled 
correctly it is much more likely to have the opposite effect.   
 
The interviewees have described the Prevent duty to be flexible in its delivery, and it is 
broadly adopted by the education providers as a whole. Although there are some instances 
of rejection from within the education community, it is by and large placated by processes 
of regulation inherent to the educational field – namely the safeguarding responsibilities 
placed on schools and Ofsted inspections. In the following and final section of this chapter, 
the role of third-party organisations within the praxis of Prevent will be examined from the 
viewpoint of educational practitioners. Emphasis has been placed on uncovering the impact 
such organisations have on delivery and how they interact with the Prevent managers.    
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6.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent 
statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they 
have? 
 
The State has created various ‘technologies of performance’ to gain access to the enclave of 
knowledge held within its constitute parts and use it to optimise them (Dean, 2010: 197-
198). In doing so, it has encouraged both the growth of the private sector and its 
amalgamation with State bodies. The knowledges of the State’s agencies or the 
‘technologies of agency’ are now largely held accountable by how they perform fiscally – to 
aid the assimilation of the economies in which private enterprises operate (Dean, 2010: 
198). NGOs working within the praxis of Prevent are a prime example of this in action. They 
become the technical means of shaping conduct into the optimization of economic 
performance because they are predominantly focused upon generating a profit through 
their services.   
 
In practical terms, NGOs that work with schools are primarily offering services that help 
them facilitate their obligation to the delivery of FBVs – another conduit of expertise 
available to schools.  For instance, Wayne runs several workshops throughout the academic 
year with targeted sections of his student population that have been identified as having 
“very strong ideological views that we feel make them vulnerable.” These workshops are 
facilitated by NGOs that offer resources and expertise “which the Home Office will often 
recommend” to Wayne via his PEO Brian. The nature of each workshop is different, however 
they often mirror PSHE lessons but with the added benefit that less students are present, 
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making them more personalised. A mixture of discussion and practical tasks are utilised to 
give the students some context but most of the content is designed to be peer led.   
 
When Wayne was asked to describe the demographical make up of these sessions, he went 
on to explain that the school has a predominantly Muslim population and as such, most of 
these targeted sessions where designed to challenge radical Islam and forms of “anti-
Semitism.” He also described that these workshops have “raised some flags” in the past, 
enabling him to make safeguarding decisions much quicker than if he was relying on more 
traditional methods. Wayne also holds whole school events which use NGOs with a CVE 
focus on a regular basis. This involves bringing in outside speakers, often facilitated by Brian. 
Michael Haines, the brother of David Haines, an aid worker who was murdered by ISIS in 
2014, has come several times to talk about his experiences to the student cohort, which 
Wayne believes has had a positive effect on his students that no one else within his staff 
could deliver.  
 
The activity of the NGOs working with Wayne and his peers are capitalising on the ‘political 
economy’ of Prevent, facilitated by its localised socio-political auditor – Brian the PEO 
(Lemke: 2013: 42-43). In this instance the involvement of privatised entities within the 
Prevent apparatus has not supplanted the regulatory functions of government, it has 
supplemented them (Lemke, 2013: 51-52). Although NGOs bring autonomous functions to 
Prevent’s delivery, the scope of their autonomy is controlled by the ‘transactional reality’ of 
fulfilling the brief of those purchasing the products they deliver (Foucault, 2008: 297).  Much 
like the Prevent managers who steer their activities within the localised setting, NGOs 
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replicate the functions of the organisations they deliver their products to in order to aid 
their assimilation into their practices.  
 
The activity of NGOs is not restricted to the delivery of programmes within the classroom 
setting. NGOs also provide training services for schools that supplement the training offered 
by the LA. Interaction with these organisations almost always go through the Prevent 
managers. For example, Victor’s online Prevent training was delivered by an NGO which 
works in partnership with the Home Office and Patrick’s safeguarding training was provided 
by an outside agency in conjunction with Peter his Prevent Coordinator – training paid for 
with funding from the LA. The training provided to both Victor and Patrick is an example of 
how private enterprise has assimilated the technologies of government. In this case 
government – taking the form of Prevent – is operating ‘through’ rather than ‘on’ civil 
society (Sending and Neumann, 2006: 668-669). The NGOs are acting as a ‘technology of 
agency’ employed by the State to carry out its ‘regulatory functions’ – to extend its sphere 
of influence beyond its own limited capacity to act within the consumer market (Dean, 
2010: 167-168). As such, the training providers deliver the perfect apparatus for the 
‘introduction of economy into political practice’ that the modern State requires to function 
(Foucault, 1991: 92). 
 
Schools can also act proactively and employ NGOs to fill gaps in provision they have self-
identified. Belle’s school is one of a group of academies that perform their own internal 
inspections or “mock Ofsteds” to establish areas for improvement. Following an internal 
inspection it was highlighted that the school needed to improve their FBV provision. The 
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senior leadership team then contacted Peter, their Prevent Coordinator, who put them in 
contact with an NGO that provided PSHE training – which Peter could supply at a discount.  
 
The NGO came into Belle’s school and conducted several training sessions with their 
personnel, all of whom being ex-teachers, on how to plan PSHE activities and lessons that 
fulfil the duty, along with resources to help facilitate them. During this training event, the 
school was upsold a training package that was part of a tiered award scheme, where they 
were effectively assessed and awarded certification by the NGO. Belle’s school went for the 
“bell’s and whistle option” which also brought in a number of the NGOs practitioners who 
delivered “targeted sessions… one for each strand [of FBV]” with the student cohort. When 
the NGO had completed its task and provided the school with its certification after a 12-
week programme, the academy group came back in to do another inspection. They were 
left “pretty satisfied” that the school was now up to speed and ready for Ofsted. In this 
instance, the NGO’s certification is acting as an extension of the ‘practical taxonomies’ of 
the bureaucratic field of education (Bourdieu, 1988: 194). The NGO is offering the school an 
assurance of their functionality – or to be more precise, proof of their ability to function – 
via the 'pedagogical machine' that is the educational field (Foucault, 1977: 173). What is 
perhaps most fascinating about this activity is that in isolation such certification is non-
translatable – it is an artificial construct that offers no transferable value beyond the 
bounded context of an impending Ofsted inspection (Bourdieu, 1988: 195).      
  
The artificial construction of knowledges by NGOs within the educational field is not only 
limited to pedagogy. The third sector also offer several surveillance technologies to schools 
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to streamline their safeguarding processes into a quantifiable, computerised format. One 
such technology of surveillance being increasingly utilized by schools is a programme called 
Child Protection Online Management System (CPOMs) – dedicated safeguarding software 
promoted by LA’s across the country. Patrick’s school is heavily invested in the software and 
it is used across all six of the schools within the academy group. According to Patrick, every 
staff member has an account and every pupil within the school has their own profile. If a 
staff member has a concern about a pupil, they log it in the programme where he and the 
other DSLs have oversight. For Patrick, the main advantage of using the programme is that 
“it’s not relying on one person” and that if a number of concerns are logged it is possible to 
see “patterns” in behaviour which can be used as evidence if the case is passed onto the 
safeguarding board. Furthermore, the programme is integrated within the wider IT network 
and data can be transferred across attendance programmes such as SIMs or behaviour 
management and rewards systems. Interestingly, if a child moves to another school with a 
CPOMs subscription their profile can also be transferred, making sure that any pre-existing 
concerns can continue to be monitored.  
 
In this instance, CPOMs acts as the mechanism to collect the aggregate of seemingly 
random behaviours which is being amassed and reassembled to produce a biopolitical truth 
(Foucault, 1979: 138-140). This process seduces the practitioner – in this case Patrick – by 
creating a semblance of sequential reality from disordered contexts (Rabinow, 2005: 186) 
Once assembled, the data collection technique almost takes on a life of its own, a 
Frankenstein’s monster of cyclic interpretation, a process Ranibow (2005: 187) defines as a 
‘biosociality.’ The surveillance apparatus occupies the milieu of biopower within this socio-
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biology, acting as the connective tissue, rendering the State upon its populations (Nelson, 
2005: 239). The fact that the technology of surveillance in this instance is created by the 
third sector should not come as a surprise. The public sphere has been encroached upon to 
such an extent that public spaces are dominated by private enterprise (Wakefield, 2005: 
529-530). CPOMs is a facet of a post- panoptic industry replicating the functions of State 
whilst also fulfilling its own requirements; this reportage of deviant subjects is formed out of 
a ‘modality’ of private enterprise that has been transposed upon the public sphere to 
generate profit (Deleuze, 1992: 3-4). This example can be seen throughout the schema of 
education and beyond. Patrick’s school itself is owned by a private academy group 
employed by the State to facilitate its function: to provide free at the point of access 
schooling for young people in compulsory education. 
 
This chapter has outlined how the Prevent statutory duty is primarily operationalised 
through the bureaucratic field of education. The responses of the educational practitioners 
have provided an account of the practicalities of the duty’s delivery. Although there is 
evidence that the ideological underpinnings of Prevent and its soft surveillance techniques 
are met with some scrutiny, by and large, Prevent negates any resistance to its 
implementation within the school setting. It does so by utilising the pastoral functions of the 
educational field, using the safeguarding agenda and the pretence of vulnerability to sell its 
significance to educators. The bureaucratic nature of safeguarding procedures and the 
broader educational field are also used to embed Prevent’s functions within daily practice. 
The private sector has been welcomed into this dynamic, multiplying the functions of 
Prevent managers and the wider CVE discourse they advocate for through programmes that 
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aim to simplify a schools legal obligation to the duty. In the following chapter, this dynamic 
will be investigated in more detail. The responses of personnel that work for NGOs that 
operate both within the localised and national context will be analysed, discussing topics 
such as their modes of production, creative process, and their means of communication 
with their target audiences.  
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Chapter 7. NGOs: Those who Profit from Prevent     
 
Foucault (2008: 243) recognizes that the language of neo-liberalism has shaped the 
discourse of security. To be precise, security agencies are not only charged with policing acts 
of criminality, they are also tasked with making them quantifiable, calculable entities. This 
calculation of criminality has led to the advent of security apparatuses designed to act pre-
emptively; to insure against the risk such criminal acts represent to the social and by proxy, 
the economic (Lemke, 2019: 217). In short, CVE initiatives such as Prevent, although 
inherently flawed, produce measurable results that can be easily translated into economic 
values. The fact that acts of terrorism are sporadic is immaterial because they produce a 
morally driven socio-political response. This can affect societal perceptions of the State’s 
ability to safeguard society – a core component of its brand if you will – which also 
translates into an economic value of its own. New industries emerge within the biopolitical 
milieu created by acts of terrorism and extremism, populating the ‘episteme’ or systems of 
knowledge required to manage such discourse (Foucault, 1989: 33-35). Consequently, 
organisations who operate within these emergent economies perpetuate the politicisation 
of extremism as a threat beyond its actual scope simply because such discourse generates 
them a profit.   
 
Thus far, this thesis has examined the responses of Prevent managers and discussed how 
they disseminate the Prevent agenda across their respective LAs. They do so through 
pastoral mechanisms: diffusing the ideology of the State through FBV and policing it through 
its apparatus of soft surveillance. It has also assessed how this practice is incorporated 
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within the educational field – the primary focus of Prevent managers – by analysing the 
responses of DSL’s and pastoral leads who are tasked with implementing the Prevent 
statutory duty within the school setting. The duty is facilitated through safeguarding 
agendas and pastoral education which primarily takes the form of PSHE and RE lessons. As 
part of this process, schools and LAs employ a plethora of third sector agencies to assist 
them in this endeavour. Such organisations offer expertise and training which is assimilated 
by LA agencies within their own practice. In the third analysis chapter, the responses of 
personnel from the third sector – people who work for NGOs that populate the discursive 
field of Prevent – are analysed.  The analysis is structured around the individual research 
questions found on page 40.   
 
The cohort for this chapter reveals the perspectives of NGO personnel that work within the 
international, national, and localised context on education and CVE focused projects. 
Pseudonyms will be used to ensure the anonymity of all the participants throughout the 
analysis. A brief description of each participant that appears within this chapter can be 
found below:       
 
The cohort:  
 
- Emma: is a programme manager for an education NGO that focuses on PSHE and 
Pastoral support within the school setting at the national level. The organisation 
works across two main workstreams: training/consultancy and direct delivery to 
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student cohorts. They also offer accreditation schemes for schools. Emma is an ex 
drama teacher and has worked in education for around 11 years. She is in her mid-
30s and of white British descent. She works in both Brian and Julian’s LAs.  
 
- Holly: is an area manager for a national level NGO whose core focus is to raise 
aspirations for young women of school age through mentorship programmes. Her 
previous professional background is in education, having worked as an English 
teacher for 5 years before this appointment. She is in her late 20s and of white, 
British descent.  She works in both Peter and Williams LAs.  
 
- Sian: is a programme coordinator for an international NGO that focuses on CVE, 
international development, and risk management. She runs an international 
programme that organises cities internal security around the world, bolstering their 
CVE apparatus. As part of this responsibility, Sian coordinates the organisation’s 
educational facilities and manages a team of individuals who produce scholastic 
tools that are sold to educational bodies. She also regularly appears on TV as an 
expert when acts of terror/extremism occur, having appeared on the BBC, ITV, and 
Channel 4 News. Previous to her current role, Sian has worked for both the Home 
Office and local government – perhaps most pertinently as a Prevent Coordinator. 
She is in her Late 30s and of white British descent. She operates in all the Prevent 
managers’ LAs.  
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- Pavel: is a CEO of a localised NGO that provides educational programmes that focus 
on music and drama with young people excluded from schools/in danger of 
exclusion because of behavioural needs. He set up his organisation 15 years ago and 
employs a small number of staff who help facilitate delivery. Pavel is in his mid-40s, 
British and of white Polish descent. Pavel works in William’s LA.      
 
- Bethany: is a deputy CEO and a subject specialist lead for a national level NGO that 
focuses on PSHE provision. They provide PSHE resources, certification programmes 
and staff training/consultancy as well as delivering directly to the student body of 
partner schools. Bethany is of white British descent and in her early-50s. She has 20 
years’ experience in teaching, specifically as a pastoral lead, PSHE specialist and 
deputy head teacher. Bethany operates in all the Prevent managers LAs.  
 
- Tim: is the managing director and cofounder of a localised NGO (that is beginning to 
operate at the national level). The NGO’s primary focus is developing aspiration 
within the school and FE setting. They deliver student focused workshops and events 
with one of their core strands being CVE based. Tim is in his early 20s and of white, 
British descent. Tim’s organisation works in Peter’s LA.  
 
The first section of this chapter will uncover exactly how NGOs incorporate their services 
within the Prevent landscape. It will focus on the methods used by NGOs to create new 
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knowledges within the schema of CVE and how it sells such narratives to its target 
audiences.   
 
7.1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors 
control its production of knowledge?   
 
Sian, a programme coordinator for a major supranational NGO who works in all the Prevent 
managers’ LAs that appear in this study describes the importance of research which “feeds 
into everything” that she and her organisation does. The research activities she employs 
primarily implement statistical analysis techniques. However, the organisation is keen to 
adopt “ethnographical” approaches to provide a more holistic approach to their 
workstreams, even though this can often prove difficult to initiate on the ground. The 
project that Sian runs, which she describes as the organisation’s “Flagship Programme”, 
creates a network of cities across the world where the civic and policing leaders utilise the 
data produced by her organisation, often sharing best practice scaffolded by the 
organisations expertise. Membership to this scheme is exclusive, with her organisation 
currently operating within seven LAs in the UK context outside of London, where all the 
boroughs are involved in the scheme. LAs, must “identify priority areas” which Sian will 
assess to see if they meet her criteria. Accessing the scheme is quite a competitive affair and 
more LAs are rejected than are signed on at any given time. Sian was clear that any 
successful application relies heavily on the LA being able to work “with national government 
to help us get some funding” so that they can offer their expertise and services.  
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The main question raised here is why are LAs across the world lining up to be associated 
with Sian’s organisation? Sian freely admits that working out how to “take all of our 
programming and run that on a city level” is often problematic; finding ways to fit her 
products within the LA setting takes up most of her team’s time and resources when a 
partnership has been established. Interestingly, Sian denotes that the best way to “build 
different constituencies” into the programme is to utilise local project workers such as the 
Prevent managers, whom she describes as “the experts that are working [in] this area.” 
Using the Prevent managers as a “consultative body”, Sian works the products and services 
at her disposal into the gaps in provision within a partner LA. Much of Sian’s organisation’s 
success is due to their ability to successfully “lobby” government departments such as the 
Home Office and DfE at the national level with the data they collect at the local level. She 
describes this as a “big part of our work.”    
 
The division in labour between private and public enterprise found in the example of 
Prevent and NGOs like Sian’s organisation is a medium of diffusion between the practices of 
State and the free market economy. It also acts as a mechanism of change – creating new 
forms of government and economic structures (Lemke, 2019: 186). The most successful 
NGOs in this sector act as both service providers and as lobbying groups. Working within the 
community setting, they gather their data or their ‘knowledges’, which they then take to 
governmental bodies such as the Home Office and DfE to influence their policy-making 
moving forward (Foucault, 2002: 211). This ‘transactional reality’ propels the interests of 
State and empowers elements of civil society that adhere to the economic model of 
governance simultaneously (Foucault, 2008: 307). Sian utilises the agents of pastoral 
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diffusion – in this instance, the Prevent managers – because they also legitimise her 
organisation’s objectives; their evangelical zeal to safeguard their subjects requires her 
direction. This symbiotic relationship allows her to collect localised data in the format most 
digestible to the Home Office and its peer departments of government. This aids her 
organisation’s assimilation within the ‘epistemological’ rational of State, helping her to 
become a component of its archaeology of knowledge (Foucault, 2002: 212).    
 
Emma, a programme manager for an education NGO that operates at the national level 
(within the LAs of both Brian and Julian) describes a different arrangement with government 
than Sian’s organisation. Emma’s NGO is supplied with most of their funding through central 
government, with the Home Office and DfE their primary source of capital. Although 
Emma’s NGO does offer services to individual schools who may wish to approach them 
directly, her organisation primarily targets the Home Office and DfE – her organisation sells 
these ministries their programme as a complete package. Once terms have been agreed, the 
Home Office will advertise Emma’s services within their Prevent network events. Prevent 
managers will then put in bids to the Home Office, who in turn will decide – dependent on a 
hierarchy of need – “where they think [Emma’s NGO] should be, where we’ve got the 
capacity to go.”  Emma will then be given a budget for her programme and it is her role to 
“work with” the LAs to “spend” it on services that best fulfil their needs. In this example, the 
Home Office is creating a market of ‘enterprise’ within its cohort of Prevent managers, 
picking the best ‘entrepreneurs’, those who best utilise the ‘human capital’ at their disposal 
and rewarding them with the services of Emma’s NGO (Dean, 2010: 185-186). The ‘socio-
economic determinations’ levied by the State towards their Prevent managers also extend 
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to Emma’s NGO, where her operations are determined by the ‘regime of truth’ established 
by the Home Office. Emma must go where they decide the greatest need is, which in turn 
dictates the nature of her organisations delivery (Foucault, 2014: 340).  
 
In practicable terms, Emma will meet with the Prevent coordinator and PEO in whichever LA 
she is designated. They will work out the “logistics of how to roll out” the programme 
together, costing various products, with different fees for services in “primary or secondary” 
education and for “staff training.” Emma encourages a “holistic approach” to LAs, 
promoting a mixture of delivery between staff training and direct workshops with student 
bodies. Emma presumably pushes this narrative because it offers value to the LA as well as 
providing her with a wide frame of reference to collect data to evaluate her organisations 
services. Similarly to Sian, Emma’s NGO must “make sure that our work is researched and 
evidenced” for it to continue offering its services – it needs to prove it can adapt to the 
environment it places itself in. Once the terms of delivery are set out, Emma will align her 
workstreams to that of the LA, producing “quarterly reports for them, and end of year 
reports” which the Prevent manager will use to supplement their own reports to the Home 
Office that also operate on a quarterly and annual basis. Emma did not divulge the actual  
content of the reports she made, however she did denote that they focused on mapping 
areas of “risk and priority” which could be used to develop the next phase of her 
organisations work within partner LAs.  
 
Emma’s services are tailor made to provide the LA with a system of delivery that fits their 
own as closely as possible. Emma denotes that her remit is to produce “effective work on 
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Prevent” and that regardless of the format, the products offered by her organisation must 
promote the “safeguarding [of] everyone and provide all young people with the skills to 
think critically” which directly align with the Prevent managers responsibilities and the aims 
of FBV. In this example, Emma’s NGO is complicit in creating a ‘regime of veridiction’ in 
conjunction with the State. To be precise, Emma’s organisation chooses to avoid its own 
objective analysis of the social artefacts at its disposal and instead uses the State’s 
ideological position to frame its understanding or ‘regime of truth (Foucault, 2014: 341).’ 
For example, Emma’s NGOs staff training programmes are designed to showcase the 
“proactive education side of Prevent” and inform teaching staff on how the duty “fits into 
[school’s] safeguarding.” She is more concerned with fulfilling her brief set by the Home 
Office than critically assessing how relevant her products are to the school’s student cohort.  
 
Emma’s willingness to replicate the LA’s systems as closely as possible is a factor of the 
‘transformations in statehood’, where the functions of State are being harmonised – 
transposed even – upon the biopolitical ‘continuum (Lemke, 2013: 84-85).’ In sum, the third 
sector’s assimilation within the functions of State should not be viewed as the receding of 
State power, it is in fact an example of its growth into the emergent socio-economic 
landscape. There are a multitude of other examples found within this field, however 
Bethany’s NGO offers a perfect illustration.  Bethany is a deputy CEO of an education NGO 
that focuses on the delivery of the PSHE curriculum within schools at the national level. 
Similarly to Emma, most of her organisation’s funding is delivered “on a contract or grant 
basis” from governmental departments such as the Home Office and DfE. A core function of 
Bethany’s organisation is to “address extremism through PHSE” which often takes the form 
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of lesson plan packs and staff training programmes that are delivered within the school 
setting.  
 
What is most interesting about Bethany’s organisations activity is that they design the 
nationally recognised PSHE curriculum which is implemented in schools across the length 
and breadth of the country. Although the DfE offer broad guidance on the content of PSHE 
syllabuses, they have decided against creating an actual curriculum themselves, preferring 
instead to sanction the expertise of Bethany’s NGO in its place. Although technically a non-
regulatory subject area, PSHE is assessed by Ofsted who do have criteria set by government 
that need to be fulfilled by schools. The need for Bethany’s NGOs services is effectively State 
assured, where they act as a mechanism of “quality assurance”, ensuring all schools and 
education providers are delivering PSHE programmes in line with Prevent, FBV and other 
statutory requirements levied upon them by the State.  
 
Although Bethany enjoys close working relationships with Prevent managers and the Home 
Office, sometimes there is a conflict of interest between them and her team, specifically 
over issues like the content of FBV lessons. Bethany seemed quite critical of FBV as a 
concept during her interview, not willing to go into her “own personal opinion of the whole 
FBV thing”, however she was clear that it was “very much woven through PHSE” and 
couldn’t be ignored by her organisation. As such, Bethany and her team have developed 
resources that “don’t label [FBV] in the programme” but can still be used by schools to 
evidence their commitment to it. In this instance, Bethany and the third sector she inhabits 
both enforces and undermines the modes of pastoral power occupied by Prevent. It 
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enforces it by engaging with the format of pastoral power adopted by the State in the form 
of the educational system but undermines it by proclaiming to have better answers to the 
problems State actors find difficult to solve. This creates an environment where State actors 
are both reliant on the third sector for their expertise and assistance but also in competition 
with them for influence over its target audiences (Dean, 2010: 90-91). This activity, where 
NGOs like Bethany’s are both in league and competition with the State is an aspect of 
‘enterprise society’, where the balance between a ‘society for the market and a society 
against the market’ is struck (Foucault, 2008: 242-243).  
 
Ultimately the State dictates the relationship between the third sector and itself because it 
is the only party with the apparatus of the adjudicator at its disposal – the power to shape 
and wield the law (Dean, 2010: 71). In the praxis of Prevent, FBV have been deemed a legal 
requirement by the State and any actor that operates within this sphere, be that a State 
body or a private entity like Bethany’s NGO must adhere to them. It must be understood 
that FBVs are merely a strand of the fabric of security apparatus that envelopes Prevent – 
they do not define the statutory duty’s function. The languages of law and commerce have 
combined to determine that issues of security encompass the threat to the economy as a 
forefront concern (Foucault, 2007: 108). The biopolitical mechanisms adopted by 
government – in this instance taking the form of FBV – are only important because they 
promote the economic viability of the neo-liberal model, not because the security of the 
individual citizen matters to those that govern. The political economy also plays a part in the 
shaping of this discursive field; Prevent ends up having a political value that exceeds its 
actual needs because it is embodied by an economy of its own (Dean, 2010: 113). 
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Fundamentally, if NGOs wish to navigate and profit from this circumstance, they too must 
perpetuate this narrative.   
 
Most NGOs that inhabit the Prevent space empathize with its ideological position; the moral 
imperative to support Prevent and its CVE apparatus to protect the vulnerable. For instance, 
Tim is a managing director of a localised advocacy NGO working in Peter’s LA. Tim’s 
organisation is currently enjoying rapid development and is starting to operate at the 
national level, in part due to him taking advantage of “various different opportunities” 
within the CVE industry. Tim believes that “the role that education plays” in keeping young 
people safe from “disillusionment, which will eventually lead to vulnerabilities” is 
paramount, especially when it comes to extremism because “education can be a hotbed for 
radicalisation.” For Tim, Prevent is “absolutely crucial [because it] gives schools and colleges 
the strategic imperative to invest in this agenda.” Tim’s own investment in Prevent has 
allowed him to travel the world acquiring expertise, working in collaboration with the Kofi 
Annan Foundation, RAND and the European Council to name but a few.  
 
Tim’s organisation specialises in providing workshops and events that brings in speakers 
from these arenas to deliver to young people directly. In particular, Tim has organised 
several events that utilise victims of acts of terror, having run successful workshops with 
speakers who were survivors of 7/7 and the Andres Breivik attacks. He has also worked 
closely with formers, establishing a partnership with another localised NGO that has several 
former far-right activists that deliver workshops to young people about their experiences. In 
this example, Tim utilises the functions of the educational field to propagate his activities. 
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Tim’s organisation acts as the ‘specialised agent’ that facilitates the diffusion of FBV within 
the target demographics (Bourdieu, 1990: 73). Tim’s account of the importance of Prevent 
to the educational field and his willingness to incorporate its ‘pedagogic actions’ allows him 
to pertain ‘practical mastery’ over its ‘habitus’, in this case taking the form of FBV (Bourdieu, 
1990: 74). Tim’s willingness to use formers and people directly affected by acts of terrorism 
further embodies his position as the expert. They provide an anchor for his organisation’s 
‘professional jurisprudence’, acting as a legitimising factor to his State sanctioned taxonomy 
of truth (Bourdieu, 1988: 195-197). A truth that asserts that young people are potentially 
vulnerable to extremism, both as victims of its actions and as victims of its functions.  
 
From an ideological standpoint, the third sector diffuses through the Prevent landscape, 
primarily through economic means. It actively replicates the functions of State to aid this 
process, by using and becoming pastoral agents of diffusion within the educational field. In 
the next section of this chapter, the practicalities of how the third sector replicates 
Prevent’s functionary apparatus within the LA setting will be analysed in more detail.  
 
7.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; 
how is it reproduced? 
 
Surveillance apparatus are fashioned through a process of calculation, often in response to a 
biopolitical imperative where a relationship between cause and causation is sought. In such 
instances, the surveillant facilitates the ‘transposition of technical models’ – in this case CVE 
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– upon target demographics to meet this aim (Foucault, 2001: 227-228).  In sum, the 
method of surveillance is designed to classify the opaque mass of the social body into 
tangible entities, constructing ‘ideal types’ which the surveillant can use as markers for their 
observations (Foucault, 2001: 231). Whether such indicators can quantify the original socio-
political quandary is largely immaterial. The actual goal of the surveillant, which takes the 
form of the Home Office in this example, is to implement a system of discipline within the 
populace so that they will choose to surveil themselves (Foucault, 1977: 108).  
 
In terms of the third sector, NGOs are largely complicit in this endeavour. Holly, a project 
manager and area coordinator for a national level NGO that focuses on raising aspirations 
for young women within the school setting describes how her target demographics are 
determined. Holly has regular contact with Prevent managers within the LAs that she 
operates, who, alongside the schools she works with, determine the cohorts who take part 
in the programmes she delivers. Targeted students are regarded as “vulnerable” by their 
school, with most having “ongoing safeguarding concerns” that, in the eyes of the schools at 
least, have attributed to lower than expected attainment. When the students are enrolled 
on the programme they become ‘mentees’ and are paired up with mentors – women 
volunteers who sign up to the programme from various professional backgrounds. Holly will 
pair mentors and mentees according to the needs of the student. She will couple “more 
experienced” mentors with students with a “safeguarding concern” because she wants them 
to be aware of the safeguarding process from the outset, so that any issues can be dealt 
with promptly and efficiently in accordance with the LA’s existing mechanisms.  
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In one case that Holly disclosed, a mentor had passed on information about one of the 
secondary school aged mentees she was working with that had been engaging with “the 
Israel and Palestine situation” online. This raised “a few alarm bells” for Holly, who duly 
reported it to both the partner school’s DSL as well as Peter, her Prevent coordinator for 
that region. The case itself did not go beyond the multiagency level, however this did lead to 
Holly running “a session with the girls on critical thinking” as a group, which Peter helped 
design. Holly’s interaction with the Prevent managers often extends to her practice. They 
keep her abreast “of policy change” as well as delivering training to both her and her cohort 
of mentors. In Peter’s LA he delivers training and workshops on FGM to her team of 
mentors at the beginning of every academic year. When asked why this was the case, Holly 
explained that the LA has “a relatively large cohort of Bengali and Nigerian young ladies and 
there is a potential link there in terms of FGM.” When pressed further on whether Holly had 
ever seen any examples of FGM within any of her cohorts she was clear that she had not, 
however she still thought it important for it to be “emphasised to [the] mentors.” This 
perhaps can be attributed to Holly’s need to liaise with the Prevent managers to garner 
business, after all, “networking is good” for Holly’s role and her ability to embed herself 
within the LA setting. 
 
 In Holly’s safeguarding example, she has adopted the ‘genealogy’ of the State within her 
practices to such an extent that her methods are indiscernible from that of an LA agency 
(Ofstad and Marin, 2019: 431-433). Much like the schools Peter’s role has principally been 
designed for, Holly does not question the Prevent coordinator’s truths, even when she is 
forced to consider how prevalent the threat of FGM (or lack thereof) is within her cohorts. If 
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anything, her proximity to young women from the communities Peter professes are 
vulnerable – something he does not enjoy – should supplant her experience over his, yet 
she does not even consider this an option. In short, Holly isn’t equipped to question Peter’s 
knowledges of the local threats because he represents the physical manifestation of the 
‘technologies’ of government that provide her with the means to operate within the 
‘territorial space’ of the LA (Rose-Redwood, 2006: 470).  
 
Instances of Prevent managers disseminating technologies of surveillance within localised 
NGOs that deliver programmes to target demographics is not uncommon. Tim describes an 
initiative he runs called “the council for students”, where William, the LA’s PEO, acts as a 
“mentor.”  William helps guide the sessions that are related to racism and tolerance – which 
Tim believes William is ideally placed to “facilitate” because he has the knowledge to shape 
the discussion of “young people that are passionate about these issues.” However, a 
question is raised here: in what ways is William mentoring these young people? William’s 
guidance has shaped Tim’s organisations community projects, instilling a need for Tim and 
his team to focus on developing “young people’s understanding of one another.” For Tim, it 
is essential for young people to understand that “in terms of spotting signs” there isn’t a 
catchall definition of extremist behaviours, however there “are things to be aware of” which 
should be taken into consideration when interacting with one another.  
 
When Tim was asked to describe what signs he made young people aware of in his sessions, 
he produced a document on his phone that was supplied by William via email. Reading from 
his script, Tim recited his list of behaviours from the Prevent manager’s playbook much like 
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a sermon: “unwillingness or inability to discuss their views, increased levels of anger, 
secretiveness, especially around internet use.” Essentially, Tim is reproducing the soft 
surveillance techniques of the Prevent manager within the student body, much like his 
counterpart educators do in the school setting. In this instance, Tim is as much an agent of 
the Prevent agenda as William is – developing technologies of self-surveillance within 
targeted, vulnerable demographics.  
 
Evidently, Tim’s organisation is enterprising within the industry that surrounds the 
mitigation of ‘socially produced’ risk – taking the form of extremism - using the Prevent 
managers ‘calculations of risks’ as guidelines (Lemke, 2013: 51-52). The Prevent managers’ 
ideological indicators hold a form of ‘symbolic domination’ that Tim must utilise if he wishes 
to act legitimately within the educational field – to access its ‘forces of cohesion’ in order to 
embed his organisation within its practices (Bourdieu, 151-153). In short, William’s factorial 
approach is the State’s attempt to classify the ‘subjugated knowledges’ of the extremist. 
This process of categorisation produces target demographics, and the only way Tim can 
interact with them is to reproduce the narrative of the Prevent manager – to speak their 
languages fluently (Foucault, 2007: 7-8). Tim, much like Holly, adopts this approach without 
pausing to question it. This is in part due to the methodology of the Prevent manager being 
rooted within the ‘pedagogy of care’ of the educational setting (Pereira, 2019: 24-25). In this 
instance, the pastoral functions of the safeguarding mechanisms found within schools are 
being monetised, from ‘economies of salvation’ to economies of scale (Foucault, 2007: 222).       
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It should not come as a surprise that Tim values his interactions with William. He feels “very 
lucky to have community-focused individuals” such as William to work with – they offer him 
“plenty of contact time” and Tim is always looking to find ways to “embed those individuals 
in some of our student voice programmes.” When Tim was pressed further on why Prevent 
managers were such assets to him and his work, he claimed that his organisation was 
“tapped into the local education community” and he regarded them as an integral part of 
that landscape. Tim is well aware that it “is a priority for head teachers to find interesting 
ways of delivering their Prevent duty” and he feels his organisation is best placed to offer 
that service.  
 
For Tim, “the lynchpin” of any successful programme he runs within the school setting is his 
“contact with the local Prevent coordinators.”  They help ensure that his services are “not [a] 
duplication” of what is currently being delivered by them and other NGOs who are already 
entrenched within the LA. Much like any marketplace, Tim is trying to balance the 
placement of his product between novelty and function; he is “trying to find creative ways” 
to meet “the core premise of preventing radicalisation” delineated to him by those 
employing his organisation’s services. Essentially, Tim is using William’s access to the 
‘technologies of government’ to help him make sense of the local market forces (Dean, 
2010: 146).  
 
Tim’s reliance on the Prevent managers is not unexpected because the marketplace itself is 
constructed upon ‘quasi’, artificial practices created by the Prevent statutory duty (Dean, 
2010: 175). In essence, the Prevent manager acts as the statutory duty’s gatekeeper. They 
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turn it into a ‘programmable’ entity within the LA setting, identifying gaps in provision and 
matching NGOs to fill this need (Lemke, 2019: 149).  
 
In juxtaposition, there are NGOs that possess resources that supplant the knowledges of the 
prevent managers. Sian’s organisation has several supranational programmes that allow her 
to collect data on a much larger scale than any Prevent manager could ever hope for, even 
rivalling national government level departments such as the Home Office in their scope. Her 
ability to do so is based on the “network approach” her organisation takes when 
establishing their projects. Sian’s NGO works with a multitude of stakeholders – “youth, a 
network of mothers, of formers, of national governments, of local governments.”  She looks 
to “join the dots” between each network in order to bring “together all those actors” to 
produce programmes that have a much wider frame of reference than the governments 
employing her have access to.  Sian’s NGO equips her with the resources too “identify 
experiences, challenges, gaps in learning and aspirations for this kind of programming… 
identify priority areas” whilst also allowing her “to be independent” of the bureaucratic 
constraints imposed upon governmental departments. As a result, Sian can develop “large-
scale implementation” programmes which governments are eager to finance because they 
give them access to information beyond their own ability to obtain.  
 
One such programme, run in conjunction with Google focusing on online safety called 
“internet citizens” has given her access to 20,000 students in the UK context. The data 
collected from this programme alone has allowed her to lobby the UK government for 
legislative change. As a result, the Home Office have now ordered their Prevent managers to 
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set up cyber clinics within their LAs, getting them to focus on online safety on a much larger 
scale than they had done before Sian’s involvement. It will come as no surprise that many of 
the cyber clinics Sian has helped create are directly affiliated with her organisation, another 
stream of data and revenue placed at her disposal.  
 
Sian’s ‘Stronger Cities network’ also gives her the ability to shape the genealogy of 
government within an LA setting. She regularly tests teachers within partner cities to 
ascertain “their confidence and their ability to teach the subject matter” related to Prevent 
and feeds this information back to the Home Office, leapfrogging the Prevent managers in 
the process. She also runs large-scale data collection programmes within a partner LA in 
order to “rank” them against each other. Sian denotes that she employs “three evaluation 
points”, when assessing each LA. Firstly, she scores their “understanding of local risk”, then 
she assesses their “capabilities” to meet the challenges presented by these risks, and finally 
she assesses the “engagement” the LA has with her NGO; that is, whether they are asking 
for support that she has the capability to “match with.” This data is collated and quantified, 
with each partner LA given an overall “score.” Sian points out that she is well aware of “who 
[the] top city is, [who is] the bottom one.” When Sian was asked if she passed on this data to 
the partner LAs, she stated that some of the performance data was shared to improve 
services however the ranking system was not – this was an entirely in-house operation. 
However, Sian did provide national government agencies with an indication of 
underperforming LAs if she thought they were incapable of change at the level she deemed 
necessary without government intervention.  
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Sian’s ability to displace the expertise of the Prevent manager is largely down to the 
economic power her organisation wields – it is a multimillion-pound enterprise that 
operates on the global stage. Sian’s organisation’s pre-eminence within the “CVE world” is 
an example of how market forces have been imprinted on the legal functions of State, which 
in turn generate the functions of its security apparatus (Vatter, 2014: 163).  This ‘certain 
legal order’ makes it impossible to separate the knowledges of the State and the 
knowledges produced by the processes of economic markets (Foucault, 2008: 159). The 
neoliberal re-ordering of the security apparatus of State depicted by Sian’s organisations 
position of authority could be seen as a form of ‘juridical regression’, where the field of 
probabilities found within the biopolitical now have jurisdiction over the State’s reasoning 
(Foucault, 1979:144).  However, similarly to how the Prevent managers acts as a gatekeeper 
to the localised market for Tim and Holly, the Home Office and national level government 
departments grant access to Sian and her organisation to the national market. As the sums 
of capital have been multiplied, so too have the functionaries of pastoral power. The means 
of control are still State centric, however, the hegemony of State is now expressed as the 
‘hegemony of financial capital (Vatter, 2014: 179-180).’  
 
In sum, the surveillance practices of the State are largely disseminated through NGOs that 
populate the LA setting through economic means. This circumstance motivates the NGOs to 
reproduce the functions of State within their own practice. It gives them access to exclusive, 
specialised markets that they can shape around the devices they have at their disposal. The 
following section of this chapter will focus on the flexibility of the Prevent duty to 
accommodate the services of the third sector within its operative discourse.   
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7.3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify 
or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?      
 
For the most part, NGOs working within the scope of Prevent act as an extension of the 
State and its agents of pastoral diffusion, the Prevent managers. They too act as 
gatekeepers of knowledge, profiteering from education providers who have a statutory 
requirement to facilitate the Prevent duty (Foucault, 2014; 92). In addition, they can (and 
often do) act in an advisory role to the Prevent managers themselves from superseding the 
authority of State actors. They legitimise this practice on the pretension of expertise that is 
underpinned by neo-liberal economics; the market knows best (Lemke, 2013: 45).   
 
Pavel is a CEO of a localised NGO that works within William’s LA providing educational 
services to young people with behavioural needs created 15 years ago.  Pavel describes how 
he applied to a job advert to run a government initiative for young people to access music, 
with the post looking “for someone to come in and appropriately shut down the 
organisation” as it wasn’t reaching as many young people as it had targeted.  Pavel 
managed to convince his potential employers that he could save the initiative, which he 
turned into an independent NGO after securing funding from the same government 
departments wishing to shut the original scheme down.  
 
One of the strands of funding Pavel has recently acquired comes via the Home Office, 
specifically the Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) fund introduced by David 
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Cameron’s government in 2016. Pavel describes the BSBT community as a “closed” one. 
They often interact through “invite only” social media groups where they “share their 
successes.”  Pavel suspects that the Home Office are “scared of ethical review” and as such 
they use these closed access groups to vet material of its partner NGOs before it uses it to 
promote the BSBT programme publicly. As part of the stipulations of this funding, Pavel 
must supply the Home Office with data. This is organised through “Ipsos MORI” – an 
independent marketing and research body that operates internationally with a multibillion-
pound turnover. As part of this assessment, Pavel must assess his cohort of young people, 
asking them questions like “do you feel happy in your community, do you feel safe in your 
community.”   
 
Pavel argues that his own ingenuity saved a valuable service from being closed down; that 
his methods differ significantly from that of government and that is why he has made a 
success of the service and why they “failed badly.” Pavel believes that his service is “a lot 
more dynamic, a lot more responsive” than what the government is able to offer. However, 
much like the other respondents his actions have merely verified the pastoral functions of 
State, just in a more economically justifiable way (Foucault, 2008: 35).  Pavel and his peers 
are actors within the schema of ‘behavioural economics’, where the State populates its 
functions within pockets of ‘economic subjectivities (McMahon, 2015: 139).’  
 
Put succinctly, Pavel’s organisation, much like Ipsos MORI who have been contracted to 
evaluate his services, act as an ‘essential mechanism’ of the economic market, allowing the 
government to economise its security apparatus (Foucault, 2007: 107–108). The data 
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collected by Ipsos MORI is the Home Office’s attempt to codify the nature of statements of 
their target demographics. This is then used to assess the capabilities of Pavel’s work at 
disseminating the self-surveillance apparatus of the State (Foucault, 1982: 220). It also gives 
the Home Office an indication of emergent threats within the localised area. Once analysed, 
this information is fed back to their Prevent managers who can use it to enhance their 
‘technical efficiency’, which in turn augments their pastoral function as the expert within the 
local context (Bourdieu, 1990: 117).  Ultimately, the Home Office are “afraid of evaluation” 
because scrutiny could undermine the States ‘apparatus of power-knowledge.’ In short, the 
State wishes to be the sovereign arbiter of what is truth and what is falsehood (Foucault, 
2008: 19). If NGOs wish to profit from the State, they must accept this circumstance and 
assimilate the State’s practices within their own.  
 
Subsequently, NGOs must base their operations upon a ‘particular production of truth’ if 
they too are to be considered purveyors of truth (Read, 2009: 34). Bethany’s organisations 
core objective is “to influence PHSE quality on different levels.”  Whether it is “influencing 
the quality of PHSE in the classroom” or “writing a national guidance document,” 
recruitment of the right personnel is key to meeting this aim. Bethany only recruits people 
who “have been a PHSE lead in a school” for this reason. She is certain that the organisation 
would not be able to deliver it services within schools had they all not been “teachers 
before” because they need to “understand” the environment they are delivering in. In this 
instance, Bethany is acting identically to the Home Office when they employ their PEOs who 
almost exclusively come from a teaching background. She presumably does this for the 
same reasons, firstly to capitalise on the pastoral functions of the educational setting by 
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replicating it and secondly, to portray expertise through the pedagogical experience of 
herself and her staff. The symbolic capital afforded to her organisation through her staff’s 
qualified teacher status and PSHE expertise creates a ‘mechanical solidarity’ between the 
partner schools and Bethany’s practitioners; they speak the same language (Bourdieu, 1996: 
81).  
 
The pedagogical mechanisms that allow Bethany to permeate the school setting also extend 
to the services offered by Bethany’s NGO. In terms of Prevent, there are a series of lesson 
plans devised to be administered over short, mid and long terms – a format the school uses 
for the delivery of all its syllabuses. Bethany sees it as her role to teach educators that “it’s 
not just learning about extremism as a thing.” Her organisation provides services that 
facilitate “the personal angle” of PSHE as a mechanism to tackle extremism and she often 
replicates the rationale of the Prevent managers when discussing extremism as a concept. 
For Bethany, “understanding what leads to extremist views, and trying to build resilience to 
going down that path” is the core message of Prevent – something PSHE, and by proxy her 
organisation, are well placed to demonstrate through their programmes.  
 
In this instance, Bethany’s practices are embedded within the habitus of three separate 
entities: FBV, PSHE and the school itself. What allows her to dominate discourse within 
these habitués is that they are not easily quantifiable modes of study – like a GCSE 
qualification for example – they are open to interpretation. For a tactile entity such as the 
school, the unknown field of possibilities presented by FBV and subjects that enable it (such 
as PSHE) are problematic (Bourdieu, 1993: 184). Bethany’s organisation possesses a ‘habitus 
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attuned to the situation’ by proxy as they design the nationally recognised PSHE curriculum 
sanctioned by the DfE (Ferrare and Apple, 2015: 48). Bethany’s organisation is acting as an 
‘ascetic’ effort of the State, where Bethany’s contract with the DfE dictates that she must 
replicate the State’s ‘deontology’ – in this case taking the form of its typology of extremist 
risk – within its practices (Dean, 2010: 26).  
 
In terms of the Prevent duty, NGOs deliver the State’s deontology through two main 
mechanisms: consultation and workshops/events that are delivered directly to the student 
body. Such workshops often employ formers, ex-members of extremist groups who go and 
present their experiences to young people, presumably to guide them away from making 
the same mistakes. Sian indicates that there is a plethora of such individuals she draws upon 
when delivering programmes within her stronger cities network. When Sian was asked to 
describe the backgrounds of the typical former she may employ, Sian denoted that the 
majority came from far-right backgrounds. When pressed further on why this was the case, 
Sian proclaimed that “the far-right is probably a bit more credible for some, and a bit more 
acceptable for some schools because it’s a bit more understandable in a sense….it’s less 
taboo.” Sian also pointed out that she had used formers from “the Islamist side”, however 
they were often harder to sell to partner LAs and schools because they “are a bit more 
scared by it.”   
 
The value of formers to the Prevent agenda is obvious. They are employed as a ‘biopolitical 
strategy’ to disseminate State sanctioned normative discourse through soft disciplinary 
power (Rasmussen, 2011: 38-39). The fact that Sian and her peers take advantage of this for 
264 
 
economic gain is not unexpected. It is also not surprising that formers from Islamic 
backgrounds are viewed as “taboo” by schools. The ‘discourse of war’, in this case the war 
on terror, has shaped the Islamist as the ultimate form of social degenerate – the ‘abnormal’ 
which society must be defended from (Foucault, 2003: 300-301). This specific form of racism 
operates in the spaces between ‘the technique of power’ and the ‘technology of power’, an 
ideologically constructed biopolitical mechanism that binds society to the State’s 
technologies of government (Foucault, 2004a: 258). Sian is acutely aware of this prejudicial 
authority, even though she does not express so in as many terms. Essentially, she is just 
responding to economic realities; one will quickly go out of business if you offer services 
nobody wants.  
 
In terms of consultative services, NGOs’ interactions with their partner schools is often less 
convoluted. Emma starts any interaction with a partner school by conducting a “mini audit” 
of their current provision. This “mapping exercise” allows her to assess what targets the 
school is already meeting, “finding the gaps” she can then come in and “fill” by developing 
collaborative resources. More often than not, Emma finds that partner schools “just don’t 
realise that they’re [already] doing it” and she can show them how to evidence the work 
they already have – “make it meaningful.” One-way Emma’s organisation facilitates this 
process is through an award system that schools can buy to evidence their commitment to 
PSHE, and by proxy, FBV. The system is organised over three different levels, each at 
different price points: Bronze, Silver and Gold. Regardless of what level of award the school 
chooses to pay for, each one “has been designed in line with Ofsted’s inspection framework” 
which enables the school to evidence their commitment to their statutory duty. For Emma, 
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the allure of buying an award is that it offers the partner school with some assurance – “If 
they’ve got an award then they know that they’re definitely meeting that duty.” Emma’s 
organisation provides the school with a “portfolio” of evidence they can present to Ofsted 
on completion of the award scheme. The size and detail of this portfolio is dependent on 
how much the school is willing the pay. Many schools chose the Gold award, or the “bells 
and whistles” option Belle the pastoral lead described in chapter 6 for this very reason, to 
provide Ofsted with the best evidence base possible to ensure that they meet all the 
necessary criteria being lobbied at them. 
 
The reproduction of Prevent predominantly occurs through pre-existing bureaucratic 
channels; in the case of education it is assimilated through pastoral mechanisms. Agents of 
the State in the localised context i.e. the Prevent managers and State sanctioned NGOs 
control this dissemination by acting as gatekeepers of knowledge – purveyors of the State’s 
‘regime of truth (Foucault, 2014: 93).’  Emma’s NGO is acting as a facilitator in the 
‘standardization’ of the language of State within the school setting (Lemke, 2013: 30). Her 
awards scheme is an example of the creative responses of the economic market to the 
State’s attempt to control the discourse of extremism through enforced bureaucratisation 
(Dean, 2010; 27).  The following and final section of this chapter will look at the creative 
process of NGOs within the Prevent schema in more detail. It will focus on how such NGOs 
legitimise their activity and on how they assess their impact upon their target 
demographics.  
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7.4.  What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent 
statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they 
have? 
 
NGOs working within the Prevent landscape have varying levels of impact upon the strategy. 
How much impact they generate is directly proportional to how much access they have to 
governmental departments. NGOs garner such access by proving that they possess 
‘authoritative knowledge’ that can be utilised by State actors like the Home Office for the 
delivery of their doctrine within their associated agencies and services (Sending and 
Neumann, 2006: 659). In order to prove their credentials to State agencies and 
departments, NGOs create systems of ‘professionalism’ that align with governmental 
processes (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 104). The most successful NGOs within this arena claim 
the transformative properties of the knowledges they possess; they become agents of the 
State’s endeavour to socially engineer its populations (Latham, 2000: 33).  
  
For instance, Sian’s organisation’s primary objective is to map evidence of extremism at the 
localised level, something she describes as the “the evolving threat”, whilst trying to gauge 
“the reaction of policy-makers at both the national and local levels” so she can adapt her 
services to match their expectations. There are many opportunities for Sian’s NGO to 
employ such analytical devices within the UK setting, working on projects for departments 
such as the “national counterterrorism police, the MET, the Home Office, the Foreign Office, 
the Office of Security Counterterrorism, the Consumers and Analysis Unit.” Sian 
acknowledges that the UK government’s CVE apparatus is “very robust” however she also 
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points out that UK governmental departments can also be overconfident, even describing 
the Home Office as “arrogant about its [analytical] capabilities.” As such, Sian must design 
sophisticated research projects that go beyond the scope of the government agencies’ 
capabilities in order to convince them that her NGO possesses the knowledges to provide 
“the most accurate ways to address [CVE] issues.”  
 
This process, where Sian’s NGO is both competing and collaborating with agents of the State 
is an example of the ‘socio-political ontology’ of the State’s security apparatus being 
operated through its economic sphere (Tellmann, 2010: 287). Sian’s organisation is 
functioning as an aspect of the ‘milieu’ of ‘circulation’ that the economy demands from its 
‘dispositifs (Foucault, 2007: 21-24).’ To be precise, Sian’s NGO and others like it are creating 
new markets through its delineation of the ‘aleatory’ within the scope of CVE. This is in turn 
scaffolded by the State’s own understanding of its targeted populations which it enforces 
upon Sian through economic means, in juxtaposition to its statutory enforcement upon its 
own institutions such as education (Tellmann, 2010: 288). The industry Sian’s organisation 
inhabits has been designed by the State to create ‘ever wider circles’ of economic and 
ideological influence through the re-interpretation of its ‘technologies of power’, but only 
within the scope of the State’s ‘techniques of discipline (Foucault, 2007: 45).’ Sian’s 
organisation becomes both a producer of the State’s ontology – its fields of knowledge – 
and a facet of the economic markets that link the private and public sectors together, but 
only if she plays by the rules afforded to her by the State.        
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Another core component of Sian’s work is dedicated to coordinating the activities of her 
community networks with the requirements of her governmental employers. Sian must take 
“the doctrine of national government policy” and develop it into a more “nuanced 
approach” that she can apply at the localised level. Sian describes this process as “capacity 
building”, where she promotes “unified approaches” between the public sector and private 
enterprise to address radicalisation within the community setting – something she refers to 
as the “threat landscape.” For example, Sian’s NGO provides smaller scale products such as 
lesson plans and resources to schools that focus on the experiences of “formers”, whilst also 
administering large scale “online safety” projects in conjunction with tech giants such as 
“Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and Google” which she runs on the ground with schools and 
communities in her ‘Stronger Cities’ network. Sian sees this as an opportunity for her to 
assist the development of “new kinds of solutions for the online space to be harnessed [by] 
counter extremism” which she markets to her government department contacts.  
 
Sian sees her organisation as a mediator between government security agencies and the 
tech industry, establishing “a code of conduct” between them to meet both of their aims as 
well as hers. Several joint projects have been facilitated through Sian’s action. One such 
project took deradicalization “techniques [from the] Channel” programme and ran them 
online with Facebook. Sian coordinated State actors, Facebook’s analytical department and 
her own team to locate “individuals who are showing and expressing significant signs of 
radicalisation” with Facebook profiles and took a direct interventionist approach with them 
via an experimental Facebook outreach programme. When asked about the outcomes of 
this project Sian wasn’t keen to go into too much detail, however she did mention that the 
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“ethnographical data” collected from it had influenced several other projects moving 
forward. For instance, some of the information collated from the Facebook project had 
influenced her organisation’s work with their formers network – currently 350 individuals 
strong – helping them to create an “architecture of support” that they employ when 
recruiting former extremists from the prison setting.   
 
In this instance, Sian is attempting to influence the ‘level of reality’ of the quasi economic- 
political market presented by the Prevent duty (Foucault, 2007: 95). She cements her 
organisation in areas of service provision dichotomously. At the service delivery level Sian 
embeds resources created by her organisation within its practices – validating her 
organisation’s connection to the frontline of the Prevent duty. At the governmental level, 
Sian acts as the intermediary – the broker if you will – between the State and supranational 
technology firms who also have a vested interest within the CVE industry through their 
proximity to the social sphere. Social media giants such as Facebook and Twitter and 
technology firms that offer both communitive software and hardware such as Google and 
Microsoft offer a public service; they have become the mechanics of the social in the 
technological age. The rise of social media in the contemporary biopolitical milieu and the 
technological firms that enable it has truly economised the cultural and social development 
of society (Stäheli, 2010: 271).  
 
It is also important to note that although social media firms wish to keep their services 
secure from extremism in all its forms, they will not enact procedures of surveillance if it 
could affect their bottom line. Furthermore, direct dialogue between security agencies and 
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tech and social media firms is often difficult to achieve for State agencies. Acting as an 
intermediary, Sian has taken advantage of her entrepreneurial status, using a language that 
both parties understand – economics – to homogenise the ‘plurality of fields’ that separates 
the State from the industries that inhabit it (Stäheli, 2010: 273). In short, Sian has managed 
to transpose the workings of State surveillance within the machinations of a social media 
company such as Facebook by proxy of her organisation being more economically minded. 
This activity also generates data Sian can use to influence her service delivery for State level 
enterprise such as her “formers” network, creating a cyclic system driven by the mechanics 
of Sian’s organisation.   
 
The private enterprise of NGOs such as Sian’s allows the State to access areas of the 
biopolitical it cannot with the apparatus afforded to it through its sovereign endowment. As 
such, Sian and her contemporaries are allowed almost unfettered access to State 
institutions and agencies because they pass the ‘market test’ set by the technologies of 
government (Foucault, 2008: 246). For example, Bethany’s PSHE focused NGO works across 
two main workstreams: advocacy work and service delivery to its membership base. 
Bethany’s organisation has become the “default national programme of study of PHSE”, 
with both MPs and Ministers referring to her organisation’s curriculum in official 
documentation pertinent to PSHE and FBV. Bethany’s influence also extends to 
governmental departments. Her NGO has worked on several projects for the National 
Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), producing “teaching materials” to run 
alongside its “run hide and tell” CVE programme that is facilitated by PEOs in schools, even 
helping to produce a film that runs alongside the programme. The NaCTSO, in conjunction 
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with the Home Office has also commissioned Bethany’s NGO to produce a handbook for 
schools and police officers to promote “best practice in police working in the classroom on 
PHSE.”  
 
Bethany’s organisation’s position as the voice of PSHE within the national context is an 
example of the State self-imposing a ‘limitation of governmental reason’ upon its own 
practices (Foucault, 2008: 13). This circumstance has manifested for several reasons; 
however it has chiefly arisen because the State has rescinded funding to many of its 
auxiliary functions within its agencies of government. In terms of education, non-assessed 
curriculums, of which PSHE is one, have taken the brunt of such funding cuts. As such, 
agencies tasked with implementing PSHE have had to look for services that can provide 
them with adequate support beyond government. Bethany’s NGO has taken advantage of 
this circumstance. They have replicated the methods of government – its taxonomy – and in 
doing so they have embedded themselves within the State’s institutional structures. They 
have incentivised the uptake of their PSHE curriculum above that of their competitors by 
adopting a theoretical rationale in line with the State’s expectations- “helping young people 
to apply their learning … to be a positive member of their community.” In short, Bethany’s 
PSHE curriculum has communicated its ethos as the ‘maximization’ of individual 
responsibility for one’s own prosperity – a core component of liberal governmentality – to 
State agencies such as the DfE which has allowed them to embed themselves within the 
fabric of educational practice (Bröckling, 2010, 262).   
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However, the flexibility of economic markets dictate that the confidence Bethany enjoys 
with the State is not guaranteed indefinitely. To maintain her NGO’s influence at the 
national government level, a fair amount of Bethany’s time is taken up with her “policy and 
campaigning work” which involves her lobbying governmental departments on the 
importance of PSHE and its benefit to FBV and the Prevent duty – “to keep the message” of 
her NGO relevant to her primary audiences. In order to do this effectively Bethany must 
foster a strong membership base within the educational setting. There are currently “4000 
plus paid memberships”, equating to “12,000 people” which her organisation provides a 
direct service to, with another “20,000” people operating within the wider networks of the 
NGO. Most of the membership base are “PHSE leads in schools”; however, there is a 
lucrative market within the private sector. Bethany’s NGO has run projects for high profile 
organisations such as “the Premier League, Siemens, Google”, providing “teaching 
resources…. or quality assuring teaching resources that they’re [already] producing.” For 
example, Bethany worked on a project for the Premier League where she produced and 
quality assured PSHE resources for their “Premier League Allstars” programme that, 
amongst other things, focuses on promoting FBV within the primary schools setting. 
Bethany has also worked with Google in conjunction with Sian’s NGO regarding online 
safety. Google already had CVE focused materials they had produced and rolled out within 
the school system in the US and employed Bethany’s NGO to “adapt [them] for the UK 
market and the UK curriculum.”  
 
In this instance, Bethany’s NGO is acting as an agent of cultural transmission, synchronising 
the capabilities of organisations such as the Premier League and Google with the 
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pedagogical apparatus adopted by the UK education system (Grenfell and James, 1998: 11). 
Specifically, Bethany is tasked with translating the symbolic capital of the partner 
organisations employing her services into the ‘structured structure’ of the educational 
setting (Bourdieu, 1971: 1255). Bethany must adopt ‘reflexive objectivity’ when acting in 
this way, taking the ‘objective structure’ of the an organisation such as the Premier League –
which has no tangible business operating within the sphere of PSHE and by proxy CVE – and 
applying it within its desired context (Bourdieu, 1984: 252). In truth this is an entirely 
subjective endeavour. Bethany is tasked with creating a ‘doxa’ or a ‘self-evident’ connection 
between the ‘habitus’ of education and the actors employing her to embed them within it 
(Bourdieu, 2013: 164). Ultimately, the primary driver of Bethany’s activity and the entities 
employing her is an economic one. The educational setting is a market of consumers much 
like any other, but it is a restricted one. Bethany’s “quality assurance” is effectively a 
certification that organisations such as Google and the Premier League can use to gain 
access to these markets, to become a voice in the ‘discursive networks’ of the educational 
space by embedding themselves within its ‘pedagogic discourse (MacDonald and Hunter, 
2019: 293-294).’  
 
Further examples of economies of scale dictating the ‘rules of formation’ within the Prevent 
landscape are not uncommon (Foucault, 2002: 37-38). In terms of delivery, the level of 
interaction and impact Emma’s NGO has at the localised level is determined by the amount 
of funding each partner LA has at its disposal. For instance, in Julian’s LA where there is a 
“large pot of money”, Emma has run “60 workshops in 28 schools” in the last academic year. 
This is likely to increase considerably in the second phase, where Emma will be given more 
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money to “spread” her programme out across the LA and “go to new schools” as well as 
continue the programme she has initiated in schools already running the programme. In 
terms of delivery, Emma will “deliver to one full year group at each school” with around 
“eight workshops” run over a two-year cycle. In LAs with less funding, Emma’s programme 
of delivery must be adapted and become more targeted in its approach. In Brian’s LA which 
has marginally less funding than Julian’s, Emma has run “37 workshops in 19 schools” in the 
first phase of her programmes roll out. Emma has had to work closely with Brian to budget 
accordingly, with the “majority of the work” being conducted in primary schools because 
their unit price is cheaper than secondary schools.  
 
Even though Emma denotes that there is an overall preference set by the Home office for 
work to be principally conducted in secondary schools, Brian is forced to employ Emma’s 
services predominantly in the primary setting to get the best coverage. Quantity is preferred 
over perceived quality in this instance. Effectively, Emma’s service provision is being 
determined by a ‘transactional ontology’ that supplants the government’s own delineation 
of best practice (Kiersey, 2010: 63). Evidently, the value of the services offered by Emma are 
being determined by ‘economic truths’ that minimise the influence of the State and 
strengthen the enterprise offered by Emma’s organisation (Foucault, 2008: 320). The 
‘regime of truth’ deposited upon the LA’s employing Emma’s services place frugality above 
that of any other priority. The security of its markets supersede the security of its citizens by 
the State’s own metrics (Foucault, 2008: 28).  
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The biopolitical imperative presented by Prevent and its CVE focus being superseded by 
measures of ‘economic performance’ does however, create a paradox (Toplišek, 2019: 66-
67). This ‘crisis in governmentality’ is central to Foucault’s (2008: 68) analysis of the 
neoliberal order and its effects on the affairs of the State, particularly matters of security 
such as those presented by the threat of extremism and terrorism. This chapter has 
described how private enterprise has merged with the State through social enterprise – 
both mimicking and developing State practices primarily through economic means. In the 
following and last analysis chapter, the responses of the primary objects of the securitised 
gaze of State agencies and the NGOs discussed in this chapter — community groups and 
advocates that fall within the Prevent duty’s target demographics – will be analysed.  
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Chapter 8. Target communities: Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Community 
Advocates. 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville (2004: 805), one of the preeminent forefathers of the contemporary 
social sciences warned of the governmentalisation of religion in his seminal work, 
Democracy in America in 1835. During his sociological study of America in the early 19th 
century he observed how Christianity had all been absorbed by the State; clergyman now 
worked for salaries, the property of the church was now the property of the government 
and clergymen now acted as the ‘functionaries’ of the State within communities beyond its 
capacity to reach. 
 
This process, the facsimile of the State’s functions upon religious institutions, has been 
facilitated by the structuration of State around that of the hierarchy of the church, a form of 
pastoral power itself (Foucault, 1988a: 71). Tocqueville’s observations can still be observed 
in the contemporary context across many sections of society. However, their interpretative 
value for the praxis of Prevent is worthy of note. Prevent coordinators actively seek out 
community groups and leaders and propose partnership working programmes. They 
incentivise this collaboration by providing spaces for the groups to use, by offering 
resources and sources of funding which can only be accessed by showing that they are 
fostering FBV and actively combating extremism within their communities. In effect, Prevent 
is disseminating its preferred form of pastoral power to members of its target demographics 
who possess superior access to the community as a whole by taking advantage of their 
often-fragile economic circumstances.  
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To be precise, Prevent and its statutory duty is an apparatus of the State’s ‘technology of 
discipline (Lemke, 2019: 68).’ Such technologies are predominantly purposed to target 
‘bodies’ that lie outside the normative structure with the aim of making them ‘docile’ and 
productive (Lemke, 2019: 69). Its purpose is to heighten an individual’s or group’s economic 
potential whilst simultaneously limiting their political agency and will to contest the 
prevailing ideology of governance. It is not happenstance that the communities targeted by 
Prevent also happen to be traditionally economically deprived within the UK context, even 
though poverty is not one of its indicators of vulnerability. The reasoning is twofold: 
vulnerable communities act as an emergent market, untapped by existing industries and 
secondly, like many normative based subjects of discipline they often exist on the periphery 
of the rule of law (Foucault, 1977: 222-223).     
 
Thus far, this thesis has examined how Prevent managers deliver the Prevent agenda 
throughout the community setting. Primarily they do so pastorally using State institutions 
such as education to disseminate surveillance practices through the safeguarding agendas of 
schools. The responses of DSLs and pastoral leads have highlighted that the delivery of FBVs 
mostly take the form of PSHE and RE lessons, and alongside their Prevent manager 
counterparts, schools often employ the services of third sector NGOs to facilitate this task. 
NGOs with a CVE focus also offer expertise and training that is assimilated by LA agencies 
within their own practice, with the Home Office acting as gatekeeper of their activity in the 
main. In the fourth and final analysis chapter, the responses of Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) and community advocates will be analysed. They offer a perspective of 
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the subjects of Prevent’s securitised gaze, its target demographics. Their responses highlight 
the tools Prevent has at its disposal to navigate the terrain of its ‘dispersed populations’ and 
why they often fall short of meeting the needs of those it targets (Rasmussen, 2011: 42). 
The analysis is structured around the individual research questions found on page 40.  
 
The cohort for this chapter reveals the perspectives of community members and 
organisations targeted by the Prevent statutory duty. Pseudonyms will be used to ensure 
the anonymity of all the participants throughout the analysis. A brief description of each 
participant that appears within this chapter can be found below:       
 
The Cohort:  
 
Madiha – is co-founder and head of research at an Islamic advocacy CBO that operates both 
internationally and nationally, a position she has held for 23 years. The CBO holds 
consultative status with the UN department of Economic and Social Affairs. She is of South 
Asian British descent and in her mid-40s.  
 
Shaheen – is co-founder and chair of the same Islamic advocacy CBO as Madiha, a position 
he has also held for 23 years. He is of Iranian descent and in his early 60s.  
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Ullah – is a senior INGO specialist working within the Islamic aid sector, as well as a Muslim 
chaplain for a university on the south east coast of England. He chairs several CBOs within 
the UK and international context and holds a PhD in finance, with professional expertise in 
Zakat (Islamic social finance). He is in his mid-30s and of Bengali British descent.  
 
Altair – is a Syrian refugee and former asylum seeker who has been volunteering for a 
migrant charity operating within London for the last 5 years. He acts as a mentor for new 
asylum seekers and helps the organisation with its advocacy work, taking part in several 
media initiatives as well as collaborative work with LAs. He is in his mid-30s.  
 
Valentina – is the Mentoring and Volunteering Coordinator for the charity Altair volunteers 
for. Part of her role is to coordinate educational programmes for new migrants which 
requires her to work closely with LA agencies. She has held this position for 7 years, with a 
professional background in social work. Valentina is of Italian descent and in her mid-40s.  
 
Keyvan – is the founder and chair of a CBO that caters to migrants from Iran and 
Afghanistan that has been operating for over 30 years. The organisation offers programmes 
of education to 20,000 migrants annually on issues such as citizenship, health, welfare, 
immigration, culture, and arts. The organisation is partly funded by the government. He is of 
Iranian descent and in his early-60s.  
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Choti – is a prominent member of the Muslim community within a tier 2 level LA on the 
south east coast, which she also works for as a health development officer. She helps 
coordinate several annual community events designed to develop community cohesion. She 
is in her early-40s and of British – Bengali descent.  
 
Rusha – is a prominent member of the Muslim community within a tier 2 level LA on the 
south east coast. She has worked for social care as a community development coordinator 
for the last 15 years but has also worked within the community both for statutory and 
voluntary organisations for the last 25 years. Rusha has coordinated several large-scale 
community development projects within her LA and often acts in an advocacy capacity for 
disenfranchised communities. She is of Bengali British descent and is in her late-40s.  
 
Salih – is an Islamic scholar and activist that has worked on deradicalization programmes for 
the Home Office, as well as running his own Islamic education CBO that operates nationally. 
In juxtaposition, he has also been the subject of surveillance and legal disputes with UK 
security agencies. He is of Egyptian descent and in his mid-50s.     
 
The first section of this chapter will focus on how the Prevent programme ideologically 
locates itself within the community setting and how that relates to its target demographics 
on the ground. Furthermore, it will concentrate on how CBOs and community advocates 
adapt their own ideological predispositions considering the pressures put upon them by 
Prevent – the hostile environment of which it is a component – and its agents of diffusion.   
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8.1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors 
control its production of knowledge?  
 
Bio-politics has become the primary concern of government. The concerns or risks to society 
are both numerous beyond measure and entropic by nature (Dean, 2010: 118-119). To 
make sense of this reality, populations are organised into subgroups by those who wish to 
control them, groups that are considered to contribute to the welfare of society and those 
that are deemed to enervate it. The majority of communities deemed detrimental to society 
are its most vulnerable, particularly ethnic minorities within the western context (Dean, 
2010: 119). The growth of the economy as the primary focus of the State has encouraged its 
institutions to communicate its processes statistically, translating the actions of the 
populations they supposedly serve into numerical values. The subjection of communities to 
a process by numbers has formed political action that is designed to be devoid of moral 
consequence. However, an unintended consequence of the neo-liberal order dictates that 
vulnerable communities still hold an economic value of their own, which CVE initiatives such 
as Prevent and those that facilitate them, both from the public and private sphere, aim to 
exploit (Dean, 2010: 138).      
 
The way community groups and individuals react to the social, political and economic 
realities created by Prevent is directly proportionate to the level of critical engagement each 
party has with CVE more generally. For Madiha, co-founder of an Islamic advocacy CBO that 
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operates internationally but primarily within the UK (within the LAs of both Brian and Julian 
in the context of this study) Prevent is driven by deeply rooted, historical contexts. During 
our conversation, she provides a detailed account of how this discourse has been 
manipulated by the bureaucratic arm of the State. She acknowledges that 9/11 was a 
seminal moment in the contemporary context, however, Mahida stipulates that Prevent is a 
natural progression of the UK’s colonial security apparatus, “bringing to the mainland” 
practices it has historically implemented across the commonwealth, facilitated by a 
perfunctory “majoritarian nationalism.” For Mahida, Prevent acts as a “coercive 
mechanism” of the State’s ‘dispositifs’ that have become “industrialised”, a “conveyor belt” 
of State security doctrine (Foucault, 2001: 222). At this point in the interview Mahida 
highlights Paddy Hillyard’s (1993: 5-6) work on ‘suspect communities’ within the Northern 
Irish context to illustrate her point, where Hillyard describes the demonization of 
disenfranchised Republican communities that deviate from the socio- cultural expectations 
put upon them by the UK government. 
 
 Essentially, Mahida see’s Hillyard’s observations as directly transposable to the 
“demonization of Muslims” seen in the contemporary context. She believes that State 
sanctioned “Islamophobia” is entrenched within wider society by legal practices such as the 
Prevent duty, mechanised by a refreshed “third tier in the legal system” that deposits the 
Islamic communities of Britain directly within its “anti-terror gaze.” Mahida is also quick to 
point out that from a community perspective, the Prevent duty is “very hard to resist” 
because of the “penalties that are involved” for those that attempt to do so.  
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The force that Mahida is describing which makes Prevent unassailable to its targets within 
the Muslim community is the State’s ‘parresia’, the enforcement of its ideology, its ‘virtue’ 
that allows it to dominant every aspect of its citizens’ lives (Foucault, 2014: 43). This mode 
of governance is hierarchal by nature. It has been designed to highlight the functions of the 
State’s power above the capabilities of those it aims to control. This hierarchy cascades 
throughout the biopolitical sphere, creating pockets of power as it does so. The nature of 
this form of power, its ‘essential technique’, dictates that in order to direct the behaviour of 
populations, the individuals that construct them must be able to locate themselves within 
the field of the ‘other (Foucault, 2014: 44).’ This is enforced upon the would-be citizen 
through the actions of the ‘collective subjects’ of biopower, which is both incentivised and 
made operational through the auxiliary functions of the State (Foucault, 1977: 31-33). Each 
individual must locate themselves by their proximity to the other because of the biopolitical 
will of the majority, who’s collective identity is shepherded by the State. In short, the 
credulity of the majority dictates the permitted creed of those that fall outside it. 
 
For example, Rusha, a community development officer for Peter’s LA and prominent 
member of the Muslim community highlights the importance of obtaining citizenship for 
migrant community members in order to access basic facilities such as health care and 
housing. To begin with, migrants must complete several “English Speakers of Other 
Language tests” to get an interview with the Home Office to start the procedure of 
obtaining British citizenship. Prospective British citizens must then complete the citizenship 
test. The tests themselves consist of multiple-choice questions, focusing on topics that 
pertain to “British culture… when was the Second World War, when was the First World 
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War, how many people died etc.”  Rusha also points out that this procedure has many added 
financial barriers, with many people having to “find a way” to access them but with many 
others “not able to because the cost is really high.” During our conversation, Rusha starts to 
talk about her sister in law’s experience of the citizenship test. Rusha’s sister in law was 
required to “religiously” study the materials supplied by the Home Office – an added cost 
for the would-be citizen that must buy them, either electronically from the Home Office 
directly or via outlets such as WHSmith for a physical copy. Of particular interest was 
Rusha’s description of the citizenship graduation process –  “you go to the ceremony to get 
your certificate to say that you’re now a British citizen and you sing the national anthem…so 
they know the national anthem by heart.”   
 
The verification of Britishness bestowed upon an individual who performs the functions of 
the citizenship test is an example of the ‘internal racism’ that allows the State to function 
(Foucault, 2004b: 216). It illustrates the internal struggle, the ‘ongoing war beneath a 
situation of peace’ the State must endure in the process of its self-determination, an 
endeavour that never ends (Rasmussen, 2011: 39). Fundamentality, the citizenship tests 
have been designed by the State to define who belongs within its ideological borders, and 
who belongs ‘le dehors’ - its outside (Foucault, 2004a:112-116). This ‘macro-level’ conflict, a 
battle between the sovereign and its populations for determination over what is an ‘worthy 
and un-worthy life’ is central to the State’s capacity to exert its pastoral functions 
(Rasmussen, 2011: 40-41). Of equal importance is the method of determination exerted by 
government; it utilises the educational field to offer verification. The graduation ceremony 
Rusha’s sister in law attended where she sang the national anthem, the formal tests she had 
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to complete in order to be there, are all examples of the reproduction of the State’s cultural 
and symbolic  capital through the’ pedagogic action’ of education (Bourdieu and Passeron, 
1990: 5). The ‘symbolic strength of the pedagogic agency’ allows the State to garner the 
compliance of Rusha’s sister in law and the many others who also attempt the citizenship 
test year on year, even paying for the privilege (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 9).   
 
For Valentina, a mentoring and volunteer coordinator for a refugee and migrant charity 
operating in London within the LAs of Brian and Julian, the citizenship tests described by 
Rusha are part of a wider shift of government policy that is designed to increase the 
“polarisation of how people behave and how they see people.”  Valentina believes the 
Prevent duty has been designed to “maintain certain stereotypes and certain ways of 
working and certain division in society” that enable government to impose its will, using 
“people’s ignorance” to negate any resistance to it.  Although Valentina believes this 
discourse to be almost “embedded everywhere”, she highlights the “education system” as its 
primary locus – where “language is being used to create more hate, there’s a lot [of that] 
happening in schools.”   
 
When Valentina was asked why she thought this was the case, her belief was that it was 
primarily economically motivated. Valentina believes that “spending money” on Prevent 
rather than “leaving the money where it should have been in the community” is ultimately 
more cost effective for the State. Valentina highlights that there have been widespread 
“cuts across all the young people’s programmes, they have a huge impact on issues that are 
related to mental health, wellbeing, community integration” that are the most significant 
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outliers to tackling extremism within vulnerable communities. For Valentina, Prevent has 
been designed to paper over the cracks left in the wake of austerity measures, to hide 
“human beings behind paperwork… ticking boxes.”  
 
The biopolitical realities of the landscapes Prevent must inhabit dictate that moralistic lines 
will inevitably be crossed by its agents. The bureaucratic processes described by Valentina – 
the box ticking – have been designed by the State to distance the processes of government 
from the morality of its effects. In this instance, Prevent is acting as the currency of the 
‘economy of power’ Valentina and her counterparts are legally required to populate 
(Foucault, 2007: 108-110). Although Valentina may well find the moral ambiguity of Prevent 
– its “ignorance” – distasteful, she is left with little choice but to mimic its processes in her 
own practices. Prevent is effectively a manifestation of the ‘essential mechanism’ of power 
she must interact with to meet the needs of her charges (Foucault, 2007: 107). Valentina’s 
compliance is further assured by the economic realities of austerity measures that have cut 
service provision in her sector. Although on the face of things such measures have 
developed a ‘state-phobia’ within Valentina’s thinking, the involvement of the free market 
(of which Valentina’s charity is a component) has created a situation where she must focus 
on her own productivity, her own responsibility to perform supplants her conceptions of the 
State’s performance (Foucault, 2008: 75-76).   
 
Ultimately, Valentina and her organisation are a product of the State opening its functions 
to the free market, which it has done by rescinding its agencies that develop similar services. 
Indeed, Valentina's employment with her organisation came about because her job with 
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social services, where she worked with migrant communities, was cut short due to austerity 
measures. Valentia much prefers the freedom her role at the migrant charity gives her now. 
Although she thinks the government were wrong to impose the cuts to the provision in 
social services where she was previously employed, she would not go back to work for the 
service, she doesn’t “want to work in that kind of role again because I can’t see myself 
supporting people in that way.” The freedom offered to Valentina is effectively a condition 
of the fragilities of programmes such as Prevent which proscribe community organisations 
to fill in those gaps. Valentina has been given funding for several small-scale education-
based projects by the Home Office in conjunction with Prevent, with budgets in the tens of 
thousands. Although they give her a level of autonomy, they are “asking for quite a lot…for 
the amount of work they want, but also for the kind of information they want and what they 
want to see that has been achieved.” In short, Valentina’s autonomy comes at a price; the 
‘shadow of the sovereign’ still looms large over everything she does (Dean, 2013: 67).  
  
The genealogy of government practice that has been applied to Valentina’s interaction with 
the Prevent landscape, where she is unable to fully resist its moral implications, is a stark 
one. The didactics of Prevent’s ideological position is equally austere. Shaheen, co-founder 
of the same Islamic advocacy organisation as Mahida, identifies Prevent’s focus on “non-
violent extremism” as a core problematic because it forces those using it to operate in a pre-
criminal space. For Shaheen, this circumstance is a process of “social engineering” that 
targets communities who are doing “nothing illegal” but who fall outside the State’s basic 
ideologies. He believes Prevent has been designed to subdue problem communities - to 
“stop them even thinking” about the injustices carried out upon their communities by the 
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State. As the interview progresses, Shaheen illustrates his point by noting the “double 
standards” employed by the British intelligence services, where they have been “involved in 
the promotion of certain lines of extremism in Syria” whilst many individuals within the UK 
Muslim community “are being demonised and criminalised when they’re not doing anything 
criminal.” Shaheen believes the British Muslim community will never fully accept the 
narratives claimed by Prevent “when our institutions and establishments are involved in 
exactly the criminality” they are accusing British Muslims of.  
 
Effectively, Shaheen is describing a facet of Prevent that has criminalised critical political 
engagement from an Islamic perspective. It is part of a wider partisan narrative that accuses 
Muslim communities of being ‘captive to ideology’ when it is easily argued that the 
processes driving Prevent are guilty of it to a greater degree (Lewis and Hamid, 2018: 106 -
107). A pre-criminal space is created, based upon ideology that posits British Muslims as an 
‘unprecedented security threat’,  whilst the State simultaneously manufactures the 
conditions that prescribe this narrative where they did not exist prior to their action (Lewis 
and Hamid, 2018: 108). This production of risk is designed to produce ‘states of exception’ 
which enable the security apparatus of the State to navigate the spaces between the 
perceived moral integrity of ‘democracy and absolutism (Agamben, 2005: 2-3).’ In essence, 
the sovereignty that the State must exert to safeguard itself is in juxtaposition with the 
totality of democracy; ‘all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others’ 
after all (Orwell, 1945: 75). The State creates programmes of security such as Prevent to 
enable this discourse, the construction of its ‘states of exception’ in order to manufacture its 
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biopolitical borders – to decide who belongs within them and who does not (Dean, 2007: 
167).   
 
The ideological factors of the Prevent duty which are presented at the community level are 
particularly precarious for British Muslims. Prevent is largely imposed upon CBOs and 
advocates active within their communities through legal channels and enforced through 
economic incentives. In the following section of this chapter, the actual methods of 
Prevent’s surveillance apparatus will be examined in more detail, with specific focus placed 
upon the agency of its target communities within this practice.  
 
 
8.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; 
how is it reproduced?  
 
Vulnerable or targeted populations most successfully interact with the bureaucratic 
mechanisms of the State through the medium of performance indicators. In short, the more 
they mimic the actions of the State and the free market the more autonomy they enjoy 
(Dean, 2010: 198-199). In terms of Prevent, community groups that can display an ability to 
quantify the needs of the communities they purport to speak for often get the most 
funding. Funding does come with a caveat however, one that insists that technologies of 
agency are employed to turn communities at risk into ‘active citizens (Dean: 2010: 199).’  In 
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such instances, the responsibility of State agencies is then effectively passed onto private 
enterprise in the form of community and interest groups (Dean, 2010: 202-203).    
 
For example, Keyvan, the founder of a CBO operating within the LAs of Brian and Julian that 
caters for Iranian, Kurdish and Afghani migrants indicates that Prevent “met [the] 
objectives” of much of the work his CBO was already doing with his stakeholders. Keyvan 
details the primary focus of his CBO’s workstreams, to help “the community to integrate into 
British society” by offering educational programmes that focus on language skills, “helping 
with CVs, jobs and [running] group cultural activities.”  When Keyvan was asked why he 
thought Prevent was relevant to this type of work, he thought it pertinent to point out that 
most of his stakeholders belong to the “Muslim community.” In this instance, Keyvan is 
replicating the State’s ontology of radicalisation where Islam in all its forms is effectively an 
early warning sign for extremism (Kundnani, 2014: 51-52). Furthermore, it appears that 
Keyvan is reproducing one of the flaws in Prevent’s conception of the radicalisation process; 
it fails to make a distinction between ‘cognitive’ thought processes that may or not be 
attributed to a vulnerability to extremism and actual instances of ‘behavioural’ participation 
in extremist discourse (Gabon, 2016: 18). When Keyvan was asked if he saw many instances 
of actual extremism within his stakeholder communities, he proclaimed that ”we haven’t 
had this issue, there have been a few cases [where] we have had to talk to people, but 
fortunately we spend most of our time educating people and families about citizenship, 
improving their understanding about extremism.” Despite this reality, Keyvan remains 
adamant that his collaboration with Prevent is a necessary one.  
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Keyvan believes that his interaction with Prevent managers, such as Brian, allows him to 
keep abreast of extremism – being “more aware on a daily basis” of what he considers to be 
a threat to his community – allowing him to “help other groups and collectively raise 
awareness about extremism and prevent it…. also educate the community about extremism 
issues and citizenship issues.” In practice, Keyvan’s engagement with Prevent managers 
happens on a very regular basis, either by keeping “in touch” via email with the Prevent 
managers about “community issues” where they offer support and guidance or via regular 
networking events. One such event is held monthly, called the “Prevent advisory group” – a 
network of CBOs working within the targeted demographics of the duty, with meetings led 
by Prevent managers. Keyvan describes these meetings as a “good opportunity for 
networking, signposting, sharing information and best practice.” The content of each of 
these meetings can vary greatly. However, there is a strong emphasis on training activities 
pertinent to Prevent, with “People coming in to train us with regards to preventative 
measures that we have to learn.”   
 
In addition to this activity, Brian the Prevent manager has assisted Keyvan in obtaining 
funding from the BSBT fund supplied by the Home Office to CBOs that are proven to be 
tackling extremism within their stakeholder communities. Keyvan is very grateful for this 
help – “otherwise small community groups” like his “don’t have sufficient capacity” to offer 
simple services – even “hiring rooms for activities” can be a huge stumbling block which 
Brian and his counterparts can (and do) help facilitate. Brian regularly assists Keyvan “to 
apply for funding for workshops, for courses, for activities that engages the community.” 
There is one caveat however, these activities must have “the aim of increasing awareness 
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about preventing extremism... the aim of promoting British values” as a core component of 
their design. The funding itself is supplied on a case-by-case basis, with every activity being 
vetted before funds are released by the Home Office. Keyvan makes the point that “you 
don’t get money for everything” and it is expected that his organisation “contribute in kind 
to the [BSBT] project” by suppling data and promotional materials that the Prevent 
managers can use to show that they are meeting their own targets. For Keyvan, the main 
benefit of his engagement with Prevent is that “it increases the social capital” of his 
organisation and by proxy his stakeholders, whom he describes as “vulnerable”, because “it 
improves trust” relations between them and the authorities.  
 
Keyvan’s interaction with Brian his Prevent manager is an example of how the State takes 
advantage of the economic circumstances created by the neoliberal order, where 
community groups are struggling to obtain resources and those on offer from its subsidiary 
mechanisms such as the Prevent duty become a lucrative revenue stream. In short, 
economic transactions become social contracts (Foucault, 2008: 246). Often this interaction 
starts innocuously, however once the duty becomes rooted within the CBO’s framework it 
steers the organisation’s activities to match its own needs to the point that they are no 
longer distinguishable from one another (Lemke, 2019: 259). This ‘transactional reality’ is 
difficult for CBOs such as Keyvan’s to refuse. Not only does it offer resources directly, it aids 
them in legitimising the organisation to the wider socio-economic landscape, a seal of 
approval if you will (Foucault, 2008: 307). Perhaps not surprisingly, Keyvan is very aware of 
how raising his “social capital” equally raises his ‘economic capital (Fine, 2010: 37).’ This 
practice is aided by a process of ‘autodidacticism’, where Brian the Prevent manager 
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diffuses his expertise to Keyvan via training, which he then replicates within his CBO’s 
educational programmes (Bourdieu, 1984: 328). The ‘aesthetic disposition’ of Brian as the 
expert allows him to embed the State sanctioned ideology within the services of Keyvan’s 
CBO through the medium of the educational field (Bourdieu, 1984: 329). Subsequently, 
Brian, by proxy of his denomination as the gatekeeper of Prevent and the funding at its 
disposal, uses his ‘symbolic power’ to entice Keyvan’s compliance (Bourdieu, 2013: 165-
166).    
 
Although the agents of Prevent have many tools at their disposal that they use to facilitate 
their pastoral functions within the community setting, such tools are not always as 
performative as they would like. Ullah, a Muslim Chaplin for a university on the south coast 
and chair of several Islamic CBOs that operate within all the LAs of the Prevent managers 
that appear in this study, describes how the trust between Prevent managers and the 
Muslim community is fraught. Ullah is disappointed by the calibre of Prevent managers he 
has had to work with – they do not “understand the community.”  As a result, they “miss out 
a lot of marginalised and vulnerable community members that need the support” in the LA 
because “they don’t have trust in the community” and spend all their efforts – and funds –  
on surveillance. During our discussion Ullah gives several examples of this in action. In one 
case, Ullah was working for a “Muslim youth helpline” that received Prevent funding 
through the BSBT network. He details how the helpline had to deal with some serious issues 
affecting the Muslim community – “rape, paedophilia, grooming, forced marriages.” Ullah 
implies that these issues were not being effectively tackled because a considerable amount 
of time was spent gathering information that was not relevant to his stakeholder’s 
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circumstances. Instead, Ullah and his fellow charity workers were forced to scope his 
stakeholders, “to see if they’re extremists or terrorists” and dependent on if they met the 
criteria set by their Prevent funders, having to “refer them” to the authorities.  
 
In this example, Ullah’s stakeholders have been targeted by Prevent because their 
vulnerable status has marked them as ‘uncertain’ entities – the ‘aleatory’ aspects of society 
the State must understand in order to ‘manipulate the circulation’ of ideology within the 
biopolitical (Dillon, 2007: 46). The surveillance practices that Ullah has been made to 
implement by proxy of Prevent is designed to secure the ‘mobilities’ of those that follow the 
ideologies of State by limiting the mobility of those that do not (Aradau and Blanke, 2010: 
45). Subsequently, Ullah has been coerced by the State into managing the circulation of 
biopower within the scope of the ‘imagined movement’ of individuals and populations that 
may not adhere to the State sanctioned ideology because it appears that it does not benefit 
them (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 208). This reality is not lost on Ullah and this experience has 
affected his interaction with Prevent from then on – “the very nature of Prevent [is] to single 
out the Muslim community… that’s a very slippery slope. The government has created 
[extremism] by doing this.”  
   
Part of Ullah’s role as Muslim Chaplin is to facilitate his students’ ability to practice their 
faith within a community setting. A young group of Muslims asked for his help setting up a 
prayer group where they wanted to hire a hall and bring in an Islamic scholar to help them 
study the verses of the Quran. Peter, the Prevent coordinator for the LA in which Ullah is 
located subverted this activity. Ullah could not understand why, after all, “there was nothing 
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problematic being discussed.”  What Ullah believes however, is that his community is 
viewed problematically. He wonders what the actual thought process Peter is employing 
when he disrupts the prayer group  – “unless you’re claiming the Quran itself is problematic, 
unless you’re claiming that Islam is problematic, unless you’re saying the whole Muslim 
community’s problematic.” For Ullah, his community is forced to exist in an environment 
where they are viewed as “guilty until proven innocent” – an assertion that is difficult to 
argue with.  
 
Ullah goes on to describe just “how disruptive Prevent has been” for CBOs when they 
organise community events, where “Prevent officers will do their hardest to try and disrupt” 
anything that has not first received their seal of approval, no matter how innocuous their 
subject matter. A common tactic Prevent mangers employ is to put pressure on venues to 
cancel bookings but “not to cancel it well in advance, but to cancel the day before.” This 
causes “disarray” and panic for the organisers, they lose money from catering expenses and 
all the other hidden costs associated with running a community event. This loss is hard to 
bear – all these organisations operate on tight budgets, something Prevent wishes to 
exploit.  
 
The agents of the disruptive forces of Prevent, in this case Peter the Prevent coordinator, 
dislocate the target bodies from their resources with the aim of interrupting their means of 
commutative circulation. They do so as a pre-emptive action to ensure that their message is 
heard the loudest – they make themselves responsible for ‘maximising the good circulation 
by eliminating the bad (Foucault, 2007: 18).’ Peter’s disruptive behaviours are an example of 
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the ‘inflationary critical value’ of the State’s ideology that its security apparatus require in 
order to function (Foucault, 2008: 187). The subversion of the State’s intervention, where 
Peter acts to undermine community events indirectly through removal of resources is an 
attempt to ‘free relations of power’ from the object of what it wishes to control (Foucault, 
2007: 117). The “disarray” the last-minute cancellations cause limits the scope of the 
organisers to fight back against Peter’s actions. Firstly, because they have more pressing 
concerns to contend with in terms of funds and secondly, Peter can share the responsibility 
of the cancellation with the event organisers, absolving him to some degree. In sum, Peter 
creates a cycle of ‘problematization’ that shifts the focus away from State practices towards 
the ‘emergence of new problems’ of which he is the architect (Voelkner, 2010: 142). 
Perhaps the most pertinent observation to be made here is that if community organisations 
wish to avoid barriers to organising events they must consult more closely with Peter and 
his fellow Prevent managers.  
 
 Part of this consultation will involve the implementation of Prevent’s surveillance apparatus 
within the organisation’s services. For instance, Altair, a Syrian refugee and former asylum 
seeker who volunteers for Valentina’s migrant charity as a mentor – a programme he was a 
mentee for when first entering the country – describes how there is a “special screening” 
process employed by LAs when a refugee enters their care. He describes how upon arriving 
in this country it was “always clear” the authorities were “really cautious about refugees, 
especially from Islamic countries.”  When Altair started working as a volunteer for 
Valentina’s organisation after the gruelling asylum process was complete and he was 
granted indefinite leave to stay in the UK, he attended a meeting with Brian the PEO who 
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trained him and the other new volunteers on his duty to Prevent. He explains how Brian and 
his team were “really clear that it’s required” Altair and his fellow volunteers were “very 
cautious and very alert to any signs, any type of extremist religious [behaviour], anything 
that doesn’t fit with our culture here should be flagged straightaway because we need to see 
what’s going on.”  Altair goes on to describe the criteria Brian wished him to employ in his 
“unofficial screening.”  Brian asked him to surveil the families he was working with, to look 
out for changes in behaviour – “ even their reaction to things that are not really related to 
[extremism], for example if they saw someone gay in the street, or about names, or about 
people eating pork or not, these kind of things.” 
 
When Altair was asked how he felt about that training and the subsequent meetings and 
interactions with Brian and his team he has had during his time as a volunteer he said it was 
very dependent on who he interacted with. Some of the people he worked with in this 
capacity were “really understanding, really welcoming” whereas others were “close minded” 
and were much harder to work with. In addition, Altair believes that his personal 
circumstances allowed him to get more out of his interactions than some of his peers may 
have. For Altair, the fact he “could speak English really well, I’m Muslim but I’m not that 
religious, maybe because I’m not that dark [skinned]” all factored in the way people like 
Brian and his peers interacted with him – “it fitted a criteria that this person will never be 
dangerous, we are not worried about it.” As this train of thought advances Altair muses over 
how things are different for many of his peers – “if I was a bit darker, if I didn’t speak 
English, and I was a bit more religious, it might have been really, really difficult for me, even 
though I’m the same person it’s just a few bits and pieces that’s different.”    
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Altair is effectively describing how Prevent and its agents are attempting to create an 
ordering of its habitus where no obvious order exists, ‘structuring structure’ to maintain a 
hierarchy in line with its ideological predispositions (Bourdieu, 1984: 170-171). This ‘duality 
of structure and agent’ goes someway to explaining the forms of racism seen in how the 
Prevent duty is applied, however, it does not explain how such ambiguous factors which 
posits a vulnerability to extremism can persist without some form of sustained resistance 
(Awan et.al., 2019: 48). Ultimately, Prevent has taken advantage of the ‘dispositif of 
precautionary risk’, where the threat to life acts of terrorism present to the biopolitical 
enable prejudicial practices to go unchallenged (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 103). 
Essentially, Prevent is applying its power through the ‘capillary functioning’ of its biopolitical 
enactors (Foucault, 1977: 198). As such, it both assimilates the prejudices of the diverse 
populations tasked with implementing it and diminishes the accountability to them across 
the social field (Foucault, 1980b: 156).  
 
The surveillance apparatus of the Prevent duty is primarily imposed upon the community 
through coercive means. Economic factors are used as both an incentive to collaborate and 
as a stick to beat CBOs with that do not interact with the duty on terms deemed acceptable 
to its agents, the Prevent managers. What is apparent is that CBOs that do adopt Prevent’s 
mechanisms enjoy more autonomy and access to funds to facilitate their services. The 
following section will focus on what happens when Prevent comes across resistance to its 
mechanisms within the community setting and how adaptable it is to this circumstance, 
both from the LA perspective and that of CBOs and community advocates whom the duty 
targets.  
 
299 
 
8.3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify 
or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?      
 
Prevent is one of many governmental mechanisms that is designed to control the socio-
political conception of ‘truth.’ The Prevent managers primary objective, acting as the duty’s 
agents of diffusion, is to convince its subjects that they are the sole custodians of this ‘truth 
(Foucault, 1982: 211-212).’ This ‘order of the true’ or regime of truth deposited by the 
Prevent managers is facilitated by their position as the expert within the localised setting 
(Foucault, 1984b: 72-73). Anything that endangers the Prevent manager’s position at the 
apex of the system of pastoral power Prevent inhabits within the community setting is 
subsequently targeted for removal. Prevent managers follow a system of ‘problematization’ 
in such instances, where they construct new parameters that resolve problem behaviours as 
and when they arise, no matter how innocuous (Foucault, 1988a: 257).   
 
For example, Rusha, who has been working for Peter’s LA for the last 15 years for 
community development as well as within the community in a personal capacity, has been 
targeted by Prevent several times. When Rusha came across Prevent in its current guise in 
2015, she originally cooperated with it fully, believing it to be useful revenue stream to 
“help people who need that help” in a system of austerity that had eroded many of the 
other services she may have used in its stead. However, as time progressed, Rusha noticed 
that it “was mainly targeting Muslims” which was creating “negative vibes” within the 
community that inhibited her interaction with it  – “I felt like people were seeing me 
differently because they thought I was spying on them… I was the agent that was working 
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for [the LA] to tell them what was going on in the community. I found people were closing 
their doors on me because they felt that I wasn’t one of them.”  
 
 Rusha realised that the duty may well profess that it focuses on the wider community, 
however, she questioned why she was being employed to facilitate Peter’s access to Muslim 
areas. As the discussion develops, she asks the question – “If Prevent is about everyone, and 
it’s about the far-right, and it’s about safeguarding, why are we holding it in mosques, why 
are we just targeting Muslim families?” It was this realisation that made Rusha back away 
from the duty, when she noticed she “was able to get that trust from people again because 
they didn’t directly see me involved with Prevent.” For Rusha, the biggest weakness Prevent 
has is its inability to build meaningful relationships with its target communities – “it was just 
ticking boxes to show that they’ve done the work.” When instances of extremism have 
presented themselves within the community Rusha is quick to point out that Prevent is 
incapable of action. In one instance, where several young men went off to Syria to fight in 
the civil war, the families left behind where targeted by far-right groups – “they were 
abused, there were lots of racial attacks, they closed their business, so many things 
happened.” Rusha is adamant that “if there was appropriate support put in place by Prevent, 
and if they were really working positively, then those families wouldn’t” have experienced 
what they had to.   
 
Rusha’s account of Prevent’s workings and her early role in them illustrates its hidden 
normative functions. Although it proclaims to not be motivated by cultural or racial bias it is 
impossible for it to circumvent the dysphoric effects of institutional racism because its 
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actions stimulate the same response within its target demographics. Ultimately, Prevent and 
its agents of diffusion are enactors of the ‘race struggle’ between the dominant State 
sanctioned philosophy that is steeped in colonial discourse and those that are maligned by it 
(Foucault,2003: 62). The duty focuses its apparatus on the actions of the select few – in this 
case the few young men who went off to fight in Syria – because it is a tangible entity that 
fits its modelling of radicalisation. It does not focus on the wider community response 
because they are not ‘programmable’ entities using the apparatus available to it (Lemke, 
2019: 149). Prevent is driven by ‘technologies of performance’ that are ill equipped to deal 
with the experiences of the communities it targets because they are not its desired 
beneficiaries, no matter how much it professes they are (Dean, 2010: 197-198).     
 
Rusha has also been the target of Prevent’s securitised gaze. In one instance, she attempted 
to organise an event with a speaker critical of Prevent for a CBO she chairs outside of her LA 
work. Similar to Ullah’s experience where he observed the way Prevent managers get 
events cancelled at short notice, Rusha’s event was cancelled “on the day” because Peter 
had pressurised the venue, citing that “the person that was going to deliver the workshop 
had a certain ideology that was against the Prevent duty” as his reason. Rusha denotes that 
the speaker passed all the usual checks she would make for an external speaker if she was 
doing so for the LA themselves – “she had a law degree, she was British, she had everything 
that you would get as a normal speaker.” Several weeks later Rusha went to attend an event 
in a neighbouring LA in her own time that was running a workshop with the same speaker. It 
was at this point that she believes that her work “phone was tapped.”  After she attended 
the event, Peter and her line manager brought her in for questioning and she faced 
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disciplinary action – “they questioned me, they said if you were told not to [book] this person 
why did you go to this talk?”  
 
In this instance, Peter is using his position as the Prevent Coordinator as an extension of the 
‘regulatory language’ of law to safeguard the Prevent knowledge base from those that could 
limit its pastoral functions within the localised context (Dean, 2010: 140). Peter’s proximity 
to the ‘policing functions of state’ allow him autonomy over Rusha, even though she 
occupies a more senior position than he does within the LA (Foucault, 1979: 144). What is 
particularly interesting in this context is that Peter is not only interested in cementing the 
norms of Prevent, he is acting as a normative actor himself. He uses the nomenclature of 
Prevent’s radicalisation modelling to enact disciplinary measures on Rusha despite her 
erroneous activity being perfectly legal by most day-to-day interpretations of the law. In 
short, Peter’s proximity to Prevent’s pastoral functions allows him to create an ‘État de 
droit’ or rule of law on a case by case basis which Rusha has fallen foul of through no real 
error of her own (Foucault, 2008: 321).   
 
If for one moment we set aside the contradiction in terms Peter the Prevent Coordinator’s 
illiberal actions illustrate when we consider the ideological position of Prevent – to 
safeguard the liberal order – it is possible to imagine how he legitimises his actions. When 
Peter exercises his pastoral power upon Rusha, he is doing so on the basis that it may be an 
instance of a ‘necessary exceptions to the norm’ that demands his intervention (Neal, 2006: 
31-32). Equally, Peter’s actions against Rusha has allowed him to collect new data, to build 
upon his ‘Archaeology of knowledge’ by deliberating the meaning of statements – to justify 
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his acts with proof of action (Foucault, 2002: 177). Subsequently, the collection of data is 
paramount to Peter’s position and therefore the conditions required to produce it need to 
be manufactured by him at any given opportunity.  
 
Such instances of Prevent’s endeavour to fabricate data are dispersed across the community 
setting. For example, Choti, a Health Development Officer in William’s LA as well as a 
prominent member of the Bengali community, describes a programme she ran in 
conjunction with the Home Office designed to work with migrant women. The programme 
targeted “60 [migrant] women” and trained them to become English as a Second Language 
(ESOL) teachers. The reasoning behind this was twofold. Firstly, “to empower them to take 
lead of their home life, but also to start thinking about career pathways” and secondly, it 
provided a platform for the LA to engage more with the community –“building a sustainable 
model… it’s women from ethnic minority backgrounds teaching others from ethnic minority 
backgrounds.” When Choti was asked to elaborate on why this was so beneficial to her work 
in health development, she argues that because “they’ve had that lived experience” it made 
them better educators. Although there is little wrong with Choti’s assertions here, what is 
interesting is how the Home Office, who primarily provided the funding for the project, 
stipulated she manage the programme. Choti was required to “filter through the women” on 
the programme, “to make sure that they had indefinite leave to remain…check their 
passports, their status, and feed that back”, which was all facilitated by William the PEO 
who played the role of silent partner.  
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Choti’s data collection at the behest of the Home Office is the operationalisation of its 
typology of risk. In this paradigm, the Home Office is not really concerned with the ‘identity’ 
of its population but focused on the ‘identification’ of possible agents that can aid the 
diffusion of its apparatus within its target demographics (Dean, 2010: 44-45). Using the 
principles of exclusion, the Home Office employs its PEO William to guide Choti into re-
educating those that potentially fall outside of its ideological foundation, who in turn 
replicate this behaviour within the target demographics to which they belong (Dean, 2010: 
98). In short, Choti’s migrant women education programme is the State’s endeavour ‘to 
distinguish, to distribute, to use’ carefully selected conciliators from its dispersed 
populations to entrench its biopower (Foucault, 1977: 272).  
 
Although Choti has had to comply with the Prevent duty in both her professional work with 
the LA and in her community work that she does in her own time, she is not blind to its 
incongruous nature. Choti believes the duty “leaves the ethnic minority community highly 
vulnerable” to misrepresentation and open to being reported for extremism where there is 
none. For Choti, the duty has created an environment that “feeds people’s fears” which 
leads to people targeting communities that have done nothing wrong, to “judge them 
before anything’s happened.” She is also quite clear that “Prevent needs to change.” Choti 
believes that Prevent’s core weakness is its focus on “preventing [radicalisation] from 
reporting it” rather than offering proactive initiatives that help people navigate their 
potentially vulnerable circumstances.  
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 In short, Choti feels Prevent perpetuates the narrative that ethnic minorities are a “burden” 
on society rather than the assets they are. The description of the racial divide provided by 
Choti is a well-trodden paradigm deposited on most matters of State and its expressions of 
sovereignty. In the case of Prevent, the duty acts as a ‘technique of power’ exerted by 
government that binds the biopolitical to the State through ethno-nationalist discourse and 
by proxy, racism (Foucault, 2003: 258). In this example, Prevent is acting to divert the 
attention of its subjects towards the ‘cultural relativism’ of those that commit acts of 
extremism and away from the ‘structural disadvantage’ that are its primary drivers, which 
coincidently are also the areas of the social government is responsible for maintaining 
(Abbas, 2020: 6). Although Choti is very critical of Prevent, she is held captive by a ‘tension-
filled narrative’ which ensures her compliance precisely because she is placed squarely 
within the politics of racism that the duty inhabits because of her ethnicity and religion 
(Awan et.al., 2019: 51-52).  
 
The nature of interactions between Prevent and its target demographics is a perilous one. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible for members of target communities to completely bypass its 
securitised gaze because it is ‘inscribed in the social space’ that they populate (Foucault, 
1980b: 146). Members of target communities that do cooperate with Prevent are required 
to manage a precarious relationship with the duty’s agencies and agents. Salih, an Islamic 
Scholar and chair of his own educational CBO that operates within the LAs of both Julian and 
Brian has had several dealings with Prevent, both at the LA level and with the Home Office 
directly. He has taken part in designing the deradicalization materials created by the 
306 
 
Channel programme in 2010, as well as delivering talks to the “Muslim Police Association in 
their annual dinners in front of the head of the Home Office.”  
 
Salih has also been the target of Prevent’s securitised gaze. One of his online videos 
published on his YouTube channel was assessed by Julian and passed on to the Home Office 
who designated it as extremist material. According to Salih, this happened because he 
criticised the UK government of demonizing the Muslim community, who are the biggest 
victims of acts of terror in terms of fatalities by “labelling these victims as enemies.” Salih 
was subsequently arrested but released on bail, with his passport confiscated. This 
experience has fixed Salih’s resolve, he is convinced that “Prevent is going in the wrong 
direction.” For Salih, the problem with Prevent is its inability to decipher what is an actual 
threat and what is not, which he believes is by design –  “if you go regularly to a mosque, if 
you are interested in Middle East politics, if you care about it you are labelled as a non-
violent extremist.”  
 
What Salih is describing here is Prevent’s attempts to control the ‘disposition of space’, to 
limit the ‘field of expansion’ offered to the Muslim community in order to control its 
production of both its social and symbolic capital (Foucault, 1980b: 148-149). This process of 
social exclusion mimics cultural racism, which in this case takes the form of Islamophobia, 
because it needs the biopower inherent within its ethno-nationalist rhetoric to drive its 
apparatus forwards (Abbas, 2020: 6-7). Of course, any process that is ideologically driven is 
subject to inefficiency. Policing agencies – which Prevent acts as a functionary – are tasked 
with evaluating the risks and the potential rewards of policing acts of criminality or allowing 
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some to occur. Governments tend to consider how effective the methods of policing must 
be to ensure bio-political survival, not total efficiency (Foucault, 2008: 256). It is also worthy 
of note that even though Salih has been targeted by the policing functions of Prevent he is 
still regularly approached by agents of the State for cooperation, recently taking part in a 
roundtable discussion with the office of the London Mayor regarding non-violent 
extremism. The question Salih posed to the Mayor’s representatives when he attended the 
workshop was an obvious one to make  – “how come you bring me to a room and we eat 
together and [yet] you consider me a non-violent extremist and want me to help you?” Salih 
was not given a clear answer to this question, not that he expected one.  
 
Although the Prevent duty is not legally bound to its target demographics in the community 
setting, it does demand that representatives from these targeted communities adopt its 
functions. It actively seeks out their cooperation through economic means, as well as taking 
advantage of their vulnerability as suspect communities to engineer their compliance. In the 
following and final section of this chapter, the role of third-party NGOs in facilitating this 
dynamic will be evaluated.     
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8.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent 
statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they 
have? 
 
Various NGOs populate the community setting and often employ members of the 
community to aid their transition into this space in much the same way Prevent managers 
do, however they are often more successful at it. Prevent encourages this activity because 
such NGOs offer a form of legitimisation to their targeted approach whilst fulfilling its 
bureaucratic functions (Dean, 2010: 63). In sum, NGOs allow Prevent and its enactors to 
provide answers to the biopolitical realties of creating a pre-criminal space by producing 
empirical data which acts as a ‘new frame of reference’ that agrees with the State’s 
assertions (Foucault, 2008: 312).  
 
NGOs that do run projects within the community also operate in a similar fashion to their 
Prevent manager counterparts in the way that they acquire access to the community and 
the funding streams they exploit. In real terms, the Home Office offer funding for jobs that 
they advertise to NGOs who bid to take on the role being advertised – an interview process 
of sorts. For Ullah, this creates a paradigm that is both hard to navigate and resist if you live 
within one of Prevent’s targeted communities. He describes how “bid winner NGOs” will 
often create “a narrative to say that there is a problem so they can keep on getting funding” 
even if there is little evidence to suggest one actually exists. Ullah goes on to explain how a 
culture of justification has been created alongside a “whole industry of terrorism and 
Prevent” that requires a “narrative effect” to keep it in place.  
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In one example, Ullah details how he was employed by an NGO as a community “advisor” 
that had been given “Prevent funding” for a “mapping project” that was run across Julian’s 
LA. Ullah describes how representatives from the Home Office were driving the NGO to 
collect “stats and data” that answered their questions – “are there any problematic 
elements, are there any extremist elements?” Ullah goes on to detail that there “was no 
signs of extremism” however Julian the Prevent coordinator and his Home Office superiors 
“were so determined” for the mapping exercise to highlight them. Ullah believes that the 
core premise of the project was to “put everyone on the map” and to identify exactly “who’s 
in the community….which organisations have some sort of pull, are they anti-establishment, 
are they critical of the government, or who’s pro-government.” In effect, Prevent was being 
mobilised through an NGO to both surveil its target demographics for evidence of threat to 
justify its means of production and to assist the mapping of potential agents of its diffusion. 
No doubt Julian and the Home Office would justify their focus as a means to ensure the 
safety of the communities under their care – ‘protecting citizens from each other’ if you will 
(Jabbar and Ali, 2019: 540). However, a question is raised here, who exactly is a citizen in 
the eyes of Prevent and those charged with enacting it?  
 
Prevent effectively functions as a component of the ‘political anatomy’ of the State which 
mandates knowledge of its citizens to allow it to administer its will (Foucault, 1977: 138). 
For the State to do so, it must first locate its citizens by creating ‘particular subjects’ from 
the endless field of subjectivities found within any population (Hallaq, 2014: 99). The agents 
of the Prevent duty, in this instance, Julian the Prevent coordinator and his Home Office 
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handlers, are exhibiting the ‘totalizing subjectivity’ of the State’s ‘pedagogical machine’ that 
demands the NGO, and by proxy Ullah, to produce the ‘citizen, the national subject’ by 
providing evidence of peoples who cannot be citizens to use as reference markers (Hallaq, 
2014: 104). Equally, there is an added benefit in employing the services of the NGO and 
Ullah – it allows the State to apply virulent economies of scale that produce the conditions 
for economic growth whilst also re-producing the ‘ideology of the liberal state’, a win-win 
situation (Lemke, 2019: 187).    
 
For Shaheen, the Prevent “industry” that Ullah describes is largely economically motivated 
which “gives it a life of its own”, however, its ideological stance is much deeper rooted, a 
“natural progression” of the “demonization and othernization of the Muslim community” 
that has been embedded within western society following colonialization. To illustrate these 
points,  Shaheen describes a meeting he had with Asma Jahangir in 2010, then acting as the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Beliefs. One of Jahangir’s 
remits at the end of her tenure had been to compile a report to advise the CVE apparatus of 
member states, with the findings informing the precursor legislation to the Prevent 
statutory duty. Shaheen and Jahangir’s business had been facilitated by his CBO’s status as a 
consultative body to the UN department of Economic and Social Affairs. Shaheen and 
Jahangir had several disagreements about the contents of her report, with Jahangir 
apparently stating that “it’s the job of secular government to say what Islam is good, and 
what Islam is bad.” Shaheen also highlights the Tony Blair Foundation’s endeavour to create 
“a true Islam” to make his argument that supranational governmental bodies and NGOs are 
working together on “social engineering” projects.  
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When asked to elaborate on this point, Shaheen begins to describe how NGOs like the Tony 
Blair Foundation and the Henry Jackson society, in partnership with national government, 
are employing ex-British Muslims to represent the Muslim community, creating an 
environment where “people who have nothing to do with Islam are [employing] social 
engineering to create a form of Islam which appeases them” with no considerations made 
on “how legitimate that process is or isn’t.” The processes of social engineering Shaheen is 
describing in this instance is the State’s endeavour to endow its target demographics with 
the metaphysical qualities it desires of them – the ‘training of the subject’ that is 
‘pedagogically incubated’ within the Muslim population through mechanisms of pastoral 
power (Hallaq, 2014: 107). In addition, the ex-Muslims employed by the likes of the Tony 
Blair foundation also reproduce the ‘deontology’ of the CVE industry. Their perceived 
proximity to populations of interest allows Prevent to normalise its presence within the 
Islamic community — to become a normative actor. The knowledges the chosen ex-Muslims 
produce allow them to claim expertise which they use in turn to delineate and/or reproduce 
the typology of risk employed by the Prevent duty (Dean, 2010: 26). 
 
Shaheen deems the government sanctioned, “Halal” Islam as “very dangerous” to British 
Muslims because it “alienates” the vast majority of them who do not recognise it within 
themselves. Madiha describes this situation as failing the “cricket test”, where British 
Muslims are forced to accommodate an “impossible aspiration” of integration that can 
never be achieved because of the normative structures that demonise them, or in the case 
of Prevent, criminalise them. Mahida is quite clear that most actors within the community 
have been “disempowered” by this unattainable ‘parresia’, which she believes is designed to 
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facilitate the machinery of Prevent (Foucault, 2014: 43). Furthermore, Prevent’s 
“industrialised” nature has promoted NGOs or, as she describes them “Prevent Wallahs, 
people making a good amount of money in [the] colonial system” who now act as “obtuse 
auxiliaries” of the State. Mahida considers these NGOs to be producing research that 
replicates the ‘bureaucratic language” used by the State which acts to remove the “morality 
from the discourse” that deposits Muslims as the “vanguard of problematic communities.” In 
short, Mahida believes that NGOs are utilising the space created by Prevent to 
“troubleshoot” target demographics – “problematising and then finding solutions” to issues 
they have generated to sell resolutions to the government to garner business.  
 
For Mahida, much of the CVE work created by NGOs is snake oil, a “coercive mechanism” 
designed to facilitate their position within the Prevent landscape to profiteer from it. 
Mahida’s description of the field of CVE focused NGOs found within the Prevent landscape 
as some form of Cuckoo bird infiltrating the sovereign nest is a seductive one. Indeed, many 
of the NGOs who have taken part in this study have described the replication of the State’s 
‘administerial and managerial’ functions – that are essential mechanisms of biopower – in 
order to cooperate with the Prevent duty (Oksala, 2013: 322). However, the activities of 
these NGOs are necessary to the State and by proxy the Prevent duty. It is a symbiotic 
relationship, they are an ‘essential technique’ of government (Foucault, 1979: 136). They 
create and process data critical to the regime of power/knowledge that enables the State to 
utilise biopower in order to govern, providing scholastic legitimacy to the practices of 
Prevent (Oksala, 2013: 322-323). Moreover, NGOs facilitate Prevent and its State enactors 
to access communities beyond their reach through a ‘network of dispersed elements’ that 
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soften its effects through a pastoral network of ‘micro power’ overseen by the Home Office 
(Foucault, 1979: 307).  
 
This chapter has illustrated how the Prevent duty both interacts and attempts to steer its 
target demographics. It does so through various socio-economic means, using pedagogic 
action to both seduce and embed itself within the community setting. Although it does meet 
resistance from within its target communities it is mostly passive – the community tends to 
employ avoidance tactics in the main. It is this circumstance, where target communities are 
held captive within the ‘archipelago’ of Prevent’s securitised gaze which makes it so hard for 
them to resist its incursions upon them (Foucault, 1977: 27). The Muslim communities of 
Britain are surrounded by a mass of third sector bodies that attempt to speak for them with 
little legitimacy to do so. Community members have little agency to challenge this narrative 
unless they work with the NGOs directly. This often leads to pacification, where community 
advocates produce data piecemeal, with NGOs collating and framing it in a way that satisfies 
their Home Office employers. In the next and final chapter– the conclusion – this thesis will 
revisit the original paradigm set out in the introduction, delineating what exactly is the 
problem with Prevent?  
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Chapter 9: Conclusions.  
 
The overall aim of this study is to evaluate the impact and assess the implications of Prevent 
and its statutory duty across education, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) tasked with monitoring and administering communities 
deemed vulnerable to radicalisation at the local authority level. The following research 
questions were developed to facilitate this task:   
 
Research questions: 
 
1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control 
its production of knowledge?   
 
2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is 
it reproduced?  
 
3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or 
reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?     
 
4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent 
statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have? 
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In order to answer these questions, the study has conducted 31 semi-structured 1-1 
interviews with participants from 4 main groupings: Prevent managers, educators, NGOs 
that populate the Prevent landscape and finally, CBOs and community advocates that form 
Prevent’s targeted demographics. This critical case sample frame has been created because 
the cohorts comprise a comprehensive subsection of the biopolitical corpus Prevent has 
been designed to inhabit. The Foucauldian concept of governmentality, where the 
apparatus of the State both shapes and controls the biopolitik is central to the analytic 
framework adopted by this study (Foucault, 1991: 12-13). In supplementation to this 
theoretical standpoint, the Bourdieusian concept of the ‘bureaucratic field’, specifically how 
it relates to the ‘educational field’, has informed the research findings because education is 
the primary vector of the Prevent statutory duty’s delivery (Bourdieu, 2014: 112-113).  
 
The methodological approach implemented by this study is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 
which has been adopted because it has allowed the interpretation of the true meaning of 
statements beyond that afforded at face value (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 5). This analytical 
framework is essential to any form of Foucauldian analysis which chooses to question the 
‘ready-made syntheses’ afforded to them in a technique of government such as Prevent and 
its normative functions (Foucault, 2002: 24). The utilisation of CDA has allowed this research 
to uncover the meanings behind the bureaucratic languages of the State that are used to 
pacify populations it deems as risks (Foucault, 2001: 233-234). 
 
This chapter – conclusions – will revisit the specific research aim and research questions 
adopted by this study and offer conclusions based upon its findings. Firstly, the previous 4 
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chapters that comprise the research findings for the targeted cohorts will be summarised 
and synthesised in the following subsection – research objectives: summary of key findings. 
In the next subsection – contributions and limitations – the specific contribution to 
knowledge this study has provided will be discussed. It will also consider the value of this 
study and to what degree it has met the aims it set out to accomplish at its inception. The 
final subsection will outline recommendations for further research and offer the would-be 
researcher an honest reflection of the barriers to carrying out critical research within this 
field.  
 
9.2. Research objectives: summary of key findings.  
 
The existing literature that examines the problematics presented by CVE initiatives such as 
Prevent have highlighted colonial discourse – which underpins CVE design – as one of the 
primary contributing factors to their ineffectiveness and divisiveness. Although this 
information is unlikely to shock many who choose to read this study, this realisation still 
manages to elude the governments who implement CVE policy, the people who produce the 
research that underpins it and the industry of expertise that they all inhabit.  
  
There are many rationales to be found within the academic literature that can be used to 
explain why this closed ecosystem of expertise continues to exist. For instance, Foucault 
(1988a: 71) highlights how the ideology of State is steeped in theological discourse and 
much like religious doctrine, its rationality is assured by how government frames its policy. 
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In effect, rules and regulations that may appear irrational to the forensic eye are 
demonstrated as rational by the mode of supposition the State forces one to adopt if they 
wish to interact with it on any meaningful level (Dean, 2010: 104-105). In addition, the State 
embeds this ideology by incentivising it through economic markets, whose propriety also 
happens to be government’s primary concern (Foucault, 2008: 61-68). Together, this praxis 
of power the State has created to marshal its biopolitical enclaves creates a ‘regime of truth’ 
that is unassailable for those that resist it; one is forced to talk to Smith’s hand as the face 
isn’t listening (Foucault, 2003: 6).  
 
Although it is all well and good to debate the overtures of the literary contribution to the 
thematics of this studies aims, we must now look at how such critical discourse is applicable 
within the biopolitical communities it seeks to describe. This study has aimed to provide an 
understanding of the totality of Prevent as a normative function of the State’s security 
apparatus. As such, the findings from each cohort for the respective research questions will 
now be synthesised to identify the overall relationships between them.  
 
9.1.1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors 
control its production of knowledge?   
  
Each cohort had variated responses within the praxis of the above research question, 
however the construction of ideal types was a common theme visited throughout the 
analysis. To be precise, the responses of participants illustrate that one of the primary 
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ideological gradations of the Prevent programme is a ‘typology’ of risk that designates 
target communities as particularly vulnerable to extremism (Foucault, 2001: 328-329). 
Additionally, Prevent managers and educational practitioners described a form of 
stratification of the Prevent duty facilitated through bureaucratic mechanisms. This 
systematic bureaucracy controls the production of new knowledges that are used to 
construct ideal types, which in turn are applied by safeguarding mechanisms to identify who 
requires intervention or steering (Dean, 2010: 26). The relationship between actors and 
agents in this instance is maintained through pastoral networks of expertise which are 
readily replicated by the ‘pedagogic actions’ of the school that also operate in this way; 
assimilation of Prevent via its replication of the practices of the educational field (Bourdieu, 
1990: 74).    
 
Indeed, those who take charge of the production of FBV materials and who manage their 
delivery are branded as Pastoral leads. Additionally, in the educational setting the soft 
surveillance apparatus of the Prevent duty is streamlined within the safeguarding agenda of 
schools. This has aided its uptake considerably. The depiction of radicalisation theory as a 
process akin to grooming – an atypical risk factor teachers are trained to look out for in any 
case – has allowed Prevent managers to align themselves with DSLs. Prevent managers use 
this position to dictate the safeguarding language spoken within the LA to embed 
themselves as one of its functionary custodians. In turn, this position provides them with 
the opportunity to collate regular data or ‘knowledges’ from the school setting which they 
then use to justify their existence to the Home Office  –  this happens at the apex of the 
Prevent programme’s pastoral system (Foucault, 2000: 212). 
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 It is important to note that Prevent managers in LAs with tier threat level status are funded 
by the Home Office directly, even though they are technically employed by their respective 
LAs. The Home Office demand Prevent managers provide evidence of threats at the 
community level to justify their own employment. This often takes the form of quarterly 
reports which ask for data pertinent to local threats, level of engagement with target 
agencies/demographics and progress reports on localised training programmes that Prevent 
managers are required to run throughout the year.    
 
As a consequence of their often-perilous employment, Prevent managers will attempt to 
gather support from potential agents of diffusion found operating at the community level. In 
the first instance, there are a plethora of NGOs who produce educational and CVE 
programmes who court LAs and schools as their primary consumers. Dependent on their 
standing within the ‘archaeology of knowledge’ of the State, Prevent managers either act as 
their gatekeepers or as their collaborators through the sanction of the Home Office 
(Foucault, 2002: 212). These NGOs act in a similar way to their Prevent manager 
counterparts, embedding themselves within the operations of the LA through replicating its 
bureaucratic mechanisms and collecting data that requires their expertise. Although many 
of the NGOs interviewed for this study would describe themselves as not for profits, they 
must generate one in order to survive and to grow within their targeted areas. Their 
existence within the Prevent landscape illustrates how the State is attempting to embed the 
economy within its ‘dispositifs (Foucault, 1980a: 195).’ Artificial or ‘quasi’ markets are 
produced through this process (Dean, 2010: 175). For instance, Prevent managers often bid 
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for the services of NGOs through the Home Office who have bought the NGOs programmes 
as a package deal. They then break up the NGOs’ services piecemeal and provide it to the 
LAs that provide the most evidence – who produce the best pitch.  
 
Economies of scale also permeate the community setting. CBOs who are not legally obliged 
to comply with the duty are incentivised to interact with Prevent managers through 
economic means. Those that do cooperate in line with the Prevent managers’ expectations 
receive funding for services and resources they are unable to obtain without their support, 
with the caveat that they must be in some way furthering the Prevent agenda’s aims. 
 
It is also important to note that it is impossible for CBOs and community advocates to 
completely forgo interaction with the Prevent managers if they find themselves within their 
securitised gaze. The pre-criminal space the duty creates, as well as the wider hostile 
environment it inhabits, predicates that members of the Islamic community are particularly 
vulnerable to the tactics produced by the strategic ‘technologies of performance’ that 
constitute the duty in action (Dean, 2010: 197-198). Although the Prevent managers would 
likely advocate  their interventions as guiding the community for its own good, they are 
effectively acting to make its setting ‘programmable’ to the State’s functionary apparatus of 
security, as well as creating the conditions for economic growth by attempting to negate 
any potential risks to the markets it inhabits (Lemke, 2019: 149).       
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In sum, the ideological gradations that permeate the Prevent landscape are dualistic in 
scope. The primary conclusion made here is not one that seeks to define precisely what 
these forces are, it is to distinguish what is their intent vis a vis what they appear to be 
intended for. The pastoral mechanisms of the State populate the field of knowledges the 
Prevent duty’s actors and target demographics construct. Prevent embeds itself within 
education, and to a lesser extent the wider community, through pedagogic action. Pre-
existing safeguarding mechanisms have been used to streamline its processes into the 
school setting. It further incentivises itself through economies of scale that invite private 
NGOs to populate its discursive field, that, in turn help construct the knowledge base that 
both reinforces and reproduces the Prevent statutory duty. Ultimately, the reproduction of 
the duty is the primary concern of its agents of diffusion as it is the sole reason for their 
existence.   
     
9.1.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the community level; 
how is it reproduced?  
 
In short, the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme aid its assimilation within the 
community setting and once embedded, enable its reproduction. Prevent managers, NGOs 
and to a lesser degree, educational practitioners and CBOs are all able to benefit from its 
multifarious mechanisms in one way or another.  However, to fully examine the minutiae of 
the modus operandi of Prevent – its soft surveillance apparatus – it is important to gain an 
understanding of what exactly is reproduced by Prevent’s actors. In the first instance, 
Prevent managers have streamlined its mechanisms through the safeguarding agenda of 
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schools. This should really come as no surprise, safeguarding procedures have always been 
the medium by which LA service providers such as schools tackle the task set by the State to 
assess and delineate the ‘conduct of conduct’ of their stakeholder communities (Foucault, 
1982: 220). What is interesting, however, is how the Prevent managers convince DSLs –
safeguarding experts in their own right with much more practical experience under their 
belts in the main – that they possess expertise that supplants their own.   
 
Prevent managers utilise the bureaucratic language of State to cement their position of 
authority within the educational setting (Dean, 2010: 90). They break down the technical 
apparatus of the Prevent duty, translating its meaning to the DSLs who are charged with 
defining the difference between ‘subjection and subjectivity’ within their student body 
(Dean, 2010: 92).  To be more succinct, the Prevent managers are the custodians of the 
‘precise rationality of the bureaucratic field’ in terms of the Prevent duty because only they 
have access to its ‘specific logic’ through their proximity to the Home Office, the duty’s 
architects (Bourdieu, 2014: 112). 
 
 In practical terms, communication between Prevent managers and DSLs occurs over two 
workstreams. In the first instance, Prevent managers entrench and reproduce Prevent 
through ‘pedagogic action’, where they regularly train DSLs in safeguarding procedures 
related to extremism and inform them of the local threats which are determined by their 
data collection across the LA (Bourdieu, 1990: 74). In effect, the Prevent managers are 
purporting that they have access to the ‘subjugated knowledges’ of the extremist which 
they use in turn to convince DSLs that the assimilation and reproduction of Prevent within 
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their own pedagogy is vital for their own safety (Foucault, 2007: 7-8). This tactic is largely 
successful and there is very little resistance to the duty or its agents the Prevent managers, 
in fact they are very much welcomed in the main.  
 
In the second instance, schools provide the Prevent managers with safeguarding data that is 
being increasingly collated on several different types of computer software. This serves two 
purposes. Firstly it, feeds the Prevent managers’ knowledge base which they then aggregate 
and re-disseminate as expertise as the duty’s ‘truths (Foucault, 1979: 138-140).’ In the 
second instance, it translates the safeguarding discourse at the community level into 
calculable units of data (Foucault, 2008: 243). It is this system of data production, collection 
and dissemination that is the primary vector through which the Prevent duty is reproduced. 
This process by numbers acts as a form of ‘insurance technology’ of the State designed to 
produce a tableaux of potential risks to its ideological predispositions (Lemke, 2019: 216). It 
is not by happenstance that this systematic evaluation of risk mimics economic forms of risk 
mitigation. Prevent’s response to the risks it finds within the biopolitical is focused on the 
threat to economic propriety because the ideology of State dictates that all its actors are 
primarily economically motivated (Foucault, 2008: 245-248).  
 
The pedagogic response to the risks delineated by the duty take the form of FBV. FBV as a 
process is designed to embed the ‘symbolic power’ of the liberal order within the 
educational field (Loyal, 2017: 83). It is delivered through PSHE and RE lessons in the main, 
scaffolded by pastoral leads who are in turn managed by their DSLs, or in some cases they 
are one and the same person. The duty employs a specific targeted approach in this 
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instance, where PEOs are tasked with providing support, training and teaching resources 
that schools can utilise to showcase their commitment to FBV for Ofsted inspection. PEOs 
are more often than not ex-teachers themselves. This permits them to multiply the 
‘technologies of domination’ ergo FBV and its normative functions by the ‘technologies of 
the self’ where their qualified teacher status allows them to mimic the pedagogy of the 
school setting to aid FBVs’ diffusion (Foucault, 2000: 212-213).   
 
This process of pedagogic reproduction is not limited to Prevent managers. NGOs that work 
within the school setting also employ a plethora of ex LA personnel to aid their transmission 
within the LA agencies who make up their consumer base. Many project leads are ex DSL’s 
and pastoral leads who produce resources and supply training which is sanctioned by the 
Home Office and DfE. Prevent Coordinators and PEOs also find employment working with 
NGOs whom they share strong connections with, even though it can be a tenuous 
relationship at points where the pastoral hierarchy becomes blurred. Ultimately this 
competition is an aspect of the State’s endeavour to involve the free market within the 
praxis of Prevent. The economy is an ‘essential technique’ of the neoliberal order FBV has 
been designed to help ensure after all (Foucault, 2014: 44). For NGOs to facilitate the 
functions of Prevent it must be able to interpret the ‘knowledges’ of the State’s ‘dispositifs’ - 
employing those who can decipher such mechanisms is the only way to do so (Foucault, 
2001:233). 
  
In brief, NGOs replicate the functions of State in the facilitation of the Prevent duty by 
employing people who can speak its languages of bureaucracy (Dean, 2010: 140). This 
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allows them to situate themselves within the pastoral networks at the community level, 
whilst also having the ability to move beyond them to the ‘pastoral’ functions of 
departments such as the Home Office and DfE. As such, the economies of scale that these 
NGOs inhabit in part dictate the ‘deontology’ or the practices of Prevent and its modes of 
delivery, embedding themselves into its discourses in the process (Dean, 2010: 27).   
 
Economies of scale also play an important role in terms of the duty’s target demographics. 
CBOs are incentivised to interact with the duty through economic means. If CBOs 
incorporate Prevent’s surveillance apparatuses and FBV within their practices they are 
rewarded with access to resources, something in short supply following 10 years of austerity 
measures that have eroded community development programmes across the board. This 
‘transactional reality’ allows Prevent managers to embed themselves within the community 
setting (Foucault, 2008: 297).  Once a network has been established, Prevent managers then 
use the pastoral mechanisms of the ‘educational field’ to legitimise the activities they are 
asking CBOs to complete, seducing them through the familiarity of pedagogic discourse 
(Bourdieu, 1990: 138). Supplying data to the Prevent managers also serves another function 
for CBOs, it increases their ‘social capital’ by proxy of their working relationships with 
Prevent managers and the ‘symbolic power’ they wield (Bourdieu, 2013: 165-166). 
In sum, the reproduction of Prevent’s surveillance apparatus is reliant on two distinct 
factors. Firstly, the pastoral nature of Prevent creates regions of expertise that its agencies 
and actors revolve around. Such expertise is exercised through the educational field, with 
the familiarity of pedagogic action acting as a legitimising factor. Secondly, economies of 
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scale are used to incentivise compliance within its targeted demographics, especially those 
that fall outside the legal obligation to comply with the duty.  
  
9.1.3. How do community level organisations adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; 
how flexible is Prevent?     
 
Prevent’s pastoral network is fundamentally assembled around and through the Home 
Office. However, the duty is designed to attract an ever-increasing number of actors to 
populate its discourses. As such, the duty must be flexible to some degree to facilitate its 
growth into the populations it targets. For instance, it can be advantageous for CBOs to 
engage with Prevent and its broader CVE objectives. In particular, the language of 
commerce within the ‘liberal state’ that dominants the discourse of governance also plays a 
significant role within this dynamic; it can reap financial rewards which enable the CBO to 
develop upon their own core aims (Lemke, 2013: 45-46).   
 
There is considerable scope for CBOs to modify such funding, with many choosing to use it 
to subsidize community-building exercises. However, there are restrictions applied by 
bureaucratic mechanisms. CBOs are routinely asked to prove that their chosen activities are 
fighting extremisms/ teaching FBV. Prevent managers act in a pastoral capacity in this 
regard, guiding CBOs through the completion of forms so that they will satisfy the Home 
Office decision makers in charge of administering funds. In effect, the duty and its 
constituent parts control the CBOs’ discourse through enforced bureaucratisation that is 
economically incentivised (Dean, 2010: 27). Although there is scope for CBOs to create 
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events and workshops that fit their needs in a more holistic capacity, the core functions of 
the duty must be satisfied for the events to take place.  
 
One could argue that that if the Home Office is funding the events then it is fair to ask the 
CBO for something in return. However, Prevent managers routinely subvert the purpose of 
community held events that do not consult or involve them or the Home Office, no matter 
how innocuous their subject matter. Prevent managers are obliged to do so because a core 
function of their role is to enforce the ‘ontology’ of the duty upon its target demographics 
(Dean, 2010: 26). Prevent managers must attempt to oversee the near infinite ‘field of 
possibilities’ targeted communities could produce by forcing them to act only in ways they 
can translate into their own processes (Foucault, 1982: 220). In brief, activities do not have 
to pose a risk to be considered risky.   
 
Targeted communities are held captive by their vulnerability. In most cases they must adopt 
the Prevent duty to some degree because of a transmutable ‘rule of law’ that is applied by 
Prevent managers (Foucault, 2008: 321). Prevent managers use the ‘knowledges’ they 
collate to justify their exercises of disciplinary power, with each instance in turn justifying 
the next by illustrating the need for it to be put in place. Proof of action becomes proof of 
need to act (Foucault, 2002: 177). The mechanics of Prevents bureaucracy – its ‘regimes of 
truth’ – act to absolve the Prevent manager of any doubt or scepticism through its formulaic 
functions (Foucault, 2003: 6).  
 
Resistance is pacified through its ‘nominalisation’, where bureaucratic language fragments 
the arguments of those that oppose the duty’s processes (Foucault, 2001: 233-234). For 
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instance, resistance to Prevent, particularly the formula and function of FBV, is easy to find 
within the educational setting. However, much like their CBO counterparts, educators that 
do appose FBV have little option but to comply with their obligation to teach them through 
the regulatory ‘educational regime’ performed by Ofsted inspection (Foucault, 1977: 141). 
The moral imperative of the safeguarding duty, which directs educators to keep their 
student bodies safe from ‘incursions’ upon them, dictates they surveil them for signs of 
vulnerability (Foucault, 1977: 27). Prevent relies on this circumstance to establish itself 
within the school setting – very few educators question the Prevent specific safeguarding 
protocols or the radicalisation theory that underpins them. 
 
 The university setting is a perfunctory outlier to the situation found in the school – perhaps 
in part because safeguarding mechanisms are less pronounced. Workshops and seminars 
that are critical of Prevent – or even those that just appear to be by Prevent managers – are 
subverted in a similar fashion to those conducted within the community setting. Although 
academics are often in a less vulnerable position to their community advocate counterparts, 
they too succumb to the ‘disciplinary monotony’ of the Prevent duty in a war of attrition of 
sorts (Foucault, 1977: 141).   
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the most adaptable actors found within the Prevent landscape are 
the NGOs who aim to become a ‘new frame of reference’ within it (Foucault, 2007: 312).  In 
fact many do just that. NGOs both create and facilitate national level policy pertinent to the 
duty’s delivery, modifying the Prevent landscape to fit the services it has to offer. Of all the 
cohorts interviewed by this study, NGOs reported the least constraints, with little obligation 
to adhere to disciplinary mechanisms – even less than the Prevent managers themselves 
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who were often under a considerable amount of pressure to collect data to present to the 
Home Office. In part, this is likely down to the ‘veridiction’ their programmes offer to the 
duty on the ground. The legitimising capacity of NGOs, wrought by their perceived proximity 
to the community setting, acts as a buffer between the State and its political enclaves – a 
veil to conceal those who surveil (Foucault, 2014: 341).  The services and products NGOs 
generate in turn create the ‘socio-economic determinations’ the Home Office will use to 
multiply the duty across the community setting (Foucault, 2014: 340).  
 
To conclude, the Prevent duty is flexible in the sense that it allows itself to be modified to fit 
within any emergent market that presents itself. Where it is inflexible however, is when it 
meets resistance to its core aims. In such instances, the Prevent duty and its agents, the 
Prevent managers, employ a regime of discipline that operates on a case-by-case basis to 
subvert resistance by fragmenting it, often taking advantage of the vulnerability of those 
whom it targets to do so.  
 
 
9.1.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent 
statutory duty; how do NGOs legitimise their activity and what impact do they 
have? 
 
The third sector plays an important role in the implementation of the Prevent statutory 
duty. Although there is sometimes a conflict of interest between Prevent managers and 
NGOs within the local authority setting, by and large they work symbiotically to establish a 
pastoral network that aims to regulate the ‘guidance of conscience’ across the duty’s target 
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communities (Foucault, 1988a: 71).  The balances of power between them is largely dictated 
by how economically ingrained the NGO is within the Prevent landscape. For smaller NGOs, 
Prevent managers act as gatekeepers to LA agencies and community groups. They select 
NGOs on the basis they can multiply their functions, creating new avenues to collect data to 
inform their knowledge base (Foucault, 2002: 211).  
 
For larger NGOs, the relationship with Prevent managers is generally reversed. NGOs with a 
greater footprint within the Prevent landscape often communicate with the Home Office 
and other relevant governmental departments directly. Once their terms of service have 
been determined, NGOs guide the Prevent managers, whilst also using them as a 
consultative body to roll out their services within the educational setting. They mimic the 
bureaucratic mechanisms of the State to aid their own practices’ assimilation into the 
‘epistemological’ rational of the Prevent duty (Foucault, 2002: 212). Their primary aim is to 
become a core component of Prevent. To do this, they must balance their ability to adapt to 
the core functions of Prevent and their capabilities to advocate for change within the duty’s 
functions (Lemke, 2019: 186). Consequently, they, much like their Prevent manager 
counterparts, must collect copious amounts of data to justify their continued existence. 
 
The data they collect comes from various sources. The vast majority of NGOs that work 
within the praxis of the Prevent duty focus on the educational sector as a primary 
consumer, but many also work within the vulnerable communities targeted by the duty. 
NGOs also utilise the legitimising factor of education to embed themselves within this 
habitus. Effectively, pedagogic discourse allows the NGOs to employ ‘temporal discipline’ 
through ‘structural exercises’ that have symbolic value that is recognised by those whom it 
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targets (Bourdieu, 1990: 75). Once established, NGOs will problematise its stakeholder 
communities, seeking evidence for ‘new problems’ they can use to create solutions only 
they can administer (Voelkner, 2010: 142). Although the community advocates and CBOs 
interviewed by this study seemed broadly aware of this circumstance, they were left with 
little option but to engage with NGOs because they were the only forms of advocacy they 
had at their disposal.  
 
NGOs have used austerity to further inaugurate themselves within the LA setting by taking 
the place of LA services who have fallen foul of funding cuts, replicating their functions 
whilst performing in a more economically viable way. They also act as a gateway to other 
private markets bringing in transnational corporations and other interested private bodies 
to the Prevent landscape transforming the ‘level of reality’ of Prevent’s quasi markets 
through their mediation (Foucault, 2007: 95). This market rationale is primarily made 
operational through the educational field, were ‘practicable taxonomies’ or constructed 
knowledges are employed to translate its biopower into economies of scale (Bourdieu, 
1990: 267). In more broad terms, NGOs produce PSHE resources that are specifically 
designed to replicate the ‘implicit pedagogy’ of the school whilst also satisfying the 
‘circumstantial observances’ of regulatory bodies such as Ofsted (Bourdieu, 1990: 69). NGOs 
capitalise on their ‘modalities of experience’ – created by employing ex-teachers and LA 
personnel  – which they multiply by their ‘specified practices’ to incorporate themselves 
within the pedagogical arrangement of PSHE and by proxy, FBV (Foucault, 2005: 46).     
 
In conclusion, NGOs work in collaboration with government and the Prevent managers in 
the LA setting. They provide legitimation, access to new knowledges and as a gateway to 
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private economic markets. This relationship is stratified. Prevent managers act as 
gatekeepers to educational bodies and to some extent, targeted communities. However, 
larger NGOs often possess a greater footprint within the Prevent landscape than their 
Prevent manager counterparts and as a result their knowledges often surpassing them. The 
impact the NGO can exert is determined by economies of scale. Their ability to establish 
themselves within the community setting is proportional to the rescission of LA agencies 
due to austerity measures – which NGO services have been chiefly designed to replace.  
 
NGOs engineer social problems through careful data collection by informants on the 
ground. The harvesting of testimony by ‘vulnerable’ individuals – whether they espouse far-
right beliefs or the tenets of radical Islamism – is the sole rationale for their continued 
employment by the Home Office. In brief, NGOs capitalise on the distances between the 
State and the community setting. They purport to have superior access to targeted 
communities which allows them to act as an agent of legitimisation, a bridge between the 
State and its political enclaves. The community itself is forced to interact with these bodies 
in some capacity if it wishes for its needs to be heard, no matter how diluted they end up 
being in reality. In terms of educational bodies, NGOs provide tailor made PSHE resources 
and workshop sessions. They produce resources that directly correlate with the Prevent 
duty and Ofsted criteria for FBV, replicating, in turn, the pedagogical expertise that the 
schools currently lack, again due to cuts in provision. During this process, NGOs collect data 
that they use to lobby governmental departments such as the Home Office and DfE that 
allows them to shape the evolution of the pedagogy of FBV.  
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9.2. Contribution to knowledge and limitations  
 
The conclusions made by this study must be viewed with a caveat. They have been made 
based on a qualitative investigation in 4 LAs that have tier threat level status, consulting the 
various actors that populate Prevent’s discursive field to provide clarity on the precise 
mechanics of the statutory duty in its real-world setting.  However, it does not purport that 
its findings can be used to generalise the experience of those affected by Prevent across the 
UK in its entirety. Indeed, most LAs in the UK do not have tier level status but still do have a 
statutory responsibility to adhere to Prevent. The reason this study has only examined 
targeted areas is twofold. Firstly, it has allowed me to test the applicability of the metrics of 
vulnerability applied by the Home Office, a critical observation lacking within the existing 
literature to date. Secondly, only tier level status LAs provide a view of the entirety of the 
Prevent statutory duty’s bureaucratic mechanisms. Without this oversight it would be 
impossible to examine the totality of the duty’s processes, a core aim of this study. 
Subsequently, the reader must apply the principles of relatability rather than 
generalisability when viewing the findings of this study.   
 
In terms of the metrics of vulnerability, Prevent purports that it engages with both Islamic 
forms of extremism and far-right extremism in equal measure. Although there is some 
evidence to suggest Prevent managers are making a concerted effort to tackle the far-right 
space – particularly in education – there seems to be little evidence that this focus extends 
to the community setting. The reasons for this are self-evident. Muslim communities are 
visible, tangible entities that exist in the physical world, whereas the far-right community is 
much more diffuse, existing by in large on internet forums and social media groups. 
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Prevent’s inability to apply its metrical evaluation of vulnerability across its target 
demographics has also translated to the way this study has applied its own sample frame. In 
terms of targeted communities – putting aside the obvious ethical concerns of engaging 
with self-identified far-right groups – this study has focused on the responses from the 
Muslim community because they are the only accessible community members who have a 
working knowledge of the duty on the ground.      
 
To meet this study’s aim, I have applied the Foucauldian concept of governmentality to 
examine Prevent’s bureaucratic mechanisms. Each research question has been designed and 
implemented to map the production and mobilisation of Prevent and its CVE narrative 
across the localised context, using Foucault’s genealogy of discourse to explain emergent 
dynamics. One of the key observations made during this study is the focus on education as 
the primary vector of the statutory duty’s delivery. This is not a particularly novel 
observation, with several examples to be found within the existing literature that similarly 
highlight the relationship of education to Prevent as paramount (Sian, 2015: 197; Ramsay, 
2017: 155; Awan et.al., 2019: 41).  Where this study has added to this discourse is its use of 
a synergy of theory to dissect this relationship, coupled with its focus on the various actors 
that also populate this field. It draws attention to the seductive nature of pedagogy that 
Prevent utilises to aid its diffusion, critically examining the functional apparatus of education 
that depict it as an emancipatory force.      
 
From a theoretical standpoint, Foucault’s analysis falls short of being able to fully explain 
the educational field, instead focusing on education as a process, on ‘its development, its 
functions’ as a modus of the State, not as an agent of the biopolitical in its own right 
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(Deacon, 2006:177).  Although Bourdieu (1996: 286) may seem like an unlikely ally of 
Foucault’s in many respects, his understanding of the bureaucratic fields of State mirrors 
that of Foucault’s to some degree. Bourdieu (1996: 287-288) builds upon Foucault’s 
conception of education as an ideal vector of State control by introducing the ‘symbolic 
value’ of education as a determining factor of biopolitical engagement. This understanding 
of the educational field can be used to delineate the motivations of actors beyond that 
offered up by Foucault’s objective stance (Masquelier, 2019: 136). This synergy of theory 
has contributed to our further understanding of the Prevent duty and how it diffuses itself 
amongst its targeted populations. This study has used this theoretical perspective to fill the 
gap within the pre-existing literature that fails to explore the dispersion of Prevent in terms 
of how the model of surveillance is outsourced and delegated across both LA agencies, the 
community setting and third-party organisations. Furthermore, it has applied meaning and 
understanding to the variated responses of agencies and actors that share a legal obligation 
and those that choose to opt into the statutory duty that have been collected by this study, 
information lacking within the current academic discourse surrounding Prevent.  
 
The empirical findings of this study are important to the academic discourse surrounding 
Prevent and CVE in general. Although there are a multitude of academics engaging critically 
with the Prevent landscape, their numbers pail into insignificance compared to those who 
engage with the CVE industry without any critical oversight. I found the contribution and 
observations from the participants fascinating and informative. This study’s findings also 
provide a springboard for further critical research into Prevent’s statutory duty and its 
implementation. Recommendations on what such research should look like will be discussed 
in more detail in the following and final section of this thesis.        
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9.3. Final reflections and recommendations for further research  
 
This investigation was a life changing experience for me. Although the journey to its 
completion has been long and arduous, it has also been an enjoyable and fulfilling one. 
However, one cannot become complacent. As the study’s findings have highlighted, Prevent 
and its agents subvert any form of resistance to it, no matter how minor. For instance, in the 
initial stages of this investigation, I had to spend a year in deep discussion with the Prevent 
managers determining the conditions of their involvement with this study. Many drafts and 
re-drafts of the investigation’s design were made, with the specific terminology of each 
research objective forensically analysed by the Prevent managers before they eventually 
agreed to participate.   
Such trepidation was not exclusive to the Prevent managers. For instance, many NGOs were 
originally unwilling to participate with the study, citing various reasons – though one could 
determine that they were fearful of engaging critically with their means of employment.  As 
a result, NGOs in general required a considerable amount of communication to guarantee 
their engagement, often taking place over several months. Community advocates and CBOs 
were similarly wary of engaging with the study, though for very different reasons. The mere 
mention of Prevent can cause panic within the community setting within the duty’s target 
demographics. Capacity building took a considerable amount of time, working through 
networks of gatekeepers – attending and facilitating community events and workshops to 
open channels of communication. Any prospective researcher who wishes to conduct 
further academic discourse who also intends to engage with targeted communities must 
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understand that it is imperative to treat this setting with special sensitivity. Of all those 
interviewed in this investigation the responses of the CBOs and community advocates were 
particularly valuable and made at great potential cost to their own wellbeing, something I 
will be eternally grateful for.       
 
Of all the cohorts, educational providers were the easiest to engage with. In truth, this is 
likely due to my proximity to the educational field and its pedagogical mechanisms that 
have acted to legitimise the study in much the same way Prevent managers and NGOs use it 
to legitimise their activity within this setting. For instance, nearly all the educators 
interviewed agreed to participate from the initial contact email – something no other 
individual from the other targeted cohorts were willing to do. To be clear, I do not want to 
diminish the responses of educators to this study, they are integral to gaining an 
understanding of the Prevent duty as education is both its primary vector of delivery and 
modus of dissemination. This study could not have happened without their contributions. 
However, it should not come as too much of a surprise that much of the critical academic 
engagement pertinent to Prevent uses this perspective because of the pedagogic proximity 
academia is afforded through its own educational foundations.     
 
With all the above reflections in mind, I have several recommendations for further research 
within the framework of this investigation, as well as some recommendations to make in 
general for the application of Prevent and those who enable it through its own industrialised 
research community.   
 
338 
 
In the first instance, during this investigation there were several aspects of the diffusion of 
the Prevent programme that became apparent. Of note was the use of formers, to be 
precise, self-identifying former extremists, to perform the function of demonstrating the 
transformative power of reformation – the journey from the ‘outsider’ to the insider (Dean, 
2010: 98). The responses of NGOs who are the primary employers of these individuals 
dictated that the work of formers is stratified. In general, most formers come from an ex far-
right background, with fewer coming from Islamist backgrounds because their services are 
effectively harder to sell to their intended audiences – schools. The reason given for this by 
respondents is that schools find the far-right narrative easier to digest than Islamist ones. 
This study has argued that this is due in part to the ‘discourse of war’, in particular the war 
on terror, which has delineated the Islamic extremist as the ultimate ‘abnormal’ from the 
ideal citizen and therefore any proximity to it is to be avoided at all costs (Foucault, 2003: 
300-301). 
  
 Although the ideological predispositions generated through the employment and 
deployment of formers is interesting enough to study in itself, there is considerable scope to 
investigate the proliferation of them within the CVE discourse that populates the Prevent 
landscape. Unfortunately, due to the nature of this investigation and its sample frame it was 
not possible to study the work of formers in specific detail. A broader understanding of how 
formers are organised and distributed across the ‘ontology’ of the Prevent statutory duty 
would be of great benefit to the critical academic discourse of the wider CVE landscape 
(Foucault, 1982: 220).   
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Secondly, this study has forced me to critically assess my own understanding of the many 
pedagogical practices that have shaped my interpretations of professionalism within the 
educational setting. For instance, I have a working background in special education – 
specifically working with young people with behavioural needs who are targeted by the 
Prevent duty. The ontological practices of one’s safeguarding responsibilities is engrained 
upon the educator. In most cases the duty of care afforded to one’s charges supplants that 
of every other facet of the educational process. It is rare for the educator to question the 
methodical approach of safeguarding mechanisms afforded to them, almost as rare as 
questioning the emancipatory value of education in general. There is a great need for 
academic research that critically appraises both dichotomies, especially when it comes to 
the life chances afforded to vulnerable communities which programmes of surveillance such 
as the Prevent statutory duty target.    
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I want to draw attention to the closed research 
ecosystem that underpins the CVE industry that drives policy such as the Prevent statutory 
duty. The use of epistemological research models to attempt to create a roadmap of 
extremism is quite frankly, absurd. If we first consider that it is impossible to create a 
consensus on what extremism is without generating a discussion that can never have a 
satisfying end, there are so few people who actually end up committing acts of terrorism on 
which to base any generalisations that could be made. It is effectively impossible for any 
researcher to claim they can create an accurate tableaux of risk we can use to assess whole 
communities of people to safeguard them from becoming extremists. In short, the data they 
would need to do so does not exist in the volume necessary to do so. Members of the 
research community that purport their outputs are capable of mapping extremist 
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behaviours to prevent their proliferation are almost certainly prevaricating about their 
findings at best, being outright dishonest at worst.   
 
Although this study has achieved its overall aims locating the Prevent statutory duty at the 
community level  – its primary actors and its modes of diffusion – it does not fall into the 
same trap that those within the CVE industry do: to claim to have a catch all description of 
the Prevent landscape and the communities it targets. What it has provided is a detailed 
analysis of the discourse of power spoken across the discursive fields of the state and its 
biopolitical enclaves within the community setting. The Prevent landscape is in a constant 
state of evolution. As such, the research community is required to be vigilant about the 
advances made by Prevent on the complex realm of the biopolitik by offering a critical 
understanding of its core CVE narrative, otherwise quis custodiet ipsos custodies?    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
341 
 
Bibliography:  
Abbas, T. (2018). Implementing ‘Prevent’ in countering violent extremism in the UK: A left-
realist critique. Critical Social Policy. DOI:10.1177/0261018318819001  
 
Abbas, T. (2020). Islamophobia as racialised biopolitics in the United Kingdom. Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 1–15. DOI: 10.1177/0191453720903468   
 
Ackerly, B., and True, J. (2008). Reflexivity in Practice: Power and Ethics in Feminist Research 
on International Relations. International Studies Review. 10. (pp. 693 – 707). DOI: 
10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00826.x. 
 
Afary, J. and Anderson, K. (2005). Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the 
Seductions of Islamism. University of Chicago Press.  
 
Agamben, G. (2005). States of Exception. Trans Atell, K. University of Chicago Press.   
 
Aiello, E., Puigvert, L., & Schubert, T. (2018). Preventing violent radicalization of youth 
through dialogic evidence-based policies. International Sociology, 33(4), 435–453. DOI: 
10.1177/0268580918775882 
 
342 
 
Allen, G. and Dempsey, N. (2017). Terrorism in Great Britain: the statistics. Briefing Paper 
Number CBP7613, 6 October 2017. House of Commons Library. Retrieved from: 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons-library 
 
Althusser, L (1970).  Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an 
Investigation) La Pensée: Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Monthly Review Press 
1971. Retrieved from: 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm  
 
Amar, P. (2013). The Security Archipelago. Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics and the 
End of Neoliberalism. Duke University Press.   
 
 
Anderson, D. (2005). Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. 
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
 
 
Anderson-Worden, E. and Smith, A. (2017) Teaching for democracy in the absence of 
transitional justice: the case of Northern Ireland, Comparative Education, 53:3, 379-395, 
DOI: 10.1080/03050068.2017.1334426 
Ansari, H. (2018). The Infidel Within. Muslims in Britain since 1800. Oxford University Press.  
 
343 
 
Aradau, C. and Blanke, T. (2010). Governing Circulation. A critique of the biopolitics of 
security. In de Larrinaga, M. and Doucet, M.G. (eds). Security and Global Governmentality: 
Globalization, Governance and the State. Taylor and Francis. 
  
 
Aradau, C. and Van Munster, R. (2008). “Taming the future: The dispositif of risk 
in the war on terror”. In L. Amoore and M. De Goede (eds.) Risk and the War 
on Terror. Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Archer, M. S. (2007). Making our Way through the World. Human Reflexivity and Social 
Mobility. Cambridge University Press.  
Archer, M. S. (2012). The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity. Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
 
Aven, T. (2014). Uncertainty in risk assessment: the representation and treatment of 
uncertainties by probabilistic and non-probabilistic methods. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley. 
 
 
Awan, I. Spiller, K. and Whiting, A. (2019). Terrorism in the Classroom: Security, Surveillance 
and a Public Duty to Act. Basingstoke: Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society. 
 
344 
 
Baron, I.Z., Havercroft, J., Kamola, I., Koomen, J., Murphy, J. and Prichard, A. (2019). Liberal 
Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 
63, Issue 1, (pp.199–212). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy060 
 
Bauman, Z. (2012). Liquid modernity. Cambridge; Malden, Mass: Polity. 
 
Bauman, Z. and May, T. (2019). Thinking Sociologically. Wiley Blackwell.  
 
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. Sage.  
 
Begg, M. (2007). Enemy Combatant: The Terrifying True Story of a Briton in Guantánamo: 
The Terrifying True Story of a Briton in Guantanamo. Simon & Schuster UK.  
 
 
Begg, M. (2004). Letter to US Forces Administration 12 July 2004. Retrieved from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/01_10_04.pdf  
 
 
Behr, I.V., Reding, A., Edwards, C. and Gribbon, L. (2015). Radicalisation in 
the digital era. The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism. Rand 
Corporation. Retrieved from: 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR4
53.pdf 
 
345 
 
 
Bennett, H. (2012). Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the 
Kenya Emergency. Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
Blacker, J. (2007). The Demography of Mau Mau: Fertility and Mortality in Kenya in the 
1950s: a Demographer's Viewpoint. African Affairs 2007 106(423): 205–227. DOI: 
doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adm014  
 
Blair, T. (2010).  A Journey. London: Hutchinson.  
 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste. Routledge.   
 
Bourdieu, P. (1988) Homo Academicus. Stanford University Press.  
 
Bourdieu, P. (2014). On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992. Translated 
by Fernbach, D. Polity.  
 
Bourdieu, P. (2013).  Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge University Press.  
 
346 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1994). ‘Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field.’ 
Translated by Wacquant, L.J.D. and Farage, S. Sociological Theory, Vol 12, issue 1. DOI: 
10.2307/202032 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1971). The Thinkable and Unthinkable. Times literary supplement, 15th Oct, pp. 
1255-6.   
 
Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J.C. (1990). Reproduction in education, society and culture. 
London, Sage.  
 
Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice. Polity Press.   
 
Bourdieu, P. (1993). The field of cultural production: Essays on art and literature. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1996). The state nobility: elite schools in the field of power. Polity press.  
 
Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J.C. (1979) The Inheritors: French Students and Their Relation to 
Culture. University of Chicago Press.  
  
347 
 
Braun, L.F. (2014). Colonial Survey and Native Landscapes in Rural South Africa, 1850 - 1913: 
The Politics of Divided Space in the Cape and Transvaal. Brill.  
 
Brewer, J.D. (2010) Peace Processes: A Sociological Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Bröckling, U. (2010). Human Economy, Human Capital: A Critique of Biopolitical Economy. in 
Bröckling, U., Krasmann, S. and Lemke, T. (eds). In Governmentality: Current Issues and 
Future Challenges. Routledge.  
 
Bryan, H. (2017). Developing the political citizen: How teachers are navigating the statutory 
demands of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 205 and the Prevent Duty. Education, 
Citizenship and Social Justice, 12(3), 213–226. DOI: 10.1177/1746197917717841 
 
Bryne, B. (2004). Qualitative Interviewing in Searle, C. (eds). Researching Society and 
Culture, 2nd Edition. Sage.  
 
Bruce-Lockhart, K. (2017). Reconsidering Women’s Roles in the Mau Mau Rebellion in 
Kenya, 1952–60. In Thomas, M. and Curless, G. (eds). Decolonization and Conflict: Colonial 
Comparisons and Legacies. Bloomsbury Publishing.   
 
Butler, M. (2017). The Northern Ireland Prison Reform Programme: Progress Made and 
Challenges Remaining. Queens University, Belfast. Retrieved from: 
348 
 
https://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/files/122986874/KESS_Policy_Briefing_NI_Penal_Reform_Pro
gramme.pdf 
 
Campbell, C, and Connolly, I. (2003). A model for the ‘war against terrorism’? Military 
intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew. Journal of Law and Society 
30:341–75. DOI:10.1111/1467-6478.00261 
 
CAGE (2018). CAGE Website. Retrieved from: https://cage.ngo/home/   
 
CAGE (2016). The Science of Pre-Crime: The Secret Radicalisation Study Underpinning 
PREVENT. CAGE. Retrieved from: http://cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CAGE-
Science-Pre-Crime-Report.pdf 
 
Chatterjee, P. (1993) The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories. Princeton University Press. 
Chomsky, N. (2007). Interventions. London: Hamish Hamilton. 
 
Choudhury, T. and Fenwick, H. (2011) The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim 
communities, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 25:3, 151-181, DOI: 
10.1080/13600869.2011.617491 
 
349 
 
Christmann, K. (2012). Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A 
Systematic Review of the Research Evidence. Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. pp. 
1-76. Retrieved from: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf 
 
Cochrane, M. (2013). Security Force Collusion in Northern Ireland 1969–1999: Substance or 
Symbolism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36:77–97. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.739080 
 
Cohen, S. (2002). Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. 3rd 
edition. Routledge.   
 
Coolsaet, R. (2011). Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and 
American Experiences. Farnham, Surrey: Routledge. 
 
Crenshaw, M. (2011). Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences. Routledge. 
 
Crouch, M and McKenzie, H. (2006). The logic of small samples in interview-based 
qualitative research. Social Science Information. Vol 45 (4). (pp. 483-499).                                      
DOI: 10.1177/0539018406069584  
 
350 
 
Deacon, R. (2006).  Michel Foucault on education: a preliminary theoretical overview. South 
African Journal of Education. Vol 26(2)177–187. Retrieved from: 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1150418.pdf 
 
Dean, C. & Lloyd, M. (2015). The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in 
Extremist Offenders. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management. (pp. 40-52). DOI:  
doi.org/10.1037/tam0000035 
 
Dean, M. (2007). Governing Societies. Issues in Society. Open University Press.  
 
Dean, M. (2010). Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. Sage Publications. 
 
Dean, M. (2013). The Signature of Power. Sovereignty, Governmentality and Biopolitics. Sage 
Publications.   
 
Dearlove, R. (2010).  ‘National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions’ In The 
Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, ed. Loch K. Johnson. Oxford University 
Press.  
 
351 
 
Deloitte (2016). Police and Crime Commissioners: Lessons for the second generation. 
Retrieved from:  https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/public-sector/articles/police-
crime-commissioners.html 
 
Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscripts on the Societies of Control. October Vol. 59 (Winter, 1992), 
pp. 3-7. The MIT Press. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/778828?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 
 
Department for Education (2014). Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in 
schools Departmental advice for maintained schools. HM Government. Retrieved from: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/380595/SMSC_Guidance_Maintained_Schools.pdf 
 
Devji, F. (2012). Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality Modernity. Hurst & Company.  
 
Dillon, M. (2007). Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance. 
Political Geography 26, no.1. 41-47. DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.08.003  
 
Dixon, P. (2012). Was the IRA Defeated? Neo-Conservative Propaganda as History. The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 303–320. 
DOI:10.1080/03086534.2012.697618 
352 
 
 
Dnes, A, and Brownlow, G. (2017). The formation of terrorist groups: an analysis of Irish 
republican organizations. Journal of Institutional Economics, 13: 3, 699–723. 
DOI:10.1017/S1744137416000461    
 
Dreyfus. H., and Rabinow. P. (1983) Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and 
hermeneutics. With an afterword by Michel Foucault. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Edmondson, J. (2002). Asking different questions: Critical analysis and reading research. 
Reading Research Quarterly. 37 (1). Pp 113-119. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/748324 
 
English, R. (2005). Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. Oxford University Press. 
 
Elkins, C. (2005). Imperial Reckoning. The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya. Owl 
Books.  
 
Elliot (2007). The Long Road to Peace in Northern Ireland: Peace Lectures from the Institute 
of Irish Studies at Liverpool University. University of Liverpool Institute of Irish Studies, 
Liverpool University Press. 
 
353 
 
Elton-Chalchaft, S., Lander, V., Revell, L., Warner,D. and Whitworth, L. (2017). To promote, 
or not to promote fundamental British values? Teachers’ standards, diversity and teacher 
education. British Educational Research Journal. Volume 43, Issue 1. pp. 29-48. DOI: 
doi.org/10.1002/berj.3253   
 
Etikan, I., Abubakar, S., Rukayya, M. and Alkassim, S. (2016) Comparison of Convenience 
Sampling and Purposive Sampling. American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics. 
Vol. 5, No. 1, 2016, pp. 1-4. doi: 10.11648/j.ajtas.20160501.11 
 
European Council, (2005). The European Union Counter-Terrorism strategy. Council of the 
European Union.  Retrieved from:  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204  
 
Fairclough, N. (2005). Critical discourse analysis in transdisciplinary research. In R. Wodak 
and P. Chilton (Eds.), A new agenda in (critical) discourse analysis (pp. 53-70). Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins. 
 
Farrell, F. and Lander, V. (2019). “We’re not British values teachers, are we?”: Muslim 
teachers’ subjectivity and the governmentality of unease. Educational Review, 71:4, 
466-482, DOI: 10.1080/00131911.2018.1438369 
 
354 
 
Febvre, L. (1973). A new kind of history: from the writings of Febvre. Burke, P. (eds). 
Routledge.  
 
Ferrare. J.J. and Apple, M.A. (2015) Field theory and educational practice: Bourdieu and the 
pedagogic qualities of local field positions in educational contexts, Cambridge Journal of 
Education, 45:1, 43-59, DOI: 10.1080/0305764X.2014.988682 
 
Ferguson, J. and Gupta, A. (2005). ‘Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal 
Governmentality.’ in Xavier Inda (eds) Anthropologies of Modernity Foucault, 
Governmentality, and Life Politics. Blackwell.  
 
Fine, B. (2010). Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving Badly. Pluto Press.  
 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can 
succeed again. Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
 Foucault, M. (2003) Abnormal: Lectures at the College De France 1974-1975. Verso 
publishing.  
 
355 
 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books -  Division 
of Random House, New York.  
 
Foucault, M. (2000). Governmentality, in Faubion, E.J. (eds) Essential Foucault, vol.3. New 
York: New Press.  
 
Foucault, M. (1978). I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my 
brother - : a case of parricide in the 19th century. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Foucault, M. (1988a). Politics in Reason in Kritzman, L.D. (eds) Politics, Philosophy, Culture: 
Interviews and Other writings 1977-1984. Routledge: New York.  
 
Foucault, M (2001). Power: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 3: 
Power v. 3 (Essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984). Allen Lane.  
 
Foucault, M (2014). On the Government of the Living. Lectures at the College De France 
1979-1980. (Eds. Senellart, M., Ewald, F., Fontana, A., Davidson, A. and Burchell, G) Palgrave 
Macmillan.     
 
Foucault, M. (2007). Security, Territory and Population. Paulgrave.  
356 
 
 
Foucault, M., Bertani, M., & Fontana, A. (2004a). "Society must be defended" : lectures at 
the Collège de France, 1975-76. London: Penguin. 
 
Foucault, M. (2002) The Archology of Knowledge. Routledge.  
 
Foucault, M. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the College De France. (Eds., Ewald, 
F. & Fontana, A.) Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Foucault, M. (1980a). ‘The Confession of the Flesh (1977) interview.’ In (eds Gordon, C.) 
Power/Knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings. The Harvester Press.  
 
Foucault, M. (1988b) The Ethic of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom, in Bernauer, 
J. and Rassmussen, D. (eds), The Final Foucault. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.   
 
Foucault, M. (1980b). “The eye of power”. In Gordon, C. (ed.) Power/Knowledge: Selected 
interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Translated from French by Gordon, C., Marshall, L. 
Mepham, J. and Soper, K. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
 
357 
 
Foucault, M., Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. M. (1991). The Foucault effect: studies in 
governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Foucault, M. (1979). The History of Sexuality. Vol.1. An Introduction. London: Allen Lane.  
 
Foucault, M. (1984a). The History of Sexuality Vol.3. The Care of the Self. Patheon Books: 
New York.   
 
Foucault, M. (2004b). The Government of Self and Others. Lectures at the College De France.  
Ewald, F. & Fontana, A. (eds.). Palgrave Macmillan   
 
Foucault, M. (2005) The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the College De France. 
1981-82. Gros, F. (eds). Palgrave Macmillan    
 
Foucault, M. (1989). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Routledge. 
 
Foucault, M. (1981). The Order of Discourse, in Young, R. (eds) Untying the Text: A Post 
Structuralist Reader. Routledge.  
 
358 
 
Foucault, M. (1997). The Politics of Truth: A History of the Present. Lotringer, S. and 
Rajchman, J. (eds). Translated by Hochroth, L. and Porter, L. Semiotext publishing.   
 
Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and the Power, in: Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton: Harvester. 
 
Foucault, M. (1984b) Truth and Power, in Rabinow, P. (eds) The Foucault Reader. New York: 
Patheon.  
 
Foucault, M. (2014b). Wrong-Doing and Truth Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice. 
Brion, F. and Harcourt, B.E. (eds). University of Chicago Press.   
 
Frowde, H. (1909) The Imperial Gazetteer of India. Vol (1). The Indian Empire: Descriptive. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.   
 
Gabon, A. (2016). The Twin Myths of the Western ‘Jihadist Threat’ and ‘Islamic 
Radicalisation.’ Cordoba Papers Vol.4, Issue 1. The Cordoba Foundation. Retrieved from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296194880_The_Twin_Myths_of_the_Western_
Jihadist_Threat_and_Islamist_Radicalization 
 
359 
 
Gallagher, T. (2005). Balancing difference and the common good: lessons from a post‐
conflict society, Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 35:4, 429-
442, DOI: 10.1080/03057920500331330 
 
Galula, D.,and Nagl, J. A. (2006). Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice. Westport, 
CT : Praeger Security International. 
 
Giddens, A. (2003). Risk and Responsibility. Modern Law review. Volume 62, Number 1. DOI: 
doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.00188  
 
Gielen, A.J. (2017): Countering Violent Extremism: A Realist Review for Assessing What 
Works, for Whom, in What Circumstances, and How?, Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: 
10.1080/09546553.2017.1313736 
 
Gearson, J. & Rosemont, H. (2015) CONTEST as Strategy: Reassessing Britain's 
Counterterrorism Approach. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:12, 1038-1064. 
DOI:10.1080/1057610X.2015.1099991 
 
Gopel, P. (2006). Reading Subaltern History. In Lazarus, N. (eds). The Cambridge Companion 
to Postcolonial Literary Studies. Cambridge University Press.   
 
360 
 
Graham, S. (2010). Cities under siege: the new military urbanism. London; New York: Verso 
 
Gramsci, A. (2012). On Hegemony: Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Gramsci. In 
Calhoun, C., Gerteis, J., Moody, J., Pfaff, S. and Virk, I. (eds) Contemporary Sociological 
Theory. 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell.  
 
Grenfell, M. and James, D. (1998). Bourdieu and Education: Acts of Practical Theory. 
Routledge.  
 
Guhu, R. (1988). Selected Subaltern Studies. Oxford University Press.   
 
GTI (2019). Global Terrorism Index, 2019. Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. 7th Edition. 
Institute for Economics and Peace. Retrieved from: 
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf 
 
Hallaq, W. (2014). Impossible State. Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament. 
Columbia University Press.  
 
Hayak, F.A. (1979). Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol.3. The Political Order of the Free People. 
London, Routledge.  
361 
 
 
Hevia, J. (2012). The Imperial Security State. British Colonial Knowledge and Empire – 
Building in Asia. Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. (2004). Participation: from tyranny to transformation?: exploring 
new approaches to participation in development. London: Zed.   
 
Hillyard, P. (1993). Suspect community: people's experience of the prevention of terrorism 
acts in Britain. Pluto Press in association with Liberty.  
 
HM Government (2016). Investigatory Powers Act 2016. TSO Blackwell. Retrieved from: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/pdfs/ukpga_20160025_en.pdf 
 
HM Government (1998). The Belfast Agreement: Northern Ireland Political Stability. 
Northern Ireland Office. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/a
greement.pdf  
 
Home Office. (2014). Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools 
Departmental advice for maintained schools. HM Government. Retrieved from: 
362 
 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/380595/SMSC_Guidance_Maintained_Schools.pdf 
 
Home Office. (2015b). The Prevent duty. Departmental advice for schools and childcare 
providers. HM Government. Retrieved from:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf  
 
Home Office (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. HM 
Government. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-
terrorism-strategy-contest  
 
Home Office (2017b). HM Government Transparency Report 2017: Disruptive and 
Investigatory Powers. HM Government.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/593668/5
8597_Cm_9420_Transparency_report_web.pdf   
 
Home Office. (2015a). Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales. HM 
Government. Retrieved from: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2-
Interactive.pdf 
363 
 
 
Hope, A. (2015). Governmentality and the 'selling' of school surveillance 
devices. Sociological Review Monograph, 63(4), 840-857. DOI:10.1111/1467-954X.12279 
 
Hoyt, T. (2012) Like a Phoenix from the Ashes’: The IRA as a Multi- Generational Movement 
and Its Relevance for the War on Terror. At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Vol. 80, 
p193-221. Retrieved from: 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=9ee267b0-87df-4a77-
9312-62fc1ec9b659%40sessionmgr120  
 
Hunter, W.W. (1876). The Indian Muslamans. London: Trubner and Company. 
 
Ingram, M. (2004). Stakeknife: Britain’s Secret Agents in Ireland. O’Brien Publishing.  
 
Jabbar, N. and Ali, U. (2019) Education as self-government: the Minhaj Education Society’s 
answer to managing violence in Pakistan, Postcolonial Studies, 22:4, 523-544,DOI: 
10.1080/13688790.2019.1697414 
 
Jenkins, R. (1992). Pierre Bourdieu: Key Sociologists. Routledge.  
 
364 
 
Johnson, A. (2014). Foucault: Critical Theory of the Police in a Neoliberal Age. Theoria. Vol. 
61. Issue 141. pp 5-29.  DOI: 10.3167/th.2014.6114102 
 
Johnson, L. (2010). The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Johnston, B. (2018). Discourse Analysis: Third Edition. Blackwell Publishing.  
 
Keddie, A. (2014). The Politics of British-Ness: Multiculturalism, Schooling and Social 
Cohesion. British Education Research Journal 40 (3): 539–554. 
DOI:  https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3101 
 
Kiersey, N.J. (2010). Neoliberal political economy and the Iraq war: A contribution to the 
debate about global biopolitics. in de Larrinaga, M. and Doucet M.G. (eds). Security and 
Global Governmentality: Globalization, Governance and the State. Routledge.  
 
Kofner, A. and Acosta, J. (2017) RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent 
Extremism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. Retrieved from: 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL243.html. 
 
365 
 
Kolstoe, S. (2017). University of Portsmouth Ethics Policy. University of Portsmouth. 
Retrieved from: http://policies.docstore.port.ac.uk/policy-028.pdf 
 
Koomen, W., & Pligt, J. D. (2016). The Psychology of Radicalization and Terrorism. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Kranser, S. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
variables. International Organisations. Vol: 36. No.2. pp. 185-205. Retrieved from: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520   
 
Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago University Press.   
 
Kundnani, A. (2014). The Muslims are coming. Verso Publishing. 
 
Lafree, G, Dugan, L, and Korte, R. (2009). The Impact of British Counterterrorism Strategies 
on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models. 
Criminology Volume 47, Number 1.  DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.2009.00138.x  
 
Latham, M. (2000) Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘‘Nation-
Building’’ in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
366 
 
 
Leahy, T. (2015). The Influence of Informers and Agents on Provisional Irish Republican Army 
Military Strategy and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy, 1976–94. Twentieth Century 
British History, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2015, pp. 122–146. DOI:10.1093/tcbh/hwu026 
 
Lefebvre, H. (2003). The Urban Revolution. Translated by Bononno, R. University of 
Minnesota Press.  
 
Lemke, T. (2013). Foucault, Governmentality, and critique. Routledge.  
 
Lemke, T. (2019). Foucault’s Analysis of Modern Governmentality. Verso.  
 
Lewis, P. and Hamid, S. (2018). British Muslims: New Directions in Islamic Thought, Creativity 
and Activism. Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Loyal, S. (2017). Bourdieu's theory of the state: a critical introduction. Paulgrave Macmillan. 
 
Luengo-Gutiérrez, P. and Smith G.A. (2016). From Colonies to Countries in the North 
Caribbean: Military Engineers in the Development of Cities and Territories. Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing.  
367 
 
  
MacDonald, M. and Hunter, D. (2019). The Discourse of Security. Language, Illiberalism and 
Governmentality. Paulgrave Macmillan.  
 
Machin, D. and Mayr, A. (2012). How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis. Sage.   
 
 
Masquelier, C. (2019) Bourdieu, Foucault and the politics of precarity, Distinktion: Journal of 
Social Theory, 20:2, 135-155, DOI: 10.1080/1600910X.2018.1549999 
 
May, T. (2015). Home Office: Counter-Extremism Strategy. HM Govt. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy  
 
May, T. (2011). Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process. Fourth Edition. Open 
University Press.   
 
Massoumi, N., Mills, T., and Miller, D. (2019): Secrecy, coercion and deception in research 
on ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’, Contemporary Social Science, DOI: 
10.1080/21582041.2019.1616107 
 
368 
 
McCauley, C. and Moskalenko, S. (2014). Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What 
Moves an Individual from Radical Opinion to Radical Action. Terrorism and Political Violence, 
26:1, (pp.69-85). DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.849916 
 
McEvoy, K. (2007) Beyond legalism: towards a thicker understanding of transitional 
justice, Journal of Law and Society, 34(4), 411–40. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2007.00399.x  
 
McCully, A. and Clarke, L. (2016). A place for fundamental (British) values 
in teacher education in Northern Ireland?, Journal of Education for Teaching, 42:3, 354-368. 
DOI:10.1080/02607476.2016.1184465 
 
McMahon, J. (2015). Behavioural economics as neoliberalism: Producing and 
Governing Homo Economicus. Contemporary Political Theory. Vol. 14, Issue 2, 137–158. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2014.14 
 
 McRobbie, A., & Thornton, S. (1995). Rethinking 'Moral Panic' for Multi-Mediated Social 
Worlds. The British Journal of Sociology,46(4), 559-574. DOI:10.2307/591571 
 
Mills, C. W. (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
369 
 
Mill, J.S. (1998). Considerations on Representative Government. In: On Liberty and Other 
Essays, Gray, E. (eds). Oxford University Press 
 
Mitchell, C. (2013). Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland. Ashgate Publishing. 
 
Morse, J.M. and Clark, L. (2019). The Nuances of Grounded Theory Sampling and the Pivotal 
Role of Theoretical Sampling in Bryant, A. and Charmaz, K. (eds) The SAGE Handbook of 
Developments in Grounded Theory. Sage.   
 
Nasser-Eddine, M., Garnham, B., Agostino, K. and Gilbert, C. (2011). Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) Literature Review. Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation. Australian Government. Retrieved from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235024824_Countering_Violent_Extremism_CV
E_Literature_Review 
   
Neal, A. W. (2006). Foucault in Guantánamo: Towards an Archaeology of the Exception. 
Security Dialogue, 37(1), 31–46. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606064135 
 
Nelson, D. M. (2005). Life During Wartime: Guatemala, Vitality, Conspiracy, Milieu, in 
Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics. (Xavier Inda, J. 
eds). Blackwell.  
370 
 
 
Nettl, J.P. (1968). The State as a Conceptual Variable. World Politics Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 
1968), pp. 559-592. DOI: 10.2307/2009684 
 
Neumann, P. (2008). Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: Papers from the 
First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence. London, 17–18 
January 2008. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR). Retrieved 
from: http://icsr.info/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/1234516938ICSRPerspectivesonRadicalisation.pdf  
 
Neumann, P. & Kleinmann, S. (2013) How Rigorous Is Radicalization Research?, Democracy 
and Security, 9:4, 360-382, DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2013.802984 
 
Novelli, M. (2017). Education and countering violent extremism: Western logics from south 
to north? Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 47:6, (pp.835-
851). DOI: 10.1080/03057925.2017.1341301 
 
Oakshott, M. (1989). The Voice of Liberal Learning. Yale University Press.   
 
371 
 
Ofstad,S. and Marin, A. (2019). ‘What Exactly are We a Part of Now?’ Norwegian NGOs’ 
Engagement with State Governmentality. Forum for Development Studies, 46:3, 429-450, 
DOI: 10.1080/08039410.2019.1593240 
 
ONS. (.2011) Census: Ethnic group, local authorities in the United Kingdom. Office for 
National Statistics. Retrieved from: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-
census/key-statistics-and-quick-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-the-united-kingdom---part-
1/rft-ks201uk.xls 
 
Olsen, T., Payne, L. and Reiter, A. (2010) At what cost? The political economy of transitional 
justice. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 165–84. Retrieved from: 
http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/publication/journal/dj0601/007.pdf 
 
 
Omand, D. (2005). Countering international terrorism: The use of strategy. Survival:  
Global Politics and Strategy. Volume 47, 2005 - Issue 4 DOI: 10.1080/00396330500433373 
 
O’Regan, J.P. and MacDonald, M.N. (2009). The Antinomies of Power in Critical Discourse 
Analysis. In: Lê, T., Lê, Q. and Short, M. (eds) Critical Discourse Analysis: An Interdisciplinary 
Perspective. (80-90). Nova Science Publishers.  
 
372 
 
Orwell, G (1945). Animal Farm. Penguin Modern Classics.   
 
Oskala, J. (2013). From Biopower to Governmentality. in (eds), Falzon, C., Sawicki, J. and 
O’leary, T. A Companion to Foucault. John Wiley and Sons.   
 
Pantucci, R. (2015). “We Love Death as You Love Life.” Britain’s Suburban Terrorists. Hurst & 
Company, London.  
 
Parker, D. and Lindekilde, L. (2020). Preventing Extremism with Extremists: A Double-Edged 
Sword? An Analysis of the Impact of Using Former Extremists in Danish Schools. Journal of 
Educational Sciences. 10(4), 111; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci10040111 
 
Pereira, A. J. (2019). Affective Governmentality: Neoliberal Education Advertisements in 
Singapore. Springer.  
 
 
Pew Research Centre (2011). The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Complete Report. 
Retrieved from:  http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-
population/ 
 
373 
 
Porch, D. (2013). Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War.  
Cambridge University Press 
 
Poster, M. (1990) The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context. University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
Powis, B., Randhawa-Horne, K. and Bishopp, D. (2019) The Structural Properties of the 
Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG22+): a structured formulation tool for extremist offenders. 
Ministry of Justice Analytical series. Retrieved from: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/816507/the-structural-properties-of-the-extremism-risk-guidelines-ERG22.pdf  
 
QARDAC. (2004). Response to Tribunal, Moazzam Begg. United States Department of 
Defense. Retrieved from:   http://www-tc.pbs.org/now/shows/230/moazzam-begg.pdf#22  
 
Rabasa, A. & Benard, C. (2015). EuroJihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalisation and Terrorism 
in Europe. Cambridge University Press.   
Ramsay, P. (2017). Is Prevent a safe space?  Journal of Education, Citizenship and Social 
Justice. Vol. 1, Issue 2. 143–158. DOI:10.1177/1746197917693022 
 
374 
 
Rabinow, P. (2005). Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to Biosociality, in 
Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics. (Xavier Inda, J. 
eds). Blackwell. 
 
RAND (2015) 2015 RAND Annual Report. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. 
Retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP1-2015.html 
 
RAND (2019). RAND Corporation website: Retrieved from: http://www.rand.org/about.html 
 
Rasmussen, K.S. (2011). Foucault’s Genealogy of Racism. Theory, Culture & Society, 28(5), 
34–51. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276411410448 
 
Read, J. (2009) A genealogy of homo-economicus: Neoliberalism and the production of 
subjectivity. Foucault Studies 6: 25–36. DOI: https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i0.2465  
 
Reed-Danahay, D. (2005). Locating Bourdieu. Indiana University Press.   
 
Richards, A. (2011) ‘The problem with “radicalization”: The remit of “Prevent” and the need 
to refocus on terrorism in the UK’, International Affairs, 87:1, 143–152. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
2346.2011.00964.x 
375 
 
 
Robins, C.S. and Eisen, K. (2017). Strategies for the Effective Use of NVivo in a Large-Scale 
Study: Qualitative Analysis and the Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Qualitative Inquiry 2017, 
Vol. 23(10) 768 –778.  
 
Rose, N. S. (1999) Powers of Freedom. Cambridge University Press 
 
Rose-Redwood, R. S. (2006). Governmentality, Geography, and the Geo-Coded 
World. Progress in Human Geography, 30(4), 469- 486.  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132506ph619oa 
  
Roulston, K. (2018). Qualitative interviewing and epistemics. Qualitative Research, 18(3), 
(pp.322–341). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794117721738 
 
Sageman, M. (2008). ‘A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists’. The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618 (1), (pp.223–231). DOI: 
10.1177/0002716208317051 
 
Said, E. (1979). Orientalism. Random House, New York.   
 
376 
 
Schinkle, W. (2013). Governing Through Moral Panic: The Governmental Use of Fear. In 
Krinsky, C (ed.) 2013, The Ashgate Research Companion to Moral Panics. Routledge. pp. 293-
304 
 
Schlosser, J.A. Bourdieu and Foucault: A Conceptual Integration Toward an Empirical 
Sociology of Prisons. Critical Criminology 21, (pp.31–46). 
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-012-9164-1 
 
Schmitt, C. (2005). Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Schumpeter, J. (1964) Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of 
Capitalist Process. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Seal, A. (2016). Thematic Analysis in Gilbert, N. and Stoneman, P. (eds). Researching Social 
Life, 4th Edition. Sage Publishing.  
 
Sending, O. and Neumann, I. (2006). Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, 
States, and Power. International Studies Quarterly. (2006) 50, 651–672. Retrieved from 
www.jstor.org/stable/4092797 
 
377 
 
Silke, A (2008). Research in Terrorism: A Review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War 
on Terrorism  in eds Chen, H., Silke, A., & Reid, E, Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge 
Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security. Springer US.   
 
Skoczylis, J. and Andrews, S. (2019). A conceptual critique of Prevent: Can Prevent be saved? 
No, but… Critical Social Policy 1–20 DOI: 10.1177/0261018319840145 
 
Shanahan, T. (2009). The Provisional IRA and the morality of terrorism. Edinburgh University 
Press 
 
Sheller, M. and Urry, J. (2006). The New Mobilities Paradigm. Environment and Planning A: 
Economy and Space, 38(2), 207–226. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1068/a37268 
 
Sian, K, P. (2015) Spies, surveillance and stakeouts: monitoring Muslim moves in British state 
schools, Race Ethnicity and Education, 18:2, 183-201. DOI: 10.1080/13613324.2013.830099 
 
Silverman, D. (2004). Research and Social Policy in Searle, C. (eds). Researching Society and 
Culture, 2nd Edition. Sage.  
 
378 
 
Sivanandan, T. (2006). Anticolonialism, national liberation and postcolonial nation 
formation. In Lazarus, N. (eds). The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies. 
Cambridge University Press.   
 
Spaaij. R, (2010). The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 33:9, (pp.854-870). DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2010.501426 
 
Stäheli, U. (2010). Decentering the Economy: Governmentality Studies and Beyond? in 
Bröckling, U., Krasmann, S. and Lemke, T. (eds). In Governmentality: Current Issues and 
Future Challenges. Routledge. 
 
Stamptnitzky, L. (2013a). Disciplining terror: How experts invented “terrorism” Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stampnitzky, L. (2013b). Toward a Sociology of “Security”. Sociological Forum, Vol. 28, No.3.  
(pp.621-623). DOI: 10.1111/socf.12043 
 
Staniforth, A., Walker, C. and Osborne, S. (2013). Blackstone’s counter –terrorism 
handbook/Andrew Staniforth; edited by Clive Walker and Stuart Osborne. 3rd edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
379 
 
Stenson, K. (2005). Sovereignty, biopolitics and the local government of crime in 
Britain. Theoretical Criminology, 9(3), (pp.265–287). DOI: 10.1177/1362480605054811 
 
Strenski, I. (1998). Religion, Power, and Final Foucault. Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion , Vol. 66, No. 2. (pp. 345-367). Retrieved from: 
http://www.jstor.com/stable/1465675 
 
Subhash, J. and Kedia, B. (2017). Reshaping India in the New Global Context. Northampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar Pub.  
 
Tellmann, U. (2010). The Economic Beyond Governmentality: The Limits of Conduct. in 
Bröckling, U., Krasmann, S. and Lemke, T. (eds). In Governmentality: Current Issues and 
Future Challenges. Routledge.  
 
Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S. (2015). Contentious Politics, Second Edition. Oxford University Press.  
 
The United States Army (2007). The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field 
manual: U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
380 
 
Thomas, P. (2017). Changing Experiences of Responsibilisation and Contestation Within 
Counter-Terrorism Policies: The British Prevent Experience. Policy and Politics 45 (3): 305–
321. DOI: 10.1332/030557317X14943145195580 
 
Thompson, K. (1998). Moral Panics. Routledge.  
 
Thompson, K. (2006). "The History and Meaning of the Concept". In Critcher, Chas 
(ed.). Critical Readings: Moral Panics and the Media. Open University Press. pp. 60–66.  
 
Thompson, S. G. (2012). JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING OF POLICE-GENERATED WITNESS 
TESTIMONY. Journal Of Criminal Law & Criminology, 102(2), (pp.329-395). Retrieved from: 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7425&context
=jclc   
 
Tirkkonen, S. (2015). Power, Religion, and Simulacrum— Foucault on the Cult of 
Dionysus. Stasis, Vol 3 No 2, Political Theology. (pp.302–321).  Retrieved from 
http://www.stasisjournal.net/index.php/journal/article/view/45 
 
Tocqueville, A.D. (2004 [1840]). Democracy in America. New York: Library of America.  
 
381 
 
Todd, H., Matthews, M., Ramchand, R., Beaghley, S., Stebbins, D., Kadlec, A., Brown, M.A., 
Tomlinson, M. (2012). From Counter-terrorism to Criminal Justice: Transformation or 
Business as Usual? The Howard Journal Vol 51 No 5. December 2012 pp. 442–457.             
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2311.2012.00735.x 
 
Toplišek, A. (2019). Liberal Democracy in Crisis: Rethinking Resistance under Neoliberal 
Governmentality. Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Turner, S. (2001). What is the Problem with Experts? Social Studies of Science, 31(1), 
(pp.123–149). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/030631201031001007 
 
Vatter, M. (2014). Foucault and Hayek: Republican Law and Liberal Civil Society, in The 
Government of Life: Foucault, Biopolitics, and Neoliberalism. Lemme, V. and Vatter, M. (eds). 
Fordham University Press.    
 
Vincent, C. (2019) Cohesion, citizenship and coherence: schools’ responses to the British 
values policy, British Journal of Sociology of Education, 40:1, 17, 32. 
DOI: 10.1080/01425692.2018.1496011 
 
Viswanathan, G. (2015). Masks of Conquest. Literary Study and British Rule in India. Oxford 
University Press.  
382 
 
 
Voelkner, N. (2010). Governmentalizing the state: The disciplining logic of human security. In 
de Larrinaga, M. and Doucet, M.G. (eds). Security and Global Governmentality: 
Globalization, Governance and the State. Taylor and Francis.  
 
Wakefield, A. (2005). The Public Surveillance Functions of Private Security. Surveillance & 
Society ‘People Watching People’ (ed. Wood) 2(4): 529-545. Retrieved from: 
https://panoptykon.org/sites/default/files/3362-5673-1-pb.pdf   
 
Walgrave, S. & Rucht, D. (2010). The World Says No to War: Demonstrations against the War 
on Iraq. Social Movements, Protest, and Contention. 33. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. Retrieved from: 
http://uahost.uantwerpen.be/m2p/publications/1267098151.pdf#page=13  
 
Walklate, S. & Mythen, G. (2015). Contradictions of Terrorism. Security, Risk and Resilience: 
New Directions in Critical Criminology. Routledge.   
 
Weber, E. (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914. 
Stanford University Press.  
 
383 
 
Willinsky, J. (1998). Learning to Divide the World. Education at Empires End. University of 
Minnesota Press.   
 
Woodside – Jiron, H. (2011). Using CDA to Make Sense of Public Policy. In Rogers, R. (eds). 
Critical Discourse Analysis in Education. Routledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
384 
 
Appendices.  
Appendix 1: Data collection 
 
The data collected during the investigation is closed access. Data management and future 
use of data will be managed by the author of this thesis and subject to the University of 
Portsmouth’s policy on long-term retention of data. participants have been invited to 
participate within the study by direct contact from the researcher, either by email, phone 
call and meetings in person. Audio files and Interview transcripts have been collated and 
thematically analysed. Participants have had access to the data that they have provided 
throughout the process of the study.   
 
Access, ethics, and informed consent. 
 
The project has strictly adhered to the University of Portsmouth’s ethics policy. Due care 
and diligence have been undertaken to ensure that all research conducted regarding 
participants is based upon the principles of informed consent and that all efforts have been 
made to respect the confidentiality and to mitigate harm that participants may face. The 
broader social context and possible implications have also been considered at all times and 
any possible benefits that may arise as a consequence of this research have been maximised 
and disseminated accordingly (Kolstoe, 2017: 5-6). 
 
Participation in this study has been entirely voluntary. Participants are informed, both 
verbally and in writing that they are under no obligation take part and may exit the process 
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at any given time. Participants have been supplied in advance with information detailing the 
nature of the investigation and the aims of the enquiry. They have also been given 
guarantees of anonymity and that any information they provide has been held under the 
strictest confidence subject to the proviso that the researcher is under an overriding legal 
obligation to disclose certain types of information which has been communicated to all 
active participants in advance. All data under analysis has been subject to the return of a 
signed consent form. A statement listing the main purpose of the study, along with details 
specifying the anonymity process and their ability to exit the research process at any time if 
they do choose to participate has been provided to potential participants during the 
recruitment stage and throughout the research process. Any ethical issues arising from the 
process of interviews (particularly concerning the personal safety of participants and/or the 
researcher) have been addressed by following the measures set out by the professional 
guidelines for sociologists (http://www.britsoc.co.uk/the-bsa/equality/statement-of-ethical-
practice.aspx#_rel)  
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Appendix 2: Example Interview questions 
These interview questions should be viewed with a caveat.  As the interviews were semi-
structured, they often followed narratives that transcended the basic question structure 
found below. In many cases, prompts were not necessary as the participants were 
encouraged to set the tone of the interview, however they were guided by the interviewer 
to keep the content of our discussion on track.      
A) Example Interview Schedule for a Prevent Manager:  
 
1. What are your main responsibilities?  
Prompts 
- On a daily basis, weekly, monthly, Annually 
- Are you monitored for progress? If so, how often and based on what criteria?  
- Has your role evolved over the period you have been employed? By how much? If so, 
what do you believe has driven this change?  
 
2. As part of your responsibility within your role, do you carry out any research on things such 
as best practice? 
Prompts:  
-   If so, how often?  
- What is the nature of the research task? Does it vary or are they sequential?  
- Is your research monitored? Do you pass on the data to other bodies, if so to whom?  
- Do you design this research or is the research design passed onto you to collect the 
data?  
 
3. Is your work influenced by outside agencies? Do you receive advice on best practice, 
research articles pertinent to your role etc.?  
Prompts: 
- If so, how often? 
- Can you give me examples of who provides such information?  
- How much do you believe this affects your practice? 
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4. How much of your role involves working with stakeholders directly and how much of it is in 
an advisory role to other local authority agencies who have a safeguarding responsibility?  
Prompts:  
- Do you provide advice to agencies regularly?  
- Do you provide support to private organisations?  
- What is the general response from stakeholders? 
- What is the general response of outside/ local authority agencies?  
 
5. What are your thoughts on the radicalisation process? Is it possible to successfully de-
radicalise an individual?   
               Prompts:  
- How difficult is it to spot a radicalised individual? What would be your response protocol 
if this comes to pass?  
- Where do you think the research that created your understanding of the radicalisation 
process comes from?  
 
6. How effective do you think the Prevent programme you deliver is? 
Prompts:  
- Strengths: what do you think your major success have been 
- Weaknesses: areas for improvement i.e. where are you focusing your energy at this 
moment in time? 
 
B)  Example Interview schedule for educational practitioner:  
 
1. Can you give me a brief breakdown of your responsibilities as a safeguarding lead and how 
Prevent fits into this role? 
Prompts:  
- How important is Prevent to this role?  
- How does it affect your workstreams on: 
- A daily basis? 
- Overall practice? 
 
2. What is your understanding of the PREVENT Statutory duty?  
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             Prompts:  
- (if applicable) Have you had any Prevent training?  
-  Do you deliver Prevent training to other members of staff? 
 
3.  A key proponent of PREVENT is to stop individuals being drawn into violent extremism. With 
this in mind, what is your understanding of: 
Prompts:  
- Radicalisation 
- De-radicalisation 
 
 
4. How aware are your stakeholders/the communities that you serve of your obligation to the 
PREVENT statutory duty?  
Prompts:  
- Do you mention it in your practice? How often?   
 
5. Keeping the previous question in mind, do you think there is an impact on the communities 
that you serve due to PREVENT? 
Prompts:  
- Positives  
- Negatives  
 
6. What is your understanding of the research that promotes the de-radicalisation method of 
countering violent extremism?  
Prompts: 
- Do you think it is possible to de-radicalise a violent extremist? 
- How does your current setup prepare you to identify a potential victim of the 
radicalisation process and how confident do you feel in dealing with such an 
eventuality? 
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C) Example interview schedule for Prevent related NGO worker 
 
1. Can you please give me a breakdown of the work of your organisation and how you fit into 
that? 
Prompts: 
- What are your main responsibilities?  
- What (if any) are the barriers to engagement with stakeholders/ local authority 
workers? 
 
 
2. What is your understanding of Prevent and its statutory duty?  
Prompts: 
- Have you been given/offered Prevent training? Would you take up the offer? 
- How much of your work focuses on Prevent?  
 
 
3. A key proponent of PREVENT is to stop individuals being drawn into violent extremism. With 
this in mind, what is your understanding of: 
Prompts:  
- Radicalisation 
- De-radicalisation 
 
4. Keeping the previous question in mind, do you think there is an impact on the communities 
that you serve due to PREVENT? 
Prompts:  
- Positives  
- Negatives  
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5. What is your understanding of the research that promotes the de-radicalisation method of 
countering violent extremism?  
Prompts: 
- Do you think it is possible to de-radicalise a violent extremist? 
- How do you envision the development of Prevent? Where is your organisations place 
in this?   
 
 
D) Example interview schedule for Community advocate. 
 
1. Can you please tell me a little bit about yourself; 
 
- Do you consider yourself a member of a community/s?  
- What role (if any) do you occupy within your community?  
 
 
2. what do you consider to be the key challenges facing the community/s you belong to?  
 
- At the individual level 
- At the group level  
- How do these challenges relate to wider society; what impact does wider society 
have on you and those around you?  
 
 
3. What is your understanding of Prevent? 
- Does it affect you at all?  
 
 
4.  A key component of Prevent is to stop individuals being drawn into violent extremism. It is based 
on the principles of radicalisation theory, where the idea is that vulnerable individuals are 
‘radicalised’ by extremists.  
 
- In light of the above, how relevant do you think Prevent is to your community?  
- Have you ever been targeted by mechanism’s of Prevent? i.e. have you as an 
individual or as part of a group been party to a counter-extremism event/activity? If 
so, how often has this happened?  
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5. What are relationships like between local authority agencies and your community?  
 
- Are they active within your community? 
- If so, how are they received? Are they trusted?  
- Do they make an impact? Positive or negative aspects?  
 
 
6.  In your opinion, what changes could be made to better serve your community and those that a 
vulnerable within it?  
- At the local authority level i.e. local services 
- Within the community itself 
- From wider society 
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Appendix 5: UPR16 form: Research Ethics Review Checklist 
 
